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Between the Pen and the Sword: Student-soldiers and the image of ideal youth in Indonesia

Jonathan Peter Tehusijarana

ORCID Id: 0000-0002-7801-2170

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Abstract

This thesis examines the *tentara pelajar* (Student Armies) of Indonesia that fought in the country's war of independence (1945-1949), and whose veterans influenced a newly independent Indonesia afterwards. Using a variety of historical resources, such as archival documents, news publications, memoirs, and regimental histories, this thesis argues that the *tentara pelajar* were influential in informing discourses of *pemuda* (youth), still a significant political category in Indonesia, throughout the war and beyond, into the post-war socio-political landscape of Liberal and Guided Democracy (1949-1965) and the militarist New Order regime (1965-1998)

It does so by analysing the identity-making processes they undertook to situate themselves in and distinguish themselves from other members of Indonesia's *pemuda* during the war and how this affected their standing afterwards. This thesis first investigates the beginning of these processes from the *tentara pelajar*'s origins in the militarised practices of scouting that emerged from Indonesian youth's interactions with early twentieth-century transnational youth culture and proliferated during the late colonial period of the Netherlands East Indies. This tradition of militarism was formalised during the Japanese occupation and culminated with the formation of the *tentara pelajar* as a *laskar* (militia) and their participation in the independence war. This thesis argues that wartime experiences influenced the *tentara pelajar* to construct a student soldier identity based on the values of discipline, professionalism, and notional "apoliticism," which were values they perceived to be possessed by the regular army.

It continues with an examination of post-war circumstances where *tentara pelajar* veterans were able to rise to important positions within Indonesia's military and government, from which they were able to exercise their agency and influence on the construction of an image of ideal *pemuda.* Retaining their status as the *pemuda* of the independence war, during the New Order *tentara pelajar* veterans constructed the ideal *pemuda* image via writing and disseminating memoirs, short stories and histories focused on their experiences that were aimed at youth, all with the support of the regime. The image they constructed was used by the regime to promote the key role of

youth is national development, rendering youth as cogs in its developmentalist project. The thesis concludes by examining the agency of youth in interacting with the legacy of the *tentara pelajar*, and how that legacy continues today.

Declaration

I certify that

i. this thesis comprises only my original work towards the Doctor of Philosophy except where indicated in the preface;

ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used; and

iii. this thesis is fewer than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of front matter, image captions, bibliographies and appendices (99,815 words).

…….

Jonathan Peter Tehusijarana

[25 April 2023]

Preface

Key ideas and content from this thesis have been presented at academic conferences and seminars, including:

- Tehusijarana, Jonathan (2022). "'I will continue the struggle to the end of time': Monuments and the memorialisation of the Student Army of the Republic of Indonesia." Indonesia Postgraduate Network Symposium, the University of Melbourne, 30 November 2022.
- Tehusijarana, Jonathan (2022). "From a 'physical struggle' to a 'development struggle': Indonesian student-veterans and the image of ideal youth under the New Order." Asian Studies Association of Australia Conference 2022, Monash University, 7 July 2022.
- Tehusijarana, Jonathan (2021). "*Pandu* to *Pemuda*: Transnational youth culture and its influence on *pemuda*-ism in colonial Indonesia." Australian Historical Association Conference 2021 (online), 2 December 2021.
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I would never have lasted till the end of the PhD without my friends and colleagues in SHAPS and the wider Indonesian research community at the University of Melbourne. The journey began in 2019 with Bronwyn Anne Beech Jones, Luke Yin, and Stephen Jakubowicz, all of whose camaraderie and solidarity helped carry me through difficult times. Stephen in particular was always there for a coffee, which was welcome in times of frustration and writer's block. Bron, Dana Fahadi, Paula Hendrikx, Ravando Lie, and I were all Kate's *santri* and supported each other both academically and, more importantly, with jokes, often awful but always earning a laugh. Paula reminded me of that big world that exists outside of academia, for which I am grateful. Bron read several draft chapters and provided invaluable input, and Ravando introduced me to the weird and wonderful world that is the marketplace for second-hand Indonesian military books on Facebook, where I first began assembling my motley collection of *tentara pelajar*-related works. I will miss our coffee/discussion/gossip sessions at Carte, which we collectively agreed should have received 10% of our scholarships in advance.

Catherine Gay and Joe Parro were inspirational student representatives and made being part of the History Postgraduate Association Committee a breeze with their hard

work and commitment to maintaining postgrad life even during the height of the COVID-19 lockdowns. Being on the Melbourne Historical Journal Collective with so many extraordinary colleagues exposed me, albeit mildly, to the world of academic publishing and its pitfalls. Working on the Indonesia Forum and Indonesia Postgraduate Network with Bron and introduced me to many postgrads and academics studying Indonesia who amazed me with their brilliant research and grounded me with their always relevant advice and life lessons, including but not limited to Rachael Diprose, Dave Mcrae, Ariane Utomo, and Annisa Beta. My greatest thanks go to friends in the *Klenik* WhatsApp group, including but not limited to Annisa Sabrina Hartoto, Ary Hermawan, Citra Lestari, Dian Fatmawati, Michael Raditya, Longgina Novadona Bayo, Pipin Jamson, Erika Suwarno, and Widyana Perdhani, who provided an unending source of support and laughs.

If I mentioned the names of all my fellow travellers and friends here, it would probably be longer than this thesis. You know who you are. Know that I am thankful for your presence in my postgraduate life and that it would not have happened without you. The saying goes that the PhD is isolating. Though this is true in some ways, in many others it is not. To paraphrase Joe, never have I been part of a community where I have liked every person I have met.

I would not have been able to gather the sources used in this thesis without the help of tireless librarians and archivists from places like the National Archives and National Library in Jakarta, the National Library of Australia in Canberra, and the libraries of Monash University, the University of Melbourne, Leiden, and Cornell. Rheny Pulungan in particular pointed me in the right direction as I got started with my research in Monash in 2019, and the team at the Asian Reading Room at the NLA were incredibly helpful and accommodating. Librarians are the backbone of any piece of historical research, and sadly their expertise has often been overlooked and undervalued in this period of increasing austerity. Thank you all for your hard work and commitment to your craft.

Along the way, I encountered many historians and descendants of the *tentara pelajar* who helped me and expressed a keen interest in my work. Pak Robert Elson's critical eye led to a re-examination of several parts of this thesis which helped make it

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Last but far from the least, my partner Hanna sacrificed much to see this thesis through. Without her I would never have applied for the PhD, nor would I have had the strength to write this thesis. Those years of COVID-imposed long-distance have birthed this thesis, along with my conversion of our holiday trips to Central Java into semi-fieldwork trips where we visited *tentara pelajar* monuments. I hope that it was worth it and that she looks forward to seeing me home with the cats, talking about something other than military history and students with guns.

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Terms

Belajar dan berjuang	To study and struggle. The motto of many student-soldier units.
Biro Perjuangan	Struggle Bureau
gakutotai	Student Corps
gunseikanbu	Japanese-era military administration, specifically that which held power in Java.
heiho	Soldiers' helpers
Kedaulatan rakyat	Popular sovereignty
kinrohoshi	Volunteer labour
kyoren	Semi-military training
laskar	Irregular militia units formed during the independence war. Often formed around political and religious lines.
Laskar Hizbullah	The Army of God
Kemerdekaan 100%	100% independence. A rallying cry used by Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan organisation.
Nilai-nilai 45	The values of (19)45
Pangreh pradja	Rulers of the realm. Refers to local native officials in the Dutch East Indies. Later changed to *pamong pradja* (protectors of the realm) following independence.
pelajar	Students, specifically those in primary or secondary school.
pembangunan	Development.
pemuda	Youth, though widely used to describe anyone taking up arms against the Dutch during the independence war.
rakyat	The people
seinendan	Youth Corps
Sekolah desa	Village school

semangat	Spirit, often used to refer to the idea of an ‘inner spirit’ that provides one’s drive.
Surya Wirawan	Sun of Heroes
Tentara pelajar	Student-soldiers/Student Army
TNI Masyarakat	Social/Society’s TNI, used to describe *laskar* that had formally joined the regular army.

Abbreviations

APWI	Allied Prisoners of War and Internees. Allied military units tasked to ensure the safe return of POWs and internees formed RAPWI (Return of APWI) and were among the first to land in Indonesia.
BB	Water Buffalo Corps (Barisan Banteng)
BKPRI	Congressional Body of Youth of the Republic of Indonesia (Badan Kongres Pemuda Republik Indonesia)
BKR	People's Security Bureau (Badan Keamanan Rakyat). The first iteration of the Indonesian Army
BKS-PM	Youth-Military Cooperation Agency (Badan Kerjasama Pemuda-Militer)
BPAR	Greater East Asia Youth Corps (Barisan Pemuda Asia Raya)
BPRI	Republic of Indonesia Rebels' Corps (Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia)
BRN	National Reconstruction Bureau (Badan Rekonstruksi Nasional)
CORO	Reserve Officers' Training Course (Cursus von Opleiding voor Reserve Officieren)
CM	University Students Corps (Corps Mahasiswa)
DHN	National Council of Generation of 1945 (Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan '45)
Disjarahad	Army History Service (Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat)
FDR	People's Democratic Front (Front Demokrasi Rakyat)
FNPIB	National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat)
GASEM	Union of Secondary Schools (Gabungan Sekolah Menengah). Often had an additional suffix to designate a student union's geographic location, e.g.,

	the Yogyakarta-based GASEMMA (Gabungan Sekolah Menengah Mataram)
Golkar	Functional Groups (Golkar)
GRR	People's Revolutionary Movement (Gerakan Revolusioner Rakyat)
GPP	Guerrilla Defenders of the Proclamation (Gerilya Pembela Proklamasi)
HIK	Dutch indigenous teacher training school (Hollandsch Inlandsche Kweekschool)
IMAM	A Free Indonesia or Death (Indonesia Merdeka atau Mati). An independent student-soldier unit. Later changed its name to Indonesia, Free or Free (Indonesia Merdeka atau Merdeka) to signify their determination to fight for Indonesian freedom
IPI/IPPI	Association of Indonesian Students (Ikatan Pelajar Indonesia). Later renamed as the Association of Indonesian Students and Youth (Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia)
ITB	Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung)
KBI	Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian National Scouting)
KDM	Military District Command (Komando Distrik Militer)
KINO	Basic Organisation Unit (Kesatuan Induk Organisasi)
KL	Royal Army (Koninlijk Legere), the Dutch regular army.
KNIL	Royal Netherlands Indies Army (Koninlijk Nederlandse Indische Legere), the Dutch colonial army.
KNIP	Indonesian National Central Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat)
KODM	Military Subdistrict Command (Komando

	Onderdistrik Militer)
Kosgoro	Mutual Assistance Savings and Lending Cooperative (Koperasi Simpan Pinjam Gotong Royong), then became the Mutual Assistance Multifunctional Organisation (Kesatuan Organisasi Serbaguna Gotong Royong) following its expansion
KOSTRAD	Army Strategic Reserve Command (Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat)
KRIS	Service of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi (Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi)
KRU	General Reserve Unit (Kesatuan Reserve Umum)
KUDP	Office for Student Demobilisation Affairs (Kantor Urusan Demobilisan Pelajar)
LVRI	Veterans' Legion of the Republic of Indonesia (Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia)
Malari	Catastrophe of 15 March (*Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari*)
Masyumi	Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia)
MBKD	Java Command General Headquarters (Markas Besar Komando Djawa)
MOBPEL	Student Mobilisation (Mobilisasi Pelajar)
NIPV	Netherlands Indies Scouting Association (Nederlands-Indische Padvindersvereeniging)
Pesindo	Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia)
P3AD	Pusat Pendidikan Perwira Angkatan Darat (Army Officer Training Centre)
PETA	Defenders of the Motherland (Pembela Tanah Air)
PKI	Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
PNI	Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia)

PP	Union of Struggle (Persatuan Perjuangan)
PSI	Indonesian Socialist Party (Party Sosialis Indonesia)
Pusjarah ABRI	Armed Forces History Centre (Pusat Sejarah Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia)
Putera	Centre of People's Power (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat)
rera	Reorganisation and rationalisation (*reorganisasi dan rasionalisasi*). Sometimes referred to as "restructuring and rationalisation," or *re-dan-ra.*
SA/CSA	Sturm Abteilung/Volunteer Corps (Sturm Abteilung/Corps Suka Rela). A student-soldier unit raised in Surakarta.
Sarbupri	Plantations Workers' Union of the Republic of Indonesia (Serikat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia)
SEAC	Southeast Asia Command
SESKOAD	Army Staff Command College (Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat)
SIAP	Sarekat Islam Scouting Department (Sarekat Islam Afdeling Padvinderij)
SMT/SMA	High school (Sekolah Menengah Tinggi). Later renamed as Sekolah Menengah Atas (SMA). SMA that were dedicated to teaching returning or on-leave student-soldiers were known as SMA Peralihan (Transitionary High School)
SNI	Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (National History of Indonesia)
SOBSI	Central All-Indonesian Workers' Organisation (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia)
TGP	Student Engineers' Army (Tentara Genie Pelajar)
TKR	People's Salvation Army (Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat). The second wartime iteration of the Indonesian Army

TLRI	Indonesian Marines (Tentara Laut Republik Indonesia).
TNI	Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia). The fourth and final wartime iteration of the Indonesian Army. For ease of reference, I use TNI to describe the regular Indonesian army throughout and after the independence war.
TP	Student Army (Tentara Pelajar), specifically units that were raised in Central Java. While they went through several redesignations, they were eventually known as the TP. Distinct from their counterparts in other regions who would sometimes name themselves 'TP' with the addition of a regional designation, e.g., the West Javanese TP Siliwangi.
TRI	Indonesian Republican Army (Tentara Republik Indonesia). The third wartime iteration of the Indonesian Army.
TRIP	Student Army of the Republic of Indonesia (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar). Refers to student-soldier units raised in East Java. Initial designations usually follow changes in the name of the Indonesian Army, i.e., the Students' BKR (BKR/P), before ultimately settling on TRIP. They are also sometimes known as MASTRIP.

Note on Translations and Abbreviations

This thesis, like many that focus on Indonesia, must traverse the alphabet soup of Indonesian political and social organisations. When first mentioning an organisation, I provide its Indonesian name, followed by an English translation and the organisation's Indonesian abbreviation. All commonly used terms, phrases, and abbreviations are contained in the glossary for ease of reference.

The *tentara pelajar* was a diverse grouping that comprised several armed student formations, including the East Javanese TRIP and Central Javanese TP. When using "*tentara pelajar*" I refer to the grouping as a whole along with its many other sub-formations. When referring to the "TP" in this thesis, I mean the Central Javanese TP sub-formation in particular. All translations and errors are my own.

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Introduction

For his submission to a short story/essay competition held to celebrate thirty years of Indonesian independence in 1975, Noer Tugiman, a lecturer at the Yogyakarta Institute of Teaching and Education, wrote a piece entitled "The Motherland Calls." It begins as a history of the Indonesian war of independence, outlining the various treaties signed between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, which were subsequently reneged on by a resumption of Dutch military aggression. Tugiman then pointed out the symbolism behind the codeword used by the Commanding General of the Indonesian army, Sudirman. Sudirman used the phrase "The Motherland Calls" in late 1948 to signal a large-scale Dutch attack, and it became a sign for the army to spread out and conduct a campaign of guerrilla warfare. The subsequent success of that campaign and the defeat of the Netherlands, Tugiman argued, showcased the spirit of answering the call of the motherland. He emphasised that it was the Indonesian youth *(pemuda)* who, during the war and in the nationalist movement prior, answered the call of the motherland. He concluded with a paragraph on the Indonesian student armies *(tentara pelajar),* a blanket term used to describe student-exclusive armed formations in the independence war, and their connection to the youth of his day. He wrote:

> The Student Army consisted of university and high school students, mostly in their teens, who left behind parental love and schooling to answer the call of the motherland… As long as Indonesia has youth who have the soul and spirit of 1945, the future of the nation is in good hands, as in their hearts, the "call of the motherland" continues to echo.[1]

Here, Tugiman touches on the link between the idea of *pemuda* and its manifestation in the form of the *tentara pelajar* in 1945, concluding that the future of Indonesia was secure if the youth of 1975 could emulate the *tentara pelajar.*[2] Tugiman's submission

[1] Noer Toegiman, "Ibu Pertiwi Memanggil," in Cahaya dari Medan Laga: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30., ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 190.

[2] Note that I use *tentara pelajar* to refer to student-exclusive armed formations as a whole. When capitalising the first letters (Tentara Pelajar) or the TP abbreviation, I refer specifically to the Central

was not the only one to make this connection. Other members of the academia and the general public, *tentara pelajar* veterans, as well as school children, provided similar accounts of the *tentara pelajar* mythologising their deeds and expounding on how Indonesian youth and students could learn from their student-soldier predecessors.

The longevity of the *tentara pelajar* within the minds of people like Tugiman is interesting to note, especially considering how small the student armies were in comparison to other units. Formed in 1945 in the wake of the 17 August Proclamation of Independence, the student armies were armed groups that fought on the side of the Indonesian Republic during the Independence War (1945-1949) that followed. Mostly composed of university and high school students, with the youngest in their teens and the eldest in their early twenties, the student armies were formed based on school affiliation and local geographies. Their organisation into distinctive student-exclusive units was not unique, as many other groups of young men formed independent *laskar* (militias), spurred on by the lack of a regular Indonesian army to enlist in. While these student formations were given the blanket designation of student army, most units were known by different names and had little to do with each other in the early stages of the war. It was only in 1948 that more connections between units were established as many entered a unified command structure under a now much more established Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army, TNI).

Additionally, the *tentara pelajar* were mostly concentrated on Java, owing to the island's relatively high levels of development and education compared to other islands in Indonesia. In other regions where resistance to Dutch reoccupation was strong, such as Borneo and Sulawesi, many students joined the fight but formed a small minority of Republican forces, thus forcing them to enlist directly in local militias or in local branches of the fledgling TNI. The island of Sumatra harboured the only other significant armed student units, but even these were smaller than those on Java.

Comprised of an elite minority of Indonesian youths who could attend secondary education, the *tentara pelajar* maintained a level of influence that outweighed their relatively small size when compared other *laskar*. Throughout the war *tentara pelajar*

Javanese Tentara Pelajar. Other units had more unique and varied names. For example, the East Javanese *tentara pelajar* unit was known as the TRIP.

units fought against British and Dutch forces across various fronts, earning the trust and respect of the Republican government and the regular army in the process. In the post-war period, student-veterans of the *tentara pelajar* continued to exercise significant influence over Indonesian society and politics that outlived the period of rule of the country's first president, Sukarno. Indeed, as I will argue the transition to the militarist New Order government led by army general Suharto strengthened their influence, to the extent that the *tentara pelajar* remained closely attached to an image of ideal *pemuda* during the height of the regime.

Aims

This thesis examines the ways in which members of the *tentara pelajar* were able to form and maintain a collective identity based on their experiences as adolescent participants during the war of independence,. It also analyses how this identity was able to grow and inform an ideal notion of Indonesian youth that persisted far beyond their military service.

I draw on wartime publications of the *tentara pelajar* such as self-published newspapers and magazines alongside post-war memoirs and regimental histories to explore how student-soldiers were able to construct a common identity facilitated by discourses through this medium. Drawing upon existing scholarship on youth culture, collective identity formation, and cultural memory, I argue that an exploration of the collective identity of the *tentara pelajar*, formed during the war with roots in the late colonial period, can shed more light on the understanding of the importance and complexity of youth as a category in Indonesian society and politics, and how a militarised version of youth that was championed by the *tentara pelajar* grew to prominence during both the Sukarno and Suharto eras. In doing so, this thesis is one of the first critical studies of the *tentara pelajar*, with most existing works on the student army being hagiographic regimental histories.[3]

[3] The nature of *tentara pelajar* histories is discussed in more detail in the "Sources" section and in Chapter VI. A critical exception to these hagiographic works is Hasumi Aditya, *Peristiwa Blitar 1950: Perseteruan Brigade "S" dan TRIP* (Yogyakarta: Matapadi Pressindo, 2021).

This thesis addresses several key research questions: what were the sources of the militarised identity that the *tentara pelajar* adopted? What were the different facets of this identity, and how was this identity formed through interactions with other *pemuda* groups during the war? How was this identity remembered in the post-war era, and perhaps more specifically, how did such practices of memorialisation tie into a larger narrative of militarised, disciplined youth that was promoted by the New Order regime? In answering the last question, this thesis also reflects beyond the Indonesian context on the role that veterans can play in nation-building, particularly in an ideological sense.

In this Introduction, I situate this thesis in literature about the roles of youth in Indonesia and in particular their importance during the Indonesian war of independence, while also positioning the thesis in the field of transnational youth culture and history. I place this thesis within the context of militarised histories and the role of veterans in disseminating and developing such histories, linking this in comparison to practices outside of Indonesia. I then discuss the use of collective identity and cultural memory as the conceptual frameworks upon which this thesis is based on. These concepts are used to examine the formation of a distinct *tentara pelajar* identity among the *pemuda*, and how this identity was subsequently preserved and passed down during the post-war period. I also discuss the different sources I use and how each of these helps to build upon the aforementioned frameworks to write a history of the *tentara pelajar* and their influence on youth discourse in Indonesia. I conclude with an outline of this thesis' chapters, briefly summarising the arguments developed in each one.

Understanding the importance of youth in Indonesia and the Indonesian war of independence

Writing in 1974, historian Taufik Abdullah spoke about the "value-laden" nature of Indonesian youth, who are often described as "needing guidance" or as bearing the "hopes of the nation."[4] In Indonesian nationalist historiography, youth are commonly

[4] Taufik Abdullah, ed., "Pengantar: Pemuda dan Perubahan Sosial," in *Pemuda dan Perubahan Sosial*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1974), 1.

categorised into different generations or *angkatan.* The basis of this categorisation broadly fits within Mannheim's definition of "generational unity," which perceives a generation as "shar[ing] a location and a destiny throughout the common history and respond[ing] in the same ways to similar social and cultural forces."[5] Youth generations within the Indonesian context are commonly perceived to be groups of young people acting in unison, participating in or even instigating events deemed significant within the nationalist canon. Within nationalist historiography, the first *angkatan* emerged in 1908, with the formation of the Budi Utomo political organisation.[6] This is seen as the beginning of the Indonesian "national awakening," after which similar organisations largely manned by masculine youth and aimed towards uplifting the lot of Indonesians emerged. The subsequent pivotal event in national historiography, the 1928 Youth Congress and the resultant Youth Pledge *(Sumpah Pemuda)*, signals the emergence of the second *angkatan.* Afterwards, the commonly recognised *angkatan* are the *Angkatan 45* that took part in the independence war, and the *Angkatan 66* which contributed to the fall of Sukarno and the rise of the New Order.[7] This is framed as part of the lineage of the role played by Indonesian youth in the nation's history, with subsequent *angkatan* each playing significant but different roles in the Indonesian political landscape in emulation of their *pemuda* predecessors. While they do so in different settings and in the context of different demands, the role of youth in nationalist historiography is consistent: they are the movers and shakers of national history, the dynamic engine that moves Indonesian history forward, the "beating pulse of Indonesian history."[8]

While this characterisation is undoubtedly simplistic, young people have indeed taken part in important events and processes that dot Indonesian history. In his study of

[5] Alexandra Popescu, "The Brief History of Generation – Defining the Concept of Generation. An Analysis of Literature Review," *Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology* 10, no. 2 (Winter 2019): 19.

[6] Indonesian history remains dominated by nationalist historiography, specifically designed to create an idealised image of the nation. In the first national history congress in Yogyakarta in 1957, it was decided that history should serve as an instigator for national development, from which the nationalist historiography emerged. A notable criticism of the nationalist historiographical school comes from West Sumatran historian Mestika Zed, see Zed, "Menggugat Tirani Sejarah Nasional" (Konferensi Sejarah Nasional VII, Jakarta, Indonesia, 2001).

[7] Yatun Sastramidjaja, "Playing Politics: Power, Memory, and Agency in the Making of the Indonesian Student Movement" (PhD dissertation, Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, 2016), 7–8, https://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.523567.

[8] Yayasan Karya Pemuda Indonesia, *Derap Langkah Generasi Muda Indonesia.* (Jakarta: Yayasan Karya Pemuda Indonesia, 1985), xi.

the *pergerakan* era that followed the emergence of Budi Utomo and immediately preceded the Youth Pledge, Shiraishi attributed the strength of the *pergerakan* to the *kaum muda* (young people).[9] Through their exposure to Western education as part of the Dutch Ethical Policy, they became more open to "modern styles" than their parents. In Shiraishi's words, the *kaum muda* formed a "'national' consciousness of being natives of the Indies," seeing themselves as existing as part of a nation beyond their local milieu for the first time.[10]

Similarly, the many youths who were part of the armed *laskar* (militia) groups that fought against the Dutch colonial (Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Legere, KNIL) and regular armies (Koninklijk Legere, KL) during the Indonesian war of independence, including the *tentara pelajar*, became known as the *angkatan* 1945. Additionally, the categorisation into generations contributed to an image of the historical lineage of Indonesian *pemuda* as being the dynamic engine of progression of Indonesian history, further contributing to the value-laden nature of the *pemuda.*

Indeed, the Indonesian war of independence was largely spurred on by the *pemuda*, of whom the *tentara pelajar* were a part, who took an active role in both the armed and diplomatic spheres. So pivotal was their role that Anderson dubbed the revolution a *pemuda* revolution in his seminal study of the time. In an attempt to define the *pemuda*, Anderson argued that Javanese culture in particular viewed the "liminal period" of youth as part of the Javanese life cycle, where young men transitioned into adulthood through either the Islamic boarding school *(pesantren)* or through the *djago* bands of local toughs and gangsters.[11] The role of the *pemuda* in the revolution, he posited, was due to the disruption of the life cycle and the shift of the whole of society into a "larger *pesantren*" where young men experienced their transition into adulthood without the traditional trappings of *pesantren* life.[12] Similarly, Frederick's study of nationalism in the city of Surabaya suggests that the *pemuda* prior to the war was

[9] Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926*, Asia, East by South (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 30.
[10] Shiraishi, 31.
[11] Benedict Richard O'Gorman Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946* (Jakarta: Equinox Publ., 2006), 4–5.
[12] Anderson, 10.

shaped by their interaction with the intellectual elite of the new *priyayi*, thus giving the influence of their older, Javanese seniors pride of place in shaping youth. [13]

Though these approaches provide us with an understanding of *pemuda* within the Javanese context, their historic analyses of the *pemuda* pay little attention to the outside flows and influences that existed beyond traditional Javanese culture that would have undoubtedly affected Indonesian youth. This thesis expands upon their analyses by arguing that young Indonesians, particularly in the incredibly mobile period of the early twentieth century, were part of a transnational community of youth with whom they shared ideas and practices. These interactions with the transnational flow of ideas influenced successive generations of *pemuda*, sowing the seeds that allowed the *pemuda* of 1945 and, by proxy, the *tentara pelajar*, to emerge.

Youth began to be described as an identifiable social category in the early twentieth century, earning a place alongside more established ones like childhood and adulthood, with the increased availability of educational opportunities to young people which accompanied the rise of industrialisation in the mid-to-late 19th century. In Europe, this allowed for a formalisation of adolescence, the period of life that is experienced between childhood and adulthood.[14] The emphasis on formal education for young people brought with it a renewed focus on the role they should play in the life of the national community, with the rise of the nation-state and with it a focus on caring governance occurring after the revolutions of 1848. There were various attempts made to manage youth on the part of the nation-state, with national schooling and education among these. Apart from school, however, the early twentieth century also brought with it the emergence of youth organisations that were concerned with the development of young people, with scouting groups and others oriented towards outdoor activities being the most prominent.[15]

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[13] William H. Frederick, *Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 69–71.
[14] John R. Gillis, *Youth and History: Tradition and Change in European Age Relations, 1770-Present*, Expanded student ed, Studies in Social Discontinuity (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 102–3.
[15] Kenny Cupers, "Governing through Nature: Camps and Youth Movements in Interwar Germany and the United States," *Cultural Geographies* 15, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 174, https://doi.org/10.1177/1474474007087498.

The role of scouting groups in shaping the Indonesian *pemuda* at the turn of the twentieth century, and particularly the transnational interactions that made such groups popular among nationalists and youth, is one that is relatively underexplored, apart from the part they played in the mobilisation of youth within particular cities or regions. This thesis utilises the framework of a "transnational youth culture" to examine the global roots of the *pemuda* and, by proxy, the *tentara pelajar*. Jobs and Pomfret emphasise that the "invention of youth… as a component of industrial modernity… was a transnational process," and identify that it was "in modern cultures and contexts of transfer and exchange that new understandings of youth took shape."[16] It was through interactions with transnational youth culture and the flow of ideas that it facilitated that young people were able to recontextualise interactions with their own society, "redefining or rejecting" visions of what their communities to be.[17] Scouting became particularly popular due to its global reach and engagement with youth through its various activities, such as camping, and variations of it were adopted in places are far flung as Mexico and Japan. While the practices of scouting were undoubtedly part of a transnational youth culture, with values and activities often shared across borders, youths often utilised scouting to address issues that were decidedly local in scope. In the case of Mexico and many other places outside of British imperial hegemony, scouting became a tool for nation-building, constructing boys into men alongside the nation, and teaching the values of nationalism.[18]

This thesis situates Indonesian youth as active actors within this milieu of transnational idea flows and argues it was through this framework of transnational youth culture that the origins of *pemuda* as a significant social category in Indonesia can be better understood, and through that, understand the emergence of the *tentara pelajar* as symptomatic of this phenomenon. As will be shown in Chapter I, scouting groups grew in prominence in Indonesia after their first introduction by the Netherlands East

[16] Richard Ivan Jobs and David M. Pomfret, "The Transnationality of Youth," in *Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Richard Ivan Jobs and David M. Pomfret (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 1, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137469908_1.
[17] Jobs and Pomfret, 12.
[18] Elena Jackson Albarrán, "Boy Scouts under the Aztec Sun: Mexican Youth and the Transnational Construction of Identity, 1917-40," in *Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Richard Ivan Jobs and David M. Pomfret (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 45–70, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137469908_2.

Indies (NEI) government in the 1910s. Initially designed as an instrument to inculcate loyalty to the Dutch Empire, they were instead co-opted by young nationalists to serve an opposing aim. Comprised in part by "politically conscious Indonesian teachers" as described by Suwignyo, scouting groups became organisations through which young Indonesians became exposed to a new sense of Indonesian citizenship at the height of the *pergerakan* movement while also surviving its decline following the failed 1926 rebellion of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI).[19]

While the *pemuda* is a historically significant social category, it is important to recognise that to some extent, the label *pemuda* has lost its lustre in contemporary Indonesia, likely due to its association with the New Order military dictatorship. As will be discussed more closely in Chapter VI, the New Order, along with the TNI in particular, formulated the image of an ideal *pemuda* to suit its developmentalist aims using, in part, the image of self-sacrificial, apolitical, and disciplined youth that fought for independence in 1945. The ideal *pemuda* was, in essence, an embodiment of the so-called "values of 1945," a militarised reinterpretation of the cause of independence that privileged first and foremost the values of the armed forces.[20] This was accompanied by a sterilised depiction of the *pemuda* within New Order historiography that prioritised their heroic deeds while neglecting to mention or recognise atrocities that the *pemuda* themselves were complicit in or divisions and variety among the *pemuda* themselves.[21] Through inculcation in the values of 1945, youth could continue the struggle of their *pemuda* predecessors, transitioning the "struggle for independence" to a "struggle for development," creating the aforementioned idea of the *pemuda harapan bangsa*.

Several seminal studies of the independence war focus on the *pemuda* due to the important role that they played in both the armed and diplomatic spheres. Anderson's aforementioned study of the *pemuda* posits them at the centre of the independence

[19] Agus Suwignyo, "The Making of Politically Conscious Indonesian Teachers in Public Schools, 1930-42*," *Southeast Asian Studies* 3, no. 1 (April 2014): 119–49.
[20] Katharine McGregor, *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past*, Southeast Asia Publications Series (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007); Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, *Dharma Pusaka 45* (Jakarta: Staf Pelaksana Khusus Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban Daerah Jawa Timur, 1972).
[21] See a discussion of the silence regarding atrocities that were perpetrated on both sides of the war in Stef Scagliola, "The Silences and Myths of a 'Dirty War': Coming to Terms with the Dutch–Indonesian Decolonisation War (1945–1949)," *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 14, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 235–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/13507480701433901.

struggle, detailing the constellation of youth groups and organisations that made up the various armed militias that supplemented the TNI during the war while arguing that ultimately the *pemuda* were unable to be organised into a "politically revolutionary force."[22] A similar conclusion was reached by Cribb in his study of the Greater Jakarta People's Laskar, a militia group operating in the Jakarta area during the war. Cribb points out the sheer variety present within the *pemuda*, as he charts the formation of the Jakarta People's Laskar from a meeting of interests between young radical nationalists and the urban youth who were part of the Jakarta underworld, ultimately reaching its end with the tightening grip of the TNI towards the end of the war.[23]

Other regionally focused studies of the *pemuda* of 1945 follow similar trajectories. In his aforementioned study, Frederick argued that the *pemuda* of the early revolution envisaged a "unified," almost classless society based on the support of the Indonesian people *(rakyat)*. While this was never achieved, and, as Frederick states, many nationalists felt that there was a loss of *pemuda* spirit only a year from the pivotal Battle of Surabaya, the *pemuda* claimed the mantle of being both "from and of the *rakyat*" and as the "defenders of the *rakyat*."[24] Examinations of the social revolutions that occurred against established indigenous elites on the northern coast of Java and in East Sumatra have also shown the importance of the *pemuda* in the early days of the independence struggle and their independence of action, in the sense that they would often choose not to wait on the Republican government for instructions. In East Sumatra and Aceh, Reid highlights the division present within the various *pemuda* groups, ranging from independent *pemuda* to those who enlisted in the fledgling TNI, which often led to infighting.[25] Lucas too, in his study of the *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah* on the northern coast of Java, touches on how malleable the definition of *pemuda* was at the

[22] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution.
[23] Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-1949 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991).
[24] Frederick, Visions and Heat.
[25] Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

time, with anyone of any age possessing enough revolutionary spirit able to credibly call themselves *pemuda.*[26]

Recent studies of the independence war have departed from focusing on the primary actors of the conflict, i.e., the *pemuda* and the TNI on the Indonesian side, with the KNIL and KL on the other. Instead, newer studies focus on instances of mass violence during the war, committed against unarmed civilians.[27] In 2011, court proceedings in the Netherlands on behalf of the civilian victims of the wartime Rawagede massacre sparked discussion of Dutch atrocities during the war. Recent publications have focussed on instances of extreme violence on the part of the Netherlands, dubbed "excesses" in official documents, as well as violence on the part of Indonesian *pemuda*, particularly during the *Bersiap* period.[28] Studies on the latter include a focus on *pemuda* atrocities committed against Dutch and Eurasian civilians as well as suspected Indonesian collaborators.[29] Additionally, new and interesting research is emerging that looks at violence committed by *pemuda* and *laskar* groups against ethnic Chinese Indonesians, something that has long been ignored in research on the war.[30] These incidents are notably absent from Indonesian nationalist historiography and from the idealised image of the *pemuda* that the New Order perpetuated.

Collectively, research on the *pemuda* of 1945 has shown the sheer difficulty of formulating a simple definition for the *pemuda* of that time. The *pemuda* were, unlike the tidy image championed by the New Order and subsequent governments, a group of

[26] Anton E. Lucas, *One Soul One Struggle: Region and Revolution in Indonesia*, Southeast Asia Publications Series, no. 19 (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen and Unwin, 1991).
[27] Rémy Limpach, *Kekerasan Ekstrem Belanda di Indonesia: Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia 1945-1949*, ed. Muhammad Iqbal, trans. Susi Moeimam, Nurhayu W. Santoso, and Maya Sutedja-Liem (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2019).
[28] Gert Oostindie, Ben Schoenmaker, and Frank van Vree, eds., *Beyond the Pale: Dutch Extreme Violence in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949* (S.l.: Amsterdam University Press, 2022).
[29] The *Bersiap* period lasted from roughly October 1945 to the landing of Dutch troops in early 1946 and is marked by widespread atrocities against Dutch and Eurasian prisoners of wars, civilians, and Indonesian collaborators. See William H. Frederick, "The Killing of Dutch and Eurasians in Indonesia's National Revolution (1945-49): A `Brief Genocide' Reconsidered," *JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH* 14, no. 3/4 (January 1, 2012): 359–80.
[30] Mary Somers Heidhues, "Anti-Chinese Violence in Java during the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-49," *Journal of Genocide Research* 14 iii-iv (January 1, 2012): 381–401, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2012.719371; Ravando and F.X. Harsono, "Chinese Mass Graves as Key Sources to Examine Chinese Massacres during the Indonesian Revolutionary Period (1945-1949)" (Social Justice in Pandemic Times: 24th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, 2022).;

people with incredibly distinct educational and class backgrounds brought together into the *angkatan 1945* through their experience of the same historical event, the war. Similarly, the masculinist portrayal of the *pemuda* by the New Order also excluded women from the discourse, mirroring the *bapakisme* that it used to strengthen patriarchal figures and shape the "hegemonic masculinity" that it engendered into Indonesian society.[31] Apart from that common experience as well as their youthful age, there was little similarity between the different groups of *pemuda* that made up the *angkatan 1945.* There was never a monolithic *pemuda*, but instead, a *pemuda* made up of different entities and subgroups, each with their own interests, goals, and imagined Indonesian future.

However, it is important to note that this does not necessarily wholly discredit the image of ideal *pemuda* that successive Indonesian governments have sought to convey, and that in reality the sheer diversity of the *pemuda* meant that there were groups of youth from which the ideal *pemuda* of the Indonesian state could be derived. This thesis will argue that the *tentara pelajar* were one of the main inspirations of this idealised, state-sponsored image of the *pemuda*, justifying a deeper examination of the unit. Even within the more recent studies of the independence war, the *tentara pelajar* are only mentioned in passing without a closer look at the sense of purpose that motivated students to fight in these student-exclusive armed units, effectively relegating them as the same alongside other *pemuda* groups. Chapters I to IV of this thesis show the origins and evolution of the *tentara pelajar* identity, from its roots in late colonial Indonesia to its emergence and consolidation during the war. I argue that some of the key components of the wartime *tentara pelajar* identity, that of loyalty to superior authorities, an emphasis on national development as being a process that youth and students have a uniquely important role to play in, and an appreciation of discipline, were all important facets of the image of the ideal *pemuda* that grew to prominence during the New Order. Masculinity too was a key component of the *tentara pelajar* identity, which was grounded in combat prowess and brotherly camaraderie as much as

[31] Julia I. Suryakusuma, "The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia," in *Fantasizing the Feminine in Indonesia*, ed. Laurie J. Sears (United States of America: Duke University Press, 1996), 95, https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/1746/chapter/183710/The-State-and-Sexuality-in-New-Order-Indonesia; Pam Nilan, "Contemporary Masculinities and Young Men in Indonesia," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 37, no. 109 (November 1, 2009): 332–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/13639810903269318.

it was in intellectualism. This thesis examines some aspects of how the *tentara pelajar* included, or excluded, female students within its discourse, particularly within the wartime identity of the *tentara pelajar* in Chapter II, as well as attempts to transfer aspects of the *tentara pelajar* identity to a new generation of Indonesian youth in the form of national developmentalism in Chapter VI. However, this thesis focuses primarily on how the *tentara pelajar* distinguished themselves from the *pemuda*, and as such does not delve to deeply into *tentara pelajar* masculinities, a feature they shared with other *pemuda* groups.

Though the similarities between the *tentara pelajar* and the New Order's ideal *pemuda* do not necessarily mean that they were deliberately chosen to be the model for the regime's image of ideal youth, it does show that the ideal *pemuda* had, at its heart, real origins and roots from amongst the youth of the *angkatan 1945*. Rather than the purely revolutionary and often criminal *pemuda* of the studies of Anderson, Lucas, and Cribb, the *tentara pelajar* represented a *pemuda* that forwarded ideas of military discipline and professionalism alongside intellectualism and was thus far closer to the ideal *pemuda* image championed by Indonesian governments.

This too meant that there were ready-made conduits for the ideal *pemuda* image to disseminate to the youth: the student-veterans of the *tentara pelajar*. While Chapter V discusses the post-war rise of the *tentara pelajar* veterans into positions within the Indonesian military and civil society where they became increasingly influential, Chapter VI analyses how these veterans, facilitated by the rise of the New Order, became willing and able agents of the ideal *pemuda* to a new generation of young Indonesians through various media.

Militarised histories and the role of veterans

While the *tentara pelajar* were initially formed as independent fighting units, largely free from the formal chain of command of the fledgling TNI, they were never as averse to the idea of taking orders from or affiliating with the TNI as many of their other *pemuda* brethren in the *laskar*. Unlike the *pemuda* of the *laskar* who were squeezed out of prominence by the TNI, often by forceful assimilation, such an issue never really

plagued the *tentara pelajar.* Instead, *tentara pelajar* units willingly submitted to TNI command as early as 1946, before integrating with the TNI in 1947.[32]

There is a significant body of literature on the socio-political role played by the Indonesian military since its formation in 1945. Much attention has been paid to the army's ideology of *dwifungsi* (dual function). First articulated by General A.H. Nasution during Indonesia's liberal democratic period, *dwifungsi* was the army's claim to having a role that transcended being merely armed defenders of the nation and posited that the army had the right, through its role in the independence struggle, to play a role in governance and the day-to-day socio-political affairs of the state.[33] *Dwifungsi* underlined the rise of the army to power in 1967 when it supported one of its own, General Suharto, to claim the presidency from Sukarno through the violent suppression of the PKI, one of the latter's power bases. Crouch's seminal study of the army's political role outlines the political interests of the army stemming from their role in the independence war, which continued to expand and even included political interests throughout the 1950s and 1960s.[34] Similarly, Said traced the army's political interests to the political interests of Sudirman, its first commanding general, who despite cooperating with the Republican government during the war, did not shy away from criticism of its diplomatic and military rationalisation policies.[35] Sundhaussen argued that the army's move to consolidate power in the mid-1960s was based on a defence of its own interests, a belief in its ability to manage the nation better than what they perceived as incompetent or uninterested civilian politicians, as well as a perception that the system of Guided Democracy, with Sukarno at its head, could no longer provide effective leadership that benefitted all Indonesians.[36]

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[32] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.* (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, 1985).
[33] David Jenkins, "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of 'Dwifungsi,'" *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 11, no. 2 (1983): 15–30; Ian MacFarling, *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia* (Canberra, A.C.T.: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996).
[34] Harold A. Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Revised edition, Politics and International Relations of Southeast Asia (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1988).
[35] Salim Said, Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics 1945-49, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991).
[36] Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Kuala Lumpur ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

The army's ideology would play an important role in informing national policy and ideology during the New Order, when *dwifungsi* was formalised. Under the New Order, in addition to having a serving army general in the presidency, officers often held ministerial positions, and the TNI had significant representation in parliament. With the strengthened influence of the army in government, the next step was to inculcate the values of the New Order and, by proxy, the military, in Indonesian society as a whole.

The militarisation of Indonesian history was part of this project, through which the military could glorify its martial values while establishing its legitimacy as the protector and saviour of the nation. Scholars have examined some of the means through which this was done. Curaming's close study of the state-sanctioned multi-volume series of national history books, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National History, SNI), and his comparison between that and a similar project in the Philippines, provided insights into the difficult issues facing scholars cooperating with authoritarian regimes. He showed that despite being written by a team comprised of historians of various stripes, the SNI was dominated by Nugroho Notosusanto, himself a *tentara pelajar* veteran in addition to being the head of the Pusat Sejarah Angkatan Bersenjata (Armed Forces History Centre, Pusjarah ABRI). Notosusanto expelled historians critical of the New Order from the team, bringing to print volumes of the SNI that were considered unfinished by other scholars whilst ensuring that the content privileged the role of the armed forces in the Indonesian independence struggle.[37] Similarly, McGregor's study of the military's role in reconstructing Indonesia's past examined how the armed forces, under the coordination of Nugroho, used museums, dioramas, and history books produced by the Pusjarah to encourage support for the military and *dwifungsi*.[38]

However, while the military utilised the combined power of itself and the state to establish its narrative as the dominant one, it also sought to mobilise both serving military personnel and veterans to inculcate the values of 1945 into Indonesian society, with a particular focus on ensuring that young Indonesians fell in line. Further

[37] Rommel Argamosa Curaming, *Power and Knowledge in Southeast Asia: State and Scholars in Indonesia and the Philippines*, Rethinking Southeast Asia 17 (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020).
[38] McGregor, History in Uniform.

examination of the role played by veterans in this process situates student-veterans into the post-Second World War world described by Alcalde and Núñez Seixas as a "world of veterans." This was a world dominated by the rise of veterans organisations that became important lobbying groups, pressuring governments across the globe to provide improved support or benefits for them whenever possible.[39] In some cases this influence was seen to be a threat: the Soviet Union's World War II veterans were prohibited from organising for four decades specifically because of the perceived threat that such an organisation would have to the political legitimacy of the Communist Party.[40] In most other cases, such as that of Wehrmacht veterans in West Germany, veterans took part in politics to advance their interests, such as greater benefits, though to mixed success.[41]

More symbolically, veterans have long played an important role in shaping remembrance of wars and conflicts, be that through the writing of memoirs or through various fraternal organisations, thus establishing themselves as key "agents of memory."[42] Studying British veterans of the Korean War, Huxford emphasises the importance of appreciating veteran agency, especially in cases of public or state apathy or opposition to their endeavours.[43] In such cases, veterans often advocated for particular modes of remembrance that privileged their own interests, be that a more truthful retelling of wartime events or otherwise, despite the potential for it to clash with dominant narratives. Such interests varied between individuals. While many Japanese veterans of the Second World War took umbrage against allegations that they coordinated violence against Chinese civilians during the 1937 Nanjing Massacre,

[39] Ángel Alcalde and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, "Introduction: A World of Veterans," in *War Veterans and the World after 1945: Cold War Politics,Decolonization, Memory*, ed. Ángel Alcalde and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, Routledge Studies in Modern History (London ; New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 3.
[40] Mark Edele, *Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society 1941-1991*, electronic resource (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 153–59, https://go.openathens.net/redirector/unimelb.edu.au?url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1093%2Facprof:oso/9780199237562.001.0001.
[41] Jay Lockenour, *Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955*, Studies in War, Society, and the Military (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).
[42] Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, "Inconvenient Heroes? War Veterans from the Eastern Front in Franco's Spain, 1942-1975," in *War Veterans and the World after 1945: Cold War Politics,Decolonization, Memory*, ed. Ángel Alcalde and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, Routledge Studies in Modern History (London ; New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 190.
[43] Grace Huxford, "State Power, Cultural Exchange and the 'Forgotten War': British Veterans of the Korean War, 1953-2013," in *War Veterans and the World after 1945: Cold War Politics,Decolonization, Memory*, ed. Ángel Alcalde and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, Routledge Studies in Modern History (London ; New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 227–30.

others sought to challenge the dominant narrative and retell their own experiences. While some did it out of a need for repentance, others emphasised a notion of intergenerational guilt, with one veteran remarking that his generation's "crime" of waging a war would be exacerbated if they did not do their best to educate future generations on that very crime.[44] In other cases, veterans have adopted radical ideologies and taken drastic steps to achieve their goals, as seen in the role played by Italian First World War veterans in Mussolini's March on Rome and their embrace of fascism.[45] However, research focusing on how veterans have contributed in particular to the official historical discourse within a country is comparatively sparse. Few studies consider the key roles played by veterans in the historic past of their nation.

This thesis aims to address that gap by examining more closely the role played by veterans, particularly those of the *tentara pelajar*, in disseminating and reproducing the New Order's values of 1945 and the accompanying notion of the ideal *pemuda* to Indonesian youth. While McGregor acknowledged that Nugroho's background as a *tentara pelajar* influenced his views on post-war Indonesian leadership and the abandonment of these values of 1945, her focus squared on him as the New Order's chief historian rather than his *tentara pelajar* background.[46] Curaming too, through his focus on the role played by scholarly historians in the writing of the SNI, naturally excludes veterans in his analysis.[47]

I argue that *tentara pelajar* veterans as a group, despite their relative lack of power compared to state institutions or intellectuals, played an important part in the militarisation of Indonesian history, and were uniquely placed to carry out the task of transferring values holding both the status of student and soldier as they fought in the independence war. Even after the war, the *tentara pelajar* were able to become important political actors by continuing to claim their *pemuda* and *angkatan 1945* status

[44] Daqing Yang, "Living Soldiers, Re-Lived Memories? Japanese Veterans and Postwar Testimony of War Atrocities," in *Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post–Cold War in Asia*, ed. Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter (Harvard University Press, 2022), 85, https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674274037-006.
[45] Ángel Alcalde, *War Veterans and Fascism in Interwar Europe*, Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108182423.
[46] McGregor, *History in Uniform*, 44–45.
[47] Curaming, Power and Knowledge in Southeast Asia.

during the Sukarno era. They continued to carry the mantle of the *angkatan 1945* during the New Order and actively took part in the transferring values project, partially at the urging of the regime and the armed forces, but also of their own free will for their own interests.

The militarisation of Indonesian history would arguably have been far less successful without the efforts of student-veterans. It was the *tentara pelajar* veterans who responded to the military's call to publish their accounts of the war with gusto, producing a prolific array of memoirs and regimental histories which would retell stories of heroism and their interactions with the *rakyat.* They did so not purely to forward the interests of the TNI and the New Order regime. Rather, like their counterparts in other nations, the *tentara pelajar* demonstrated their capabilities as "agents of memory" by taking part in transferring values to advance their own interests and achieve their own goals. By examining the social makeup of *tentara pelajar* veterans, many of whom became members of the Indonesian elite and middle-class, this thesis argues that the *tentara pelajar,* like many other former combatants in the "world of veterans" were motivated by a want to impart their values to the next generation of Indonesian youth. These findings will further add to the existing scholarship on the role veterans play in memorialising war and how advocating for a particular mode of remembrance, in this case one that is endorsed by the state, can help them achieve their interests.

Collective identity and cultural memory

As mentioned previously, the phrase *pemuda* has become less widely used in recent times. Farid observed that the phrase *anak muda* is increasingly used among youth because of its lack of association with the New Order and its values.[48] Similarly, Nilan and Parker have written that the terms *remaja* (teenager) and ABG (*anak baru gede,* literally children who have just become big), both of which are mostly used to describe

[48] Hilmar Farid, "Meronta dan Berontak: Pemuda dalam Sastra Indonesia," *Jurnal Prisma Edisi Gerakan Pemuda 1926-2011: Persatuan Terhenti, Kesatuan Asimetris* 30, no. 2 (2011).

consumption habits, have mostly replaced *pemuda*, while in recent years Western generational terms, like millennial and Gen Z, have also come into wider use.[49]

Despite this, the historical importance of the *pemuda* legacy as established by nationalist historiography has led to the *pemuda* identity being subject to various claims from different actors, including some sections of Indonesia's youth, all of which see it as a source of legitimacy. The Indonesian state, for example, passed a Law on Youth in 2009 under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration which explicitly defined what constituted the *pemuda* while calling youth "a moral force, a social control, and an agent of change" in all aspects of national development, thus enshrining the vision of *pemuda* so popularised by nationalist historiography in legal terms.[50]

The *pemuda* identity has also been claimed by student activists, most notably during the 1998 student demonstrations that led to the fall of Suharto. Student activism, particularly that of university students, remains one of Indonesia's major political forces. Student activists regularly draw on the legacy of past *angkatan* of youth as inspiration for their actions, pointing to the *angkatan* as examples of youth taking an active part as agents in Indonesian history while positioning themselves as a continuation of previous generations and adopting the *angkatan* moniker for themselves.[51] This harkening back not only included that of past generations of post-independence student activism, such as the *Angkatan 1966* that helped overthrow Sukarno and pave the way for the New Order, but also the *pemuda* of the *angkatan 1945* that fought for national independence.

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[49] Lyn Parker and Pam Nilan, *Adolescents in Contemporary Indonesia* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 11, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unimelb/detail.action?docID=1318941; For use of Western terms, see for example Karina M. Tehusijarana, "Underprivileged Millennials: Being Young and Poor in Jakarta," News, The Jakarta Post, January 22, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/longform/2020/01/22/javascript:window.location.href; Radhiyya Indra and Deni Ghifari, "Gen Z's Love for Chess Keeps Growing in Indonesia," News, The Jakarta Post, September 12, 2022, https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2022/09/11/gen-zs-love-for-chess-keeps-growing-in-indonesia.html.

[50] "Undang Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2009 Tentang Kepemudaan" (2009). See appendices.

[51] Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford, Calf: Stanford University Press, 2005), 222; Jonathan Tehusijarana, "A Dynamic Relationship: Student Perceptions of the People and the Masses in the Fall of Suharto" (Honours thesis, Melbourne, Australia, the University of Melbourne, 2015), 12, http://hdl.handle.net/11343/56232.

Legitimacy for student activists could be obtained by way of comparison with previous *angkatan*s, such as through surmising whether students of one generation could outdo previous ones in terms of courageousness or achievement.[52] Lee's study of the student activism in 1998 that helped overthrow Suharto and the New Order regime showed how "*pemuda* history provided the iconography and typology" around which student activists could structure and justify their resistance as students adopted the style and rhetoric of the *pemuda* of the *angkatan 1945*.[53] In this way, the generational memory of *pemuda* is a form of "cultural memory" where the student activists construct a "shared past" based upon the legacy of being a part of the greater *pemuda* identity.[54]

However, it is important to recognise that while the cultural memory of *pemuda* served as a binder while the students adopted it wholeheartedly, cleavages within the *pemuda* identity began to show as student activists tried to increase their *massa* (masses) at demonstrations by encouraging more and more urban poor youth to join their ranks. Student activists did make some attempts to erode this sense of elitism. Lee noted that one student eschewed his university student credentials, insisting that his activism derived from a larger nationalist base rather than narrow-minded student intellectualism.[55] Another student, Felix, called for university students to eliminate distinctions between university students and *pemuda*, going so far as to ask university students to take off their distinctive alma-mater jackets while proclaiming "We are all *pemuda*."[56] While such claims might point to a "*pemuda* without social distinction" as Lee mentions, this was rarely practiced on the ground. Identifiers like Student ID cards and almamater jackets were often used by student activists to root out government infiltrators from their demonstrations, inadvertently creating an air of exclusivity around many student protests.[57] This shows how the *pemuda*, while presented in the sweeping

[52] Sastramidjaja, "Playing Politics: Power, Memory, and Agency in the Making of the Indonesian Student Movement," 7–8.
[53] Doreen Lee, *Activist Archives: Youth Culture and the Political Past in Indonesia* (Durham, North Carolina; London, England: Duke University Press, 2016), 9.
[54] Astrid Erll, "Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction," electronic resource, in *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, Media and Cultural Memory ; Medien Und Kulturelle Erinnerung 8 (Berlin ; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 5, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unimelb/detail.action?docID=364668.
[55] Lee, Activist Archives, 96–97.
[56] Lee, 97.
[57] Heru Cokro and Tb Munawar Aziz, *Pendudukan Gedung DPR/MPR: Kesaksian Aktivis Mahasiswa* (Jakarta & Bandung: Teraju, 2008), 126–30.

terminology of the *angkatan,* were far from monolithic and instead extremely variegated. What held true for the student activists of 1998 was also true for the youths of 1945.

Similarly, in her wide-ranging study of the role of youth in Indonesian politics, Sastramidjaja outlines how the *pemuda* of 1945, precisely because of their development of an identity as being the defenders of the *rakyat,* adopted a spirit of paternalism that divided them from the *rakyat.* Ultimately, the liberated "We" of the revolutionary *pemuda* as Sastramidjaja articulated was an exclusive one, based on the formation of a collective identity that naturally had to have natural delineations.[58]

In many ways, the *pemuda* identity is very much like the concept of collective identity as formulated by Melucci. Melucci posited that the construction of a collective identity requires a common cognitive framework shared by individuals within the collective group.[59] From this, a collective identity is formed through a constant process of "negotiation and renegotiation," whereby the goals of the collective and the means to achieve them are agreed upon by members of the group.[60] While it is important to recognise that the *tentara pelajar* were less of a social movement, instead evolving into a military unit, there are similarities between them and the social movements that Melucci studied. The *tentara pelajar* emerged as an organic, revolutionary force, organised by students across different schools rather than being a force of conscripts. They were born of "systemic conflict," that of decolonisation, and fought for the destruction of that system, just as social movements seek inclusion within or destruction of systems perceived to be unjust.[61] Though, as Melucci acknowledged, it is important to recognise that a collective identity is never entirely set in stone and is instead subject to change through that process of negotiation and renegotiation.

This thesis uses this notion of collective identity to further unpick the cleavages within the *pemuda* identity as discussed by Sastramidjaja and Lee. While the *pemuda*

[58] Sastramidjaja, "Playing Politics: Power, Memory, and Agency in the Making of the Indonesian Student Movement," 85–86.
[59] Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989), 35.
[60] Melucci, 35.
[61] Melucci, 38–39.

could be seen as a larger collective identity, as in the works of Anderson and Cribb, the *pemuda* were comprised of many more groups of youth, each of whom had their own interests and views of what an independent Indonesia would look like, and what their role in achieving that goal was. Indeed, while Lee argued that the *pemuda* identity had been largely "co-opted" by the New Order to support its developmentalist aims, the sheer variety of the *pemuda* means that it is difficult to make such generalisations.[62]

I argue that the *tentara pelajar*, which has so far been under-researched, serves as an important foil to this generalised idea of the *pemuda*. Examining the *tentara pelajar* through this lens sheds light on the emergence of an influential subsection of the *pemuda* of 1945 and how the exact traits that emerged from their interactions with the various groups and individuals involved in the independence war allowed the *tentara pelajar* to evolve into the perfect conduits for the "ideal *pemuda*" image championed by the New Order regime. The constant boundary maintenance performed by the members of the *tentara pelajar* to define their goals and imagine their role in achieving and maintaining an independent Indonesia would distinguish themselves not just from the *rakyat* whom they felt the need to guide and lead, but from other *pemuda* as well. As will be shown in Chapters I to IV, the evolution of *tentara pelajar* identity was based on their assumption of a leadership role of the *rakyat* and other, less educated *pemuda*, ultimately placing themselves in a position of superiority over both.

Though forged by the independence war, the *tentara pelajar* identity was not weakened by post-war socio-political circumstances. On the contrary, it persevered and to some extent strengthened, in part due to the political influence that *tentara pelajar* veterans wielded. In the immediate post-war period under Sukarno and even more so under Suharto's New Order regime, the *tentara pelajar* veterans continued to promote remembrance of their acts during the war. They constructed their own *lieux de mémoire* (sites of memory) taking various forms, such as physical monuments, memoirs and military/regimental histories, all of which were designed to perpetuate particular ways of remembering the role of the *tentara pelajar*.[63] While these were initially designed to forward a straightforward recognition of the various exploits of the *tentara pelajar*

[62] Lee, Activist Archives, 7.
[63] Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *Representations*, no. 26 (1989): 7–24, https://doi.org/10.2307/2928520.

during the war, they ultimately became a means through which the representation of the *tentara pelajar* as ideal *pemuda* in the New Order vein would be remembered. The identity of the *tentara pelajar* and, by proxy, that of the ideal *pemuda*, was constantly constructed and re-constructed via these sites of memory and the mode of remembrance they provided.[64] As Chapter VI will demonstrate, these acts of remembrance were carried out by various actors, such as the *tentara pelajar* themselves, elements of the New Order regime such as the military and the National Council of the Generation of 1945, as well as the Indonesian youth who were their target audience.

Sources

This thesis utilises various primary sources to support its contentions. Documents from the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia are used throughout to shed light on elements of the organisation of different *tentara pelajar* units throughout the war and as veterans in the immediate post-war period. Newspapers and magazines spanning the Japanese occupation, the war of independence, the Liberal and Guided Democracy periods and the New Order are similarly used. The extensive microfilm collections of Monash University provided much needed access to the Japanese-era publications *Djawa Baroe* and *Asia Raya,* as well as the wartime *laskar* publications *Banteng* and *Revolusioner*. The online newspaper database Delpher provided access to Dutch-language coverage of the post-war actions of the *tentara pelajar*. The National Library of the Republic of Indonesia's (Perpusnas) collection of *Gema Angkatan 45* provided insights into the process of transferring the values of 1945 that the *tentara pelajar* took part in, sponsored by the magazine's publisher, the state-backed National Council of the Generation of 1945.

The core primary sources used in this thesis take the form of works written and published by *tentara pelajar,* both during their active service in the independence war and afterwards, as veterans. Throughout the war, *tentara pelajar* units and other affiliated organisations maintained various newsletters and magazines. While several such publications have seemingly been lost, several issues of the two major

[64] Erll, "Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction," 5–6.

publications, namely *Patria* of the East Javanese Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar (Student Army of the Republic of Indonesia, TRIP) and *Api Merdeka* (Fire of Freedom) of the Central Javanese Ikatan Pelajar Indonesia (Indonesian Students Association, IPI*)*, have been preserved in the collections of Monash University and the Perpusnas. Though these newsletters were published with varying degrees of regularity due to the constant demands of the war, they became arenas where the "imagined community" of the *tentara pelajar* could be first developed.[65] As will be shown in Chapter II, it was precisely in these newsletters, through articles and responses to articles, that the *tentara pelajar* could construct the aforementioned cognitive framework, negotiating and renegotiating what being a student-soldier truly meant in relation to the war and their responsibility to the Indonesian people. These articles often debated the purpose and aim of the *tentara pelajar*, with some examining the *tentara pelajar*'s claim to uniqueness and others taking the shape of reader responses to previous articles, thus enabling them to be analysed as part of that constant dialogue of negotiation and renegotiation. Others include *tentara pelajar* responses to political events, which are particularly informative towards highlighting their differences vis-à-vis other armed groups.

Their post-war works are far more numerous, with some written in the immediate aftermath of the war in the 1950s, but most written in the 1970s and 80s during the height of the New Order regime. These works come in different forms, with personal memoirs, regimental histories, and historical novels being the most prominent. All of these cover the exploits of the *tentara pelajar* during the independence war, while some go on to mention their role in national affairs after the war's end. In some respects, one can say that this thesis attempts to construct a history from below of the *tentara pelajar,* as many of the authors of these primary sources were not of the highest rank within these organisations. Indeed, the veterans' associations that many student-veterans soldiers formed, which often played an active role in promoting the writing of these works, were inclusive of most ex-student-soldiers from the rank-and-file to the officer level. However, considering that many of these organisations and its members

[65] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2016); Soebagijo I. N, ed., *Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1987), 229–37.

increasingly grew in power and prestige in Indonesian society, particularly after the start of Suharto's New Order dictatorship in 1966, it is far from being a traditional history from below. Indeed, it is exactly their significant influence on the evolution of the discourse of youth in Indonesia, attained largely during this time period, that this thesis seeks to examine.

Among the primary sources, regimental histories are the most prevalent. In her study of the history of a Canadian regiment that served in the First World War, Cavell stated that the purpose of regimental histories of the time was to "…[provide] a coherent framework for what might otherwise have been random and confusing memories of combat."[66] This applies as well to the regimental histories of the *tentara pelajar.* While a few works were clearly prepared and sanctioned by the military, being authored by the infamous Pusjarah, this was more the exception rather than the norm.[67] Most regimental histories were not written by professional historians, but instead on the initiatives of veterans' groups and individual *tentara pelajar* veterans and we in some cases self-published, showcasing a push from within the "grassroots" of veterans to preserve their history.[68] In other cases, where institutional backing is particularly clear, more often than not said institution had a *tentara pelajar* veteran holding an important leadership role.[69] The sheer amount of these works have led to some being difficult to locate in existing libraries, often accessible only through the extensive collections of the National Library of Australia, the Perpusnas, or by chance in second hand bookstores. This thesis thus serves as one of the first efforts to collate and present an archive of *tentara pelajar* works in a cohesive and integrated way.

In addition to preservation, the need to pass on the values of the *tentara pelajar* also motivated the writers of these regimental histories, perhaps to justify and provide "coherence" to their combat experiences as argued by Cavell. In cases where the

[66] Janice Cavell, 'In the Margins: Regimental History and a Veteran's Narrative of the First World War', *Book History* 11, no. 1 (2008): 202, https://doi.org/10.1353/bh.0.0008.
[67] See for example Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*
[68] See for example Abdul Radjab, *TRIP dan perang kemerdekaan* (Surabaya: Kasnendra Suminar, 1983), and *Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, wilayah Jawa Tengah* (Jakarta: Keluarga Besar ex Tentara Pelajar Semarang, 2005).
[69] See for example Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, *Perjuangan Pelajar Bersenjata TRIP Jawa Timur* (Indonesia: Dinas Pembinaan Mental TNI Angkatan Darat, 1986). Though it was nominally authored by the Army History Service, the head of the service was a veteran of the East Javanese Student Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TRIP).

regimental history was written by an individual, it often evolved into a memoir where the author used their own experiences in the war to illustrate a point or forward a value that they wanted their readers to emulate. While this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI, it does serve to illustrate that regimental histories are perhaps the most "biased" of biased sources. As Cavell writes, regimental histories ultimately seek to glorify the personnel of a particular military unit.[70] Thus, while they do not shy away from the darker aspects of warfare, they largely accentuate the gallantry of soldiers in battle However, this is precisely why regimental histories serve as an excellent source to examine the *tentara pelajar*'s influence on the *pemuda* discourse. In a preface to a regimental history of the Purwokerto *tentara pelajar* from Central Java, Nugroho Notosusanto argued that as it was written by veterans of the unit, it was not a historical work in the traditional sense. Rather, the work was:

> …more of a memoir, but not an individual memoir. Instead, it is a collective memoir. It is natural for a memoir to be emotionally loaded and highly subjective. But that should not be seen as a weakness. Instead, it is a strength. A memoir is a truly human document.[71]

As "collective memoirs," the regimental histories of the *tentara pelajar* and their subjectivity showcase precisely the kind of messages and values that *tentara pelajar* veterans wanted to pass on. It is through their depiction of the heroic acts of themselves and their comrades that veterans created the image of the ideal student-soldier, one that the younger generation of Indonesia could strive to model.

Fivush argues that "autobiographical memory is the core of identity."[72] In the case of the *tentara pelajar*, the nature of their memoirs points to this being true of collective memory as much as it is individual memory. *Tentara pelajar* memoirs and historical novels often straddle similar lines. Many historical novels appear to function as a kind of *roman-a-clef* and end up being memoirs in all but name, with their authors

[70] Cavell, "In the Margins," 203.
[71] Keluarga Ex Anggota Be XVII Tentara Pelajar Cie Purwokerto, ed., *Sejarah Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Purwokerto*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Yayasan Mastepe, 1979), 13–14.
[72] Robyn Fivush, "Autobiographical Memory," in *Research Methods for Memory Studies*, ed. Emily Keightley and Michael Pickering (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 13.

being represented in the story under a different name.[73] However, while this can ground the apparently fictional novel in reality, perhaps it is due to their status as fiction that the authors of the historical novels often embellish their contents with accentuated stories of heroism, much like the authors of regimental histories. This approach might also be linked to the youthful target audience of these works, who might consider purely factual memoirs to be rather dry historical fare and difficult to consume. A more loose, less strict approach to storytelling that focuses on telling an interesting tale that is mostly, if not completely, grounded in truth, would have had a greater appeal among a younger readership.

Perhaps due to this consideration of the target audience, there are fewer dedicated memoirs of individual student-soldiers. These are unsurprisingly concentrated amongst *tentara pelajar* officers, and even then it seems only those few who rose to particularly high government positions actually wrote about their experiences. These individuals include former Vice President Sudharmono of the Ronggolawe Division's Student Reserve Regiment, Air Force Chief of Staff Sri Mulyono Herlambang who had served in the Surakartan Volunteer Corps, and the first Indonesian ambassador to South Korea, Sukamto Sayidiman of the TRIP.[74] One notable anomaly is that of Soehario Padmodiwiryo, better known as Hario Kecik, who had served in the small Corps Mahasiswa (University Student Corps, CM).[75] While he had risen in the ranks of the Army following the end of the independence war, following the events of 30 September 1965, Hario was purged from the military for his apparent leftist tendencies and imprisoned from 1977 to 1981. A prolific writer, he wrote numerous works, both fiction and non-fiction, which were only published after the fall of the New Order.

A small but significant variant of these memoirs are the short stories/essays in the vein of the Noer Tugiman example that began this Introduction. Though there are

[73] See for example Asmadi, *Sangkur dan Pena* (Jakarta: Indira, 1980).
[74] See, respectively, Sudharmono, *Sudharmono, S.H., Pengalaman Dalam Masa Pengabdian: Sebuah Otobiografi* (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1997); Sri Mulyono Herlambang, *Pengabdianku Hanya Untukmu, Bangsa, dan Negaraku* (Jakarta: R.A. Media Specialist, 2001); Soekamto Sajidiman, *The Tender Power: An Autobiography*, Indonesian and English (Jakarta: PT. Grafikaria Utama Sakti, 1977).
[75] Though his memoirs span multiple volumes, the one that covers his experiences during the revolution is Suhario Padmodiwiryo, *Memoar Hario Kecik: Autobiografi Seorang Mahasiswa Prajurit*, ed. Herman Widodo Soemitro (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1995).

relatively few of these works, they effectively function as concentrated versions of memoirs, distilling the stories that *tentara pelajar* veterans sought to convey into a few pages with a clear message at the end. While these, as well as the other memoirs and regimental histories, will also be discussed in further detail in Chapter VI, it is important to note that the writing of *tentara pelajar* memoirs and histories began in earnest in the 1970s before peaking over the two decades that followed. This was a period when the militarist New Order regime was at the peak of its powers. It was during this time that the Third Army Seminar was held in 1972 and recommended that veterans write memoirs of their experiences during the war of independence to better transfer these and the attached values of 1945 to Indonesian youth.[76] Much of the works concerning *tentara pelajar* were written with this in mind and were clearly geared to impart these values upon their youthful readers. Many of these works are thus written with a clear sheen of nostalgia, as student-veterans seek to share their memories of not just the violence of war, but also the camaraderie they experienced with fellow *tentara pelajar* in camps and the classrooms of wartime schools.

In both memoirs and historical novels, however, the *tentara pelajar* outline their role in the shaping of the Indonesian nation, a hallmark of many Indonesian autobiographical works. Analysing a sample of autobiographical works written by prominent Indonesians, Watson surmised that many, if not all, contained "a sense of contributing to the definition of a nation."[77] *Tentara pelajar* works too contain these features, seeking to shape an ideal image of youth for the nation through narratives of their wartime and pre-war experiences.

Thesis outline

The thesis is made up of six chapters and is structured in chronological order.

In Chapter I, I argue that the militarisation of Indonesian youth began in the late colonial period, with the emergence of nationalist scouting groups and exposure to the global scouting movement. This militarisation, initially latent, was then formalised with the arrival of the Japanese, who encouraged youth to militarise under their own

[76] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, *Dharma Pusaka 45*.
[77] C. W. Watson, Of Self and Nation: Autobiography and the Representation of Modern Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 15.

auspices. It was within these circumstances that the *tentara pelajar* were formed from militarised student groups.

In Chapter II I discuss the formation of a *tentara pelajar* identity, through an examination of their wartime publications and post-war memoirs. Here, the *tentara pelajar* developed an identity based on notional "apoliticism," an aversion to partisan feuds and arguments committed by other *laskar* groups that they viewed as distractions from the goal of Indonesian independence. This was coupled with a sense of elitism, which viewed their role as 'student-soldiers' as superior to other *pemuda* taking part in the independence war. They argued that as an educated minority among a backwards people, students played an important role in national development, including the development of the Indonesian people. These values were solidified in student congresses and displayed in their responses to various political developments around them.

Chapter III covers the ties developed between the *tentara pelajar* and the TNI. Due in large part to their sense of superiority over other fighting *pemuda* groups, the *tentara pelajar* sought to affiliate more closely with the TNI. In their eyes, the TNI was apolitical, unlike the ideologically motivated *laskar* groups, as well as more professional and disciplined due to their status as the regular army. Reorganisations within the army and the *tentara pelajar* as well as the students' performance in battle against Dutch forces during the first Dutch military aggression encouraged closer ties and the eventual absorption of the *tentara pelajar* into the TNI, cementing the close relationship between the two armed groups.

Chapter IV covers the consolidation of these processes of identity formation within the latter stages of the war. Tested by internal dissent within their ranks, the *tentara pelajar* snuffed out alternative views that stood in contrast with their aforementioned values. Through siding with the TNI in fighting against the leftist uprising of the Madiun Affair in late 1948, playing an important role in the TNI's military government, as well as more notable performances in battle during the Second Dutch Military Aggression, the *tentara pelajar* had fully developed an identity grounded in the aforementioned values, cemented by images of victorious heroism in the later battles of the war.

Chapter V covers the immediate post-war challenges faced by the *tentara pelajar* when they demobilised and sought to find a role in civilian life. While not entirely smooth, *tentara pelajar* veterans became an important power base for both Sukarno and the military in the struggle for power between the two that coloured the 1950s and 1960s. It was through this process that they gained political influence and standing in post-war Indonesia. Though the anti-communist genocide of 1965 and the rise of the New Order, negatively impacted many student-veterans, others were able to rise to positions of power within the new regime. While they were largely aligned with the New Order military dictatorship, they remained on the lookout for ways in which to advance both their interests and their legacy under the regime.

Chapter VI, the final chapter, focuses on how student-veterans looked to ensure the survival of their legacy by responding to the call of the military to transfer the values of 1945 to Indonesia's youth, and educating and inculcating Indonesian youth with said values. They did this through the construction of various sites of memory, ranging from historical novels to memoirs and regimental histories, all of which were specifically aimed at young people. Importantly, while the project of transferring values was facilitated by the military and the New Order regime, the veterans of the *tentara pelajar* took part willingly, largely because they saw their own values in the state-approved values of 1945. This chapter takes on this theme of agency for both the *tentara pelajar* and the youth that they sought to influence, concluding with an examination of how the legacy of the *tentara pelajar* was utilised by student activists who opposed the New Order.

The thesis concludes with an examination of the findings of each chapter and the survival of the *tentara pelajar* legacy in post-New Order Indonesia.

Chapter I

Students, scouts, and soldiers: The militarisation of Indonesian youth (1917-1945)

Writing well after the end of the war of independence, many veterans of Indonesia's *tentara pelajar and* its associated sub-groupings trace the origins of both their units and their own penchant for military discipline from the Japanese occupation. Most see the *tentara pelajar* as a natural evolution and successor of the many different youth organisations formed by the Japanese military administration as part of its efforts to militarise Indonesian youth in support of the Japanese war effort. In particular, the students of the *tentara pelajar* saw themselves as emerging from school-based youth groups, such as the *seinendan* (Youth Corps) and the *gakutotai* (Student Corps).[1] These views are echoed by scholars such as Reid and Anderson who respectively argued that the Japanese occupation brought an end to a Dutch emphasis on technical skills, replacing it with a focus on militarism, and that the occupation "crystallised a powerful self-consciousness among those mobilised" in the various youth organisations.[2]

While this version of events would certainly have had more relevance to these veterans, many of whom were of secondary and even primary school age when independence was proclaimed on August 17th, 1945, I argue the practices and values that would inform their militarisation predated the arrival of the Japanese. In fact, the process that married together both militarism and Indonesian nationalism could be seen in the early twentieth century, when the NEI's governance changed with the implementation of the Ethical Policy.

In this chapter I explain how changes in colonial education for indigenous Indonesians throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century encouraged the widespread growth in the use of youth in Indonesia's nascent anti-colonial movement.

[1] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 81.
[2] Anthony Reid, "Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword," in *Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980), 27; Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 1–2.

Resistance to colonialism emerged from all parts of NEI society, such as the aristocratic *priyayi*, proletarian labourers in the colony's new industries, and even among the Dutch-trained teachers of the burgeoning indigenous education system. Though their contribution to the anti-colonial *pergerakan* might seem paltry by comparison, school-aged youth who participated in the various organisations of the movement also played a key part in its growth and were of pivotal importance, as will be seen later, in the long-term struggle for independence.

I will show this by utilising existing research on the process of modernisation in the NEI and the many other processes that accompanied it, particularly Suwignyo's extensive study on education reform.[3] I use these to interpret memoirs and accounts written by young people who experienced these processes as they occurred, many of whom ended up joining the *tentara pelajar* and other nationalist military units following the proclamation of independence. Young people were often militarised as a part of the growing popularity of the global scouting movement among anti-colonial activists. Despite continued pressure from the NEI, these organisations and their associated practices encouraged young people to reimagine their roles within a future Indonesia that was free from Dutch rule, thus envisioning an alternative form of citizenship in a post-colonial Indonesian society.

This chapter will also argue that this process was not sparked, but instead encouraged and formalised by the abrupt end of Dutch rule and the start of Japanese occupation in 1942. Japan's victory over the Netherlands and other Western colonial powers in Southeast Asia galvanised Indonesian nationalists, some of whom sought to cooperate with the new occupiers. Additionally, the Japanese military's stance on utilising youth for its war effort, whilst haphazard, provided an opportunity for young people to learn martial skills that were previously heavily regulated by the colonial regime. This, alongside further pro-nationalist changes to indigenous schooling, continued the longstanding relationship between nationalism and militarism among Indonesian youth, and set the stage for the evolution of these groups from glorified

[3] Agus Suwignyo, "The Breach in the Dike : Regime Change and the Standardization of Public Primary-School Teacher Training in Indonesia, 1893-1969" (PhD dissertation, Institute of History, Faculty of the Humanities, Leiden University, 2012), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/18911.

scouting troops to fully armed military units during the outbreak of the Indonesian war of independence.

Students and scouts: Education reform in the Netherlands East Indies

To better understand the emergence of different *tentara pelajar* units following the proclamation of independence, one must first look at the context in which the students who made up these units were brought up in. Most of the students who joined armed student units in late 1945 were men and middle- or high-school students. On average, they were 15 to 22 years old by the time the Indonesian war of independence started, thus indicating that most were born in the 1920s and 1930s.[4] The experiences of these students are unique within Indonesian history, as many underwent formal education under both the NEI and the Japanese occupation, with some even completing high school in a newly independent Indonesia at war with its former Dutch colonisers. The education that they received played an important role in shaping notions of student identity and purpose within Indonesian society.

The early twentieth century saw the final stages of the Netherlands' consolidation of power in the NEI. Wars in Aceh (1873-1913) and Bali (1908) that resulted in the destruction of entities that opposed the NEI in the Indonesian archipelago and completed the process of Dutch colonisation of the region, which had started with the establishment of the city of Batavia in the 17th century.[5] However, this period also saw the initial implementation of the so-called Ethical Policy in 1901, by which the Netherlands reformed its approach to governing the NEI. The policy was the culmination of efforts by humanitarians within both the NEI and the Netherlands to reform colonial policy which these reformers considered to be cruel and exploitative.[6] The crux of the Ethical Policy was a belief that, due to a combination of past injustices

[4] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 24.
[5] M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200* (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2008), 48–49.
[6] Robert Van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1960), 33–36.

and the Netherlands' Christian values, the Netherlands had an "honour debt" to the NEI and thus had a duty to improve the lot of its native inhabitants.[7]

While there are many facets to the Ethical Policy that contributed to the relative modernisation of the NEI, for the purposes of this thesis the educational reforms it brought about were the most important. Prior to the implementation of the Ethical Policy, education in Indonesia was only available to either Europeans or members of the indigenous elite. The latter group included classes such as the *priyayi* aristocracy of Java, who were educated in the "first-class schools," while non-aristocratic Indonesians could find education in "second-class schools."[8]

The educational reform brought about by the Ethical Policy extended official education to a larger proportion of the Indonesian population, along with a host of other policies aimed at "civilising" Indonesians. Education in first- and second-class schools, for instance, was carried out in Dutch rather than the Malay vernacular starting in 1907, partly to "Dutchify" Indonesians.[9] However, the Dutch formed a new set of schools for rural Indonesians which taught in the Malay vernacular. This was the *volksschool*, commonly known to Indonesians as the *sekolah desa* (village schools). *Sekolah desa* were implemented at the village level as an effort to increase literacy among poorer Indonesians, with high achieving graduates able to continue their studies in more prestigious Dutch-language schools.[10] In practice, however, this was a rarity, as the socioeconomic pressures faced by many of the children enrolled in the *sekolah desa* prevented them from pursuing education beyond that basic level.

Further developments in indigenous education came in 1914 with the evolution of the first-class schools into the HIS, which was coupled with increasing demand for schooling from Indonesians. To match this demand, the NEI sought to standardise teacher training for indigenous teachers. They did this by forming the Hogere Kweekschool (Upper-level teacher training school, HKS), which then further evolved into the Hollandsch Inlandse Kweekschool (Dutch indigenous teacher training school,

[7] Van Niel, 8.
[8] Suwignyo, "The Breach in the Dike," 24.
[9] Suwignyo, 61.
[10] S. Nasution, *Sejarah Pendidikan Indonesia* (Bandung: Jemmars, 1983), 79.

HIK) in 1927. HIK were eventually opened across the NEI, with schools in Java, Sumatra and the Moluccas.[11]

As formal education was increasingly Dutchified, additional extracurricular activities were also introduced and made available to young Indonesians. Scouting in particular became a popular activity for youth. From its founding by British Army officer Robert Baden-Powell in 1907, the scouting movement grew popular globally, reaching more than a million worldwide members by 1922.[12] Branches of the scouting movement or other groups that copied its methods sprung up in numerous countries, including the Netherlands. The first Dutch boy scouts were formed in several cities in 1910, with various national-level scouting associations for boy scouts and girl guides forming the following year.[13] Indonesia followed a similar trajectory, with scouting groups emerging in major cities in 1912 before they were formalised and unified under the banner of the Nederlands-Indische Padvindersvereeniging (Netherlands-Indies Scouting Association, NIPV) in 1914, formed with the blessing of its Netherlands-based parent association. Though membership of the NIPV was open to children of all ethnic groups, in practice it was dominated by Dutch youth and was very much "colonialist" in nature, in the sense that its practices were geared towards glorifying the Netherlands and its monarch.[14]

Though the NIPV was not the most welcoming organisation for Indonesian youth, it did demonstrate the usefulness of scouting for individuals and organisations interested in mobilising young Indonesians. The first "indigenous scouting group" to be formed was the Javaansche Padvinderijs Organisatie (Javanese Scouting Organisation, JPO) in 1916.[15] Its patron, Mangkunegara VII, was a member of the royal family of the princely state of Surakarta in central Java. Unlike the NIPV, whose members swore allegiance to the Dutch homeland and its monarch, JPO members swore an oath of

[11] Suwignyo, "The Breach in the Dike," 107.
[12] Jobs and Pomfret, "The Transnationality of Youth," 4.
[13] "Geschiedenis & toekomst," Scouting, accessed August 8, 2021, https://www.scouting.nl/over-scouting/wat-is-scouting/geschiedenis-toekomst.
[14] Pujo Semedi, "Padvinders, Pandu, Pramuka: Youth and State in the 20th Century Indonesia," *Africa Development* 36, no. 3–4 (January 1, 2011): 21–22.
[15] Renny Pujiartati, "The Existence of First Indigenous Scouting Javaansche Padvinders Organisatie in Mangkunegaran," *Yupa: Historical Studies Journal* 3, no. 1 (June 1, 2020): 41, https://doi.org/10.30872/yupa.v3i1.168.

loyalty to "the Prince and the beloved Motherland."[16] The anti-colonial tendency of the JPO was clearly pronounced, as Mangkunegara himself was also a member of Budi Utomo (Virtuous Endeavour), a proto-nationalist Javanese political association founded in 1908.[17]

The new *priyayi* and the growth of the anti-colonial *pergerakan*

The better quality of schooling made available to indigenous Indonesians helped create a new class of Western-educated intellectuals within the colony's society. Whilst many of these newly educated youths were members of the *priyayi* aristocracy that had been so important in the colony's system of indirect rule, many more were from common families who sought to improve their standing in society. Many of those who enrolled in the HIK, for example, came from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds and saw teaching as a pathway to social mobility.[18] This new class of well-educated youths, ready to take up work in colonial society that was previously barred from them, has been called the *new priyayi* by Frederick.[19] Taking an example from the city of Surabaya in east Java, Frederick argues that the *new priyayi* were distinguished by their educated status as "*kaum terpelajar*," the learned class, and took "pride in their intellectuality."[20]

The emergence of the new *priyayi* signalled a period of transformation within the NEI, where indigenous Indonesian were increasingly afforded opportunities in both the economic and social spheres from which they were previously excluded. Schulte Nordholt argues that the exposure of the newly formed Indonesian middle class, Frederick's *new priyayi*, to Western modernity, coupled with their ability to partake in it through the consumption of Western education and products, constituted a form of

[16] Semedi, "Padvinders, Pandu, Pramuka," 23.
[17] Renny Pujiartati, "The Existence of First Indigenous Scouting Javaansche Padvinders Organisatie in Mangkunegaran," 41.
[18] Suwignyo, "The Breach in the Dike," 175–77.
[19] William H. Frederick, "Hidden Change in Late Colonial Urban Society in Indonesia," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 14, no. 2 (1983): 364–65, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400011012.
[20] Frederick, 365.

"cultural citizenship."[21] By this, he meant that the emerging indigenous middle class would be able to view themselves as citizens of the NEI, understanding their relations vis-à-vis the Dutch ruling class and the indigenous working class. This shift was in the interests of the colonial government as well, as the process of encouraging the middle class to adopt cultural citizenship would complement the Dutchifying process instigated by education, creating a future where indigenous, middle-class families were the "bearer(s) of stability, cleanliness and order," "cornerstones" of colonial society.[22]

However, though they were able to attain levels of education far higher than many Indonesians were able to before, most of the *new priyayi* were still unable to achieve the heights of socioeconomic prestige promised to them by their Western education. This was largely due to the still discriminative nature of the NEI, which ultimately limited the opportunities available even to the most educated Indonesians. "Cultural citizenship" thus failed to adequately translate to real political citizenship. This fomented dissent amongst many *new priyayi*, who would later become the "backbone" of the *pergerakan* anti-colonial movement that swept Indonesia throughout the 1920s.[23]

The *pergerakan* movement took a variety of forms, but its leaders were largely either dissatisfied or new *priyayi*. In the field of education, so-called wild schools emerged which were largely spurred on by educated Indonesians disillusioned with the availability and quality of education for indigenous youths.[24] Examples vary, but the most well-known wild school was the Taman Siswa (Garden of Students), founded by Soewardi Suryaningrat in 1922. Better known by the pseudonym Ki Hadjar Dewantara, whilst he was a member of the *priyayi* aristocracy, his dissatisfaction with the NEI was well known. Prior to the founding of Taman Siswa, Suryaningrat was best known for

[21] Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Modernity and Cultural Citizenship in the Netherlands Indies: An Illustrated Hypothesis," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 42, no. 3 (2011): 439, https://doi.org/10.1017/s002246341100035x.
[22] Nordholt, 447.
[23] Frederick, "Hidden Change in Late Colonial Urban Society in Indonesia," 366.
[24] Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 83–84.

being the writer of the nationalist pamphlet "If I Were a Dutchman."[25] This critical piece of writing caused him to be exiled to the Netherlands from 1912 to 1919, where he would go on to obtain a teaching degree and develop ideas on a new education system, centred around Javanese cultural principles.[26] Though not founded as an explicitly nationalistic endeavour, Taman Siswa became a safe haven for nationalist intellectuals who were able to teach students there without the qualifications required of an official school.[27]

Different political associations also emerged, following different ideologies and having different purposes but ultimately all harbouring some level of dissatisfaction against the colonial government. One of them, the aforementioned Budi Utomo was largely an elite Javanese endeavour to "develop" and essentially revive Javanese culture.[28] The Sarikat Islam (Islamic Union, SI), formed in 1912, was a more politicised iteration of the Sarikat Dagang Islam, a union of Islamic merchants that initially sought to protect the interests of its members.[29]

Whilst both Budi Utomo and the SI were, initially at least, largely comprised of either elite *priyayi* or wealthy merchants, opposition also emerged from more distinctly non-elite, lower-class *new priyayi* sources. The Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (Indies Social Democratic Association, ISDV), formed in 1914, was a leftist political party founded by the Dutch trade unionist Henk Sneevliet.[30] Though it initially had a mostly European membership, its stance on issues like the suppression of indigenous press publications by the colonial authorities gained it support from many radicals. As its indigenous membership grew the ISDV evolved into the PKI in 1921.[31]

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[25] David Radcliffe, "Ki Hadjar Dewantara and the Taman Siswa Schools; Notes on an Extra-Colonial Theory of Education," *Comparative Education Review* 15, no. 2 (1971): 221, https://doi.org/10.1086/445532.
[26] Radcliffe, 221.
[27] Kenji Tsuchiya, "The Taman Siswa Movement--Its Early Eight Years and Javanese Background," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 6, no. 2 (September 1, 1973): 164, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400017306.
[28] Akira Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918 (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1972), 158.
[29] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 204–5.
[30] Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006), 13–14.
[31] McVey, 51.

Publications known as "wild readings" *(batjaan liar)* also predominated and appealed largely to the lower classes. These were often written in the Malay vernacular instead of the usual high Malay that was often used in priyayi-centred publications.[32] Many of the authors of *batjaan liar* fit the *new priyayi* mould set by people like Ki Hadjar Dewantara. For example, Marco Kartodikromo, a journalist for the widely read *Doenia Bergerak* newspaper, was the son of a minor *priyayi* family who grew disillusioned with the colonial system whilst working on the railways.[33] *Batjaan liar* articles were notable for their active criticism of the colonial system, which was aimed not only against the NEI but also against the *priyayi*, and any indigenous group that collaborated with the authorities.

Scouts and the new citizenship of the NEI

It was within the strong *pergerakan* atmosphere that many indigenous scouting groups began to emerge. The JPO was among the first indigenous scouting groups, and it did not take long for many more to emerge in its image. Many of the newly formed scouting groups emerged as youth wings of the *new priyayi*'s political associations, just as the JPO was patronised by a leading member of Budi Utomo. When the height of the *pergerakan* came to an end with the failed PKI rebellion of 1926 and the subsequent repression of the more radical components of the anti-colonial movement by the NEI, scouting groups became even more useful for nationalists. The clearest example of this can be seen in the Surya Wirawan (Sun of Heroes), a scouting group formed when Budi Utomo merged with another political association, Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia, to form the Partai Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia Party, Parindra) in 1935. Whilst Parindra itself was tightly supervised by the colonial regime despite its status as a "cooperative political party," the Surya Wirawan became its scouting organisation-cum-youth wing, a space where more radical ideas could be explored because it was subject to somewhat less scrutiny due to its status as a scouting troop, though this did not completely allay

[32] Hilmar Farid and Razif, "Batjaan Liar in the Dutch East Indies: A Colonial Antipode," *Postcolonial Studies (London, United Kingdom)* 11, no. 3 (September 9, 2008): 278, https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790802226694.
[33] Farid and Razif, 280.

Dutch suspicions.[34] Other scouting groups closely linked to political associations were formed as well. The SI, which later evolved into the Partai Sarikat Islam political party, formed the Sarikat Islam Afdeling Padvinderij (Sarikat Islam Scouting Department, SIAP) scouting group.[35] Muhammadiyah, a modernist Islamic organisation that sought to "develop" Islamic culture in a similar way Budi Utomo sought to do to Javanese culture, also founded a scouting organisation as its influence grew.[36] The Hizbul Wathan, as it was known, had multiple branches across Indonesia that generally followed the spread of Muhammadiyah, with several emerging in western Sumatra.[37]

Whilst the scouting movement and its activities had gained widespread adoption across the world in the early 20th century, the reasons for its popularity were varied from country-to-country. In Europe, it emerged with the "*fin-de-siècle* culture of adolescence" which had emphasised the formation of youth as a distinct social category.[38] Along with this came the belief that youth, particularly young men living in the increasingly dominant urban centres of Europe, were slowly being corrupted and made effeminate by "overcivilisation."[39] As such, scouting was seen as a means of reengaging youths with nature and through that allowing young men to regain their masculinity.[40]

At its core, however, the process of strengthening youth was seen as not only benefitting young people themselves, but also the nation. Part of the British Scouts Law called on members to profess loyalty to "God, King and Country," while Baden-Powell himself referred to a mythical English past of unspoilt natural beauty and chivalric values when he first codified the practices of scouting in his book "Scouting for

[34] Yannick Lengkeek, "Staged Glory: The Impact of Fascism on 'Cooperative' Nationalist Circles in Late Colonial Indonesia, 1935–1942," *Fascism* 7, no. 1 (May 5, 2018): 122, https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-00701003.
[35] Semedi, "Padvinders, Pandu, Pramuka," 24.
[36] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 209–10.
[37] Fikrul Hanif Sufyan, "Kepanduan Dan Politik: Gerakan Padvinders Di Padang Panjang 1926-1934," *Patanjala: Jurnal Penelitian Sejarah Dan Budaya* 13, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): 60–61, https://doi.org/10.30959/patanjala.v13i1.630.
[38] John Neubauer, *Fin-de-Siècle Culture of Adolescence* (Yale University Press, 1992), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt211qwh4.
[39] Cupers, "Governing through Nature," 189.
[40] Cupers, 189.

Boys."[41] Paired with this inculcation of patriotic feeling were the undeniably militaristic activities associated with scouting. Though Baden-Powell had argued strongly that the Scouts were not militarised in any way, working hard to maintain the movement's independence from the Army-run Cadets, many of the activities of scouts prepared them for a role in future conflict.[42] The basics of scouting involved camping and survival skills, which Baden-Powell himself partly learned during his time in the British army, while the cover of Scouting for Boys depicted young scouts lying in wait for some unseen enemy.

The paramilitary training of young scouts became even more pronounced during the outbreak of the first World War. Many English scouts were enlisted into work that had been vacated by older men who had been drafted into the Army.[43] Many of these included policing and semi-military work, with scouts serving as assistant constables as well as rotating in-and-out of ship-spotting duty along the British coastline.[44] This potential of using scouting and similar youth organisations as a way to prepare youths for service in the armed forces became widely practiced globally, though often they would adopt characteristics unique to the place in which they emerged. In Imperial Japan, the *seinendan* (youth corps) eagerly adopted the practices of British scouts to encourage nationalism and train up rural Japanese youth.[45] Branches of the *seinendan* were also set up in Japanese colonies such as Korea and Taiwan, where they embraced local youths. In these places, the *seinendan* programme was designed to encourage youths to identify first and foremost as subjects of the Japanese Empire, preparing them to serve the nation through whatever means necessary.[46]

[41] Sam Pryke, "The Popularity of Nationalism in the Early British Boy Scout Movement," *Social History* 23, no. 3 (October 1, 1998): 318; 320, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071029808568040.
[42] Pryke, 322–23.
[43] N. A. Bubak, "Hyper-Citizenship and the Experience of Youth in the Edwardian Scouting Movement" (PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 2017), https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3007246.
[44] Bubak, 190–93.
[45] Sayaka Chatani, "Youth and Rural Modernity in Japan, 1900s–20s," in *Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Richard Ivan Jobs and David M. Pomfret (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 28–29; 33–34, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137469908_2.
[46] Sayaka Chatani, Nation-Empire: Ideology and Rural Youth Mobilization in Japan and Its Colonies (Cornell University Press, 2018), 2–3.



Figure 1 The cover of the first edition of Scouting for Boys. (Illustration by Robert Baden-Powell, London: Horace Cox, 1908)

Its usefulness in inculcating both patriotism and militarism in youth served to attract the new *priyayi* to scouting. Many scouting groups linked to the *pergerakan* political associations were strongly militarised and made little attempt to hide this. The SIAP was famously known as *pandoe militer* (military scouts) due to their devotion to military drill and discipline, while one of Hizbul Watan's regular publications was called *Sendjata Pandoe* (Scouts' Weapons).[47] Even the Surya Wirawan, whilst ostensibly operating under the cooperative Parindra, was very much drilled in paramilitary fashion.[48]

Ideologically, however, these scouting groups were naturally divided along political faultlines, which were also influenced by the transnational spread of ideas. Hizbul Watan was strongly influenced by the modernist Islam embraced by Muhammadiyah and its founder, Ahmad Dahlan.[49] Surya Wirawan took some inspiration from fascism, which was already on the rise in Europe and Japan by the 1930s. The leadership of Parindra, Surya Wirawan's parent organisation, were attracted

[47] Semedi, "Padvinders, Pandu, Pramuka," 24.
[48] Lengkeek, "Staged Glory," 122.
[49] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 209–10.

to fascism largely due to its blend of both modernity and tradition.[50] This made it suitable for the purposes of figures like Soetomo, who had co-founded the party's predecessor, Budi Utomo, specifically to develop Javanese culture through modernising it, whilst at the same time maintaining the "harmony" of its traditional core.[51] Thus, Surya Wirawan was modelled in many ways after similar right-wing scouting/youth groups in Europe. It took particular inspiration from its Dutch counterpart the Nationale Jeugdstorm, the youth wing of the National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands.[52] The Jeugdstorm was militarised along the line of the Hitler Youth, initially clandestinely during the 1930s but then more openly under German occupation during the Second World War.[53] Many Jeugdstorm members would go on to join the SS. Though Dutch scouting at large mostly tended to avoid the "culturally essentialist" approach of British scouting that used the so-called "martial races" of empire as inspiration for the scouts, Dutch scouting groups were ultimately laden with scouts who dreamt of glory on the battlefield, in defence of the nation.[54]

The political divisions between the different new *priyayi* organisations, and by proxy the scouting and youth groups they backed, were often so pronounced that it prevented effective cooperation between the different groups. For example, there were several attempts to unite the different scouting groups under one banner in the 1930s. This move was likely influenced by the 1928 Youth Congress, which brought together youth organisations from across ethnic divisions and culminated in the Youth Pledge. The contents of the pledge eschewed any mention of traditional ethnic distinctions, instead calling on youths to pledge their loyalty to a single nation, language and homeland: that of Indonesia.[55] Despite this, scouting groups were largely unable to overcome political divisions, and even the most successful attempt to unite the scouts,

[50] Lengkeek, "Staged Glory," 111.
[51] Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism, 165.
[52] Lengkeek, "Staged Glory," 122; Ramses Oomen, "Jeugd van Het 'Nieuwe Europa': Transnationale Connecties van de Nationale Jeugdstorm Bij Het Europees Jeugdverbond," *Tijdschrift Voor Geschiedenis* 130, no. 4 (November 1, 2017): 593–4, https://doi.org/10.5117/TVGESCH2017.4.OOME.
[53] Oomen, 601-3.
[54]Matthijs Kuipers, A Metropolitan History of the Dutch Empire: Popular Imperialism in the Netherlands, 1850-1940, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022), 157, 160, 176.
[55] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 224.

the Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian National Scouting, KBI), was unable to bring all indigenous scouting groups together under one banner.[56]

Despite this, it is important to recognise that many indigenous scouting groups were united in the sense that they, like their new *priyayi* parents, were all disillusioned with colonial society as it was, and envisioned a future where the Indonesian people were both more "developed" and held greater sway over political affairs in the NEI.[57] The KBI, for example, inculcated singing the would-be national anthem *Indonesia Raya* into their activities, while its scouts were given red-and-white pennants, the colours of the nationalist flag.[58] Whilst divisions among them perhaps made imagining a singular nation based around an Indonesian identity difficult, it did not prevent them from collectively imagining a new form of citizenship for indigenous Indonesians within the colony.

Scouting was well suited to facilitate this reimagining. As mentioned previously, inculcating a sense of patriotism was a key feature of the scouting movement in almost every nation where they operated. Within the Edwardian British context in which they were founded, scouts often saw their activities as a means of proving their right to citizenship within Edwardian society.[59] Despite resisting militarism as an institution, the British Boy Scouts saw their members take up military training and subsequently paramilitary roles during the First World War. Bubak has shown that many scouts who followed this pattern saw such activities as a part of their own civic-mindedness and an essential part of their citizenship.[60] It would not be difficult to imagine that indigenous Indonesian scouts, drilled in similar activities and influenced by anti-colonial ideologies, might have felt the same way.

This idea is strengthened by the fact that similar processes also occurred amongst other groups within NEI society. Research has shown that indigenous teachers working within the colonial school system, whose numbers had grown during the late

[56] Semedi, "Padvinders, Pandu, Pramuka," 25–26.
[57] Semedi, 25–26; Lengkeek, "Staged Glory," 119.
[58] Tim Redaksi SMT, ed., *Jembatan Antar-Generasi: Pengalaman Murid SMT Djakarta, 1942-1945*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998), 29.
[59] Bubak, "Hyper-Citizenship and the Experience of Youth in the Edwardian Scouting Movement," 37.
[60] Bubak, 38.

1920s and early 1930s, also collectively reimagined their role within the colony. Teachers' magazines of the time showcase how teachers experimented with ideas such as independence, self-respect and unity in the process of developing a "self-perception of their identity, position and roles in the broader context of *the* Indonesian society," becoming "politically conscious."[61] It was, as Suwignyo aptly states, a process that culminated in visions of a society, and thus a citizenship, "beyond the colonial construct."[62] Though these teachers worked within the colonial system, unlike their counterparts in the "wild schools," they too were dissatisfied with the trappings of "cultural citizenship" that the colonial status quo provided. Instead, their reimagined role as citizens within a new Indonesian society saw teachers as aids to the development of the *rakyat* and the uplifting of indigenous Indonesians, much like that of the new *priyayi.*

Whilst teaching schools proved to be spaces for young adults to forge this new citizenship, scouting provided an excellent primer for school-aged new *priyayi* youth to imagine their own roles as young people in a new Indonesian society. Their rhetoric was largely similar to their teacher counterparts, in that they focused on uplifting the *rakyat* and the Indonesian nation. In *Sedia,* the publication of the Surabaya branch of the KBI, a senior scout wrote that they "were not truly scouts if [they] have not done any good for our nation and people."[63]

Many students who joined indigenous scouts also testify to experiencing this process within their scouting activities. Many of those who joined scouting groups were the sons and daughters of the new *priyayi*, and were thus part of the new elite in their own right. Soehario Padmodiwiryo, also known as Hario Kecik, was one such youth. His father was a teacher at an engineering school in Surabaya, and, true to his new *priyayi* status, wanted his son to receive the best education he could afford, though not at the expense of subservience to the NEI. Hario thus attended a prestigious Dutch-language school in the city.[64] However, whilst encouraging his son to study Western

[61] Agus Suwignyo, "The Making of Politically Conscious Indonesian Teachers in Public Schools, 1930-42*," *Southeast Asian Studies* 3, no. 1 (April 2014): 123.
[62] Suwignyo, 123.
[63] K.P. Merah-Koening, "Roeangan Pandoe Oemoem," *Sedia "Madjallah Kepandoean,"* June 1940, 7.
[64] Padmodiwiryo, *Memoar Hario Kecik,* 24–25.

education, he insisted on enrolling his son in the KBI. It was in the KBI that the young Kecik was first introduced to concepts like Indonesian nationhood.[65] In Surakarta, Sri Mulyono Herlambang also had a similar experience as a member of the local KBI chapter.[66]

Older individuals who had finished their secondary education also sometimes found themselves attracted to scouting groups. One example of this is Abdul Haris Nasution, the son of a village schoolmaster who would eventually serve as a general in the Republican army during the war of independence. Born in North Sumatra in 1918, Nasution was in his mid-teens when he enrolled in the Bukittinggi HIK in 1932.[67] While a student there, he and his fellow students were increasingly aware of the arrest of nationalists by colonial authorities as well as other notable acts of defiance against the colonial regime. In particular, Nasution mentions the mutiny on the *de Zeven Provinzien* naval ship, where Indonesian sailors rebelled due to poor treatment at the hands of their Dutch officers, as well as the fame and household notoriety of figures in the nationalist movement.[68] Events such as this spurred both he and his peers' interest in nationalism, so much so that he was once summoned for interrogation by NEI police. Following his completion of HIK, Nasution became a teacher in Bengkulu in Southeast Sumatra, where he encountered more nationalist peers and eventually joined the local branch of the Surya Wirawan.[69]

Stories such as Nasution's are not unique, and many students experienced nationalistic fervour during this time. Djoko Sanjoto, a student of who enrolled in the Yogyakarta HIK in 1938, was expelled after leading his friends in a rousing rendition of the banned nationalist anthem *Indonesia Raya* during an athletics parade down the city's main street.[70] This itself did not seem to be the only deciding factor in his expulsion, as prior to the incident he had already argued with a Dutch teacher over the use of Indonesian during class. Suhendro Sosrosuwarno, a student in Surakarta, recalled

[65] Padmodiwiryo, 2.
[66] Herlambang, Pengabdianku Hanya Untukmu, Bangsa, dan Negaraku.
[67] Abdul Haris Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Cet. 1, vol. 1 (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1982), 18.
[68] Nasution, 1:23; J. C. H. Blom and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma, *De Zeven Provincien: Ketika Kelasi Indonesia Berontak (1933)*, Cetakan pertama (Menteng, Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2015).
[69] Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, 1982, 1:35–36.
[70] Suwignyo, "The Breach in the Dike," 191.

having similar thoughts. Sosrosuwarno described how he became increasingly sceptical of the "Indies history" taught to him by his Dutch teachers, as it portrayed a glorious Dutch conquest against the "natives" of the East Indies.[71] Sosrosuwarno would later become a member of the Surakarta *tentara pelajar* after the proclamation of independence. As it became increasingly apparent that the Dutch and Europeans in general were not the invincible beings that they portrayed themselves to be, many Indonesian youth expressed their doubts about the colonial system more openly.

Whilst, as Kecik stated, many experiences of indigenous scouting throughout the late colonial period only gave young scouts a tenuous grasp of nationhood, it was crucially their first introduction to the idea that would grow to dominate youth activities throughout the Japanese occupation and the war of independence. This commitment to an alternative vision of Indonesian society ultimately culminated in many indigenous scouting groups eschewing any affiliation with their Dutch counterparts. Many groups, including the Surya Wirawan, Hizbul Wathan and SIAP, refused to federate with the NIPV. One of their main objections was that joining the NIPV would necessitate scouts to express an oath of loyalty to the Netherlands and the Dutch monarch.[72] For these groups, who had spent much of their existence imagining an Indonesian society outside of colonial subservience, such an oath would have been unthinkable. This decision on the part of these groups is particularly notable as non-participation in the NIPV as the solely recognised scouting representative of the NEI would have prevented these groups from taking part in events such as the Scouting Movement's World Jamboree, effectively isolating indigenous scouts from the global movement.[73] Though some would ultimately back down, partly due to economic hardships brought about by the Great Depression, the initial decision to decline joining the NIPV is a clear indicator of how much indigenous scouting groups, despite sharing the divisions of their parent organisations, also shared their investment and interest in the anti-colonial cause.

[71] Peter Schumacher, *Ogenblikken van Genezing: Indonesische Ervaringen* (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1996), 65.
[72] Semedi, "Padvinders, Pandu, Pramuka," 25.
[73] Semedi, 27.

The Japanese occupation and the beginnings of a formal militarisation of youth

Whilst *Parindra* was notably influenced by German and Italian fascism, another influence also began to dominate Indonesia's anti-colonial scene. The rise of Japan as a global power throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century was looked upon with admiration by many members of the new *priyayi.* Many HIK students admired Japan and its Pan-Asianist rhetoric, buying into notions of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" by the late 1930s.[74] Nasution expressed similar sentiments, saying that he felt a "strange pride" at the achievements of the Japanese, whom he regarded as "fellow Asians."[75] The aforementioned Sosrosuwarno stated that his then-nascent nationalism was inspired by his father's admiration of Japan as a nation that was able to develop independently of Western powers.[76]

Perceptions of Japan as a beacon of Asian equality to, or even superiority over, European powers were further encouraged by the onset of the Second World War. The German invasion of the Netherlands in 1940 overwhelmed Dutch forces, who quickly capitulated and thus isolated and weakened the NEI. This further exacerbated the Japanese threat, which had already been heightened by the ongoing Second Sino-Japanese War. Crackdowns were made on suspected Japanese sympathisers, with Parindra activism placed under close supervision.

In order to supplement the ill-equipped KNIL, attempts to further integrate indigenous soldiers into its officer corps were made. This most notably took the form of the *Cursus voor Opleiding van Reserve Officieren* (Reserve Officers' Training Course, CORO), an ad hoc officer training school for indigenous soldiers who were willing and able to join the KNIL's officer corps. Whilst the course provided some military training to select indigenous youth, its participants criticised it as being too obsessed with the

[74] Suwignyo, "The Breach in the Dike," 172.
[75] Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, 1982, 1:23.
[76] Schumacher, Ogenblikken van Genezing, 81.

non-tactical side of military knowledge, and it ultimately did little to strengthen the KNIL.[77]

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Japan moved swiftly to occupy Allied colonial holdings throughout Southeast Asia, including Burma, the Philippines and the NEI. The first Japanese forces to enter Indonesia were army units who landed in Tarakan, Borneo on 12 January 1942. Java was invaded on March 1, forcing the NEI Governor-General to surrender on the 8th.[78] What remained of the KNIL and the colonial government retreated to Australia, eventually forming the a government-in-exile. The quick defeat of the NEI at the hands of fellow Asians impressed many Indonesians, many of whom would initially welcome the Japanese as liberators.

The Japanese occupation was the backdrop to which many future student-soldiers would have received their education. The atmosphere of many schools was charged with nationalism, palpable among young students. While this was not necessarily a new development, as highlighted in previous paragraphs, the Japanese occupation of Indonesia during the Second World War served as a trigger that would engage these nationalist sentiments and allowed them to grow. Students were not wrong to be optimistic, as Japanese propaganda throughout their occupation of the archipelago praised Asian unity and brotherhood against Western colonialism.[79] The initial stages of Japanese occupation, however, would dampen hopes for an immediate uptake in nationalist sentiment, as the newly installed Japanese military administration (*gunseikanbu*) would take steps to prohibit expressions of Indonesian nationalism.

These attempts would ultimately be partially reversed by the *gunseikanbu* due to wartime constraints and demands. Japan's conquest of Indonesia was spurred by the need to secure its natural and human resources to support the Japanese war effort. Thus, to mobilise the local populace in support of Japan, the *gunseikanbu* would go on to

[77] Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, 1982, 1:43–48; Djatikusumo, "Prajurit dari Keraton," in *Memoar: Senarai Kiprah Sejarah: Diangkat dari Majalah Tempo*, ed. Tempo, Cet. 1, vol. 3 (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1993), 256–57.
[78] Peter Post et al., eds., *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War* (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2010), xvii.
[79] Ethan Mark, "Intellectual Life and the Media," in *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War*, ed. Peter Post et al. (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2010), 354.

facilitate Indonesian nationalism to some degree. In exchange for committing to the idea of Indonesian independence within an unspecified near future and allowing the use of nationalist symbols like the red-white flag, Japanese officers asked prominent nationalists to rally the populace in support of the Japanese war effort.[80] Within this scope, some expression of nationalism was encouraged by the *gunseikanbu*, though the idea of Japan as Indonesia's "older brother" within the Japan-led Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was always emphasised by the authorities, and to some extent recognised by cooperating nationalists.[81]

The *gunseikanbu* eliminated prior distinctions between Dutch- and vernacular-language education (and thus distinctions between elite and non-elite education) by simplifying the school system, at least in Java, partly with the advice of Ki Hajar Dewantara. While indigenous schools, such as the *sekolah desa,* were allowed to reopen in late April 1942, Dutch language schools were permanently closed during the Japanese occupation.[82] The Dutch middle and higher secondary schools, MULO and AMS respectively, were replaced by the Indonesian-speaking *chu-gakko* and *koto-gakko* in September 1942.[83] For most Indonesians, however, they would be known as Sekolah Menengah Pertama (Middle School, SMP) and Sekolah Menengah Tinggi (High School, SMT).[84] Initial reactions to the change were mixed. Many students and teachers opted to leave the school system entirely, feeling uncomfortable using a language that they had previously never used for formal learning.[85] However, many accounts from both teachers and students describe the use of the new national language as, though difficult at first, a formative experience afterwards.[86] The national language, in turn, was

[80] This seemed to be a kind of unspoken agreement initially, though the Japanese would go on to commit to a promise of Indonesian independence in 1944. See Peter Post et al., eds., *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War*, xxv.
[81] Taufik Abdullah, "Nationalist Activities during the Japanese Period," in *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War*, ed. Peter Post et al., Handbuch Der Orientalistik. Dritte Abteilung Südostasien 19 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2010), 115.
[82] Aiko Kurasawa, *Kuasa Jepang di Jawa: Perubahan Sosial di Pedesaan 1942-1945*, trans. Hermawan Sulistyo, Cetakan pertama (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2015), 380.
[83] Aiko Kurasawa, "The Education of Pribumi," in *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War*, ed. Peter Post et al. (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2010), 322.
[84] Tim Redaksi SMT, *Jembatan Antar-Generasi*, 33–34.
[85]Kurasawa, "The Education of Pribumi," 322.
[86] Amin Singgih, "Mengenang SMT," in *Jembatan Antar-Generasi: Pengalaman Murid SMT Djakarta, 1942-1945*, ed. Tim Redaksi SMT, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998), 105–7; Agus Suroto,

used to teach an early form of national history, a departure from the Europe-focused NEI education. Figures such as the rebellious Yogyakarta aristocrat Prince Diponegoro who fought a war against the Dutch colonial regime in the mid-19th century, previously vilified as a traitor and subversive under the NEI, were for the first time presented within school classrooms as heroes in a long struggle for Indonesian independence.[87] In addition to this, the relative value that the *gunseikanbu* placed on education ensured that school fees were completely abolished. This contributed to an increase in students enrolled, despite the decrease in the number of open schools.[88]

Despite the more national tone that education now possessed, the *gunseikanbu*'s main purpose in encouraging education remained to create an Indonesian populace supportive of the Japanese cause and understanding of their junior position to the Japanese Empire within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese language was a compulsory school subject, much to the disdain of many students. Japanese practices, such as morning gymnastics *(taiso)*, a military-style parade before classes and a daily salute towards the Emperor in Tokyo *(saikeirei)*, were also compulsory in the new education system.[89] These practices were coupled with the formation of organisations dedicated to Indonesian youth.

Early in the occupation, the *gunseikanbu* showcased some interest in indigenous youth, forming the Barisan Pemuda Asia Raya (Greater East Asia Youth Corps, BPAR) in July 1942. The BPAR operated in conjunction with the Gerakan Tiga A (Three As Movement), an organisation designed to ferment pro-Japanese sentiment among the Indonesian populace. Indeed, the BPAR itself can be seen as an evolution of a smaller Gerakan Tiga A-sponsored youth organisation, the Three As Youth Training Centre. While these youth training centres, or *seinen kunrensho*, would be subsumed into the BPAR, they remained important spaces for the exposure of Indonesian youth to Japanese values far beyond the relatively short lifespan of the BPAR.[90]

"SMT yang tak Kulupakan," in *Jembatan Antar-Generasi: Pengalaman Murid SMT Djakarta, 1942-1945*, ed. Tim Redaksi SMT, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998), 127.

[87] Suroto, "SMT yang tak Kulupakan," 127.

[88] Kurasawa, "The Education of Pribumi," 322-323.

[89] Tim Redaksi SMT, *Jembatan Antar-Generasi*, 41–45.

[90] R. B. Cribb, "Institutions," in *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War*, ed. Peter Post et al. (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2010), 108.

The BPAR's aims were rather vague, with its head, Dr R. M. Slamet Soedibyo, saying that that he aimed to shape a "disciplined and obedient youth," though how this would be achieved was not very clear.[91] The BPAR held a grand ceremony celebrating its formation in Jakarta on 7 July 1942, complete with speeches from the leadership of the Gerakan Tiga A and the *gunseikanbu*.[92] However, despite this, it failed to gain a large following outside of Jakarta, and early Japanese efforts to appeal to youths as a whole seem to be relatively unsuccessful and rather disorganised.

However, by 1943, it seemed that the Japanese had better defined the role that Indonesian youth needed to play within the context of the war. In the Sumatra-based monthly magazine *Minami*, published with the approval of Japanese authorities, the Indonesian author of an article discussing the importance of *semangat* (spirit) in education argued that the society in which a child lives necessarily affects said child's development. Centuries of Dutch colonisation had "frightened" Indonesians into submission. The coming of the Japanese, however, changed this. Indonesians were now "confident that [they] were higher [in social stature] than a de Ruyter or a van der Plas."[93] The author then praised the achievement of the Japanese in encouraging not only their own children, but Indonesian children as well, in practicing a *"*strong and resilient *semangat*."[94] Quoting an article from a magazine entitled *Kemadjoean Nippon* (The Progress of Nippon), he wrote that "[Japanese] middle and high schools do not only teach sciences and skills, but also strengthen *semangat*, which is useful for members of the Japanese nation."[95]

He argued that this *semangat* played an essential part in Japan's victories against Western powers, and that it had become "engrained" within the Japanese people,

[91] R.M. Slamet Sudibyo, "Daftar oesaha dari Barisan Pemoeda Asia Raya," *Asia Raya*, 1942, Nomor Istimewa Merayakan 6 Boelan Balatentara Dai-Nippon Melindoengi Indonesia edition.
[92] Bagian Propaganda, "Barisan Pemoeda Asia Raya: Lahir Dalam Zaman Pantjaroba," *Asia Raya*, 1942, Nomor Istimewa Merayakan 6 Boelan Balatentara Dai-Nippon Melindoengi Indonesia edition.
[93] The van der Plas mentioned here might refer to the powerful prewar Dutch colonial governor of East Java. de Ruyter might refer to a famous Dutch admiral from the Anglo-Dutch Wars, likely a staple of colonial history education.
[94] Moenar, "Didikan Semangat," *Minami: Madjallah Boelanan Terbit di Medan*, April 8, 1943, 14.
[95] Moenar, 15.

becoming almost a part of their bodies. He then exhorts Indonesian parents to do the same with their children, to shape a *semangat*-engrained consciousness within them.[96]

The author does not necessarily describe what this *semangat* was. However, in his analysis of the Indonesian war of independence, Anderson argued that the idea of *semangat* was one introduced by the Japanese, through numerous propaganda efforts.[97] Looking within Japanese culture, one understanding of *semangat* can be seen in *bushido*. While often perceived as code of conduct and honour closely associated with Japan's samurai tradition, by the 1930s *bushido* had been reinvented as Japan's "national soul," with its values partly influenced by Western chivalry and gentlemanship and taught across Japanese schools and importantly, the military.[98] Writing in *Minami,* Mohammad Kasim, a prominent North Sumatran author, provides an Indonesian understanding of Bushido. He referred to advice given by the Emperor Meiji to his soldiers to explain bushido as a combination of bravery, courtesy, loyalty and respect.[99] Though he makes mention of how the *semangat bushido* was also a *semangat* that could be used to "work for the prosperity of all, and for the advancement of humanity," it is clear throughout his article that *bushido's* main purpose is to encourage the aforementioned values within a military setting.[100] Youth were the main target of this new bushido-based semangat, as articulated by a the a Japanese officer of the *gunseikanbu* who told Indonesian teachers in Central Java to "deepen the education of *semangat*" and that their duty was to "inflame a *semangat* behind the frontlines [in their students] to progress towards victory."[101]

Scouts to soldiers: The *seinendan* and *gakutotai*

The frequent use of *bushido* and semangat within media at the time could be indicative of a more well-formulated Japanese policy toward Indonesian youth. Early 1943 also

[96] Moenar.
[97] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 32-34.
[98] Oleg Benesch, *Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan* (Oxford University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198706625.001.0001.
[99] Mohammad Kasim, "Nippon dan Semangat Busido," *Minami: Madjallah Boelanan Terbit di Medan*, June 8, 1943, 5
[100] Mohammad Kasim.
[101] "Kolonel Nakajama: Pendidikan Semangat Baroe pada anak-anak haroes diperdalam," *Asia Raya*, January 18, 1943.

saw the replacement of the Gerakan Tiga A with the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Centre of People's Power, Putera). The Gerakan Tiga A was disbanded largely due to its lack of success in mobilising Indonesian support for the Japanese. Though it was helmed by nationalists, it was viewed as being monopolised by members of the Parindra party who had previously collaborated with the Dutch.[102] Additionally, the Gerakan Tiga A, while promoting pro-Japanese sentiment, was not explicitly authorised by the *gunseikanbu*, instead being organised by an enterprising Japanese propagandist whose programs were viewed with scepticism by many Indonesian nationalists.[103] The leadership of Putera, on the other hand, was comprised of a wide array of nationalist figures who had not cooperated with NEI interests. Both Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta had been imprisoned by NEI officials, while Ki Hadjar Dewantara was well-respected for his role in developing indigenous education. Mas Mansur, the leader of the Muhammadiyah-based mass organisation Masyumi, completed Putera's leadership. Though in 1944 Putera would be reformed even further, the leading figures of its successor organisations were largely the same, thus representing the first demonstration of stability within Japanese policy towards Indonesia.

Out of this renewed focus on the youth emerged the *seinendan*. The s*einendan* was perhaps the most prominent youth organisation of the Japanese occupation. On the occasion of the Japanese Emperor's birthday on 30 April 1943, the *gunseikanbu* announced the formation of a *Djawa Seinendan* which, in the words of the chief military administrator, was to be a "strong and gallant body of youth."[104] The stated goals of the *Djawa Seinendan* were, similar to the BPAR, relatively vague, initially aiming to "provide education and leadership" to Javanese youth so that they could better "support the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." This goal was to be achieved through a variety of equally vague means, including "learning different skills" and "doing other things that would help achieve the goals of the *seinendan.*"[105] This would shift over time, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Initially established at a local level, the birthday announcement served as a formal

[102] Abdullah, "Nationalist Activities during the Japanese Period," 115-6.
[103] Abdullah.
[104] "Pelantikan Djawa Seinendan," Asia Raya, April 30, 1943.
[105] "Djawa Seinendan (Barisan Pemoeda di Djawa)", Kan Po, May 10, 1943.

endorsement of the *seinendan* by the *gunseikanbu*. Following this, *seinendan* groups would be formed in local chapters throughout Java and other islands in the archipelago.

The emergence of the *Djawa Seinendan* also coincided with new articulations of the purpose of youth within a "new Indonesia." The idea of Japan's occupation heralding a new Indonesia was used heavily in Japanese propaganda. It was used mainly to highlight Indonesia's "liberation" from Dutch colonialism and the introduction of apparently new, anti-colonial values by Japan. In a special edition of the *Asia Raya* newspaper celebrating the first anniversary of Japan's victory over the NEI, one author wrote that the "new Indonesian youth" must inculcate the three values of "godliness, brotherhood and discipline" in order to achieve a "glorious Indonesia within Greater East Asia."[106] Though one could argue that these ideals were strikingly similar to those expressed by Soedibyo and the BPAR, the *seinendan* that would sport them was a different organisation and would prove to be much more effective in reaching out to youth then the BPAR ever could.

The *seinendan* was not a novel conception of the *gunseikanbu*, instead sharing its name with youth organisations previously established in the Japanese main islands and the then-colonies of Korea and Taiwan. In its original incarnation, the *seinendan* was a largely rural organisation, dedicated to shaping Japanese youth into ideal subjects of Imperial Japan.[107] Part of achieving this aim involved the militarisation of these youth, and the *seinendan* thus served, in many cases, to give Japanese youth early exposure to militaristic ideals. However, in addition to this, many youths in Japan's colonies willingly joined local branches of the *seinendan* to obtain some form of social and physical mobility away from village life.[108]

Though the *Djawa Seinendan* was not initially established for the same militaristic goals as its counterparts in other parts of the Japanese Empire, this would shift as the war dragged on. It is interesting to observe that the outcomes of the *seinendan* differed between newly occupied Java and the more established groups in

[106] Abu Hanifah, "Djiwa Pemoeda Baroe," *Asia Raya*, 1942, Nomor Istimewa Merayakan 6 Boelan Balatentara Dai-Nippon Melindoengi Indonesia edition.
[107] Sayaka Chatani, Nation-Empire: Ideology and Rural Youth Mobilisation in Japan and Its Colonies (Cornell University Press, 2018), 3.
[108] Chatani, 146–49.

Korea and Taiwan. *Seinendan* membership in the latter two increased in part due to the value placed on rural youth by the Japanese colonial regimes. Colonial *seinendan* here largely succeeded in creating a base of youth who were proper "imperial subjects" and ready to lay down their lives for the Japanese Empire, though the experience of discrimination that these youth experienced after volunteering for service in the Japanese military effectively undermined this.[109]

Accounts differ on some aspects of the nature of the *seinendan* in Indonesia. Part of this can be attributed to its relatively short lifespan, lasting only from 1942 to 1945, and its quick supplanting by other organisations, most notably the Pembela Tanah Air (Homeland Defence Force, PETA). On the one hand, Anderson argues that the *seinendan* in Indonesia was largely urban in character, lacking organisational structures to operate into villages beyond the regency level and was in any case relatively unpopular amongst the rural populace.[110] On the other hand, Kurasawa argues the exact opposite, stating that the *seinendan* achieved some popularity in rural areas exactly due to the promise of social mobility, similar to Chatani's analysis of *seinendan* in other Japanese colonies, and was thus an example of rural youth mobilisation that the Dutch had previously neglected.[111] However, even she concludes that the overall effects of the *seinendan* on the Javanese is difficult to quantify.

Either way, enrolment in the *seinendan* was restricted to relatively affluent youth. The *seinendan* had both an age limit (recruitment was restricted to male youth aged 15 to 24) and an educational requirement. For *seinendan* in Kediri, for example, finishing primary school was a prerequisite for acceptance.[112] This effectively meant that *seinendan* membership was restricted to students who had completed their primary education under the NEI, as well as possibly excluding rural youths from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds.[113] *Seinendan* group leaders received special training in the aforementioned *seinen kunrensho* before going on to train both *seinendan* members and

[109] Chatani, 242-43
[110] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 29; William H. Frederick, Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 156-157.
[111] Kurasawa, *Kuasa Jepang di Jawa*, 380, 386.
[112] Kurasawa, 383.
[113] Though it should be noted that the enforcement of these standards differed from place to place.

rural youths.[114] *Seinendan* group leaders were just as elite as, or perhaps even more than, regular members. Following his desertion from the KNIL, Nasution would become a *seinendan* group leader after three months of training at the Jakarta *seinen kunrensho,* with a regimen that he described as worse than his experiences in the CORO.[115]

Additionally, it does not seem that the youth that joined the *Djawa Seinendan* bought into the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, retaining and even nurturing feelings of Indonesian nationalism despite their decision to enrol. This was possibly caused by both the emergence of organised Indonesian nationalism in the 1920s and the short time span of Japan's rule. The Japanese occupation and colonisation of Taiwan and Korea began in 1895 and 1910 respectively, giving the *seinendan* there ample time to take on the project of constructing an ideal imperial subject.[116] In Indonesia, where occupation only started in 1942, they did not have this luxury.

In practice, the *Djawa Seinendan* much resembled scouting groups of the late colonial period and to some extent can be seen as a successor to them. Importantly, unlike the old groups that were fragmented along ideological lines, the *seinendan* had the backing of the government and thus was the first truly national organisation that courted Indonesian youth.[117] This was enhanced by the reforms brought about by the Japanese, which essentially eliminated elitist distinctions within the school system. Indeed, colonial era scouting groups ended up joining the *seinendan* upon its formation. It was no surprise that branches of the KBI ended up disbanding a week after the formation of the *Djawa Seinendan.*[118]

Initially, the *gunseikanbu* was content to use the *seinendan* as a kind of all-purpose scouting organisation for young men, without an obvious goal aside from ideological indoctrination and mobilisation for the war. Importantly, whatever

[114] Kurasawa, *Kuasa Jepang di Jawa*, 383; Nugroho Notosusanto, *Tentara PETA pada Jaman Pendudukan Jepang di Indonesia*, Ed. 1 (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1979), 45–46.
[115] Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, 1982, 1:61–62.
[116] This succeeded to some extent there, though Chatani notes that the ill-treatment of *seinendan*-raised colonial recruits in the Japanese military actually inspired ethnic pride rather than a stronger identity as an imperial subject. See Chatani, *Nation-Empire*, 244-46.
[117] Notably, young women were not allowed to join the *seinendan*. Instead, alternative organisations, such as the *fujinkai*, were open to Indonesian women. See "Djawa Seinendan."
[118] "KBI Soerabaja dibubarkan," Asia Raya, May 6, 1943.

ideological training that the *seinendan* was exposed to was tightly controlled by the Japanese. Kurasawa notes that nationalists and affiliated organisations, such as the Putera, were never allowed to subsume the *seinendan* into their ranks, and it remained a relatively independent organisation under direct Japanese control.[119] This, however, did not necessarily mean that the nationalist elite disliked the *seinendan*, and many appreciated the skills that the organisation aimed impart onto youth. Nor did it mean that the *seinendan* became an unthinking Japanese tool, considering that several nationalist *pemuda*, such as Sukarni, who would go on to kidnap Sukarno and Hatta and force them to proclaim independence in 1945, were part of the *seinendan*'s leadership structure.[120] Many of the *seinendan*'s functions as outlined within the *gunseikanbu*'s edict on its formation were limited to what one would have expected from ordinary schooling at the time. This included training in the Japanese language and in generic skills aimed at increasing wartime production, such as agriculture and fisheries.[121] Unlike the BPAR, the *seinendan* had the full support of the *gunseikanbu,* and there was plenty of guidance available for *seinendan* leaders to carry out their tasks. One *gunseikanbu* publication for *seinendan* leaders provided an in-depth explanation of various aspects of Physics and basic engineering, with the necessary expectation that this would be relayed onto lower ranking members.[122]

After completing a run in the *seinendan,* a student could expect to use the skills he had learned to progress to the *keibodan*. The *keibodan,* aimed for older youth, had a better-defined role than the *seinendan,* and played a practical role in aiding policing on behalf of the *gunseikanbu*.[123] Some *seinendan* members also ended up joining the *heiho,* an auxiliary unit formed to support Japanese fighting units against the Allies.[124]

One activity that the *seinendan* had in common with other youth groups was the *kinrohoshi*. Though it can roughly translate to "volunteer labour," in practice *kinrohoshi* participation was a compulsory part of many Japanese social organisations during the

[119] Kurasawa, Kuasa Jepang di Jawa, 383.
[120] Abdurrachman, "Pandangan rakyat terhadap cita-cita prajurit PETA," in *PETA: Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air*, ed. Purbo S. Suwondo, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996), 64.
[121] "Djawa Seinendan."
[122] Boekoe Petoendjoek Praktek Teknik bagi Pemimpin Seinendan (Djakarta: Djawa Gunseikanbu, n.d.).
[123] Kurasawa, *Kuasa Jepang di Jawa*, 387–88.
[124] Cribb, "Institutions," 108.

war, including the *seinendan*.[125] For the *seinendan*, *kinrohoshi* came in a variety of forms, mostly geared towards aiding in the war effort. In early 1945, *seinendan* participated in the Rice Delivery Movement, aimed at increasing rice yields for both civil and military consumption.[126] Other common *kinrohoshi* activities that students participated in included planting castor oil plants, which would yield hydraulic fluid for Japanese planes.[127] In his novel *Bara Bola Api* (Embers of the Fireball), Slamet Danusudirdjo, then a young secondary school student and later a member of an armed student unit during the war of independence, wrote a scene where members of a secondary school's *gakutotai*, or as he called it the *seinendan sekolah* (school seinendan), placed bets on which form of *kinrohoshi* would be given to them one morning: clearing an airbase or weeds, or cleaning a recently-bombed port of debris.[128]

Though many participants disdained the practice, calling it out as forced labour to aid the Japanese cause, in some circles it received a more positive spin.[129] For example, the medical students of the *Ika Daigaku* dormitory, a hotbed of nationalist sentiment during the Japanese occupation, viewed the *kinrohoshi* as a way of achieving closer ties with the *rakyat* and to aid them in the face of the harsh effects of the Japanese war economy.[130] This aspect must have been particularly impactful for many of these students, who were still largely members of the urban elite.

While limited military training was present within the *seinendan*'s curriculum, notably in the form of anti-air defence training, this was far from the central purpose of the *seinendan*'s formation.[131] Whatever military training was present within the *seinendan*'s program was token at best. For example, some *seinendan* participants remembered the limited military training as the *kyoren*. *Kyoren* involved marching

[125] Himpunan Pas T Ronggolawe, Pasukan T Ronggolawe: Perjalanan Sejarah Sekelompok Pemuda Pelajar Semarang (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000), 7.
[126] Shigeru Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, Southeast Asia Publications Series, no. 26 (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1994), 124.
[127] Herlambang, Pengabdianku Hanya Untukmu, Bangsa, dan Negaraku, 20; Suyono Martosewoyo, Mahasiswa '45 Prapatan-10: Pengabdiannya (Bandung: Patma, 1984), 40–41.
[128] Pandir Kelana, *Bara Bola Api* (Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1992), 31–32.
[129] M. Djamhur Arif, "Stop Kinrohoshi!," in *Jembatan Antar-Generasi: Pengalaman Murid SMT Djakarta, 1942-1945*, ed. Tim Redaksi SMT, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998), 146–47.
[130] Martosewoyo, Mahasiswa '45 prapatan-10, 39–40.
[131] "Djawa Seinendan."

practice with wooden rifles, long-distance running, and bayonet training.[132] Though the Japanese began intensifying military training for the *seinendan* towards the end of the war, especially after the first allied landings on Indonesian soil in September 1944, the nature of this intensification still fell short of actual military training.[133] Indeed, in his study of Surabaya during this period, Frederick noted that the *seinendan* never trained with actual rifles, thus indicating the low military value that Japanese authorities placed on the group.[134]

Though the training provided by the *seinendan* was rudimentary at best, it remained a significant step. Though during its existence the KNIL was open to a host of indigenous ethnic groups, including the Javanese, in practice it was widely perceived to be dominated by minority groups from Eastern Indonesia, such as the Manadonese and Ambonese.[135] Despite Javanese and Sundanese soldiers often making up the majority of the KNIL's manpower of enlisted men, Manadonese and Ambonese soldiers often received preferential treatment, including higher pay and better facilities.[136] This reputation led to the KNIL having a fairly bad reputation among the majority Javanese, with seeking employment in the KNIL perceived as a desperate measure taken only in the most extreme conditions.[137] The *seinendan* thus became the first place for many Javanese young men and those from other ethnic groups to experience some form of military training. Importantly as well, the training they received was imbued with a spirit of anti-Western and, to some extent, pro-nationalist sentiment, which would serve them and the cause of independence well when fighting broke out against the Allies following the Japanese surrender.

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[132] Himpunan Pas T Ronggolawe, *Pasukan T Ronggolawe*. 6.
[133] Shigetada Nishijima, "Economic and Military Mobilisation in Java, 1944-1945," in *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945*, ed. Anthony Reid and Akira Ōki, Monographs in International Studies. Southeast Asia Series, no. 72 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 225.
[134] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 155–56.
[135] Wawan K. Joehanda, *KNIL: Dari Serdadu Kolonial Menjadi Republik*, Cetakan kedua (Mantrijeron, Yogyakarta: Matapadi Pressindo, 2018). 22-23.
[136] Joehanda; Petrik Matanasi, *KNIL, Bom Waktu Tinggalan Belanda*, Cet. 1 (Yogyakarta : Jakarta: Media Pressindo ; Distributor tunggal, Buku Kita, 2007).
[137] Joehanda, *KNIL*, 23. This sentiment among Javanese contrasted with that held by Ambonese and Manadonese, who considered service in the KNIL as a sign of loyalty and trust in them as 'martial races'.. For further information about the ethnic composition of the KNIL, see Henri Eckert, "The Mixed Company: Fighting Power and Ethnic Relations in the Dutch Colonial Army, 1890-1920," in *Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia*, ed. Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006), 146–60.

The low esteem in which the Japanese held the *seinendan*'s military value makes good sense, especially considering that several more organisations had been formed by the Japanese for the defence of Indonesia. One was the *gakutotai* (Student Corps) which mobilised youth even younger than the *seinendan*'s age range for military training.[138] Less is known about the *gakutotai* than the *seinendan*, though one account states that *gakutotai* training was "intracurricular," thus occurring within school hours, and held for at least an hour a week.[139] Other accounts of the *gakutotai* recall similarities to the *seinendan*, such as the practice of *kyoren*, as well as it having instilled "a fighting *semangat* [and] a military spirit within students."[140] *Kyoren* at the school level, which was likely practiced by the *gakutotai*, was similar to that of the *seinendan*, though one account specifically mentions the harsh penalties for failing to meet the standards of the trainer.[141] This focus on *semangat* is also portrayed in the rhetoric espoused by *gakutotai* members, which can be seen as representative of the full extent of Japanese intentions for Indonesian youth and the practice of *bushido* amongst them. *Gakutotai* members apparently extolled the values of the organisation, saying that the workload it placed on them in addition to the usual duties of students was "no issue."[142] One student was noted as saying that "the duty to work outside of the schoolhouse is also a subject worthy of study," while another said that serving in the *gakutotai* would "hasten the achievement of final victory."[143] However, while the cultivation of the *semangat bushido* was an important part of the activities of these Japanese-sponsored youth groups, it was apparent that a form of *bushido* privileging duty and discipline was the one encouraged. One reason for this could have been the trepidation with which the *gunseikanbu* approached providing Indonesian youth with the means and mentality to achieve their nationalistic aims. In any case, it was clear that participation in youth groups such as the *gakutotai* and the *seinendan* showed youths

[138] Post et al., The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War, xxiv.
[139] Sagimun M. D., Mas TRIP : Dari Brigade Pertempuran ke Brigade Pembangunan, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Bina Aksara, 1989).
[140] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 81.
[141] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1985), 31.
[142] "Rasa Tjinta Pada Tanah Air Meresap Ke Sanoebari Pemoeda: Semangat 'Benteng Perdjoeangan Djawa' Dan 'Barisan Peladjar' (Gakutotai)," *Djawa Baroe*, July 15, 1944.
[143] "Rasa Tjinta Pada Tanah Air Meresap Ke Sanoebari Pemoeda."

and students that "*semangat*, however strong, could never entirely replace hard work, discipline and cooperation."[144]

The formation of PETA and the *seinendan*'s decline

While the *gakutotai* remained at best an auxiliary militia force which, like the *seinendan*, received only the most basic military training, the additional grouping formed for the defence of Indonesia was far more professional. These groupings became known as the *giyugun* (volunteer corps) and were formed throughout Indonesia. In Java, they became better known by an Indonesian name: Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland, PETA). These were voluntary corps of young men, given proper military training by Japanese instructors. Unlike the *seinendan*, the PETA trained with actual firearms, and were designated as military units.[145] The PETA were to be deployed in the eventual defence of Java, complementing the existing Japanese occupation forces.

Though prior to its formation, the Japanese had already provided military training to Indonesian volunteers in the *heiho* auxiliary unit, PETA was a distinctly different grouping. As auxiliaries, the *heiho* remained under the direct command of a Japanese officer and were designed as a support unit for a larger, better equipped Japanese unit. In this regard, *heiho* soldiers initially served as a kind of uniformed labour force for the Japanese military, helping prepare defensive positions and being armed only in the direst of circumstances. In contrast, the PETA were conceived from the start, or at the very least presented as such in Japanese propaganda, as a full army conceived by and comprised of Indonesians. Indeed, the Japanese officially attributed the formation of PETA to a letter written by Gatot Mangkupradja, a leading figure in the PNI prior to the Japanese occupation. The letter, supposedly written in blood, made a humble request to authorities to form a "motherland defence force" to aid the Japanese in the defence of Indonesia against a predicted Allied assault.[146] Whether the letter was of actual importance in the formation of the PETA is subject to debate, but the Japanese

[144] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 156.
[145] Shigeru Satō, "The PETA," in *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War*, ed. Peter Post et al. (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2010), 136–37.
[146] "Tentara Pembela Tanah Air Lahir," *Djawa Baroe*, October 15, 1943; *Almanak Soeara Asia.* (Soerabaja: Soeara Asia, Bagian Perpustakaan, 1944), 39–42.

authorities characterised PETA's formation as a response to the eagerness of Indonesians in defending their homeland.

The formation of the PETA has been widely recognised in scholarly research as the birth of what would become the TNI.[147] Indeed, indicative of its importance, the PETA became a fixture in Japanese propaganda in Indonesia after its formation. The picture magazine *Djawa Baroe* (New Java) dedicated a whole edition to the formation of PETA, calling on all fit young Indonesians to join.[148] PETA soldiers became symbolic of a revived Indonesian nation, awoken with Japanese help after centuries of oppression by the Dutch. This, to some extent, left the *seinendan* ignored, featuring only as assistants or apprentices to the PETA and other formal military formations in Japanese rhetoric.[149] While there was no clearly defined organisational hierarchy, joining the PETA was considered to be the apex of achievement of Indonesian youth after completing a run in the *gakutotai, seinendan* or *keibodan*.[150] Newspapers and magazines constantly exhorted young men to join the PETA, which likely fed into perceptions that enlisting into the PETA increased one's social status.[151]

As such, the formation of PETA can be seen as the start of a reduction in the *seinendan*'s prestige. As the Allied threat to the Indonesian archipelago grew towards the end of the war, officially sanctioned publications naturally began to focus more clearly on recruiting young men for the more professional PETA rather than youth organisations with very limited military trainings.[152] In inter-organisational training exercises covered by official media, the *seinendan* were depicted not as equals of the PETA or the *heiho*, but as their helpers. In some cases, PETA leaders provided training for *seinendan* groupings and "increased the standards of their semi-military training."[153] Even in non-cooperative nationalist circles, the PETA gained respect over and above organisations that were perceived to be more subservient to the Japanese, especially

[147] See for example Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*.
[148] For several examples of articles in this edition, see "Bangkitlah Pemoeda!," *Djawa Baroe*, October 15, 1943; "Bangkitlah oentoek Membela Tanah Air," *Djawa Baroe*, October 15, 1943; "Darah Pemoeda jang Menggelagar," *Djawa Baroe*, October 15, 1943.
[149] See "Heiho Memberi Toentoenan kepada Seinendan," *Djawa Baroe*, August 15, 1944.
[150] Abdurrachman, "Pandangan Rakyat Terhadap Cita-Cita Prajurit PETA," 64.
[151] Abdurrachman, 64.
[152] See for example "Belalah Tanah Air," *Djawa Baroe*, May 15, 1945.
[153] Abdurrachman, "Pandangan Rakyat Terhadap Cita-Cita Prajurit PETA," 24–25.

after the rebellion of an East Java PETA section in February 1945.[154] Following the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945, it was the soldiers of the PETA and *heiho* who were first called up to form the newly minted People's Security Bureau, later to become the TNI.[155]

However, despite the enhancement of the PETA's stature at the cost of the *seinendan* and the *gakutotai*, it is important to recognise the different groups of young men the organisations targeted. While joining the PETA was thought of by young men as the logical next step after graduating from the *gakutotai* and *seinendan*, the PETA's pool of recruitment was much larger. While PETA officers were chosen from influential figures in local communities, there were no educational requirements for the PETA's rank-and-file, and many new recruits were illiterate.[156] The *seinendan* and *gakutotai*, were mostly comprised of youth enrolled in primary and secondary schools, meaning that they had received some formal education. As such, while the PETA grew in prominence as the precursor to the TNI, the *seinendan* and *gakutotai* served as places where elite youth in particular, the students of the new *priyayi*, were exposed to military training.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the genealogy of the *tentara pelajar* and argued that they are able to trace their origins to the processes started by the educational reforms spurred by the implementation of the Dutch Ethical policy. Through the greater availability of Western-style education among Indonesian youths, students were exposed to the transnational flow of ideas that proliferated in the increasingly interconnected world of the early twentieth century. It was through this that they interacted with the militarised practices of the global scouting movement. Embraced by youth and the nationalist organisations of the *pergerakan*, scouting movements became places where young

[154] Notosusanto, Tentara PETA pada Jaman Pendudukan Jepang di Indonesia, 120–27.
[155] Aan Ratmanto, *Kronik TNI, 1945-1949*, Cetakan pertama (Mantrijeron, Yogyakarta: Mata Padi Pressindo, 2013), 5.
[156] Satō, "The PETA," 137.

Indonesians learned about nationalism in a militarised setting, interacting with new ideas of citizenship that took them beyond the colonial structures of the NEI.

While these allowed for the development of nationalism as a legitimate ideology among secondary students, it was the defeat of the NEI at the hands of the Japanese, and their subsequent occupation of Indonesia, that allowed these ideas to manifest fully among middle and high school students. The Japanese occupation, rather than introducing militarism, encouraged its growth through the formalisation of militarised youth organisations that aimed to encompass young Indonesians from all walks of life. The *gunseikanbu* aided in this process by establishing youth and student organisations which reached a greater proportion of the youth population than ever before. If during the late colonial period, nationalism was practiced subtly within *pergerakan* scouting organisations, the occupation allowed youth to openly embrace nationalist values and do so with an even more overt commitment to military-style practices through organisations like the *seinendan* and *gakutotai*. In these organisations, young Indonesians were indoctrinated with ideas of *semangat* and were taught to be the equals of Westerners. The elevation of youth to a position of increasing importance through these programmes also encouraged them to begin imagining themselves as pivotal parts of a New Asia, or perhaps an independent Indonesia.

These organisations were both militarised and instilled a greater sense of national pride within Indonesian youth. While this was designed to facilitate Japanese interests and to aid their war effort against the Allies, Japan's defeat and its loss of legitimacy in Indonesia saw this backfire. Militarised student organisations became recruiting sources for armed *laskar* militias, especially for *tentara pelajar* units, while the regular armed forces were still taking shape.

While these organisations did not provide professional military training, with *seinendan* and *gakutotai* members never even holding actual firearms, it is important not to underestimate the impression that these organisations left on their young members. For many, never exposed to the level of discipline and regimentation that these organisations provided, the *seinendan* and *gakutotai* imparted valuable lessons that they would carry into the independence war and even beyond that, as they dedicated themselves to careers in the regular armed forces. Additionally, these groups

also exposed their elite young members to the plight of the Indonesian *rakyat*, which would later help shape their views and become a source of legitimacy for their struggle.

Chapter II

Forming the *tentara pelajar* identity: Battles and debates (1945-1946)

While the formalisation of militaristic practices during the Japanese occupation accelerated the militarisation of the youths who would form the *tentara pelajar*, their evolution into an armed force occurred during the later months of 1945 and throughout 1946. From October to December 1945, different *tentara pelajar* units throughout Central and East Java would participate in a series of decisive battles against Anglo-Dutch forces who had the dual aim of repatriating Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (APWI) and re-establishing Dutch colonial rule over Indonesia. This chapter will outline the emergence of *tentara pelajar* units and their role in these battles, and how their performance became a foundation upon which they could build a reputation as an effective fighting force.

While individual *tentara pelajar* units had been formed in response to wartime demands, questions remained internally over their longer-term purpose. In this sense, the evolution of the *tentara pelajar* also occurred away from the battlefields. While armed students fought on the frontlines, the organisations they were affiliated with, such as IPI, were preoccupied with shaping a sense of identity and purpose for students in an Indonesia that was fighting to preserve its independence. Though students were also members of the *pemuda*, whose strength and dynamism were important parts in establishing it as one of the most important actors of the independence war, they were also keenly aware that their status as *pelajar* (students) accorded them a different set of responsibilities. As students, *tentara pelajar* personnel recognised their elite upbringing and background as the educated sons and daughters of the new *priyayi*. Tensions between these identities, mirroring the dual role of students as both student and soldier, were key questions in the construction of a pelajar identity that distinguished students from the *pemuda* at large. In its attempt to address this issue, the *tentara pelajar* used concepts like national development, the *rakyat* and armed struggle, and began to situate

their roles in each of these. This chapter will analyse how the *tentara pelajar* took part in this process.

Publications from the *tentara pelajar* and its affiliated organisations, as well as other *pemuda* groups, form the core primary sources of this chapter. Most of the major *pemuda* groups had magazines which communicated the values and views of these groups to its readership. The Barisan Banteng's *Banteng* and the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia's (Pesindo) *Revolusioner* that are used to contextualise the *tentara pelajar*'s publications served the largest and most influential *pemuda* organisations. Often its readers were members of the groups themselves, though there is evidence that these groups often exchanged their publications with each other, thus ensuring a wider readership. Student and youth-specific issues were present within the pages of many of these publications. These became exercises in identity building, as many *pemuda* publications sought to contextualise the role of youth within the struggle for independence. As such, understanding how these other *pemuda* organisations viewed their role within the independence war is an important part of understanding how the *tentara pelajar* sought to differentiate themselves from these very groups.

Though the pages of these publications were one space where the *tentara pelajar* were able to construct their identity, its manifestation came in the group's response to the changing political situation they experienced. Throughout 1946, the fledgling Indonesian republic was faced with internal dissent. This dissent manifested through the formation of opposition groups to the government and its policy of negotiation with the Netherlands. This endangered the Republican cause, as these groups threatened to split the independence movement and the armed *pemuda* groups that supported it. This chapter will show that the response of IPI and the *tentara pelajar* to the murky political waters that they had to traverse was consistent with the identity that they had shaped for themselves, thus showing that the *pelajar* were not simply an unthinking component of a monolithic *pemuda.*

In effect, this chapter seeks to address Sastramidjaja's claim of the "rebirth of the student" that followed the "death" of the *pemuda* following the end of the war. As she argues, the "paradox" of the *pemuda* was the tension between their intellectuality

and pro-*rakyat* populism.[1] However, rather than the rebirth of the student heralding the death of the *pemuda*, I argue that the *tentara pelajar* were the clearest example of how both identities existed side-by-side and how these contradictions were effectively negotiated through the shaping of a student identity within the larger *pemuda.*

Before proceeding, it is important to mention why discussion of the *tentara pelajar* in this chapter will focus largely on Central and East Java. On many of the other major islands, such as Kalimantan (Borneo) and Sulawesi, the educational infrastructure was often unable to support the formation of dedicated *tentara pelajar* units. This was exacerbated by the comparatively stronger Anglo-Dutch presence on these islands compared to Java. While guerrilla fighting against the Dutch did take place on these islands, with students often involved, they were never exclusively organised into their own units.[2]

West Java was a notable outlier in the formation of *tentara pelajar* units on the island. A likely cause for the lack of *tentara pelajar* formations there was the strong presence of the TNI within the region, due to its vicinity with the centre of Republican power in Jakarta. West Java was also the base of one of the TNI's best-organised units, the Siliwangi division. The division commander, A.H. Nasution, had a considerable following among the youth in the region due to his past experience as a leader in the local *seinendan*, thus likely attracting students to enlist directly in the TNI.[3] Thus, the formation of *tentara pelajar* units in West Java came only in mid-1946. Even then, it was not its own independent formation, and was instead directly subordinate to the Siliwangi division.[4]

In the initial stages of the war, *tentara pelajar* units were an uncommon sight in Sumatra, the island where resistance to Dutch recolonisation was strongest outside of Java. While IPI would eventually have branches on the island as well, students who sought to join the armed struggle would either take opportunistic action against Anglo-

[1] Sastramidjaja, "Playing Politics: Power, Memory, and Agency in the Making of the Indonesian Student Movement," 86–87.
[2] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 220-225.
[3] Barry Turner, A. H. Nasution and Indonesia's Elites: "People's Resistance" in the War of Independence and Postwar Politics (Lexington Books, 2017), 29.
[4] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 162–63.

Dutch forces or join with the numerous other, more established political *laskar* groups, such as the Pesindo. Aceh is a good example of this case. While an IPI branch opened in the regional centre of Kutaraja in 1946, most students who took up arms were not concentrated in student-specific units.[5] Armed Acehnese students fought on the Medan front in North Sumatra against an Anglo-Dutch presence almost continuously between 1946 and 1948, but they were largely spread out among different groups and were only organised as specialised *tentara pelajar* units later in the war.[6]

The *laskar* and the formation of IPI

The organisational weakness of the TNI in the early stages of the war led to the formation of various independent militias. Known as the *laskar*, these groups were mostly formed around established youth and political associations that had persisted or were first formed under the Japanese occupation. As such, many were divided along political, religious, and even ethnic lines. For example, one of the more dominant *laskar* groups was the Barisan Banteng (BB, Water Buffalo Corps). Formed from the Barisan Pelopor, a youth group formed to complement the PETA during the later stages of the Japanese occupation, it was aligned closely to Sukarno and was led by Dr Muwardi, a charismatic former KBI scouting leader.[7] Another *laskar* group, the Laskar Hizbullah (Army of God), was affiliated to the Islamic association Masyumi and formed during the Japanese occupation. In addition to these large groups, many smaller *laskar* militias also emerged, each with their own leaders and political affiliations.

While this showed the presence of support for Indonesian independence, the sheer number of *laskar* groups made them notoriously difficult for the Republican government and the still-disorganised TNI to manage. Most had no reason to subordinate themselves to the government as they were largely formed and armed independently. Nasution writes in hindsight that "For every *pemuda* organisation there

[5] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 218–20; Soebagijo I. N, *Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI*, 120–21.
[6] See Amran Zamzami, *Jihad Akbar di Medan Area*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1990); Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 217.
[7] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 429–30.

was a *laskar* formation. These private armies grew like mushrooms during the rainy season."[8]

This did not, however, stop the government from attempting to manage them more effectively. The first of these attempts was the first national congress of *pemuda*, held in Yogyakarta from 9 – 11 November 1945. Fifteen *pemuda* organisations were invited to join, with the government taking steps to suggest the fusion of all *pemuda* groups into a single organisation. Many were worker-affiliated youth groups linked to industries like railways and electricity.[9] There was also the Yogyakarta-based IPI, which was formed in a mass rally in the city in late September, as well as the Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi (Sulawesi Indonesian People's Service, KRIS), formed by the Sulawesi student diaspora in Java.[10] Of note as well was the participation of the Surabaya-based Pemuda Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Youth, PRI).[11]

The IPI was among the earliest groups to focus on organising students for the Republican cause. It was formed in Yogyakarta on 28 September 1945 after a three-day long congress of students who came from across Java and Madura. The basis of IPI's organisation were local Gabungan Sekolah Menengah (Secondary School Unions, GASEM) that were formed across Java during the Japanese occupation to mobilise students for the war effort.[12] These included the Yogyakarta-based Mataram GASEM, as well as similar groups in Semarang, Surakarta, Surabaya, Malang, and other major Javanese towns and cities. While the success of the unions in supporting the war effort is questionable, many student leaders in social organisations like the *seinendan* and *gakutotai* were members of these interschool groups.[13] These groups were thus able to foster a degree of shared student identity beyond the confines of the schoolhouse and across different social organisations, forming a base for future *tentara pelajar* units. During the *Ramadhan* holiday of August 1945, the Mataram Secondary School Union,

[8] Abdul Haris Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, vol. 2 (Bandung: DISJARAH-AD, 1977), 119.
[9] Abito Marto Hardjono, *Dokumentasi Perdjuangan Pemuda Indonesia, 1915-1950*, Tjetakan pertama (Medan: Islamyah, 1950), 26.
[10] Hardjono, 22–23.
[11] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution; Frederick, Visions and Heat; Hardjono, Dokumentasi Perdjuangan Pemuda Indonesia, 1915-1950, 22-23, 26.
[12] Soebagijo I. N, *Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI*, 24–33; "Rasa Tjinta Pada Tanah Air Meresap ke Sanoebari Pemoeda: Semangat 'Benteng Perdjoeangan Djawa' dan 'Barisan Peladjar' (Gakutotai)."
[13] Himpunan Pas T Ronggolawe, *Pasukan T Ronggolawe*, 10–12.

which had already taken part in underground resistance efforts against the Japanese, held a small rally in which they proclaimed the expressed aims of "refusing to be students of any government other than that of the Republic of Indonesia," and "devoting [their] strength, soul and body for the independence of the Indonesian nation."[14] The September student congress in which IPI was formed also echoed these sentiments, concluding with a statement saying that secondary students were "a part of the Indonesian *pemuda* and as such is duty-bound to struggle with all of Indonesian society to maintain the independence of the Indonesian nation and people."[15] The strength of IPI was apparent by its quick spread, as it would have branches in every city that had a Secondary School Union.

As the *pemuda* congress began on November 10th, a resolution was brought forward to fuse the groups together into one, massive *pemuda* group. In turn, this group would operate on the principles of socialism and *kedaulatan rakyat* (popular sovereignty). This effort was supported by then-Defence Minister Amir Syarifuddin. Syarifuddin was an ardent socialist and was previously a member of the underground leftist resistance against Japanese occupation and would thus have enjoyed seeing a major *pemuda* group formed under his ideological patronage.[16]

The proposal, however, only attracted a relatively small number of *pemuda* groups, with many deciding to remain independent. These groups, fused together, became known as the Pesindo. Notably absent from the Pesindo was the BB. The group declined the proposed fusion and refused to back a resolution that called for socialism to be recognised as the underlying principle of a newly independent Indonesian state. IPI too refused to join Pesindo and back the resolution, ostensibly stating that it was not for students to meddle in political affairs.[17] In spite of this, Pesindo emerged as a major player in the *pemuda* sphere, alongside the BB and the Laskar Hizbullah. Among the

[14] Paguyuban Tiga Tujuh Belas, *Tentara Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pengabdian III-17, 1998), 18; Soebagijo I. N, *Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI*, 27–32.
[15] Soebagijo I. N, Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI, 248.
[16] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 254–56.
[17] Hardjono, Dokumentasi Perdjuangan Pemuda Indonesia, 1915-1950, 27.

groups that formed it were several somewhat powerful industrial sector youth unions, such as the Angkatan Muda Kereta Api. The PRI also joined Pesindo's ranks.[18]

The Battle of Surabaya and the formation of the TRIP

News reached the conference on the 10th that open fighting had broken out in Surabaya between Republican and British forces. The presence of British forces in Surabaya dated back to October 1945. Even prior to their arrival tensions in Surabaya were already high as pro-independence *pemuda* groups clashed with Dutch former POWs who had just been released following the surrender of Japan. Incidents of violence had already broken out between the two, with civilian casualties on both sides.[19] The most notable of these was the flag incident at the Yamato Hotel in the city centre. Dutch former POWs raised the flag of the Netherlands on top of the hotel on 19 September. Incensed, a large number of *pemuda* stormed the hotel and tore off the blue lower third of the flag, changing it from the Dutch red-white-blue to the Indonesian red-white.[20] Additionally, in the time between the proclamation and the British arrival, the *pemuda* had also obtained arms through the storming of a Japanese barracks and armoury.

Among the more organised *pemuda* groups in the city was the BKR/P (BKR Pelajar, Student's People's Security Bureau), an armed student group that would later become known as one of the most influential units of the *tentara pelajar,* the TRIP. There are differing origin stories for the TRIP. Barlan Setiadijaya, a Surabaya veteran, highlights a meeting between student representatives that took place in a Surabaya high school on September 15 that resulted in a commitment to form an armed student unit.[21] Asmadi, a TRIP soldier, claims that the idea of the TRIP first came in the wake of an illegal mass rally of the Surabaya *pemuda*, including the Surabaya GASEM at Tambaksari Stadium, just north of the city centre, on September 21. Ultimately, the

[18] Norman Joshua Soelias, *Pesindo, Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, 1945-1950*, Cetakan pertama (Serpong, Tangerang Selatan: Marjin Kiri, 2016), 40.
[19] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 197–218.
[20] Ady Setyawan, "Questions about the Flag Incident in Surabaya 1945 – Histori Bersama," accessed October 23, 2019, https://historibersama.com/questions-about-the-flag-incident-in-surabaya-1945/.
[21] Barlan Setiadijaya, *Merdeka atau Mati di Surabaya, 1945*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Widyaswara Kewiraan, 1985), 302–3.

BKR/P was formed in and around September, with recruits filing in by September 22.[22] In the wake of the conference, the Surabaya secondary school union sought to organise the formation of an armed student unit, resulting in the formation of the TRIP the following day. Though admission into the unit was officially restricted to students aged 17 and above, many younger students enrolled nonetheless.[23]

Organising the TRIP at its inception proved to be difficult. Unity amongst the different students and schools was tenuous at best. During the Tambaksari rally, representatives from the multitude of secondary schools across Surabaya butted heads, insisting on particular points and often disagreeing with one another. It was only a call for unity from senior republicans that ensured that colder heads prevailed, thus paving the way to the formation of the TRIP.[24]

These tensions were reflected in the relatively loose way the TRIP was organised at this early stage. The unit was subdivided into four different "*staf*" (staff), loosely organised formations that were roughly structured around several major secondary and vocational schools where most nationalist student activity was concentrated.[25] The *staf* as an organisational subdivision is difficult to define: most accounts gloss over its description, and it did not survive subsequent reorganisations of the TRIP. Abdul Syukur, then a student in Surabaya, attributed the *staf* formations to the lack of military knowledge that the students had, thus forcing them to adopt terms and units that they saw fit.[26]

In this form, the TRIP can be described as the first *tentara pelajar* unit to have been formed, though this is subject to debate. Unlike the TNI, *tentara pelajar* units were founded as irregular formations. Many were formed on a whim and often only received official recognition later as they proved their worth in battle. One example of this is the Indonesia Merdeka Atau Mati (Indonesia Freedom or Death, IMAM) armed student unit, based in the town of Purwokerto in Central Java. The formation of IMAM came on

[22] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 77–78.
[23] Asmadi, 83.
[24] Asmadi, 79.
[25] Asmadi, 80.
[26] Abdoel Sjoekoer, *80 Tahun Abdoel Sjoekoer: Bersukur*, ed. HD. Haryo Sasongko (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafiksi, 2004), 51.

the initiative of local student Suparto, who suggested the creation of a student-soldier unit in a meeting of the local Secondary Students' Union on 15 September 1945.[27] Official recognition from the regional military commander, however, only came on 20 December 1945, after IMAM had sent groups of students to fight in the Battle of Ambarawa.[28]

Some *tentara pelajar* units try to trace their origins to moments where their members first participated in fighting, even if no unit structure had been laid down at that point. For example, the *Ronggolawe* reserve regiment, a student-dominated formation attached to a TNI division, traces its origins to the participation of students in the local Secondary School Union in the Battle of Semarang despite its official formation at a later date.[29] Thus, the TRIP with its relatively clear organisational structure and focus on student recruitment was the first unit of its kind.

On 23 September, the TRIP received training from the Surabaya Special Police, who unlike the PETA and *heiho* were allowed to keep their arms by the Japanese.[30] This allowed the special police to train and arm the TRIP. Later in the day, they were officially recognised as part of the Surabaya TNI following an inspection by the city's military commander, a former PETA man named Sungkono. He was a well-respected figure among the TRIP, having previously been an enlisted man in the colonial navy and taken part in the *De Zeven Provincien* mutiny of 1933, a *cause celebre* for nationalism in the late colonial period. Such was the affinity that Sungkono had with the TRIP that he personally received a salute from them during a military parade.[31]

The British ultimatum of 27 October sparked the first instance of fighting. Aircraft flying over Surabaya dropped leaflets containing an ultimatum from British high command, which had established its headquarters in Jakarta. In the ultimatum, the British demanded that all Indonesians surrender their arms to the British within 48

[27] Team Penyusun Sejarah Perjuangan Pasukan Pelajar I.M.A.M., *Ringkasan Sejarah Perjuangan Pasukan Pelajar I.M.A.M. Purwokerto* (Purwokerto, Indonesia: Keluarga Besar I.M.A.M, 1983), 1.
[28] Iwa Sumarmo and Keluarga Besar IMAM, *Indonesia Merdeka atau Mati*, Cet. 1. (Jakarta: Keluarga Besar IMAM, 1985), 46.
[29] Himpunan Pas T Ronggolawe, *Pasukan T Ronggolawe*, 16–17.
[30] Lorenzo Yauwerissa, *Pasukan Polisi Istimewa: Prajurit Istimewa dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan di Jawa Timur*, Cetakan pertama (Yogyakarta: Mata Padi Pressindo, 2013), 13–15.
[31] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 103–5.

hours.[32] While the British commander in Surabaya, Brigadier General A.W.S. Mallaby, had managed to secure an uneasy truce with Indonesian commanders over the past couple of days to safeguard Allied POWs within the city, his decision to enforce the ultimatum led to three days of fighting throughout Surabaya. These skirmishes were the first instance of fighting experienced by the newly formed TRIP against the Allied forces.[33] Three students died during the fighting.[34]

Sukarno arrived in the city on the 29th to negotiate ceasefire terms with the British. Though negotiations were successful, with freedom of movement on both sides being guaranteed, the truce broke down immediately after he left on the morning of the 30th. Later that day, Mallaby was killed during a gunfight. The identity of Mallaby's killer remains the subject of debate; while testimony from British soldiers suggests that Mallaby was killed by armed *pemuda*, at least one Indonesian historian has written that Mallaby died of friendly fire.[35]

In any case, Mallaby's death served to worsen already deteriorating relations between British forces and the Republican government in the city. On 9th November, another set of leaflets was dropped over Surabaya by British planes, this time demanding the surrender of *pemuda* arms and the release of British prisoners in *pemuda* hands.[36] Republican forces were given a 24-hour time limit to respond. Most *pemuda* viewed this as a challenge to Indonesian sovereignty, a view echoed by the city government. Ultimately, they refused to comply, and on the following day, British forces committed fully to an attempt to capture Surabaya.[37] This marks the beginning of the Battle of Surabaya proper.

The makeup of the TNI in Surabaya was very disorganised at the time, indicative of the hesitance of the central government to take the initiative in forming a

[32] Richard McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946: Britain, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Revolution (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 39.
[33] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 130–34.
[34] Asmadi, 134–37.
[35] McMillan, *The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946*, 46–52; An example of the ongoing debate regarding the shooter of Mallaby can be seen in this news article, Yusron Fahmi, "Siapa Pembunuh Jenderal Mallaby yang Memicu Pertempuran Surabaya?," liputan6.com, November 9, 2017, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3156373/siapa-pembunuh-jenderal-mallaby-yang-memicu-pertempuran-surabaya.
[36] McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946, 54.
[37] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 266–67.

national army. The TRIP was one of the best-organised units within the city, alongside the relatively small numbers of TNI units. They formed a minority of pro-Republican forces in the city, as there also existed an array of *pemuda* groups with their own armed *laskar* units. The most notable of these was the Badan Pemberontakan Rakyat Indonesia (Forces of the Indonesian Peoples' Rebellion, BPRI), which was formed in mid-October.[38] While it emerged relatively late onto the scene in Surabaya, its more confrontational stance against the British attracted a widespread following. The BPRI also possessed a radio transmitter, from which it broadcasted inflammatory propaganda across the city.[39] It served as a platform for one of the BPRI's leaders, Sutomo, to spread pro-independence rallying cries to the Surabaya *pemuda.* Bung Tomo, as he was commonly known, and his cries for the *pemuda* to fight tooth and nail against the British became iconic symbols of Indonesian resolve throughout the fighting.[40]

Many Surabayan *pemuda* also operated outside of the *laskar* and TKR groups. In places where formal organisations were less influential, such as the *kampungs* that dotted the city, many *pemuda* fought with no notion of structure or chain of command. Instead, much of the *rakyat* of Surabaya took the initiative to fight on their own, often without the access to weapons and training that being in an army unit or *laskar* group could provide.[41] In this sense, the *pemuda* were hopelessly outclassed by British weaponry, with the image of young men charging British tanks with sharpened bamboo poles being often cited in subsequent nationalist depictions of the battle.[42]

However, despite their technological advantage, the British were heavily outnumbered by Republican forces, and the sheer passion of the *pemuda* made advancing through the city a chaotic experience. Asmadi described the battle as *perang tawuran* (chaotic fighting), where British troops were faced not only with frontal

[38] Frederick, 243–44.
[39] Harry A. Poeze, *Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri, dan Revolusi Indonesia*, Ed. 2, vol. 1 (Jakarta: KITLV-Jakarta : Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2008), 137.
[40] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 252–53.
[41] Frederick, 261–62.
[42] See for example Roeslan Abdulgani, *Heroes Day and the Indonesian Revolution* (Djakarta: Prapantja, 1964), 27.

assaults by the TNI and *laskar*, but with the numerous irregular *pemuda* assaulting their sides and rear.[43]

The TRIP fought in several different engagements throughout the city. Casualties were numerous. One student of *Staf I*, Sukamto Sayidiman, suffered a bullet wound in the neck during the battle.[44] He was rushed to Simpang Hospital in the city centre, where he was able to recover but was then forced to fight in the defence of the hospital against oncoming British forces. The commander of *Staf III*, Mulyono, was killed while leading his unit in evacuating ammunition from their school building.[45]

Between November 10th and 28th, the TRIP fought throughout the city alongside other TNI and irregular formations. While bloodied, British forces were able to slowly push back against Republican forces, forcing them further and further away from the city centre. On the 30th, British forces had reached the line of hills at Gunungsari, a suburb of the city that marked the southern edge of Surabaya. In one of the final engagements of the battle, the TRIP mounted an ultimately unsuccessful defence of Gunungsari on December 1st, losing five more students in the process.[46] With this, the TRIP began a full-scale retreat, joining the ranks of *laskar* and civilians fleeing the city. They were subsequently able to regroup and reorganise in the village of Jetis-Parengan in Mojokerto, some 50 kilometres outside of the city.[47]

Surabaya proved to be a "cauldron" for the TRIP and the Indonesian nation as a whole.[48] Though defeated, the fledgling Indonesian army proved that it could fight, while widespread *pemuda* support proved that the *rakyat* were, to a large extent, behind the Republican cause. Apart from combat experience, Surabaya provided the TRIP and students as a whole with an added sense of legitimacy as a fighting force. They acquitted themselves relatively well during the battle, and the loss of students could be seen as indication that they had gotten into the thick of it. More importantly, they did so under the auspices of the TNI, proving themselves to the regular army.

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[43] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 139–41.
[44] Sajidiman, *The Tender Power*, 19.
[45] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 198–207.
[46] Asmadi, 218–22; Radjab, *TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan*, 181–87.
[47] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 32–33; Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 192–212.
[48] Abdulgani, Heroes Day and the Indonesian Revolution, 54–55.

The Battle of Ambarawa and the formation of *tentara pelajar* in Central Java

Apart from Surabaya, British landings had also occurred in Semarang, a major port city on the northern coast of Central Java. The circumstances there, however, were slightly different. While there was relatively little resistance on the part of the Japanese to Surabayan *pemuda* attempts to disarm them, in Semarang fighting between Japanese soldiers and local *pemuda* was fierce. Incidents of violence between *pemuda* and the Japanese culminated in the Boeloe massacre, where imprisoned Japanese soldiers were killed by the Semarang *pemuda*.[49] This escalated the violence into an all-out battle, which lasted for five days until the arrival of the British on October 19th.[50] British soldiers then moved to quell the *pemuda* with the support of the Japanese before eventually moving south towards the inland towns of Central Java.

The British advance southwards went as far as the town of Magelang, where they were stopped by the presence of better-organised TNI units and armed student formations from the local Magelang Secondary Schools Union, a subsidiary of IPI. Fierce fighting drove the British back to the town of Ambarawa, just south of Semarang.[51] The fighting eventually ended when Sukarno arrived in Magelang on November 1st. In a parallel to his actions in Surabaya, he brokered a ceasefire and requested the formation of a "contact committee" comprised of both British and Indonesian officers. While the British felt that their main objectives were to secure former POWs, Indonesians were suspicious of the presence of Dutch colonial troops within British ranks, as well as their use of the very same Japanese units that had fought against the *pemuda* in Semarang.[52]

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[49] Han Bing Siong, "The Secret of Major Kido: The Battle of Semarang, 15-19 October 1945," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde* 152 (January 1, 1996): 385–87, https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-90003005.
[50] McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946, 26–27.
[51] R.A. Soerjati Soesanto, "Perjuangan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan," in *Bunga Rampai Perjuangan dan Pengorbanan*, ed. Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia, Cet. 1, vol. 6, 8 vols. (Jakarta: Markas Besar Legiun Veteran RI, 1982), 416–22.
[52] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 2:336; McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946, 27–28.

While the truce was able to hold for a time, allowing for the evacuations of some POWs, the reinforcement of British positions in Magelang raised further Republican suspicion. By November 21st, relations had broken down to such an extent that the British decided to withdraw from the town. While British records stated that they had communicated their intentions to the Indonesian side via the contact committee, Indonesian accounts differ, arguing that the British had left without warning, leading to further suspicion. By this time as well relations between both sides in Ambarawa and Semarang had also broken down.[53]

This marked the beginning of the Battle of Ambarawa, which would last well into December. As British forces tried to consolidate their presence in the town, a hodgepodge of *laskar,* TNI formations and independent *pemuda* descended on their positions.[54] British forces occupied the old Dutch fortifications in the town proper and set up advanced fortifications in the village of Banyubiru, just south of Ambarawa. It was at Ambarawa that many of the fledgling *tentara pelajar* formations of Central Java experienced their first taste of battle.

By this time, numerous students from cities and towns across Central Java had already organised themselves into armed militias, many of which were either sent or went up willingly to the Ambarawa front. The previously mentioned IMAM was one of these many groups. While they had not yet received extensive military training, students of the IMAM attached themselves with different TNI units on the frontlines, hoping to gain some battle experience in the process.[55] Two of their students would die in the battle.[56]

The most established student formations to fight at Ambarawa, however, came from the city of Surakarta, located to the southwest of Ambarawa. Surakarta was a hotbed of *pemuda* activity. Despite the strength of the BB there, many Surakarta students opted to form their own militias, perhaps guided by their perceived identity as

[53] McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946, 226–30; Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 2:337–42.
[54] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 2:344–50.
[55] Sumarmo and Keluarga Besar IMAM, *Indonesia Merdeka atau Mati*, 55–59.
[56] Team Penyusun Sejarah Perjuangan Pasukan Pelajar I.M.A.M., *Ringkasan Sejarah Perjuangan Pasukan Pelajar I.M.A.M. Purwokerto*, 2.

members of the educated elite. Most of these student militias were, like the TRIP, school-based, though there was no early impetus for them to unite under one command as there was in their Surabaya-based counterparts. These school-based militias sported a variety of names. Twenty-two senior high school students were organised into the Laskar Kere (Impoverished Laskar), led by fellow student Achmadi. Achmadi was a key member of the Surakarta Secondary School Union and had maintained a secret discussion group of students who opposed the Japanese occupation.[57] After the proclamation of independence, this group aided in the mobilisation of students in Surakarta and took part in the disarmament of the branch of the infamous Japanese secret police, the kenpeitai, in the city. The "impoverished" moniker was adopted by the group apparently because they believed that in this war of independence, "even beggars need to fight."[58] In contrast, many middle school student militias adopted more idealistic names, such as the Laskar Satria (Knightly Laskar) and the Laskar Pandawa (Pandeva soldiers), after the five strong warriors of Indian folklore.[59]

This is just one example of how many *tentara pelajar* units sought to utilise Indonesia's historical Hindu-Buddhist heritage. While a Muslim majority country by the early 20th century, strands of Hindu-Buddhist culture persisted throughout Indonesia. In Java, Hindu-Buddhist folklore, such as the Mahabharata in which the Pandeva are important characters, was able to maintain a presence in the public consciousness through the practice of shadow puppetry. Shadow plays were regularly conducted on special occasions in the towns and villages of Java, such as during harvest celebrations, or births.[60] This was possibly the easiest form in which the *tentara pelajar* could access knowledge on Hindu mythology. The other major example of their use of Hindu deities was their adoption of Ganesh as part of their insignia. In Hindu mythology, Ganesh symbolises knowledge and wisdom, a perfect fit for the *tentara pelajar* who took pride in their intellectualism.

[57] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 82.
[58] Keluarga Besar SA/CSA, ed., Sejarah Perjuangan Batalion 55 Kompi I-IV, Keluarga Besar eks Tentara Pelajar Pejuang Kemerdekaan SA/CSA (Pamulang, Ciputat: Keluarga Besar SA/CSA, 2000), 28.
[59] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 87.
[60] Ward Keeler, *Javanese Shadow Plays, Javanese Selves*, Princeton Legacy Library (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017), 5.

Of these groups, the Laskar Kere was the most active on the Ambarawa front. These students were placed in the south-eastern sector, where they fought alongside regular units of the TNI's 10th Division. The Laskar Kere developed a fearsome reputation for themselves during the battle, with some other laskar units convinced that Achmadi and his men were bulletproof. This belief might have originated from an incident where the Laskar Kere suffered from friendly fire due to their use of Japanese uniforms. Miraculously, none of their members were even wounded in this incident.[61] This view was perpetuated by Laskar Kere members, such as Suhendro Sosrosuwarno. Sosrosuwarno believed that concentrated meditation allowed him to use his "*kundalini*" to generate a field of energy around him which would absorb and stop incoming bullets.[62] Similar to the choice of naming one student *laskar* unit after the legendary *Pandeva, kundalini* is a phrase used in Hinduism to describe a kind of divine energy flowing within one's body, which can only be harnessed through spiritual practices. In his description of the *kundalini,* Suhendro refers to the shape of *stupas,* Buddhist cone-like meditational structures present on Borobudur temple, located near his hometown of Surakarta.[63]

Though this claim could very well be a mix of myth and exaggeration, the story is indicative of the reputation held by Achmadi and his men. The Laskar Kere would grow in influence and become the most noteworthy armed student formation in Surakarta, largely supported by other local student units like the Student Volunteer Corps (SA/CSA).[64]

While the British had the advantage of better arms and holding fortified positions, the numerical superiority and high morale of Republican units would eventually push them back. British troops were forced to retreat from Banyubiru on December 5th and were eventually forced out of Ambarawa proper by the 15th.[65] While British sources try to present the retreat to Semarang as part of a tactical withdrawal, having already been able to secure most former POWs in the local area, Indonesian

[61] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 90–91.
[62] Schumacher, Ogenblikken van Genezing, 66.
[63] Schumacher, 66.
[64] Keluarga Besar SA/CSA, Sejarah Perjuangan Batalion 55 Kompi I-IV, Keluarga Besar eks Tentara Pelajar Pejuang Kemerdekaan SA/CSA, 62–63.
[65] Ratmanto, Kronik TNI, 1945-1949, 33.

sources present the battle as a victory for the combined forces of the TKR and the *pemuda*.[66] The close of the battle marked the end of campaigning for 1945, apart from several skirmishes in Jakarta and several areas along the fronts of Surabaya and Semarang. Armed student formations thus played important roles in key battles that marked the beginning of the independence war, establishing a good reputation among Republican ranks.

The January 1946 IPI Congress and the formation of the Laskar IPI

The active role played by armed student formations in the Battles of Surabaya and Ambarawa left an impression on the IPI and led it to begin questioning what role students could play in the ongoing independence war. Initially, the IPI was not founded with armed struggle in mind, with the pledge to "never be a student under colonial oppression" more geared toward a non-violent form of resistance. IPI students in territories under Dutch occupation, such as Semarang and Surabaya, often refused to attend schools there, boycotting education as long as it was under Dutch control.[67] IPI students in Republic-controlled areas were encouraged to take part in campaigns to educate the rural populace which aimed to teach reading and writing skills but also doubled as a propaganda campaign to raise awareness of the Republic and the meaning of Indonesian independence.[68] While these sorts of efforts were clearly the IPI's early aim, the brutal fighting of late 1945 led IPI to consider shifting gears.

Partly in response to these changing aims, the IPI organised a congress in Madiun, East Java from 1st to 6th January 1946. The second congress helped further define the role within the war as both a student organisation and a support group for the war effort. The congress categorised its decisions into four main areas of concern, which again showcased its commitment to non-violent means of resistance and student welfare first and foremost, alongside its other wide-ranging interests. The first area focused on education. Demands in this area called on the government to reserve schoolhouses for

[66] McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946, 29–30; Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 2:349–50.
[67] Soebagijo I. N, Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI, 84.
[68] Soebagijo I. N, 69; Soejono Pandji Soeroso et al., eds., *Lembayung Senja: IPI Malang 1945* (Jakarta: De Kepingans eks anggota IPI Malang, 1995), 80–89.

their intended use, increase the number of schools, subsidise private schools and include students in any discussion about shaping a new curriculum.[69]

Another area of concern was "social matters," where the demands reflected the varied issues of the time. A large section was devoted to the welfare of war refugees, who must have been increasing in number following the battles of Surabaya and Semarang. These included housing, moral support, healthcare and financial support. Further emphasising IPI's commitment to education, the congress also considered illiteracy as an important social matter and volunteered to instigate an illiteracy elimination campaign by organising classes focused on reading and writing and building libraries with newspapers and easy-to-read books.[70]

However, it was the congress' decisions in the field of defence that would arguably have the greatest impact on the war. The IPI congress suggested to both the government and the general headquarters of the armed forces to form a "reserve corps" within the army. In another point, the congress suggests that the government use this chance to create an organisation to "rationalise existing strength, especially the strength of students."[71]

Any official government response to this seems to have come rather late. An official decree from the Minister of Defence about the status of students within the independence struggle would only come as late as October 1947, following the formation of the so-called TNI Masyarakat (Social TNI) *laskar* grouping. Considering the variety of *pemuda* groups, it was also likely that the government received demands and suggestions from different organisations concurrently, further dampening the effects IPI's demands would have made. There was nothing particularly special if the IPI organised an official *laskar* affiliate. If anything, they were rather late to the party compared to other *pemuda* groups. However, while initial responses might indicate the relative obscurity of both the IPI congress and its demands, it was likely the first effort to organise students into armed units at a scale larger than one school or one city.

[69] Lola, "Resolutie Kongres Ikatan Peladjar Indonesia di Madioen," *Api Merdeka*, February 1, 1946.
[70] Lola.
[71] Lola.

Importantly, this call for the formation of what was effectively an organised *tentara pelajar* formation, while receiving a lacklustre response from the government, was taken to heart by members of the IPI. In many IPI branches across Java, secondary students took the initiative to form armed groups under the IPI banner. These groups became known as the Laskar IPI, and small towns as varied as Kediri in East Java and Magelang in Central Java all had small Laskar IPI groups in one form or another.[72] The increasing number of these groups entailed the formation of a specialised committee within the IPI dedicated to managing armed students. This organisation, known as the IPI Pertahanan (IPI Defence Section), was formed in July 1946. It would then evolve into the more formally organised Markas Pelajar Pusat (Student Central Headquarters, MPP) located in Yogyakarta.

With the formation of the IPI Pertahanan, there were now three major *tentara pelajar* formations in Java: the TRIP of East Java, the Central Javanese Tentara Pelajar (TP) whose core was very much around Achmadi's Laskar Kere alongside other student formations in Surakarta, and the Laskar IPI who, despite being present in several different towns in Central and East Java, took its commands from the IPI Pertahanan in Yogyakarta.[73] Some independent student formations remained, such as the Purwokerto-based IMAM, but these were relatively small when compared to the aforementioned big three. Even in Purwokerto, a relatively small town to Yogyakarta's west, the IMAM were not the only *tentara pelajar* unit. The larger and more well established was the Purwokerto TP, itself an offshoot of the IPI Pertahanan.[74] Members of this group had attended the student congress that led to IPI's formation in September 1945, representing their local secondary school union, as did many other Laskar IPI members from across Java. These major *tentara pelajar* formations would persist in one form or another to the end of the war, and despite emerging independently, were closely interlinked throughout.

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[72] Soedarwo et al., Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, Wilayah Jawa Tengah, 50–54; Panitya Penulisan Sejarah Perjuangan Pelajar/TRIP Besuki, Prajurit Sangkur dan Pena: Genderang Perjuangan Pelajar (Jakarta: Team Penulisan Sejarah Perjuangan Pelajar TRIP Besuki/Jawa Timur, 1978), 11–14.
[73] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 21–156; Soedarwo et al., Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, Wilayah Jawa Tengah, 35–57.
[74] Keluarga Ex Anggota Be XVII Tentara Pelajar Cie Purwokerto, *Sejarah Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Purwokerto*, 34–42.



Figure 2 A map showing the order of battle of Republican forces from 1946-47. *Tentara pelajar* units were mostly concentrated along the Surabaya and Semarang frontlines. (Map by Robert Cribb. In R. B. Cribb, *Digital Atlas of Indonesian History*, electronic resource (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2010).

Persatuan Perjuangan and shifting *pemuda* allegiances

The formation and consolidation of *tentara pelajar* formations in Java between late 1945 and early 1946 came during a period of change in the conduct of the independence war. The heavy losses suffered by the British at Surabaya and Ambarawa dissuaded them from any further commitment to Java and encouraged them to push for a quicker transition to Dutch boots on the ground. By contrast, Republicans were experiencing higher levels of morale. The battles at Surabaya and Ambarawa, while not clear victories in the traditional sense, with their heavy losses in personnel and territory, showed that there was significant support for independence.

However, the battles also made Republican leaders painfully more aware of the arms disparity between them and British, later Dutch, forces. British forces were able to hold onto Ambarawa for so long despite their numerical inferiority because of their use of heavy artillery, air support and armour, all of which the TNI sorely lacked. In Surabaya, British forces had all three with the addition of support from naval ships stationed in the Madura Strait.[75] This realisation hastened the government's adoption of diplomatic strategies to achieve foreign recognition. This essentially meant taking both Britain and, more importantly, the Netherlands, to the negotiating table and ironing out

[75] McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946, 54–55.

terms that would result in, hopefully, a sovereign Indonesian state recognised by both powers. The government's policy of *diplomasi* (diplomacy) is largely associated with the first Prime Minister, Sutan Syahrir.

Like Syarifuddin, Syahrir did not actively cooperate with the Japanese during the occupation as Sukarno and Hatta did. Syahrir had solid nationalist credentials of his own: he was a leading member of Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, better known as PNI Baru (New PNI), a successor to Sukarno's disbanded Indonesian National Party.[76] For his role in the PNI Baru, he was exiled to Eastern Indonesia with Muhammad Hatta before the Japanese occupation brought this to a premature end.[77] His decision to not cooperate with the Japanese was apparently sanctioned by Sukarno and Hatta, and he used his influence to gather a small following of elite, intellectual youth throughout the occupation.[78]

Sukarno had already met Hubertus van Mook, Acting Governor General of the NEI and overall commander of Dutch forces in Indonesia, as early as October 1945, though this meeting was relatively fruitless and not well-received by many nationalists.[79] Later, in an effort to defend the government's policy, Syarifuddin sought to explain why negotiations with the Netherlands needed to be considered. He argued that nations were "social creatures" like humans and thus had to communicate with each other in order to thrive. In his words, "…like it or not, we will have to talk to each other… on the basis of mutual respect, with a neutral third-party supervising negotiations."[80]

Despite their commitment to it, neither Sukarno nor Syahrir believed that *diplomasi* would be the only way to win recognition for Indonesia. It was largely accepted that negotiation was one tool to achieve that end, alongside armed struggle. The aim of negotiation at this stage was to provide a level of breathing space for

[76] Rudolf Mrázek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia*, Studies on Southeast Asia, no. 14 (Ithaca, N.Y: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994), 82–87.
[77] Mrázek, 138–97.
[78] Mrázek, 219–69.
[79] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 2:157–58.
[80] Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica: Sedjarah Dokumenter dari Pertumbuhan dan Perdjuangan Negara Republik Indonesia (Djakarta: Bulan-Bintang, 1953), 110–15.

Republican forces to regroup and reorganise, in order to place them in a stronger position if fighting with the Dutch was to resume.[81]

However, internally opposition was already building against taking the diplomatic road under any circumstance, even for such limited aims. In particular, there was fear that complete independence for the Republic of Indonesia, which at this stage claimed the entirety of the NEI, would be sacrificed for only partial control over the archipelago or an arrangement that placed the Republic in a subordinate position to the Netherlands. Again, while the battles of Surabaya and Ambarawa were not necessarily the clearest victories for the Republicans, the fighting spirit of the *pemuda* and their sacrifice often made front page news in nationalist newspapers.[82] This helped harden large sections of the Indonesian populace against *diplomasi,* including the many *laskar* groups and large sections of the TNI who bore the brunt of the fighting.

It was during this period in early 1946 that Tan Malaka stepped into the limelight. A member of the Minangkabau ethnic group from western Sumatra, he was a veteran of the nationalist movement, obtaining fame as a member of the PKI during the 1920s. After being exiled to Europe by the NEI government because of his leading role in the PKI, he became an important figure in the international communist movement, ultimately working for the Comintern in Asia before returning to Japanese-occupied Indonesia in 1942.[83] While he played an important role in garnering support for Sukarno and Hatta in the immediate aftermath of the Proclamation of Independence, he never became a part of the government, instead remaining in the background.[84]

He was present in Surabaya during the battles of late 1945, and it was there that he wrote *Muslihat* (Strategy), one of many political pamphlets which outlined his socioeconomic views. *Muslihat* forwards his views on the strategies with which the independence war could be won, including a seven-step program that he believed would guarantee victory, through a series of imagined conversations between people who

[81] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 2:161–65.
[82] For example, see "Pemoeda Kita Lebih Tjinta 70 Djoeta Rakjat Dari Pada 20,000 Pendoedoek Semarang," *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, December 25, 1945, 89 edition.
[83] Arif Zulkifli et al., eds., *Tan Malaka: Bapak Republik yang Terlupakan*, Cet. 1, Seri buku Tempo. Bapak bangsa (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2010), 10–11.
[84] Zulkifli et al., 12–23.

represented different classes and groups in Indonesia. The crux of his argument in the pamphlet was his criticism of a diplomacy-first approach in winning the war. In one dialogue, Denmas, the character representing the Javanese *priyayi* aristocracy, argues that diplomacy was required to supplement the military inferiority of Indonesian forces. "Foreign sympathies" for the cause of independence were needed for its success.[85]

Godam, the character representing the working class (and quite clearly Tan Malaka's voice within the pamphlet), responds by saying that "foreign recognition is not a prerequisite for the existence of an Indonesian Republic."[86] This sparked further conversation between the five characters about the issue, with many distrusting the British presence in the country as simply paving the way for Dutch recolonisation, and subsequently the exploitation of Indonesia's resources and people by the Western capitalist class. Eventually, Godam concludes this section of the pamphlet by stating that "Indonesian diplomacy is not a diplomacy of begging and receiving. Fighting for and taking what is ours, that is our diplomacy!"[87]

In stating this, he made it immensely clear whom he opposed. The first step in his 7-step "Program of the Platform of People's Struggle" was to "form a fighting government, derived from the fighting people." Pacul, the representative of the peasantry, responds to Godam by saying that this government could not be one that did not "[…] fight alongside the struggling people, and simply await a gift from these careless imperialists, or even seek a compromise with them!"[88] The second step was to create a "people's *laskar*." Toke, the representative of the middle class, said that the people's *laskar* needed to be "completely detached from a leadership… eager to 'compromise', or cowardly surrender."[89]

The criticism presented against the government's policy of negotiation is clearly visible in *Muslihat.* His call to form a people's *laskar* was clearly a call for the *pemuda* and *laskar* groups, still eager to fight, to rally around a militant, revolutionary

[85] Tan Malaka, "Tan Malaka: Muslihat (1945)," accessed October 25, 2019, https://www.marxists.org/indonesia/archive/malaka/1945-Muslihat.htm.
[86] Malaka.
[87] Malaka.
[88] Malaka.
[89] Malaka.

government. While *Muslihat* itself was not widely circulated, the presence of sympathisers for this viewpoint within the political elite boosted Tan Malaka's visibility to the public. Muhammad Yamin, a prominent nationalist intellectual and fellow Minangkabau who helped write Indonesia's provisional constitution, sang praises to Tan Malaka in a series of newspaper articles highlighting his speaking prowess and influence on the youth.[90]

The manifestation of Tan Malaka's ideas came on January 4th and 5th during a mass meeting in Purwokerto meant to discuss the current circumstances of the independence struggle. Present at the meeting were several political parties, such as the PKI and Syarifuddin's own Socialist Party.[91] The Masyumi Islamic mass organisation was also present. There were also delegations from numerous *pemuda* and *laskar* groups, such as the BPRI, Pesindo, and the KRIS. Militarily, the most influential attendee of all was Sudirman, Commanding General of the TNI. Previously a colonel, his leadership at the Battle of Ambarawa, combined with his credentials as a former PETA officer and his relative popularity. allowed him to rise to the top position of the TNI. Tan Malaka too was present.[92]

On the second day of the meeting, Tan Malaka spoke and outlined the need for a "minimum program" to be the basis of the struggle for independence. To achieve the minimum program, unity amongst the different pro-independence organisations was required to present a strong, united front to the would-be Dutch occupiers. For this, he called for the formation of a Volksfront (People's Front), a popular front-type organisation that would include the groups present at the meeting.[93] Though he did not outline the contents of this minimum program in his speech, he consistently repeated its aim: *Kemerdekaan 100%*. This catchphrase became the most popular slogan to emerge from the meeting and would become the rallying cry for his new organisation.[94]

[90] Harry A. Poeze, *Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri, dan Revolusi Indonesia*, Ed. 2, vol. 4 (Jakarta: KITLV-Jakarta : Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2008), 185–89.
[91] "Hasrat Perdjoeangan Rakjat Indonesia," *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, January 4, 1946, 89 edition.
[92] "Hasrat Perdjoeangan Rakjat Indonesia."
[93] Tan Malaka, "Isi dan Soesoenan Volksfront," *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, January 4, 1946, 89 edition.
[94] Malaka.

On the 15th, a follow-up meeting for the Volksfront was carried out in Surakarta. It was largely dominated by the same participants of the Purwokerto meeting, though a notable addition was the head of the fledgling Indonesian Navy. The Surakarta meeting gave the Volksfront an official, Indonesian name, Persatuan Perjuangan (Union of Struggle, PP) and formalised the minimum program. The finalised contents of the minimum program were largely similar to what Tan Malaka outlined in *Muslihat,* including points such as the creation of a "true people's army" and the need for a "true people's government," both of which would be revolutionary in nature.[95] The most important point was that any negotiation, based on 100% independence, could only be carried out after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Indonesian soil, a direct challenge to the Syahrir government's current policy of negotiations. Between the 15th and the end of January, the structure of the PP would begin to take shape. On the 27th, during another congress in Surakarta, it formed a governing secretariat, which comprised the BPRI, Masyumi, Pesindo and the Indonesian Labour Party.[96] Some seventeen other parties and organisations sought to join the PP during the congress as well. While most of these groups were present at previous meetings, a notable addition was the BB, which appears to have only joined at this date.

With this strength, the PP became a powerful group, largely successful in unifying those organisations dissatisfied with the government's negotiation policies. Even Syahrir was forced to adopt the slogan of 100% independence, though this was not enough to satiate his critics. A PP delegation sent to pressure the government only heightened the sense of precarity that Syahrir's cabinet must have already been feeling. The pulling power of the PP was also undeniable and was enough to organise a mass demonstration in Yogyakarta on February 17th, with Sudirman himself present as a speaker.[97] Eventually, PP pressure was enough to force Syahrir to tender his resignation in late February. Sukarno, however, still supported Syahrir, and was able to reappoint him as Prime Minister only a few days after his resignation.[98]

[95] Poeze, Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri, dan Revolusi Indonesia, 2008, 4:237.
[96] "Secretariaat Persatoean Perdjoangan Dibentuk," *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, January 31, 1946, 108 edition.
[97] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution., 310.
[98] Anderson, 315–20.

Politics. *pembangunan* and the *rakyat*: A role for *pelajar* amongst the *pemuda*

The presence of Pesindo, BB and numerous other *pemuda* groups within the PP's ranks contrasts with the notable absence of IPI and other student groups. IPI in particular was occupied by other affairs during the first *Volksfront* meeting at Purwokerto, with the Madiun IPI Congress being held at the same time of the Purwokerto meeting. However, it is also highly likely that its absence from any subsequent meeting and its absence from the roster of PP members was due to its own expressed aversion to politics. Indeed, while the PP was keen on preserving the image of a loyal opposition, even encouraging the government to join its ranks, it was quite clear through the pressure it exerted to force Syahrir's resignation that it aggressively opposed the government.

Indeed, IPI's tendencies towards notional apoliticism could be seen as early as the Yogyakarta youth congress, where, as stated earlier, it refused to back a resolution which would adopt socialism as a basic principle of an independent Indonesia.[99] Even as IPI might have agreed with the rallying cry of *Kemerdekaan 100%,* their use of it in their main media organ, *Api Merdeka,* was sparing and often free of any kind of endorsement of the PP.[100] Here distinctions and cleavages within the *pemuda* cause become apparent, which are important to unpack in analysing the formation of a *tentara pelajar* identity.

The two major *pemuda* organisations at this stage, Pesindo and BB, were a far cry from IPI when it came to expressing their own political views. Both Pesindo and BB, being out-and-out members of the PP, openly supported the organisation, correspondingly criticising what they viewed as the government's weak stance against the Netherlands. Politically, Pesindo proudly displayed its leftist affiliations in its name, while its main media organ, the magazine *Revolusioner,* often carried articles on Marxist political economy, the heroism of Second World War Soviet partisans and biographies of leading communists.[101] Leading *Pesindo* members were also a part of

[99] Hardjono, Dokumentasi Perdjuangan Pemuda Indonesia, 1915-1950, 26–27.
[100] Ri Dirdjokoesoemo, "Persatoean," *Api Merdeka,* June 1946.
[101] For example see G. Soekarno, "Marxisme, dipandang dari Soedoet Filosofi," *Revolusioner,* January 17, 1947; I. Widjaja, "Bertempoer dalam Laskar Gerilja," *Revolusioner,* January 27, 1947; J. Romein, "Riwajat Hidoep Lenin," *Revolusioner,* January 26, 1946.

Defence Minister Amir Syarifuddin's Pendidikan Politik Tentara (Army Political Education, *Pepolit*) project, in which he sought to create a class of officers who would be responsible for the political education of army units, similar in role to the political commissars of the Soviet Army.[102] Indeed, Pesindo would be closely associated with Syarifuddin throughout the war, seeing that it was formed primarily with his support. This would create some discontent amongst the professional officer corps, which is discussed further in this chapter.

The case for the BB was slightly different. Initially, like IPI, it chose not to vote for the socialist resolution. The BB's political leanings initially seem to be ill-defined, aside from its loyalty to Sukarno and overall nationalism. Its leader, Dr. Muwardi, was a close friend of the president.[103] Another principle that the BB was strongly married to was that of *kedaulatan rakyat*, or popular sovereignty, though this was the case of most, if not all *pemuda* groups. The definition of *kedaulatan rakyat* itself is rather vague, which became a cause of further diverging opinions on the course and nature of the independence war.

Kedaulatan rakyat, in Tan Malaka's and the general socialist viewpoint, involved not only independence from foreign colonial powers, but also from the systems which they had used to control the *rakyat* themselves. This included people such as the *pangreh praja* (rulers of the realm), later renamed to the *pamong praja* (protectors of the realm). Largely drawn from the local aristocracy, the *pamong praja* were the educated administrators of the NEI and were largely retained during the Japanese occupation.[104] Following the proclamation of independence, Sukarno too sought to retain the *pamong praja* and other components of local control to ensure continued governance, though he did advise the *pamong praja* to forget any pretensions of being better than the populace at large, and to be closer to the people. The *pangreh praja* were then renamed as the *pamong praja*, perhaps to show that this once elite

[102] Soelias, Pesindo, Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, 1945-1950, 83–84.
[103] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 263–64., 263-264.
[104] Shiraishi, An Age in Motion, 27–28; Satō, War, Nationalism and Peasants, 26–27.

group now sought to protect the *rakyat* and be an integral part of the new *kedaulatan rakyat*.[105]

This view was not universally accepted. In the chaotic early days of the independence war, many *pemuda* groups forcibly, and often violently, removed the *pamong praja* from their positions. One example was the *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah* (Three Regions' Affair) on the northern coast of Java, where in October 1945, the *pamong praja* were removed from their positions by a combination of leftist nationalist militias.[106] Similar "social revolutions" occurred in North Sumatra and Aceh, where revolutionary *pemuda* groups ousted, often violently, local aristocrats that were rather lukewarm about supporting the independence movement.[107]

Among *pemuda* organisations, Pesindo was particularly vocal in its criticism of the continued use of colonial-era *pamong praja*.[108] Pesindo opined that many of the *pamong praja* did not possess enough revolutionary elan, thus compromising their legitimacy in the eyes of the *rakyat*.[109] This, in turn, compromised the whole idea of *kedaulatan rakyat*. Through *Revolusioner,* Pesindo asked that the government instead appoint *pamong praja* who were more revolutionary in spirit.

This leftist interpretation of *kedaulatan rakyat* seems to have been more closely adopted by the BB as the war continued. Like Pesindo and other *pemuda* groups, BB had its own publication. Rather unimaginatively titled *Banteng,* it was published as a bi-weekly magazine. Aspects of the groups ideological evolution can be seen in the pages of *Banteng*. Initially, *Banteng* addressed the concept of *kedaulatan rakyat* in more practical ways, such as through encouraging the establishment of economic collectives and cooperatives to implement *kedaulatan rakyat* economically. It does not take long, however, for *Banteng* to begin describing socialism as a means to uplift the *rakyat* from

[105] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 113.
[106] Anton Lucas, "The Tiga Daerah Affair: Social Revolution or Rebellion?," in *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity*, ed. Audrey Kahin (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 23–54.
[107] The Sumatran social revolutions are discussed in detail in Eric Morris, "Aceh: Social Revolution and the Islamic Vision," in *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity*, ed. Audrey Kahin (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 83–110 and Anthony Reid, *The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra* (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
[108] Asmara Hadi (H.R.), "Revolusi Kita," *Revolusioner*, September 17, 1946.
[109] M.T., "Dimana Batas Kedaulatan Rakjat?," *Revolusioner*, February 2, 1946.

their current, "feudal" conditions brought upon by them by colonialism and capitalism, thus preparing them to take power in a true manifestation of *kedaulatan rakyat*.[110]

IPI's main publication, *Api Merdeka,* also expressed support for socialism from time to time, using the similar rhetoric of it being a cure to the woes of the perceived feudal nature of Indonesian society. However, unlike *Banteng* and *Revolusioner,* socialism is far from being the focus of most *Api Merdeka* issues. While some articles carried by *Api Merdeka* espouse socialistic or pro-labour viewpoints, they are featured sporadically at best.[111] Much of the bulk of the publication instead seems to have consisted of discussions of the current state of the struggle, translated pieces from abroad and readers' contributions, such as short stories and poetry. Another important part of *Api Merdeka* were student-specific concerns, which were present consistently throughout most issues.[112]

This is where a look at the distinctions between these three publications, and the three organisations that they represent, might give us further insight into the formation of a *tentara pelajar* identity. For IPI, it was important that, being students, they remain politically neutral outside of their own nationalist commitment to an independent Indonesia. What apoliticism meant for the *tentara pelajar* was thus not an aversion to politics itself, but to political activities which they viewed to be detrimental to the cause of independence. This was first seen at the Yogyakarta congress but was affirmed by *tentara pelajar* units affiliated to IPI further down the line. Importantly, despite the geographical distance between the IPI in Yogyakarta and the TRIP in East Java, they came to roughly the same conclusion regarding politics and other aspects of the *tentara pelajar* identity independently. An article by *Patria,* the main publication of the East Javanese TRIP, in November 1946 argued that students had to stay clear of the "taint" of politics. The writer, Tanoe, argued against the claim of the author of an article in an earlier edition of *Patria* that it was within the interests of Indonesian students to take an active role in political developments and ideologies. Instead, Tanoe likened students to

[110] "Dari Zaman Feodalisme ke Sosialisme," *Banteng*, February 21, 1946.
[111] A rare example is Lola, "Soeara Rakjat Moerba," *Api Merdeka*, June 1946.
[112] For example, Tatang Mahmoed, "Longgarkanlah Belenggoe Asrama Peladjar!," *Api Merdeka*, March 16, 1946. discussed the issues surrounding boarding schools and the lack of freedoms for students in such facilities.

flower saplings, still far from showing their true colours. The focus at this stage needed to be the struggle for independence: social change would naturally follow from that. Introducing politics to these tender saplings, he argued, might jeopardise their growth, or even poison them. Tanoe expressed this view clearly, urging those who sought to involve students in politics to "give a chance for these flowers of the nation to obtain their true colours, not to be dyed in the colours of someone else. Do not let poisonous plants grow from pure seedlings."[113]

Thus, there was a contrast between the "purity" of students and the perceived "dirtiness" of politics. The roots of the emergence of this idea among the *tentara pelajar* partly lie in the notion of prioritising independence above other aspects of Indonesia's political future but can also be seen in several pre-war student and youth movements. The scouting group that many *tentara pelajar* originated from, the KBI, was largely nationalist in character and chose not to engage directly with ideas such as communism or socialism. Indeed, one of the reasons the KBI failed to federate with other scouting groups in the 1930s was largely due to the refusal of its nationalist subgroups to acquiesce to the demands of Islamic groups to make being a Muslim a prerequisite to joining the organisation. In its stated aims, despite championing Indonesian independence, the KBI remained non-partisan, indicative of the apolitical legacy that it would impart onto *tentara pelajar* units.[114]

Additionally, the view of students being "pure" is likely linked to the notion that students were a class apart from the *rakyat* at large. This view was subsequently amplified by Sukarno's own call for the *pemuda* to participate in *pembangunan* (national development). In a speech delivered on 5 January 1946, Sukarno stressed the importance of three different types of *perjuangan*. The first two he described were offensive and defensive *perjuangan*, clearly referring to the armed struggle. However, the third type of *perjuangan* that he described was "constructive" *perjuangan*.[115] This was the means with which Sukarno was able to attach the idea of national development to the independence struggle. Constructive *perjuangan* as used by Sukarno described

[113] Tanoe, "Peladjar Berpolitik," *Patria*, December 15, 1946.
[114] Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia tjabang Mataram, *Kitab peringatan Pangeran Dipanegara*. (Djokja: Kepandoean Bangsa Indonesia, Tjabang Mataram, 1933).
[115] "Memperkoeat Isi Toeboeh Negara Kita," *Merdeka*, January 7, 1946, 84 edition.

national development in the widest possible sense and was strongly linked with economic and industrial growth.

This was not the first nor the last use of *pembangunan* within the Indonesian political landscape. The phrase might have derived from the Dutch word *ontwikkeling*, which was used to describe development in the NEI in the early twentieth century. One example of its use was to describe the "cultural development" of indigenous Indonesians to prepare them for duties within the colony's administration.[116]

This new emphasis on the importance of development in the independence war was quickly seized upon by the different *pemuda* organisations, who saw the call as being perfectly tuned to older ideas of Indonesian *pemuda* identity.[117] Youth actively tried to stake a claim to the *pemuda* legacy through these publications, publishing articles that glorified the historic legacy of the *pemuda* struggle. For example, it was common for *pemuda* groups to point at the 1928 Youth Pledge as a pivotal moment that showcased the primacy of place that the *pemuda* held in the pantheon of national struggle. Students as a subset of *pemuda* could point to an even further legacy, as many of the early nationalist youth groups began life as student groups.[118]

The role of the *pemuda* in development thus became heavily propagandised within various *pemuda* publications. *Banteng* described supporting national development as a form of *perjuangan* that occurred behind the front lines, whose aim was to empower the Indonesian people. This posited national development as an important support in achieving *kedaulatan rakyat*.[119] *Banteng* urged for the formation of cooperatives as a means of supporting a development-oriented socialist economy that also empowered the *rakyat*. Cooperatives, *Banteng* argued, encouraged self-reliance and solidarity amongst the *rakyat* through the necessary cooperation required to keep them running. This fostered a spirit of *gotong royong* (mutual assistance), which both

[116] Suwignyo, "The Breach in the Dike," 50.
[117] An example of this view of the *pemuda* can be seen in Mantoro Tirtonegoro, "Promotor," *Revolusioner*, February 2, 1946.
[118] A notable example was Hatta's *Perhimpunan Indonesia,* a group comprised of Indonesian students in the Netherlands. See Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200,* 22.
[119] Benteng Pedan, "Pembangoenan Negara," *Banteng,* February 14, 1946.

strengthened the *rakyat* and made steps towards the much yearned for socialist economy.[120]

In *Revolusioner*, though Pesindo mentions that development was an important part of the struggle for independence, it falls short of advocating policies directly linked towards *pembangunan.* However, one could argue that Pesindo saw development as necessary in achieving socialism, which it advocated for consistently in the pages of *Revolusioner.* Examples of such articles include translations of foreign language works on Marxist political economy and Leninism.[121] More original pieces in *Revolusioner* call for Pesindo youth to be "beacons of socialism," and to be watchful of the Indonesian bourgeoisie, whose pro-nationalist sentiment it viewed to be a passing affair.[122]

In contrast to the relatively general manner in which Pesindo and BB discussed it, IPI took steps to weave *pembangunan* into a particular, student identity, separate from the *pemuda* at large. This distinction between students *(pelajar)* and the *pemuda* at large was an important part of the shaping of a *tentara pelajar* identity and was heavily used by IPI and other *tentara pelajar* units. At first glance, pointing at this distinction might seem rather nit-picky. Indeed, writing in late 1946, the editorial staff of *Patria*, the main TRIP publication, wrote that the choice to adopt the *pelajar* designation was simply to indicate that the formation was made up of students.[123] However, the need to make that distinction serves to indicate the importance of the *pelajar* designation to those students who took part in the war. To further examine the use of *pelajar* by *tentara pelajar* formations like the IPI and TRIP, it is important to inspect the educational context in which these organisations and their members developed.

As mentioned in Chapter I, formal education for Indonesians during both the NEI and the Japanese occupation was largely the realm of children of the elite, i.e., the *pamong praja* and other parts of the *priyayi* class. This elitism permeated into the new student-based organisations and their *laskar* formations and is reflected by the

[120] "Koperasi sebagai Sendi Kemakmoeran Bangsa Indonesia jang Sehat," *Banteng*, February 28, 1946.
[121] For example, see Joseph Stalin, "Beberapa so'al tentang Leninisme," *Revolusioner*, June 9, 1946.
[122] Soekarno, "Soeloeh Socialisme," *Revolusioner,* June 9, 1946.
[123] Tjak Gahyo, "Tentera Pelajar."

insistence of IPI and other *tentara pelajar* organisations to distinguish themselves from the *pemuda* at large.

In its calls to action, for example, *Api Merdeka* does not simply call on the *pemuda*, but instead the "*pemuda pelajar*", or "student-youth."[124] In using this phrase, IPI thus not only stakes the claim of students to the *pemuda* identity and its glorious lineage, but also marks students out as separate from the remaining *pemuda. Api Merdeka* further emphasises this distinction, with many contributing authors to the publication referring to the *pemuda djelata* or even *pemuda desa* as examples of uneducated, non-student youths.[125] *Patria* too makes this distinction when speaking about *pembangunan*, addressing its call to be more "culturally developed" to students in particular, instead of *pemuda* in general, perhaps seeing greater potential for cultural development in students rather than less-educated youth.[126]

Thus, being *pelajar* as well as *pemuda* gave students, and student-soldiers, an even more specialised role in the independence war. In IPI's view, the elite and educated nature of students positioned them as exceptionally capable to uplift the uneducated *rakyat*, perhaps preparing them for a future of *kedaulatan rakyat*: one *Api Merdeka* article called upon students to participate in *pembangunan* by translating foreign language textbooks into Indonesian, as they were a literate minority amongst the illiterate masses.[127] While such views of an intellectual *pemuda* were echoed in some other groups, IPI sought to assign this particular feature exclusively to students.[128] In a way, IPI thus embraced the idea of "cultural development" as being a form of *pembangunan* that students were best equipped for.

Studying was thus seen as a key part of the *pembangunan* process. Through studying, one author in *Api Merdeka* argued that students were doing their bit to ensure the future of an independent Indonesia, and that such effort would be just as important, if not more, than fighting in the frontlines. As the *rakyat* did not have the technical

[124] For one example of this phrase in use, see Pimpinan Oemoem Api Merdeka, "Boeah Bakti Pelajar," *Api Merdeka*, November 1946.
[125] Pimpinan Oemoem Api Merdeka.
[126] Padmi, "Ontwikkeling sama dengan Beschaving?," *Patria*, December 15, 1946.
[127] "Masa Pembangoenan," *Api Merdeka*, December 1, 1945.
[128] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 286 sees similarities between Pesindo and tentara pelajar discourse, though it is apparent that socialism is more important to Pesindo than intellectualism.

knowledge or intellectual capacity to help develop Indonesia in a more sophisticated manner, the onus was thus on students to absorb as much knowledge as possible for the good of the nation.[129] This point was pressed continuously in *Api Merdeka.* Students, for instance, were encouraged to choose subjects useful to development, such as science or engineering, when considering tertiary education. One author even went so far as to drop the emphasis on dynamic youth, praising elder university students as consistent pursuers of knowledge, and calling on younger students to emulate them.[130] A common phrase used to describe the role of students was as a "pillar of the nation" *(tiang negara),* without whose support the nation might fall.[131]

In practice, "developing" the *rakyat* came in the forms of literacy campaigns and health programs for the rural populace. This was a common practice among many *pemuda* groups, with Pesindo as a notable example.[132] However, it seems that IPI students were affected quite differently by this work from those in other *pemuda* groups and placed special meaning on their interactions with the *rakyat*. Many IPI and *tentara pelajar* students, either by choice or by circumstance, ended up leaving their city homes and entering the Javanese countryside. Often this was their first real interaction with the Indonesian masses, and for many students these experiences left an indelible mark on their lives. The experiences of students from the Malang branch of IPI serve as a good illustration of this. While some were struck by the friendliness and humility of villagers, others were surprised at their lack of knowledge of the independence movement and sought to rectify that through easy-to-understand propaganda lessons.[133]

This interpretation of the role of educated students in relation to the masses of uneducated *rakyat* deserves further discussion. The origins of this viewpoint within Indonesia can be seen even prior to the independence war. The formation of Budi Utomo in 1908, retrospectively hailed as the definitive moment of Indonesian national awakening, ignores the fact that the organisation was dominated by the *priyayi* elite.[134]

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[129] Pranoto, "Kedoedoekan Peladjar di-Tengah2 Ra'jat," *Api Merdeka*, November 1946.
[130] Dj. Djalil, "Bangkitlah wahai para Peladjar," *Api Merdeka*, May 1, 1946.
[131] Moeh. Dar., "Memelihara Sifat K'satria," *Api Merdeka*, July 1946.
[132] Soelias, Pesindo, Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, 1945-1950, 71–73.
[133] Soejono Pandji Soeroso et al., *Lembayung Senja: IPI Malang 1945*, 82–83, 98–99.
[134] M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200* (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2008), 202-203.

While one of the aims of the organisation was to promote Western education among Javanese, it was clearly an organisation of the Javanese *priyayi* aristocracy which viewed themselves as superior and more "enlightened" when compared to the lower classes.[135] This sentiment was in aspects further encouraged by reforms in the late colonial education system in the 1920s, which emphasised "concordance" between Dutch and Indonesian cultures in education in an effort to encourage the educated elite to act as "advocates" of Western culture in Indonesia.[136] These factors encouraged the separation of the elite from the *rakyat* at large but at the same time mandated the sons and daughters of the elite to act as beacons of education to further develop the *rakyat*. In many respects, the sentiment held among IPI students and others in the *tentara pelajar* can be seen as the continued lineage of these ideas among young, educated Indonesians: while they sought to uplift the *rakyat*, they did so in a way that presumed the *rakyat*'s backwardness, which further perpetuated this sense of student exceptionalism.

It is notable however that the *tentara pelajar'*s interpretation of the new *pelajar* role did little to depart from the traditional masculinity associated with the *pemuda.* While, for example, there was clearly room for female students to contribute within *pembangunan* and the *perjuangan*, they were often restricted to operating in traditional roles such as child reading and urged to maintain their own "purity" as women.[137] Similarly, while women formed a part of the *tentara pelajar,* most accounts place them within support roles such as in field hospitals and kitchens rather than in active combat positions.[138] Female students, while also encouraged to contribute to *Patria* and *Api Merdeka,* were often published within the women's section of these *tentara pelajar* publications with little interaction between their writings and those of their male counterparts. Ultimately, while women formed an important part of the *pelajar* idea as conceived by the *tentara pelajar*, their domain differed from male students.

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[135] Akira Nagazumi, *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918*, I.D.E. Occasional Papers Series, No. 10 (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1972). 66.
[136] Suwignyo, *The Breach in the Dike*, 95. These policies were instigated by Dutch educationist G.J. Nieuwenhuis.
[137] Pok Jaja, "Wanita dan Perdjoeangan," *Api Merdeka*, December 1946; Iboe Ruby, "Sekitar So'al Pergaoelan Bebas," *Patria*, October 1946.
[138] SAR, "Poeteri Indonesia," *Api Merdeka*, May 1, 1946; Boedi Sewojo, "Kowad-Kowad Tempo Dulu," in *Merdeka Merdeka Dan MERDEKA*, ed. Soedarsono (Jakarta: Sekretariat Darmo 49 Ex Brig. 17 Det. I TRIP Jawa Timur, 1987), 43–46.

This idea of students as being part of an intellectual elite, however, eventually came into conflict with the IPI's shift to endorse armed struggle. The formation of Laskar IPI units in IPI branches across Java brought students into the fold who prioritised the student role in the armed struggle over their role in the more passive form of *pembangunan* that the IPI had initially supported. This led to a struggle between the *tentara* (soldier) and *pelajar* (student) components of the *tentara pelajar* identity which became more pronounced with the heightened interactions between Laskar IPI units and the TRIP.

Through their experience in Surabaya, the TRIP was by far the more established and experienced *tentara pelajar* unit. Following their retreat from the city in 1945, they had formed a base in Jetis-Parengan on the outskirts of Surabaya where they continued to have skirmishes with probing Anglo-Dutch forces.[139] In establishing its presence in Jetis, TRIP also became a gatekeeper for those student militias who wished to fight on Surabaya front. Colonel Sungkono, the Surabaya city military commander, saw them as the most experienced student unit to have fought in the war so far, and thus he instructed all student militias entering the fray to first coordinate and train with the TRIP.[140] This led many student units, including the Laskar IPI, to interact with the TRIP and even go out on joint patrols with them. Many of these units came from different towns across East Java. Students came from Malang, where they had previously been able to disarm Japanese soldiers with relative ease.[141] More students came from the town of Bojonegoro and were initially members of the local branch of the BPRI before choosing to join the TRIP.[142] Even the Yogyakarta IPI from Central Java sent troops to the Surabaya front, where some members would even become wounded in action.[143] This practice of rotating units in-and-out of the frontlines for them to gain combat experience and to relieve other units was common across all frontlines. Soldiers of the

[139] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 192–212.
[140] Asmadi, Pelajar Pejuang.,
[141] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 15.
[142] Padang Soedirdjo et al., *Sejarah Perjuangan TRIP Bojonegoro: T.N.I. Brigade XVII. Det. I, TRIP Jawa Timur* (Jakarta: Keluarga ex-TRIP Bojonegoro, 1980), 60–61.
[143] Paguyuban Tiga Tujuh Belas, Tentara Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan, 23–25.

IMAM and other Central Javanese *tentara pelajar* units did the same along the Ambarawa and Semarang fronts in Central Java throughout 1946.[144]

For many of the largely city-based students, the experience of rural village life at Jetis was an eye-opener. In their memoirs, many veterans fondly recount their experiences there, remembering the names of village officials and even ordinary villagers who provided them with a safe haven, food and supplies. Ultimately, this time in Jetis-Parengan would help shape the notion of TRIP being "integrated" with the *rakyat*, which allowed them to partly shed their elitist pretensions.[145] In many ways, like the experience of those IPI students who worked with villagers, some TRIP veterans idealised the simple, agrarian lifestyle of the Jetis villagers as truly representative of the *rakyat* experience.[146] Following this period, the TRIP also began to adopt "from the *rakyat*, by the *rakyat*, and for the *rakyat*" as its unofficial motto, which was carried in several articles of *Patria.*[147] However, in many respects the paternalistic manner in which the students viewed the *rakyat* remained. One veteran, Abdul Radjab, was struck by the generosity of villagers who, in his view, had so little to begin with. He writes of how grateful they were in receiving medical aid from TRIP soldiers, often to the extent of giving gifts in return. With this awe of the *rakyat* also emerged the aforementioned sense of *pelajar* elitism that IPI articulated so well: Radjab writes of how "honest and innocent" the *rakyat* were, a trait that the *pelajar*, should emulate.[148]

This sentiment was also present in the TRIP publication *Patria.* Run by a combination of TRIP students and sympathetic teachers, the articles and opinions carried in *Patria* are a good indicator of feeling among the students of the TRIP during its short print run. In an article written in November 1946, one student argued that it was important for the TRIP students to maintain their studies despite the ongoing conflict, saying that "if we do not have this distinctive colour [as in studying], then our backwards *rakyat* will not be able to understand why we need to study, and for whom

[144] Paguyuban Tiga Tujuh Belas, 27–29; Team Penyusun Sejarah Perjuangan Pasukan Pelajar I.M.A.M., *Ringkasan Sejarah Perjuangan Pasukan Pelajar I.M.A.M. Purwokerto*, 3.
[145] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 192.
[146] Radjab, 193.
[147]See for example the closing paragraph of Imam, "Nafsoe," *Patria*, May 31, 1947.
[148] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 194.

we need to study."[149] Another article in the same issue of *Patria* continues this line of thinking. In this piece, after exhorting their fellow students to avoid "adventurism" and realise their privilege as being a "fire, required in all aspects of the national struggle," the student concludes by calling for his peers to channel their "fire and guidance" to support the "soul of the *rakyat* and their youth taking part in this revolution."[150]

To study or to fight: The 1946 Malang Student Congress

Though the close interactions between the IPI and TRIP led to a heightened level of collaboration, the relationship between the two groups during this stage of the war was not always so harmonious. In its efforts to organise or amalgamate armed student groups into its organisation, it seems that IPI was initially eager to integrate TRIP into its groups, thus relegating it to a subordinate role. While this might have been possible in the smaller towns, the TRIP was already an established unit with its own hierarchy and had the added prestige of having fought in the Battle of Surabaya.

Additionally, further differences of opinion between the two centered around the distinction between offensive *perjuangan* and *pembangunan*, and which of these was the most important for a *pelajar*. Some accounts portray this as largely an argument contained to the main leadership of the two organisations. This narrative focuses on disagreements between Ichsan, the head of the East Java IPI, and Isman, now the overall commander of the TRIP.[151] Sayidiman's account of the debate alludes to this, saying that "debate in the leadership" between "those who wanted to continue the armed struggle, and those who believed that the duty of the TRIP was finished and that its members should return to the cities, to their classrooms" was tantamount to a "crisis" within the TRIP.[152]

However, some veterans' accounts portray a much more widespread and animated disagreement. Radjab noted an incident where this disagreement bred further resentment. He recounts that a letter from then Minister of Education Ki Hajar

[149] Tjak Gahyo, "Tentera Pelajar."
[150] Vifa, "Telah Masanja...," *Patria*, November 30, 1946.
[151] Soebagijo I. N, Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI, 98; Asmadi, Pelajar Pejuang, 277.
[152] Sajidiman, *The Tender Power*, 11.

Dewantara, which was supposed to be mailed to TRIP headquarters, was mistakenly sent to the East Java IPI. The letter, which contained the Minister's congratulations for the unit's battle performance at Gunungsari and condolences for the fallen students, was ultimately sent through to the TRIP. However, not long after, the media publication of the Kediri branch of IPI published an opinion article strongly criticising the use of students as frontline soldiers, saying that they "[died] without good reason."[153]

This article sparked much anger and resentment amongst the fighting students of the TRIP, and his subsequent argument can provide more detail into the *tentara pelajar* mindset. He wrote that some students "forget that besides being a *pelajar*, they are also a *pemuda*, who must be ready to rise up if their nation's sovereignty is threatened. They must be at the frontlines because… they can give true meaning to this struggle for independence. Is this not a noble struggle"?[154]

Radjab's statement showcases the importance of the constant negotiation between the *pemuda* and *pelajar* dichotomy had for many of those students who were members of the *tentara pelajar*. The *pemuda* is depicted as prepared to fight, while the *pelajar* is less willing to do so, instead concentrating on *pembangunan*. It should be noted that for many students, the decision to fight was not entirely forced upon them. Most, if not all, students serving within the unit did so voluntarily.

However, there was at least enough goodwill for this disagreement to be pushed into the background. In July 1946, an all-East Java student congress was held in Malang, with IPI and TRIP being the two main actors. The crux of discussions during the conference was, as Asmadi put it, a question of "*belajar dan berjuang*" or "*berjuang dan belajar*."[155] While both fighting and studying were considered to be important, there was still debate over which should be prioritised over the other. IPI believed that students had to study first and foremost, for *pembangunan*. The TRIP on the other hand argued that this was unfeasible in times of war and that students had to take up arms first before returning to *pembangunan* in peacetime.

[153] As cited in Radjab, *TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan*, 202.
[154] Radjab, 202–3.
[155] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 289.

While the debate went back-and-forth, the decision of the leadership of the Laskar IPI to side with the TRIP forced a decision. IPI leadership begrudgingly accepted the TRIP's stance and allowed Laskar IPI units to merge with the TRIP. IPI would gain TRIP support for its efforts in improving education levels and literacy among the *rakyat*, and received assurances that TRIP students would return for schooling when circumstances permitted.[156]

The TRIP's response to the result of the conference was indicative of its stance. It called for the mobilisation of students while taking into account that students could ignore neither their studies nor the war.[157] It adopted an ostensibly laissez-faire stance by saying that all male students aged 17 and above should take part in efforts to "destroy all external obstacles of the nation in accordance to their own skills and character," though it noted that the motherland expected the "service of its *pemuda*."[158] However, though it acknowledged that the mobilisation of students that it called for went beyond armed struggle into facets like education, it underlined that any contribution to the independence struggle had to be practical in nature. It also made a slight jab at those students who opposed participation in the armed struggle, saying that "the happiness of those living behind the front lines is built on the mounds of our dead heroes."[159]

Ultimately, this recognition of a diverse *perjuangan* established a kind of different-but-equal partnership between the IPI and the TRIP and other *tentara pelajar* formations, and serves as an excellent illustration of the tension between the *pemuda* and *pelajar* identities that many *tentara pelajar* had to face. To some extent, this dichotomy was addressed by the outcome of the congress. Writing about the circumstances after the Laskar IPI-TRIP merge, Sayidiman stated that TRIP students sought to "fill [their] brains with knowledge" in addition to "fighting on the frontlines," emphasising that the TRIP were truly happy to "occupy [their] free time by reading textbooks useful for the TRIP's peacetime *perjuangan*."[160]

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[156] Sagimun M. D., *Mas TRIP*, 196–98.
[157] Markas Tentara Peladjar, "Mobilisasi Peladjar," *Patria*, August 25, 1946.
[158] Markas Tentara Peladjar.
[159] Markas Tentara Peladjar.
[160] Sajidiman, *The Tender Power*, 12.

This can be seen as a marrying of the two initially different aspects of *tentara pelajar* identity. However, the tensions remained, albeit partly. In August, a month after the congress, an article in *Api Merdeka* chided frontline *tentara pelajar* for looking down on their study-focused peers, once again taking from Sukarno's idea of a multi-faceted *perjuangan.*[161] Another article from the same month warned of the perils of "excessive intellectualism" from a fear that such an approach would lead to a return to the pitfalls of colonial-era education. They viewed this as overly individualistic, and too concerned with material gain instead of advancing the lot of the nation and the *rakyat*, echoing once again the elitist sentiment present within *pelajar* identity.[162] This seems to have been a common attitude among the *tentara pelajar* of the time, especially as they sought to be "of, with and for the *rakyat*." Quoting the diary of a fellow student who died in battle, Abdul Radjab writes:

> I realise now what caused me, part of the learned class, to be separated from the lowest in society, the working class, and the rabble… I and my kind are products of a colonial education system, forced to grovel at the feet of colonialists and leave our people behind. I was taken from my roots, and branded as an "intellectual…" We must give this nation an education system that is independent, free, democratic, and humane. This is our duty.[163]

Students of the *tentara pelajar* recognised their elite status and to some extent viewed it critically, seeing it as colonial in origin, and sought to become again part of the *rakyat*. However, it was precisely this elite status that gave the *tentara pelajar* their unique role between *perjuangan* and *pembangunan* and further encouraged their belief of being guides of the *rakyat*.

Overall, students who remained in schools were encouraged to maintain a "revolutionary spirit."[164] This sentiment also became a platform to criticise students obsessed with "hedonistic pleasures," such as card playing and general revelry.[165] One article in *Patria* urged students to avoid these "germs," saying that even the highest

[161] Dj. Djalil, "Perdjoeangan," *Api Merdeka*, August 1946.
[162] Ri, "Akibat Pendidikan yang Intellectualistisch," *Api Merdeka*, August 1946.
[163] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 189.
[164] Amir, "Perdjoeangan Peladjar," *Api Merdeka*, August 1946.
[165] Padmi, "Ontwikkeling sama dengan Beschaving?"

levels of education would be useless for *pelajar* if they did not exercise "self-control" in their daily lives. Such was the duty of a "pillar of the nation."[166]

Ultimately, while the path to closer cooperation between the two major student groups in Java was not a smooth one, it would serve as a platform for future developments. This integration of IPI and TRIP was an important milestone for the *tentara pelajar*, as IPI's presence throughout Java provided the first joint command structure for student-soldier units that spanned different parts of the island through the formation of IPI Pertahanan, a sub-organisation of IPI that was tasked with coordination IPI-affiliated student militias.[167] This marked the beginning of closer cooperation between IPI and different *tentara pelajar* units, which would ultimately lead to a unified *tentara pelajar* command later on. Additionally, important questions regarding what constituted a *pelajar* during this time of conflict were answered. Despite their differences, IPI and TRIP had similar conceptions of the duty of students, particularly in their relationship with the *rakyat* and politics. These ideas of *pelajar* identity and duty would be clearly illustrated in their responses to talks between the government and the Netherlands later in the year.

Responding to the Linggadjati Agreement: Cementing *tentara pelajar* apoliticism

As the *tentara pelajar* continued to wrestle with these questions of identity, the progress of events continued to move around them. Despite the PP's initial success in organising opposition, its downfall would come in a quick fashion. Syahrir was able to outmanoeuvre the PP politically with Sukarno's support, eventually attracting influential PP members such as the Pesindo leadership to his new cabinet, despite the fact that his government never gave a strong commitment to the minimum program.[168] In March and April, Tan Malaka and those leading members of the PP who refused to switch sides were arrested by members of the TNI for alleged "saboteur actions" against

[166] Padmi.
[167] Paguyuban Tiga Tujuh Belas, Tentara Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan, 21.
[168] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 317–19.

the government.[169] Following this, membership of the PP became anathema for any *pemuda* group which still wanted to remain in the government's good graces. The PP itself was officially disbanded on June 4th, though the slogan of *Kemerdekaan 100%* would long outlive the group.[170]

Discussions with the Netherlands would continue, spearheaded by Syahrir and Syarifuddin. The earliest communications between Dutch and Indonesian leadership with the aim of reaching an end to hostilities began in March, when Syahrir met with van Mook for further talks. While he initially insisted on Dutch recognition of Republican sovereignty over the whole of Indonesia, Syahrir eventually relented and agreed to three conditions: recognition of Republican sovereignty over Java and Sumatra, the formation of a federal United States of Indonesia, and the formation of a union between Indonesia and the Netherlands along with its other colonial possessions.[171]

These secret terms would become the basis of official discussions between Dutch and Indonesian delegates in the Netherlands in April 1946. The discussions lasted for two weeks, but neither side was able to come to an agreement. The breakdown in discussion fuelled speculation among the Republican press, who were largely kept out of the loop by the government. Many feared, rightly, that Syahrir was only pursuing partial recognition of the Republic's sovereignty, which encouraged even further discontent.

Within the armed forces, which under Sudirman had been at least sympathetic, if not supportive, of the PP, opposition emerged against Syarifuddin's *Pepolit* political commissar endeavour.[172] The *Pepolit* was comprised of politicians rather than trained officers and providing political indoctrination and guidance to soldiers.[173] Many professional officers viewed it as an unnecessary form of political intervention in their affairs. Amir's attempt to organise *laskar* under a separate organisation to the army,

[169] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Koesalah Soebagyo Toer, and Ediati Kamil, eds., *Kronik Revolusi Indonesia*, Cet. 1, vol. 1 (Jakarta: KPG, 1999), 174.
[170] Irfan Teguh, "Umur Pendek Persatuan Perjuangan, Oposisi Pertama di Indonesia," tirto.id, accessed May 23, 2020, https://tirto.id/umur-pendek-persatuan-perjuangan-oposisi-pertama-di-indonesia-cDaC.
[171] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 331.
[172] Said, *Genesis of Power*, 44–45.
[173] Said, 44–45.

dubbed the Biro Perjuangan (Struggle Bureau), was also met with opposition. Officers were concerned over the confusion that a separate command for the *laskar* might create. Suspicion grew even further as it became known that, due to Syarifuddin's sponsorship of it, the Biro was dominated by Pesindo members just as the *Pepolit* was. This fuelled further TNI discontent with government policy.[174]

These tensions eventually culminated with the kidnapping Syahrir and other government officials were kidnapped by TNI units sympathetic to Tan Malaka and the PP on June 28th. When the commander of the mutinous TNI units, met Sukarno on July 3rd to demand the release of Tan Malaka and his appointment to the government, Sukarno refused.[175] A lack of support among other TNI and *laskar* units ended the attempted coup, and Syahrir was released soon after. Perhaps the most important effect of this was Sukarno's declaration of a state of emergency and the strengthening of presidential powers during the kidnapping.[176] Because of this, while Syahrir lost some of his powers as Prime Minister, he was able to negotiate without fear of too much internal pushback.

Fresh discussions between the Republican government and the Netherlands began again in Jakarta in October, but these too were fruitless. Eventually, further discussions would be held in November in Linggadjati, a village just outside of the city of Cirebon on the northern coast of West Java. These discussions culminated in both sides signing an agreement on 15 November. However, while the Syahrir government celebrated its success, many of its detractors were criticising the agreement's text as soon as it was carried in the Republican press. Political parties within the Republic were split regarding the agreement. Supportive of the agreement were the *Sayap Kiri* (Left Wing), a small coalition of left-wing groups. Included in the *Sayap Kiri* were the Socialist Party, Pesindo, the Labour Party and the PKI. Opposing them were the Masyumi, PNI and the People's Party, united under the *Benteng Republik* (Republican Fortress) coalition.[177] This split in the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Indonesian

[174] Said, 45–49.
[175] "Sejarah Peristiwa 3 Juli 1946, Kudeta Pertama di Indonesia," tirto.id, accessed May 23, 2020, https://tirto.id/sejarah-peristiwa-3-juli-1946-kudeta-pertama-di-indonesia-crSy.
[176] Toer, Toer, and Kamil, *Kronik Revolusi Indonesia*, 1999, 1:247–48.
[177] George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2003), 199.

National Central Committee, KNIP) had the potential to scrap the agreement entirely, as ratification from both Dutch and Indonesian parliaments was needed for the agreement to take effect.

Pemuda groups too were split on the agreement. As mentioned earlier, Pesindo fell into the Sayap Kiri while the KRIS was part of Benteng Republik.[178] The final draft of the Linggadjati Agreement consisted of 18 separate articles, with several of these being subjected to intense criticism and scrutiny by the *pemuda* groups. Different *pemuda* groups took aim at different parts of the agreement, though it can be argued that there was really very little in the agreement that the groups approved of.

The BB was the largest *pemuda* group to come out in opposition to the agreement, at least initially. In response to the agreement, the BB held a conference on November 23rd to discuss their stance. Their criticism of the agreement covered all the articles included, though they singled out several ones in particular. The most important of these was article 16, which called for the reduction of the armed forces of both the Netherlands and the Republic.[179]To the BB, this was a diplomatic blunder if the Netherlands only recognised *de facto* Republican authority. The federal nature of a future Indonesian state was also strongly criticised, considering that most *pemuda* groups imagined an independent Indonesia as a unitary, centralised republic and viewed federalism as a channel for the Netherlands to reassert control.[180] Though the BB opposed the agreement, it should be noted that they did not openly call for Syahrir, Syarifuddin or any other member of the government to be removed.[181] Instead, it adopted a pro-unity stance, calling for supporters and opponents of the treaty to remain united in order to present a strong front against the Netherlands.[182]

Even Pesindo, which came out almost immediately in support of the agreement, could not present it as a complete victory. Instead, they spun Linggadjati as a milestone

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[178] Kahin, 199.
[179] Central Intelligence Group, "Basic Dutch-Indonesian Issues and the Linggadjati Agreement" (Central Intelligence Group, June 9, 1947), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-01617A002900020004-4.pdf.
[180] Moewardi, "Koepasan Terhadap Rentjana Persetoedjoean Indonesia Belanda jang mengenai Pokok Kepentingannja," *Banteng*, November 28, 1946.
[181] Moewardi, "Kita Menolak.....!," *Banteng*, November 28, 1946.
[182] Sudirman, "Kenjataan Haroes kita Hadap dengan Kenjataan: Pidato Nasehat Panglima Besar Tentara Dalam Malam Resepsi Kongres ke III Barisan Banteng di Solo," *Banteng*, December 26, 1946.

on the path to full independence. The editorial of the *Revolusioner* issue published after the agreement took pains to emphasise that Linggadjati was not the final goal in the struggle. Instead, the agreement should be viewed as a short pause in the fighting, giving time for Indonesian forces to reorganise and regroup. Acceptance or rejection of the agreement, *Revolusioner* argued, was at this stage a non-issue. The *rakyat*, instead, should focus on how to best use the opportunities provided by the agreement. This constituted a departure from its previous support for the PP.[183] While Pesindo's withdrawal from the PP was officially due to the latter's "counterproductive" opposition, its support for Linggadjati could be seen as a form of political opportunism, especially considering that Pesindo's main sponsor, Syarifuddin, was so closely associated with the agreement.[184]

IPI also made it clear that they were not satisfied with the agreement, taking aim at article 8, which placed the Dutch sovereign at the head of any union between the Netherlands and Indonesia. IPI feared that this would place the Indonesian president below the Queen, compromising the struggle for independence. However, despite this expression of dissatisfaction, IPI stressed the need for *pemuda,* and *pelajar* in particular, to maintain unity with the government and the KNIP. In a statement carried in *Api Merdeka,* IPI essentially left the final decision in the hands of the KNIP. Though the *pemuda* were an important component of the independence war, it could not afford to be so "stubborn" in insisting for an overly "aggressive" pursuit of the revolution. At the same time, the *pemuda* could not afford to be split between supporting or opposing the agreement itself. The author argued that this is not the purpose of the *pemuda.* Instead, the duty of the *pemuda* was to continue the struggle in whatever way it continued, be that through "aggressive" armed struggle or "passive" diplomacy.[185]

A similar sentiment was echoed by the TRIP in their response to the agreement in a *Patria* article. They acknowledged that much of the agreement went against what they had been fighting for since the start of the war, but also asked the *pemuda* to consider the power imbalance between Republican forces and the KNIL/KL and the

[183] S. Soegijono, "Pesindo dan Naskah," *Revolusioner*, December 7, 1946.
[184] This was the official Pesindo line, as outlined in Soelias, *Pesindo, Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, 1945-1950,* 79–81.
[185] Marshal, "Pemoeda Bidjaksana Menentoekan Sikap," *Api Merdeka*, December 1946.

changing international situation. However, the TRIP's response did not dwell much on this, instead focusing on what the *pemuda* could do in response. In the current circumstance, the duty of the *pemuda* was to fight, and the agreement did not change that. Instead, the *pemuda* had to be wary of Dutch violations of the agreement. While the TRIP also acknowledged that this was a difficult task, the *pemuda* could not afford to be selfish. They were not fighting for themselves: instead, they were fighting for the uneducated *rakyat*, who could barely fend for themselves against resurgent Dutch colonialism. This, the TRIP argued, was the purpose of the *pemuda*.[186]

Looking again at the pelajar identity that IPI and TRIP sought to fashion for themselves, these statements are unsurprising. To leave the political aspect of the war to the government and the KNIP is a perfect illustration of their professed apoliticism. Unlike Pesindo and BB, who found themselves shifting and switching allegiances to pursue their own aims, the *tentara pelajar* were able to largely remain outside the political quagmire of the early Republic. Instead, they sought to maintain the "purity" of the *pelajar* struggle, focusing on both responding to challenges and advancing the status of the *rakyat*, which it saw to be the main purpose of the *pemuda pelajar*.

Conclusion

Formed in the wake of the proclamation of independence, *tentara pelajar* units were able to establish themselves as respectable fighting units through displays at key early battles in the war of independence, such as Surabaya and Ambarawa. It was through these displays of combat effectiveness that the *tentara pelajar* were able to grow, attracting the creation of new armed student formations through different means, such as the formation of the IPI-affiliated Laskar IPI.

However, their performances in these battles were far from being their only defining traits. Throughout 1946, the *tentara pelajar* wrestled with internal tensions surrounding what its role in the ongoing independence war was to be. In many ways, aspects of the *tentara pelajar* identity that was constructed during the period predated the war, as students harkened back to elitist values that dated as far back as the founding

[186] Wdb., "Kita Berdjoeang Teroes," *Patria*, December 15, 1946.

of the Budi Utomo in 1908. These values, which placed students as guides of the uneducated, backwards *rakyat*, were wholeheartedly embraced by the *tentara pelajar.*

The students of the *tentara pelajar* believed that their elite status as part of the budding Indonesian intelligentsia made them well-suited as guides of the in the quest for national development. Circumstances, however, demanded that students not only be the guides of the *rakyat*, but also their armed protectors. This forced the *tentara pelajar* to ask deeper questions on which role it would prioritise. This process was not a completely smooth one, as competing beliefs on whether within the *tentara pelajar* and IPI threatened to split the efforts of the students. Eventually, these disagreements were settled, though not in the most amiable of ways, and the *tentara pelajar* were able to prioritise *berjuang* over *belajar*, if only for a moment.

The student experience of the NEI and Japanese education systems, which they believed to have perverted their status in society, also shaped the new *tentara pelajar* identity. Students were urged to be pure in thought and deed, and to prioritise service to the *rakyat* and the cause of independence above all else. By the same token, students were discouraged from indulging in "hedonistic behaviour," such as gambling and card playing. This policy extended into politics, which students were asked to avoid. This trait in particular distinguished the *tentara pelajar* from the *pemuda* at large. While major *pemuda* groups like Pesindo and BB actively navigated Indonesian politics through affiliation with political patrons and organisations like Tan Malaka's PP, IPI and the *tentara pelajar* took pains to remain outside of the political sphere. Even when faced with government decisions that they did not agree with, such as the Linggadjati Agreement and its many concessions to the Netherlands, the *tentara pelajar* remained loyal not only to the government, but to its own version of apoliticism. For them, the duty of a *tentara pelajar* was to simply continue the struggle for independence, without distraction from what they viewed to be the taint of petty politics. The crystallisation of this *tentara pelajar* identity would continue well into the later stages of the war, as student-soldiers would be again thrusted into situations where they were able to distinguish themselves from other *pemuda* and *laskar* groups.

Chapter III

Discipline and professionalism: The *tentara pelajar* between the *laskar* and the Indonesian Army (1947-1948)

By the end of 1946, the *tentara pelajar* were able to settle, at least temporarily, internal ideological tensions regarding their role within the independence war and the war of independence. The timing of this development coincided with the Linggadjati Agreement, which saw the implementation of a ceasefire and some stabilisation along the frontlines in Java and Sumatra. The respite brought by the agreement was, however, only temporary, and both sides would soon resume open fighting by July.

The brief period of peace that followed the Linggadjati Agreement was a time for the TNI to rest and regroup. Even in this relatively early stage, Republican military planners saw the need to reform the army's confused and bloated hierarchy along with its unwieldy military formations. When the respite ended, the resumed fighting was coloured by severe setbacks for the Republicans. Most notably, the First Dutch Military Aggression, an offensive launched by the KNIL/KL in July 1947, saw the TNI and *laskar* forced to retreat across frontlines in Java and Sumatra in the face of overwhelming Dutch superiority in arms. For the *tentara pelajar*, these organisational changes and military setbacks proved to be key events in the continued shaping of their collective identity. This chapter will examine how the *tentara pelajar* adapted in response to shifting organisational hierarchies and frontlines. The chapter argues that the time between 1947 and 1948 was of particular importance because, unlike the 1946 period which focused largely on internal *tentara pelajar* debate over their identity, this period focused on their relationships vis-à-vis the various other factions that took part in the independence war.

By examining the reorganisation of the TNI and the *tentara pelajar* during this time, this chapter argues that the *tentara pelajar* actively sought to become more closely linked with the TNI throughout 1947 and 1948. As discussed in Chapter II, the *tentara pelajar* were initially largely independent units who were not part of the official TNI

hierarchy, thus effectively being part of the irregular *laskar* instead. As the organisation of *tentara pelajar* units became more formal and established, however, many units sought to rectify this by aligning themselves organisationally to be closer to the TNI. The *tentara pelajar*'s organisational shift to emulate the TNI derived not only from a desire to be more efficient, but also from an admiration of the TNI's perceived professionalism and apoliticism. Continuing from the sense of *pelajar* superiority discussed in Chapter II, this chapter argues that the *tentara pelajar* viewed the TNI as embodying the ideal values of the *pelajar*. Both the TNI and the *tentara pelajar* disdained political parties, and both saw themselves as different, if not superior, to the irregular *laskar* formations. The combat experience gained by the *tentara pelajar* during the First Dutch Military Aggression, examined in this chapter, served to bring the two closer together, with TNI higher-ups holding the *tentara pelajar*'s performance in high regard, viewing the well-educated students as superior and more obedient soldiers than the *laskar*.

By the end of 1948, the close relationship between the *tentara pelajar* and the TNI was symbolised by their integration into the official TNI hierarchy, and the action taken by *tentara pelajar* units against unruly *laskar* formations. These events serve as indicators of just how far the *tentara pelajar* identity had shifted to effectively become far more militarised and disciplined. Though the overall professionalism of the TNI can be questioned, it is clear that the *tentara pelajar*'s respect for them made emulating the TNI a key part of their evolution. Similarly, the TNI's high estimation of the *tentara pelajar* showed how much they preferred the student-soldiers as an effective fighting force among the various other *pemuda* and *laskar* groups. This evolution of the *tentara pelajar*, as subsequent chapters will show, will deeply influence the legacy that the *tentara pelajar* will leave behind.

Ratifying Linggadjati: Mistrust and discontent

Despite both the Dutch and Indonesian delegations coming to an agreement at Linggadjati, they faced significant difficulty in convincing their respective legislatures to ratify the agreement. On the Indonesian side, as mentioned in the last chapter, the KNIP was essentially divided between the pro-agreement *Sayap Kiri* and the anti-

agreement *Benteng Republik* coalitions, with the latter obtaining considerable support from not only several political parties, but also an assortment of *pemuda* and *laskar* groups.[1] Many of these groups took issue with the fact that the treaty outlined the formation of a "Dutch-Indonesian union," where the Dutch monarch would be recognised as the head, arguing that such a clause diminished the status of Indonesian independence.[2] Others found the clause to reduce the number of soldiers serving both the Netherlands and the Republic as another ploy to weaken Republican sovereignty through further enhancing Dutch superiority in materiel. As negotiations within the KNIP reached an impasse, Sukarno and Hatta then made an unprecedented ultimatum: the KNIP was to either ratify the agreement, or they both would resign. Though neither Sukarno nor Hatta held much real formal power when compared to the KNIP, the potential of losing the symbolic power of the ruling duumvirate shook the KNIP into action. Following this ultimatum, both sides duly put aside their differences and ratified the agreement.[3]

The Dutch side experienced similar difficulties within their own parliament. While members of the governing coalition openly supported the agreement, many of the smaller opposition parties believed that Linggadjati ceded far too much to the Republic. At this stage, many politicians, including some members of the governing cabinet, objected to the *de facto* recognition of the Republic's authority over Java and Sumatra. The Minister for Colonial Affairs at the time attempted to satiate some of the dissenting opinions, by arguing that ultimately Dutch ratification of Linggadjati rested upon Indonesian approval of the "Dutch interpretation" of the agreement. With power lying in the hands of the ruling coalition anyway, the opposition parties begrudgingly approved, and ratified the agreement.[4]

However, it was this very issue of interpretation that proved to be the main problem when it came to implementing the Linggadjati Agreement. Neither side found themselves in agreement with the other's interpretation of the text. For example, while

[1] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 199.
[2] For a detailed examination of the clauses of the Linggadjati Agreement, see Central Intelligence Group, "Basic Dutch-Indonesian Issues and the Linggadjati Agreement."
[3] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 203.
[4] Justus M. van der Kroef, "Dutch Policy and the Linggadjati Agreement, 1946-1947," *The Historian* 15, no. 2 (1953): 175–76, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6563.1953.tb00146.x.

the Netherlands viewed a federal Dutch-Indonesian union to be one that was Dutch-led, the Republicans expected a greater level of consultation in its structuring.[5] These irreconcilable differences would ultimately pave the way for renewed conflict between both sides later in 1947.

Reforms in the regular army: Solidifying distinctions between *tentara pelajar* and *laskar*

The relatively lean period that followed the discussions at Linggadjati also allowed the TNI to begin reform attempts in earnest. The most pressing concern for the TNI command and Amir Syarifuddin's Defence Ministry was the question of the *laskar*. The mixed response to the Linggadjati Agreement was indicative of the divides present within the multitude of different *laskar* units. Though even those *laskar* who voiced their disapproval of the agreement had insisted that they were still loyal to the cause of independence, it was clear that the *laskar* and various other *pemuda* groups had a mind of their own and could not be relied on to consistently support government policy. Indeed, the skirmishes that continued along the frontlines even after the ratification of Linggadjati shows the relative autonomy of the *laskar*, as they continued to harass the KNIL/KL despite not necessarily having the orders to do so.[6]

Attempts by the TNI to assert a greater degree of control over the *laskar* had occurred as early as 1945, though at the time the regular army had to accept the need for these irregular troop formations, considering their own lack of manpower and centralised control. In December 1945, Chief of Staff Urip Sumoharjo released a decree acknowledging the *laskar* units as important actors in the struggle for independence. In his words, national defence was not the monopoly of the regular army, instead being a duty for all the *rakyat*.[7] Thus, the army would support the formation of *laskar* units, be those formed at the local level for the defence of home villages, or those that operated on the frontlines with the regular army. Despite this expression of support for the

[5] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 206.
[6] Naturally, it should be noted that such provocations occurred both ways, and that it is just as likely that such small-scale firefights were also initiated by probing Dutch forces.
[7] Abdul Haris Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, vol. 2, 11 vols. (Bandung: DISJARAH-AD, 1977)., 216.

laskar, Sumoharjo noted that many groups required disciplined, centralised leadership, and that the army would help address this by proving some level of training.[8]

One example of this type of training occurred in April 1947, when the TNI facilitated a guerrilla warfare training program on the outskirts of Surakarta. The program involved a wide variety of *laskar* units, including the BPRI, BB, Laskar Hizbullah and the *tentara pelajar*. The training covered the basics of guerrilla warfare, such as the construction of temporary shelters, night raids and kidnapping tactics and recognition of the sounds of different animals that might be encountered.[9]

While this level of support might serve as an outward endorsement of the *laskar* by the TNI, several members of the officer corps continued to harbour a degree of suspicion against these seemingly disorganised and ill-disciplined militias. To better understand this, it is important to look at the tensions present during the initial formation of the TNI. The early organisation of the regular army was coloured by disagreements between the would-be members of its officer corps. On one side were the KNIL-trained officers, led by Sumoharjo as the most senior officer in rank, as well as younger officers such as Nasution, Didi Kartasasmita, and T.B. Simatupang. On the other side were the more numerous PETA-trained officers.[10] Both sides viewed the other with suspicion. The PETA officers saw the ex-KNIL men as traitors to the nation because they had sworn loyalty to the Dutch crown as part of their service in the colonial army, though they had denounced this once the Republic had been proclaimed. The KNIL officers disparaged the PETA men as tactically inept because of the *semangat*-based training given to them by the Japanese and as such thought they were not fit for command.[11] These tensions came to the fore when the position of army Commanding General was up for grabs. While Sumoharjo was initially appointed by the Republican government due to his experience, protests from the PETA officers forced an election for the position, which handily elected PETA man Sudirman to the post. As

[8] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 2:217–18.
[9] Sekretariat Badan Organisasi Dewan Pusat Pesindo, "Surat dari Sekretariat Badan Organisasi Dewan Pusat Pesindo kepada Menteri Pertahanan Amir Sjarifoedin tentang Laporan Pelatihan Gerilya yang Diadakan di Penggok daerah Surakarta," April 25, 1947, Inventaris Arsip Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, no. 265, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[10] Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, 13–20.
[11] Said, *Genesis of Power*, 30–33.

a compromise, Sudirman appointed Sumoharjo to be his Chief of Staff, and largely relied on him for administrative and strategic matters throughout the war until Sumoharjo's untimely death in 1948.[12]

Support for the *laskar* was mostly based around the KNIL-PETA split in the officer corps, with the former being more hesitant and the latter being more supportive. Both sides, however, saw the merit in exerting further control over the *laskar.* Nasution, again writing in hindsight, criticised Sumoharjo's decree as essentially a paper tiger, with his lack of willingness to control the *laskar* being ultimately detrimental to the advancement of the war. In his words, both the TNI and the *laskar* had to be "well-coordinated, with the relationship between regular forces and partisan units being clearly defined."[13] Ultimately, this lack of coordination manifested in the large, yet ill-equipped and untrained, numbers of men that the Republicans could field from among the *laskar* and TNI which were largely ineffective against superior KNIL/KL arms.

The first major effort to exert further government control over the *laskar* came with the formation of the Biro Perjuangan by the Defence Ministry in late 1946.[14] However, this effort was coldly received by TNI officers, many of whom viewed Syarifuddin with suspicion. In a post-war interview Kartasasmita said that many higher-ranking officers thought that Syarifuddin and the Defence Ministry heavily favoured leftist figures and *laskar* groups when it came to allocating funding or positions.[15] Additionally, Nasution can be seen as representing the opinions of the army's professional officer corps when he argued that the position and function of the Biro Perjuangan, along with other new formations within the TNI's increasingly bloated hierarchy, was unclear.[16]

Perhaps because of this suspicion, Sukarno and Sudirman collaborated to instigate a fresh approach to reorganising the TNI and formally bring the *laskar* under the control of the regular army. This first set of reforms resulted in the formation of the

[12] Said, 61.
[13] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 2:218–19.
[14] Said, *Genesis of Power*, 44–45.
[15] Didi Kartasasmita, Interview with Didi Kartasasmita, Cassette tape, 1984, Arsip Sejarah Lisan, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[16] Abdul Haris Nasution, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, vol. 1 (Djakarta: Seluring Masa, 1968), 301–2.

TNI-Masyarakat (Society's TNI), a sub organisation of the army that was mostly made up of the *laskar*.[17] While in practice the TNI-Masyarakat was simply a rebranded Biro Perjuangan, they were more successful in achieving their aims than their predecessors: though the *laskar* still existed organisationally, they were reorganised into specific military formations as designated by the TNI, such as in the case of the *laskar*-dominated Brigade 17.[18]

While most *laskar* units eventually assented to integration into the armed forces, it was difficult to ignore tensions that had already existed between the *laskar* formations themselves. Disagreements over the Linggadjati Agreement were just one manifestation of these tensions. For example, the previously mentioned Surakarta training session was noteworthy in that many *Sayap Kiri* militias, most notably Pesindo, were invited but ultimately declined to take part. In a letter written to the defence minister, while it was not made clear exactly why they refused to join the training program, the leadership of the Pesindo militia were quick to identify that the training was held using Masyumi-owned barracks and grounds, an organisation they had some pre-existing tensions with.[19]

Indeed, many of the *laskar* also did not see eye-to-eye with the TNI. Even the most disciplined of *laskar* units were fiercely independent and actively resented anything they perceived as TNI interference in their affairs. For example, KRIS soldiers in Jember clashed with soldiers of the TNI in early 1947 in the face of an incoming KNIL/KL offensive.[20] While details of this clash are scant, TRIP accounts claim that their student-soldiers played an part in calming nerves and settling whatever disagreement sparked the incident.[21] As will be seen later, even the integration of the *laskar* into the TNI would not fully settle these tensions.

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[17] Said, Genesis of Power, 67.
[18] Brigade XVII, "Laporan tentang Brigade XVII dan Instruksi Pembentukannya," 1947, Inventaris Arsip Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, no. 865, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[19] Sekretariat Badan Organisasi Dewan Pusat Pesindo, "Surat dari Sekretariat Badan Organisasi Dewan Pusat Pesindo kepada Menteri Pertahanan Amir Sjarifoedin tentang Laporan Pelatihan Gerilya yang Diadakan di Penggok daerah Surakarta," April 25, 1947.
[20] Panitya Penulisan Sejarah Perjuangan Pelajar/TRIP Besuki, *Prajurit Sangkur Dan Pena*, 20.
[21] Panitya Penulisan Sejarah Perjuangan Pelajar/TRIP Besuki, 20.

These tensions undoubtedly fuelled perceptions among TNI officers that many of the *laskar* units were not fit for purpose due to a perceived lack of discipline and adequate leadership from *laskar* officers. One record of these difficulties comes from the aforementioned Brigade 17. The brigade consisted of three regiments and was formed in August 1947 following the dissolution of several *laskar* commands in East Java. The soldiers were a motley crew coming from a variety of *laskar* backgrounds, with some from Pesindo, BPRI, Laskar Hizbullah and BB.[22] The author of the report, an officer in the TNI, complained of poor discipline among the men and a shortage of soldiers who were fit to assume leadership roles. He concluded that trained regular TNI officers had to be brought into the brigade, if an acceptable level of discipline and organisation was to be obtained.[23]

Tentara pelajar units were different from the *laskar* in this regard. The TRIP was initially designated the BKR/P (Students' BKR) prior to the Battle of Surabaya in November 1945. While it was possible for the student formations of Surabaya to link up with other more established local militant groups such as the BPRI or the Laskar Hizbullah, they sought instead to affiliate directly with the untested regular army, which still found significant difficulty in projecting power outside of Jakarta.[24] Similarly, at the Madiun student congress of early 1946, IPI urged the government to form an armed student reserve that would operate at the behest of the regular army.[25] The small independent IMAM armed student group too thought it was important to seek formal recognition from regular army command, so much so that they marked their official formation date as the day they were recognised by Gatot Subroto, the commander of the local TNI formation.[26] Despite this, they were never integrated officially into the regular army until close to the end of the war.

These organisational shifts to bring *tentara pelajar* units in line with regular formations served to complement the efforts explained in Chapter II, whereby student organisations sought to distinguish themselves from the *pemuda* in general. Unlike the

[22] Brigade XVII, "Laporan tentang Brigade XVII dan Instruksi Pembentukannya."
[23] Brigade XVII.
[24] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 103–5.
[25] Lola, "Resolutie Kongres Ikatan Peladjar Indonesia di Madioen."
[26] Ringkasan Sejarah Perjuangan Pasukan Pelajar I.M.A.M. Purwokerto (Purwokerto, Indonesia: The Team, 1983).

politicised *laskar*, the TNI had no party allegiance, and as shown earlier refused political indoctrination.[27] Though it has been rightly argued that this was due to the army's own ambition for political power, their non-affiliation with political parties and notional subservience to the state made them a clearer fit to the *tentara pelajar*'s apolitical tendency. Additionally, as the regular army, despite facing difficulties in sourcing arms, the TNI still represented the best-trained and disciplined units on the Republican side. The clear lines of command and hierarchy of the TNI might also have appealed to the students of the *tentara pelajar* who had experienced something similar in their schooling, though it should be noted that in some aspects *tentara pelajar* units were less rigid in applying a fully militarised commander-subordinate relationship.[28] It can thus be inferred that the shared values of professionalism and the perceived apolitical nature of the TNI attracted *tentara pelajar* formations to their ranks.

By early-to-mid 1947, *tentara pelajar* units occupied a kind of middle ground between the regular TNI and the irregular *laskar*, best showcased by their moderating role in the KRIS-TNI clash in Jember. However, it is likely that the "TNI-drive" of the *tentara pelajar* was greater than their "*laskar*-drive." Their choice to actively distinguish themselves from the other *laskar* groups ultimately brought them more in line with the regular army. This meant that, at least to the new TNI, *tentara pelajar* units were not lumped into the same grouping as other more politically active *laskar*. Thus, it does not seem that the *tentara pelajar* were particularly affected by the TNI reorganisation, at least certainly not as much as the independent *laskar* like Pesindo and BPRI.

Rather than awaiting a forced restructuring, *tentara pelajar* units reorganised themselves closely on military lines. The TRIP departed from its rudimentary *staf* arrangement as soon as it regrouped in Jetis. While the initial arrangement might have been sufficient the relatively small numbers of students that they had organised in Surabaya, the influx of *Laskar IPI* students and others from across East Java made a structural reform of the TRIP structure necessary. Additionally, the *staf* were heavily depleted after the Battle of Surabaya due to the losses sustained in engagements during

[27] Said, *Genesis of Power*, 44–46.
[28] Moehkardi, *Pendidikan Pembentukan Perwira TNI-AD, 1950-1956* (Jakarta: PT. INALTU, 1981), 71–72.

the battle and further developments also caused many initial members of the TRIP to withdraw from the unit.[29]

Some students, such as those of *Staf II*, had already been attached to other groups even prior to the reorganisation. As *Staf II* was largely comprised of technical and engineering students, there seems to have been a degree of pressure from its members to change the unit's specialisation into one that could better facilitate their skills. Many *Staf II* students ended up leaving the TRIP and forming a new independent unit of technical students, formalised in early 1947 as the Tentara Genie Pelajar (Student Engineers' Army, TGP) in Malang.[30] The TGP's main role was the production and planting of explosives to sabotage infrastructure that might be used by the enemy, as well as producing weapons and ammunition to be used by TNI soldiers.

The middle school students of *Staf III,* comparatively younger than their high school student peers in the other *staf,* were also rotated out of the TRIP formation. Many of the *Staf III* students ended up leaving the TRIP and enrolling in the different schools that opened in Republican-controlled territory.[31] Some of these schools were dedicated almost solely to those students who were members of the *tentara pelajar* and were among the most visible manifestations of the IPI-TRIP compromise ironed out in the July 1946 congress.[32]

Thus, the withdrawal of many existing TRIP members and the influx of new recruits from outside of the Surabaya student bubble necessitated a fresh approach to the TRIP structure. Now better informed of military practices, the new structure of the TRIP closely followed military lines. Instead of the loose central leadership that united the *staf,* power was vested in a central TRIP command. This was largely composed of the Surabaya Darmo Middle School students of *Staf I,* the subunit least affected by student withdrawals. The *staf* themselves were now completely abolished and replaced with more conventional battalion formations. These battalions were essentially

[29] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 240–41.
[30] Moehkardi, *Pelajar Pejuang Tentara Genie Pelajar, 1945-1950* (Surabaya: Yayasan Ex Batalyon TGP Brigade XVII, 1990), 62–65.
[31] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 241.
[32] Meck Sunarno, *Sekilas Profil Kompi Mobil-I* (Jakarta: CV Patma Suwita, 1999), 15 These schools were sometimes known as 'peralihan,' or transitionary schools.

territorial commands: many of the student-soldiers in these battalions came from the areas that their battalion was assigned to defend.[33] Five battalions were formed: Battalion 1000, based in Mojokerto along with the central TRIP leadership, was comprised of the remnants of the original four *staf.* The four remaining battalions: 2000 in Madiun, 3000 in Kediri, 4000 in Jember and 5000 in Malang, were renamed Laskar IPI formations that had been previously raised in these areas.[34]

IPI Pertahanan, which now became the coordinating organisation for the TRIP and most other *tentara pelajar* units in Java, was also subject to further reorganisation. This push for reorganisation seems to have come in tandem with efforts to further militarise the *tentara pelajar* away from their normal student responsibilities as mentioned in Chapter II. That members of the Laskar IPI and thus IPI Pertahanan agreed with this shift likely spurred them to make organisational changes independent of central IPI leadership. Thus, IPI Pertahanan slowly but surely grew into its own independent organisation, restructuring itself along army lines even prior to the army's own efforts at reshaping itself. By mid-to-late 1946, IPI Pertahanan had morphed into the Markas Pertahanan Pelajar (Student Defence Headquarters, MPP), shedding its IPI identity to adopt a more militaristic image.[35] The leadership of the MPP, while appearing student-led, deferred to the opinion of high-ranking TNI officers.[36] The MPP in turn divided the *tentara pelajar* units into three or four distinct subunits, depending on which sources are consulted.[37]

The first of these subunits, Regiment A, which contained the TRIP, commanded East Java. Regiment B was formed out of Central Javanese TP units, who themselves experienced an influx of new student recruits similar to the TRIP and thus organised under similar battalion lines. Five battalions made up the Central Javanese TP. Battalion 100 covered the region around Surakarta and was comprised of many of the units that

[33] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 290.
[34] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 45–56.
[35] Kerukunan Keluarga Besar Ex. TP/TNI Detasemen II Brigade XVII, "Monumen Mayor Achmadi," August 7, 2010. It should be noted that some sources disagree, saying that the MPP was formed before IPI Pertahanan, but this seems to be less likely than the alternative.
[36] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 164.
[37] Paguyuban Tiga Tujuh Belas, Tentara Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan, 33 states that the MPP had three subunits, while; Soedarwo et al., Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, Wilayah Jawa Tengah, 44 believes that there were three regiments and one battalion-level unit.

were raised in the city, such as the *Laskar Kere.* Battalion 200 consisted of students from middle-Central Javanese towns like around Semarang, Ambarawa and Salatiga. Battalion 300 was formed from the core of IPI Yogyakarta's initial formations, while Battalions 400 and 500 came further west of Yogyakarta, from Cirebon and Banyumas respectively. Achmadi of the *Laskar Kere* emerged as one of the stalwarts of this group.[38] Both the TP and the TRIP, owing to their independent roots and combat experience, were the most prestigious *tentara pelajar* units in Java.

Regiment C, stationed in West Java, was supposed to have been comprised of the student-soldier units that had formed under the auspices of the army's Siliwangi division. Indeed, accounts by veterans of the West Javanese TP outline a journey taken by their student leaders to Yogyakarta to seek the approval of the MPP and Urip Sumoharjo himself. This journey was a success, and the West Javanese unit was inducted into the MPP, thus affirming its position as an "official" *tentara pelajar* formation.[39] However, some sources contend that the West Javanese unit was never a part of the MPP, and instead operated independently until at least 1948.[40] There was often very little overlap between West and Central Java during this period, apart from platoon-level exchanges between forces in the two regions.[41] As mentioned earlier, West Java was also the area of operations of the Siliwangi Division, which was arguably the most disciplined and trained unit within the TNI at the time, partly owing to the predominantly ex-KNIL makeup of their officer corps.[42] The presence of such an effective Republican force in West Java, along with Nasution's decision to integrate all of the region's armed formations into the Siliwangi likely convinced students that affiliating with the Yogyakarta-based MPP was not necessary.[43] Indeed, it was evident that the West Javanese *tentara pelajar* were ultimately subordinate to the Siliwangi

[38] Soedarwo et al., Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, Wilayah Jawa Tengah, 44–57; Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 164.
[39] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 163–64.
[40] For example, only one tentara pelajar battalion out of a planned four was ever formed in West Java, and only this single battalion apparently had official MPP approval. See Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 169.
[41] Multiple cases of small platoon level *tentara pelajar* deployments from Central to West Java can be seen in Paguyuban Tiga Tujuh Belas, *Tentara Pelajar Dalam Perang Kemerdekaan Dan Pembangunan*.
[42] Aan Ratmanto, *Pasukan Siliwangi: Loyalitas, Patriotisme, Dan Heroisme*, Cetakan pertama (Suryodiningratan, Mantrijeron, Yogyakarta: Mata Padi Pressindo, 2012), 39–44.
[43] Said, *Genesis of Power*, 35–36.

division, with later iterations going so far as to name themselves the Siliwangi Student Corps.[44]

Some regimental histories that contend that the MPP had four sub-units point to the TGP as the fourth formation.[45] The TGP was the odd one out in terms of *tentara pelajar* organisation. It was unique in the sense that, unlike the other three regiments, it was not a territorial command. Though, as mentioned before, the origins of the TGP can be traced to the Surabaya technical students of TRIP's *Staf II*, it would evolve to encompass engineering and technical students from other areas, most notably Central Java.[46]

Ultimately, though in this somewhat unclear and unwieldy form it was short-lived, the MPP represented the first real attempt to organise the disparate *tentara pelajar* units of Java under a single command, closely emulating the TNI in an attempt to follow the values of superior discipline and professionalism that they believed the regular army possessed. Indeed, the MPP that spearheaded this reorganisation was closely linked to the leadership of the TNI, to the extent that by the end of it the *tentara pelajar* were less a student militia but more of an unofficial detachment of the regular army. This close relationship between the TNI and the *tentara pelajar* would lead students to play a pivotal role as the TNI continued its attempts to reform and exert control over the *laskar*.

Operation Product: The *tentara pelajar* experience battle and defeat

The failure of Linggadjati was visible not only in the diplomatic disagreements between the Dutch and Indonesian governments, but also with the actions of both countries' militaries on the ground. Dutch forces on the ground in Java, a combination of KL volunteers and recently freed KNIL soldiers, had completely replaced British forces by the end of 1946, with the last British troops leaving at around the same time as the talks

[44] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan pelajar dalam perang kemerdekaan., 184.
[45] Soedarwo et al., Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, Wilayah Jawa Tengah, 44.
[46] Moehkardi, Pelajar Pejuang Tentara Genie Pelajar, 1945-1950, 182.

at Linggadjati began.[47] Dutch scepticism of the Indonesian government being able to keep their side of the bargain led to a somewhat indifferent attitude to the agreement among Dutch officials in Indonesia, including the Acting Governor General Hubertus van Mook.[48] Engineered partly as a show of force to demonstrate that the KNIL was just as capable as the British military, Dutch forces violated the Linggadjati-agreed ceasefire line in several places. The most noteworthy of these actions occurred on the exact day when the Dutch parliament ratified the agreement, on 17 March 1947 in Mojokerto, where the TRIP's high command and Battalion 1000 were based.[49]

The Mojokerto incident involved a combined air and ground attack on the city. KNIL/KL soldiers advanced with the protection of tanks and armoured transports, as well as uncontested close air support from Dutch planes.[50] Republican forces within the city, including Battalion 1000 of the TRIP, were only able to provide token resistance. By the 20th, Republican forces had retreated, and the KNIL/KL had established a strong presence in the city. TRIP headquarters followed the HQ of Division VI and relocated to Malang where Battalions 3000 and 5000 were stationed, while Battalion 1000 retreated to Madiun and regrouped with Battalion 2000.[51]

The attack was a blatant showcase of the failure of the Linggadjati Agreement and in hindsight, can be seen as a kind of test attack for the KNIL/KL. A Pesindo wire to the Ministry of Defence correctly argued that the success of the Mojokerto attack showcased the weaknesses of the TNI in maintaining static lines of defence, likely encouraging the KNIL/KL to plan even larger-scale attacks.[52] This full-scale offensive

[47] McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946, 182.
[48] van der Kroef, "Dutch Policy and the Linggadjati Agreement, 1946-1947," 184.
[49] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Koesalah Soebagyo Toer, and Ediati Kamil, eds., *Kronik Revolusi Indonesia*, Cet. 1, vol. 3 (Jakarta: KPG, 1999), 90–92.
[50] Mochamad Chariris, "Jalur KA Dibombardir Belanda, Sebarkan Selebaran dari Udara," March 21, 2018, https://radarmojokerto.jawapos.com/read/2018/03/21/58952/jalur-ka-dibombardir-belanda-sebarkan-selebaran-dari-udara.
[51] H. Boges Sudjadi GR, Sejarah Singkat Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar Jawa Timur (TRIP-JATIM) (Jakarta, 1987), 23.
[52] Sekretaris Umum Dewan Pusat Pesindo, "Surat dari Sekretaris Umum Dewan Pusat Pesindo kepada Kementrian Pertahanan tanggal 22 Maret 1947 tentang Penyampaian Laporan dan Berita-berita Kilat dari Modjokerto mengenai Situasi Militer di daerah tersebut," March 22, 1947, Inventaris Arsip Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, no. 265, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.

eventually came in July, when Dutch forces conducted a coordinated attack on multiple Republican defensive positions in Java and Sumatra.[53]

The Netherlands presented the offensive to the international community as a "police action," claiming that their goal was simply to enforce the Linggadjati Agreement upon a Republican government that had either ignored its stipulations or had little power to enforce its control over the many *laskar* units that disagreed with the agreement. This was seen as simply a convenient excuse by most UN members that had been actively involved in Dutch-Indonesian mediation, such as the United States, the Soviet Union and Australia. In many ways, the name given by the Republicans to the offensive, Dutch "military aggression," was a far better fit.[54]



Figure 3 A map of Dutch advances during Operation Product. *Tentara pelajar* units were active in battles across various fronts, including Malang and the Semarang-Ambarawa frontline. (Map by Robert Cribb. In R. B. Cribb, *Digital Atlas of Indonesian History*, electronic resource (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2010).

The Dutch advantage in arms served them well, as they were largely able to steamroll a TNI that was both ill-equipped and still undergoing the process of reorganisation. The aim of the Dutch offensive, codenamed "Product," was to secure the most economically viable areas of Java and Sumatra while weakening the Republican government in the process.[55] Dutch strategy during the campaign dictated the bypassing and encircling of

[53] Leopold Scholtz, "The Dutch Strategic and Operational Approach in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945–1949," *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 46, no. 2 (2018): 8, https://doi.org/10.5787/46-2-1237.
[54] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 209–14.
[55] Roel Frakking, "'Who Wants to Cover Everything, Covers Nothing': The Organization of Indigenous Security Forces in Indonesia, 1945–50," *Journal of Genocide Research* 14, no. 3/4 (November 2012): 339–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2012.719369.

most TNI strong points, thus concentrating offensive power on weaker sections of the line that were not well-defended by either regular or *laskar* troops.[56] At this stage of the war, the TNI still stuck to conventional defensive tactics, centred around static defensive lines. This, coupled with Dutch control over the air and general superiority in equipment on the ground, led to most TNI units being forced into a headlong retreat.

The KNIL/KL attacks occurred simultaneously, leaving most Republican forces unable to respond. In many of these cases, soldiers of *tentara pelajar* units were on the frontlines, bearing the brunt of the attacks. Student-soldiers of the Yogyakarta detachment of Central Javanese TP faced KNIL/KL forces advancing out of Semarang in the towns of Salatiga and Purwokerto.[57] The experiences of most TP units were similar: while some resistance was offered to Dutch advances on the towns they initially defended, they were unable to hold back the Dutch attacks.[58] Thus, many TP units chose to retreat from larger towns and villages into the Javanese countryside alongside the TNI and various *laskar* groups.[59]

In East Java, the thrust of the Dutch attack came in the form of a ground offensive from Surabaya to secure Malang and an amphibious attack on Pasirputih Beach in Besuki, southeast of Surabaya.[60] Like in Central Java, the Dutch attack caught the TNI by surprise. The landings were largely uncontested, allowing KNIL/KL forces to advance southwards towards the town of Bondowoso which counted soldiers of the TRIP's Battalion 4000 among its defenders. The company's commander, student Thomas Abdullah, ultimately judged resistance against such superior force of arms to be futile with the men and equipment at their disposal. Similar to his Central Javanese TP counterpart, he ordered a retreat out of the town, leaving KNIL/KL forces to occupy Bondowoso.[61]

[56] Scholtz, "The Dutch Strategic and Operational Approach in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945–1949," 8.
[57] Paguyuban Tiga Tujuh Belas, Tentara Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan, 39–46.
[58] Soedarwo et al., Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, Wilayah Jawa Tengah, 68–73.
[59] Soedarwo et al., 77.
[60] Panitya Penulisan Sejarah Perjuangan Pelajar/TRIP Besuki, *Prajurit Sangkur Dan Pena*, 22–23.
[61] Panitya Penulisan Sejarah Perjuangan Pelajar/TRIP Besuki, 24–25.

The most well-recorded and celebrated incident of TRIP resistance against the Dutch attack occurred in Malang on July 31st. Unlike the speedy advance of the KNIL/KL at the start of the offensive, the thrust on Malang faced stiff resistance from TNI and *laskar* troops who had been able to consolidate themselves. Defensive lines here were comparatively more well-prepared, perhaps due to their its proximity to the front lines in Mojokerto and the strategic importance of Malang, which contained the headquarters of the TNI's Division VII.[62] Sungkono, previously the TNI commander in Surabaya and now commander of Division VII, used this opportunity to order an evacuation of most TNI units from Malang and the implementation of a scorched earth policy. While many among them argued that the decision was premature, TGP soldiers ultimately followed Sungkono's orders to make Malang "a sea of fire," destroying important buildings in the city such as the local radio transmitter and train station, indicative of their obedience to lines of command.[63]

The defence of Malang was divided among several units of *laskar* and TNI troops. Regular TNI units were assigned to defend the eastern approaches to the city, while a mix of BPRI and KRIS *laskar* units held the city centre.[64] The TRIP's Battalions 3000 and 5000 held the western part of Malang. Both TRIP units were severely undermanned. Many of Battalion 5000's companies were either on leave or off in the East Java countryside, providing rural villages with basic defensive military training.[65] This was a part of the TRIP's "total defence program" where they sought to utilise the local population in fighting the Dutch whilst also inculcating them with nationalistic values.[66] This left Susanto, the battalion commander, with only one hundred and fifty men at his disposal, later supplemented by two companies from Battalion 3000.[67]

Dutch forces were able to press into Malang by July 30th. Fighting within the city continued well into the next day, which saw the TRIP thrust into action. TRIP

[62] Moehkardi, Pelajar Pejuang Tentara Genie Pelajar, 1945-1950, 71.
[63] Moehkardi, 71–72.
[64] H. Boges Sudjadi GR, Am-Track dan Gugurnya 35 Anggota TRIP Jawa Timur (Jakarta, n.d.), 13–15.
[65] H. Boges Sudjadi GR, Sejarah Singkat Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar Jawa Timur (TRIP-JATIM), 24.
[66] Asmadi, *Pelajar Pejuang*, 300–302.
[67] H. Boges Sudjadi GR, Sejarah Singkat Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar Jawa Timur (TRIP-JATIM), 23–24.

defensive positions on the main thoroughfare into Malang were flanked and destroyed by Dutch soldiers and armour.[68] In the chaos, some thirty-five TRIP student-soldiers, including Susanto, were killed, with the remnants of Battalions 3000 and 5000 retreating to the village of Blitar, south of Malang.[69]

Figure 4 The "TRIP Heroes Cemetery" located in Malang, opened by Sukarno in 1959. Image taken by the author, 4 April 2022.

Operation Product came to an end on August 4th but fell short of its goals. Dutch command had initially planned Product to be the first of two operations, the second of which aimed to "pacify" isolated Republican forces.[70] This, however, was cut short by protests from the international community. Pressure from the United Nations and particularly from the United States, whose Marshall Plan was key to post war Dutch economic recovery, forced the Dutch government and the KNIL/KL to halt offensive military operations.[71]

[68] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 251–52.
[69] Radjab, 263–65; H. Boges Sudjadi GR, Am-Track dan Gugurnya 35 Anggota TRIP Jawa Timur, 20.
[70] Scholtz, "The Dutch Strategic and Operational Approach in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945–1949," 8.
[71] Scholtz, 20–21; Though, as was the situation following Linggadjati, fighting still occurred between KNIL/KL and Republican forces even after Dutch offensive operations ended. Some of these involved

Ultimately, while Product was relatively successful in consolidating KNIL/KL control over many Dutch-owned colonial plantations in Java and Sumatra, it had failed to strike a fatal blow to the Republican cause.[72] The TNI, along with the *tentara pelajar* and other *laskar* forces, were battered but not out of the fight. Of note is the fact that the capital, Yogyakarta, had not been subjected to a Dutch ground attack by the end of military operations, much to the disdain of Dutch overall commander General Simon Spoor.[73]

Tentara pelajar responses to their experiences in battle during Operation Product seem to be rather mixed. It is important to acknowledge that not many contemporary accounts of these battles from the eyes of *tentara pelajar* students have survived. It appears that many contemporary *tentara pelajar* publications, such as IPI's *Api Merdeka* and TRIP's *Patria,* either did not survive the Dutch attack or experienced major disruptions which prevented them from publishing issues regularly. *Patria,* for example, was printed in the town of Kediri before being sent off for distribution at the then-TRIP headquarters in Mojokerto.[74] The loss of Mojokerto prior to Operation Product proved a major issue for *Patria,* as conceded by its editorial board in a subsequent issue. Following the start of Operation Product, it is difficult to say whether *Patria* was able to publish anything at all, considering the close proximity of the TRIP to the frontlines in East Java.[75] The difficulty in sourcing *Patria* issues after this time period lends some credence to this hypothesis. Similar difficulties can be faced when looking for *Api Merdeka* issues published following Operation Product. While there is some evidence that at least *Patria* continued publishing and circulating issues in some limited capacity, it cannot be denied that the persistence of Dutch military operations severely disrupted the abilities of many smaller *laskar* magazines and newspapers to publish.

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tentara pelajar units. For example, see the Sidobunder incident involving Central Javanese TP units in Paguyuban Tiga Tujuh Belas, *Tentara Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan*, 46–50.
[72] Frakking, "'Who Wants to Cover Everything, Covers Nothing,'" 339–40.
[73] Scholtz, "The Dutch Strategic and Operational Approach in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945–1949," 9.
[74] Soebagijo I. N, Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI, 231.
[75] Soetomo, "Katerangan Keloearga Patria," *Patria*, March 31, 1947.

As such, most of the *tentara pelajar* reactions to the Dutch attack that are readily accessible derive from memoirs and regimental histories, often written far after the war itself. This temporal distance opens these sources to embellishment with hindsight. Many of the veterans writing the histories often either sought to glorify their exploits during the war or were in turn glorified by the Indonesian state itself, which aimed to promote veterans of the war as role models to a new generation of Indonesian youth.[76] Nevertheless, despite their deficiencies, these sources remain the best record of *tentara pelajar* experiences following Operation Product

While some core units of the East Javanese TRIP and Central Javanese TP had experienced fighting beforehand, most of the fresh *tentara pelajar* units that had been raised in 1946 and early 1947 had little experience in battle apart from the small skirmishes that characterised the nature of fighting along the Surabaya and Semarang frontlines. For these rookie soldiers, while most of their battles during Operation Product were ultimately losses, they were still among the first instances of fighting they had ever experienced. To this end, these were points of pride, and as such every moment of resistance, however fleeting, is depicted in their memoirs as part of a struggle against a much more powerful foe.[77] This position is not entirely without merit, as the hit-and-run attacks that the *tentara pelajar* and other *laskar* and TNI units carried out on Dutch-controlled infrastructure after Operation Product caused such stress among plantation owners that they began hiring Indonesian guards.[78]

Veteran *tentara pelajar,* on the other hand, were somewhat more meditative. As shown in Chapter II, the period of reflection that they experienced throughout most of 1946 and early 1947 had opened them up to more complex discourses surrounding the role of students within the war. While there was a degree of internal consensus over the dual role of students as *belajar* (studying) and *berjuang* (struggling/fighting), disagreements about this role continued to plague the *tentara pelajar*, not so much

[76] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, *Dharma Pusaka 45*. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI
[77] For example, many accounts of Product in Soedarwo et al., *Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, Wilayah Jawa Tengah* depict battles in this way. Retreats and losses in pitched battles are not necessarily depicted in such a manner, with focus instead being given to the act of maintaining low-level insurgencies against the Dutch.
[78] Frakking, "'Who Wants to Cover Everything, Covers Nothing,'" 338–39.

internally as they did externally. Opposition to the active use of students as frontline soldiers persisted mostly among teachers and parents. Parents were naturally opposed to their young children fighting on the frontlines: most of the grievances of these parents outlined in *tentara pelajar* memoirs focused on the tender age of the average student-soldier.[79] Teachers, on the other hand, held the same views as those of the IPI higher-ups, believing that students would serve the struggle far better by focusing on their studies and thereby participating in national development (*pembangunan*). Indeed, teachers were among the few external groups who came out in support of this stance when it was brought up at the Malang student congress in 1946 and were undoubtedly disappointed when the dual *belajar* and *berjuang* role was formally adopted there.[80]

Radjab noted that one teacher lamented the death of his friend, a fellow student named Wandi, who died during the Dutch attack on Mojokerto. Suwandi's body was taken by the retreating TRIP soldiers to Malang, where they performed a formal burial with military honours. The teacher, Pak Purwadi, exclaimed during the funeral, "How many Wandis can this nation produce each year?"[81]

Radjab acknowledged the merit of Purwadi's statement, elaborating that Indonesia, still a "backwards" country, required students to help in national development, echoing similar arguments made by IPI cadres. However, he also argued for the merits of his own view that ultimately the manpower and leadership provided by the students would be put to better use in the armed struggle. Radjab's argument is vindicated later in his book, where he describes the Dutch attack on Malang. He began the account by explicitly mentioning the destruction of the secondary school where Purwadi taught as a part of the military's scorched earth tactics, while also criticising the view that prioritised *belajar* over *berjuang*. .[82] In this way, Radjab sought to portray that without students playing an active role in the armed struggle, there might not be

[79] The tension between student-soldiers and disapproving parents is a common theme in novelizations of the tentara pelajar experience. For some examples, see Surowo Abdulmanap and Tanda Huria Manurung, *Pelajar Berjuang: Roman Sejarah* (Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia (UI-Press), 1983); Gatut Kusumo, *Pita Merah di Lengan Kiri*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1981); Asmadi, *Sangkur dan Pena*.
[80] Soebagijo I. N, *Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI*, 231. Though it should be noted that some teachers were supportive of the *tentara pelajar:* one of the founding editors of *Patria* was a teacher.
[81] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 206.
[82] Radjab, 249.

any schools left for students to learn, or perhaps any country left to develop. After this, Radjab transitions into describing the actions of Battalion 5000 in the defence of Malang, including a detailed account of the death of their commander, Susanto.

Accounts of Susanto's death differ among several sources, though the account offered in Radjab's writing is the most detailed.[83] Radjab did not write the account himself, instead detailing the words of Nurhadi, a survivor of Battalion 5000. Nurhadi described the deaths of his comrades in grisly detail, including the graphic death of his commander Susanto who was shot and then crushed by a Dutch armoured vehicle.[84] Nurhadi then hid with what remained of his squad before being rescued by another TRIP soldier, a senior from his high school. He cannot help but tear up, telling his upperclassman, "so many of the kids are dead," before escaping the city with what was left of his unit.[85]

Nurhadi's description of the events on Jalan Salak is particularly interesting due to the intensity of emotion that it conveys. Overall, it presents a more nuanced understanding of the experience of battle on the part of the *tentara pelajar* when compared to the accounts of other veterans. This nuance is apparent throughout Radjab's book, which is structured as a mix between traditional autobiography and formal history writing. It should be noted that it is unclear whether Nurhadi was a founding student of the TRIP as Radjab was. Considering that he was part of Battalion 5000, a new formation raised in Malang, it is likely that he was still a rookie soldier, with perhaps some battle experience that was limited to fighting in small skirmishes along the Surabaya front. Thus, Nurhadi's testimony provides some additional insight into how these secondary school students, often as young as fifteen or fourteen years old, experienced their first taste of the horrors of war.

Though Operation Product was a disaster for the TRIP and other *tentara pelajar* units, as they were once again forced to retreat, it would be a disservice to say that they had failed to make an impression. There was certainly a degree of disdain placed on some *tentara pelajar* units' disregard for orders. The TRIP in particular received an

[83] For example, H. Boges Sudjadi GR, *Am-Track dan Gugurnya 35 Anggota TRIP Jawa Timur*, 20–21 describes Susanto as having died from gunfire.
[84] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan.
[85] Radjab., 256-262.

emphatic chewing out from the command of the TNI Division VI for their actions in Malang. For some senior officers, losing thirty-five valuable men to the defence of a city that was supposed to have been subjected to a scorched earth policy anyway was unacceptable.[86]

However, this criticism does not seem to have dampened support for the TRIP, and indeed the *tentara pelajar* as a whole, among officers in the TNI. While defeated on essentially all accounts, the *tentara pelajar* acquitted themselves rather well during Operation Product, providing, in almost all instances, relatively stolid resistance against Dutch forces before eventually retreating. In hindsight, Nasution writes of the TRIP's actions in Malang,

> From the many instances of heroism that are on the official record, the most noteworthy is the heroism of members of the TRIP, which consisted of secondary school students in their teens…[87]

If anything, the fighting spirit displayed by the *tentara pelajar* further enhanced their position in the eyes of the TNI.

Becoming a part of the TNI: Renville, *rera* and the end of the *laskar*

The territorial losses brought about by the Dutch attack left many *tentara pelajar* units outside of their home regions. A new TRIP headquarters was established outside the town of Blitar, in the village of Wlingi, some sixty kilometres southwest of Malang.[88] In Central Java, many of the new TP units that were formed in towns now under Dutch control retreated to the remaining centres of Republican power in the region: the capital of Yogyakarta and the city of Surakarta.[89] The hardest case was experienced by the soldiers of the West Java *tentara pelajar*, whose fate was tied with the Siliwangi

[86] Moehkardi, Pelajar Pejuang Tentara Genie Pelajar, 1945-1950, 266.
[87] Abdul Haris Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, vol. 5 (Bandung: DISJARAH-AD, 1977), 258.
[88] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 41.
[89] Soedarwo et al., *Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, Wilayah Jawa Tengah*, 94–99; Though the Purwokerto TP unit was able to find a safe haven in the town of Banjarnegara to Yogyakarta's northwest. See Keluarga Ex Anggota Be XVII Tentara Pelajar Cie Purwokerto, *Sejarah Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Purwokerto*, 77–79.

division. Prior to Operation Product, West Java was the part of the island where the KNIL/KL had the highest level of influence, controlling not only Jakarta and Bandung but also the road that connected both cities.[90] The Dutch advance out of these positions was thus considerably strong, and despite their relatively elite status within the TNI, the Siliwangi division was isolated in several pockets dotted throughout West Java by the end of large-scale fighting in August.[91]

The end of fighting brought about a return to the negotiation table, though any discussion between the Dutch and the Republicans would now be marked by heightened levels of suspicion. With Britain now no longer a major player in the conflict, responsibility for mediating a settlement between the Republic and the Netherlands fell upon the United States. After some discussion within the United Nations Security Council, it was agreed that a Commission of Good Offices comprised of third-party countries nominated by both sides, would be formed to mediate between the Netherlands and the Republic.[92]

The effectiveness of the Commission was hampered by numerous factors. Its key member, the US, was in the good graces of neither the Dutch nor the Republicans. The Netherlands, while deferential to the US due to its dependence on Marshall Plan aid, was disappointed about having to stop its successful military operation just short of crushing the Republican government. On the other side, Republicans largely viewed the US as not fully supportive of their cause, as while it was partly the US' protestations that brought a premature end to the offensive, the US had not really taken any meaningful punitive action against the Dutch either. The Security Council too was half-hearted in its support for the Commission of Good Offices, partly because it represented a compromise solution that failed to garner the complete support the colonial powers of France and Britain nor the communist Soviet Union.[93]

Even as the Commission for Good Offices was established, the Netherlands maintained an aggressive posture on the ground. Only shortly after the committee was set up, the KNIL/KL advanced from their positions on the so-called Van Mook line that

[90] R. B. Cribb, *Digital Atlas of Indonesian History*, electronic resource (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2010).
[91] Ratmanto, *Pasukan Siliwangi*, 62–65.
[92] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 217–18.
[93] Kahin, 214–15; 219.

marked the furthest extent of their advance during Operation Product, to secure the remainder of the island of Madura off the East Java coast. Between August and the end of 1947, the KNIL/KL also practiced so-called "mopping up" operations against the remaining pockets of Republican resistance within the Van Mook line, which often involved atrocities against civilians.[94] Consolidation of Dutch power in these newly controlled parts of Sumatra and Java, as well as in other islands of the archipelago that were more securely under Dutch rule, went beyond simple military domination, however. Throughout the remainder of 1947, the Netherlands would establish many "federal states" that were to be part of the planned Indonesian federal state as outlined in the Linggadjati Agreement. While some, such as the "Great East," which encompassed large swathes of eastern Indonesia, were established as early as 1946 due to relatively lacklustre Republican resistance there, others, such as the State of East Java, were formed from territory freshly captured during Operation Product.[95]

Ultimately, the committee was able to achieve some success by January 1948. This came in the form of bringing Dutch and Indonesian delegations together once again for talks. These discussions occurred on the USS Renville, a US Navy ship that was anchored in Jakarta Bay. Talks on the Renville took place throughout January, and by the end of the month, an agreement was reached.[96] Despite initial Republican opposition, both parties agreed to reaffirm the Van Mook line, which was now supposed to be a demilitarised zone.[97] Despite its success in bringing the Dutch and the Republicans together at the negotiating table, the success of the Committee of Good Offices and the Renville Agreement was incredibly short-lived, with skirmishes continuing along the Van Mook line.

The Renville Agreement affected the TNI and *laskar* in several different ways. Initially, the most felt impact of the agreement was the withdrawal of Republican forces that remained within the Van Mook line when the ceasefire was declared. The most notable formation to have experienced this was the Siliwangi Division which, as

[94] Scagliola, "The Silences and Myths of a 'Dirty War,'" 256.
[95] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 196–97; 351; 378–81; Robert Cribb, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia* (England: Curzon, 2000), 55.
[96] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 262–63.
[97] Ricklefs, 263–64.

mentioned earlier, found itself surrounded by KNIL/KL forces in West Java. Similarly, a mix of TNI and TRIP units in East Java were also behind enemy lines when hostilities concluded in August.[98] In February, Sudirman ordered all Republican formations to *hijrah* (retreat) to positions under Republican control beyond the Van Mook line.[99] This was a fairly dramatic process for the Siliwangi division and its attached *tentara pelajar* unit, as most of their home region of West Java was under Dutch control. Thus, Siliwangi units had to effectively leave West Java behind, eventually settling outside of Surakarta in Central Java.[100] By comparison, while also tinged with a sense of sadness for the villages they were leaving behind, TRIP formations in East Java experienced a far less dramatic upheaval. A good half of East Java was still under Republican control, with the new TRIP headquarters in Blitar not very far from its old base in Dutch-occupied Malang.[101] Central Javanese TP units also did not experience such a dramatic retreat, largely due to similar reasons.

However, the most important part of the Renville Agreement was the commitment that both sides made to reduce the sizes of their armed forces. The Republican government took this agreement to heart, as it began trimming down the number of troops it had in both the TNI and the *laskar*. Part of the eagerness with which the Republicans embraced this new policy of "reorganisation-rationalisation," often abbreviated as *rera* or *re-dan-ra*, came with a significant shake-up within the government. Just like Linggadjati, the Renville Agreement was far from popular among Republicans, and its signing brought about such a massive loss of support for the government that Prime Minister Amir Syarifuddin was forced to resign. Vice President Mohammad Hatta stepped into the positions of Prime Minister and Defence Minister, also vacated by Syarifuddin, with the full support of Sukarno.[102]

The idea of *rera* was not particularly new within Republican circles. A version of it had already been floated as early as the signing of Linggadjati, when the unwieldy

[98] Soedirdjo et al., *Sejarah perjuangan TRIP Bojonegoro*, 18–19. The term *hijrah* is an allusion to the Prophet Muhammad's journey from Mecca to Medina seeking protection from religious persecution.
[99] Ratmanto, Kronik TNI, 1945-1949, 104.
[100] David Charles Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," *Indonesia*, no. 21 (1976): 9–13, https://doi.org/10.2307/3350956.
[101] Meck Sunarno, Sekilas Profil Kompi Mobil-I, 14.
[102] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 231.

nature of the large numbers of regular and irregular troops began to make an impression on military commanders. As mentioned earlier, Nasution pointed out how it was impossible to equip all of the Republic's soldiers, thus leaving many large formations with enough arms to equip twenty-five percent of their men. With this in mind, the start of *rera* under the Hatta government was unsurprisingly welcomed in some sectors, who adopted the new Prime Minister's rhetoric that the economic savings the new policy would incur was required to support eventual national development.[103]

The previous administrations of Syahrir and Syarifuddin were either preoccupied with other matters or simply ignored the implementation of *rera*. Syarifuddin in particular had reasons to forego rationalisation. The organisations created by the government to coordinate the *laskar* and to some extent control the armed forces, such as the *Pepolit* and the TNI Masyarakat, were largely Syarifuddin's constructions and were populated by many of his political associates.[104] Thus, by packing both the *laskar* and the TNI with his sympathisers, he could maintain a significant power base within the army. Additionally, by the time of the Renville agreement, the cost-cutting measures that *rera* would provide were increasingly needed by the Republican government. Not only had the Netherlands managed to secure the most economically productive parts of Java and Sumatra, but its offensive had also caused refugees to begin streaming through the Van Mook line, into the arms of a Republican government facing an economic crisis.[105] In many ways, Hatta's hands were tied, and implementing *rera* was almost a given.

Syarifuddin's resignation from the cabinet left his allies bereft of protection, and thus *rera* significantly impacted them. Hatta aimed to reduce the number of active military personnel to around 160,000 men over the first period of rationalisation, before eventually implementing further reductions to achieve a final number of 57,000 regular troops.[106] The Hatta administration hoped that demobilised soldiers would be allocated

[103] Subandi Rianto, "Reformasi Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Dalam Pemberitaan Kedaulatan Rakyat: Sebuah Studi Kebijakan Amir Syarifudin Dan Moh. Hatta 1947-1948" (Unpublished manuscript, Surabaya, n.d.).
[104] Said, *Genesis of Power*., 44-45.
[105] Rianto, "Reformasi Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Dalam Pemberitaan Kedaulatan Rakyat: Sebuah Studi Kebijakan Amir Syarifudin Dan Moh. Hatta 1947-1948."
[106] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 262.

to economically productive activities within Republican-held territory as part of the local workforce. The government even went so far as requesting village heads and other local notables in Java to help find work for returning soldiers, arguing that the men would be skilled enough and that giving them even simple jobs like farmhands would help in the *rera* effort. In some respects, the government was successful. Some 100,000 demobilised soldiers were given work in agriculture, while others were given some training under government schemes.[107]

Despite this, tensions emerged as many former soldiers were demobilised only begrudgingly, and subsequently directed their anger against the government. Many of these were *pemuda* who were previously in the *laskar*, such as Pesindo youth who in March 1948 declared their opposition to *rera* in a conference in Surakarta.[108] Another notable formation that refused to demobilise was the Surakarta BPRI, under the command of Mardjoeki, an illiterate former chauffeur who had joined the BPRI in Semarang and rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.[109] In addition to refusing to demobilise, there are accounts of Mardjoeki's men acting as "bandits," terrorising the local populace, raping women, and sustaining themselves off of stolen goods.[110] Mardjoeki was also said to have recruited men for his BPRI unit from prisons in Surakarta and had been corrupt in his dealings with locals.[111] In March, the Surakarta branch of the TP, under the command of Ambarawa veteran and Laskar Kere commander Achmadi, was tasked by the TNI command to bring Mardjoeki and his men to heel. Despite the loss of one soldier, Gajah Suranto from the Surakarta TP, the operation was a success and concluded with the capture of Mardjoeki and his execution by order of a military tribunal.[112]

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[107] Kahin, 263.
[108] Pesindo, "Kesimpulan dan Putusan Konferensi 'Pesindo' – Pembelaan" (Surakarta, March 25, 1948), Inventaris Arsip Kementerian Penerangan, no. 1232, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[109] Petrik Matanasi, "Ahmad Jadau: Komandan TLRI dalam Pusaran Peristiwa Madiun 1948," tirto.id, accessed August 5, 2020, https://tirto.id/ahmad-jadau-komandan-tlri-dalam-pusaran-peristiwa-madiun-1948-eiGz.
[110] Moehkardi, *Pelajar Pejuang Tentara Genie Pelajar, 1945-1950*, 122; Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat, *Sedjarah TNI-AD Kodam VII/Diponegoro* (Jajasan Penerbit Diponegoro, 1968), 127–28.
[111] Julianto Ibrahim, *Dinamika Sosial Dan Politik Masa Revolusi Indonesia*, Cetakan kedua (Bulaksumur, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2016), 137.
[112] Kerukunan Keluarga Besar Ex. TP/TNI Detasemen II Brigade XVII, "Monumen Mayor Achmadi."

In comparison to the *laskar,* the *tentara pelajar* was relatively untouched by the *rera* process. This can be partly explained because of the largely voluntary structure of the *tentara pelajar.* While the *tentara pelajar* leadership clearly emulated the TNI and military discipline was practiced to some extent, rank-and-file student-soldiers would often come and go from active formations.[113] Schools still ran, and while their commanders might have preferred to have a larger pool of manpower, there was no punishment for student-soldiers who decided to leave the frontline in order to resume their studies. This effectively meant that *tentara pelajar* units were part-time formations that consumed fewer resources than full-time regular or *laskar* units, perhaps exempting them from the worst effects of *rera.*

However, perhaps the most important factor that helped protect the *tentara pelajar* from *rera* was the high regard in which they were held by the TNI high command. The combination of their emulation of TNI organisation, their performances during Operation Product as well as their conduct in the capture and subsequent execution of Mardjoeki helped to increase their standing in the eyes of ranking officers. Indeed, in some respects the capture of Mardjoeki was a showcase of the *tentara pelajar*'s resolve to truly become a part of the armed forces. Take, for example Surakarta TP veteran Soehendro Sosrosuwarno's account of the incident, where he describes Mardjoeki's BPRI regiment as being "a bunch of undisciplined, long-haired bandits."[114] While he does confess some level of admiration for them, mentioning that their long hair was part of an oath they took to not cut their hair until Indonesian independence was secured, it is clear that Sosrosuwarno considers himself and his men to be superior to this criminal *laskar* unit. Their implied respect of the military grooming standard within the TP, and thus their superior discipline, contrasted with the apparent long-haired banditry of the *laskar* of the BPRI. This becomes evident further on, as Sosrosuwarno concludes that the act played an important role in the *tentara pelajar*'s integration into the TNI.[115]

To some degree the TNI's respect for and reliance on the *tentara pelajar* as a disciplining force among the *laskar* groups went beyond the Central Javanese TP. In

[113] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 8, 91-92. 160-161.
[114] Schumacher, Ogenblikken van Genezing, 138–39.
[115] Schumacher, 139.

West Java, the IMAM, for example, disarmed units of the *Laskar Rakyat* and KRIS during the Battle of Cirebon in 1947 at the behest of the TNI, as the two *laskar* units refused to integrate into the TNI's chain of command.[116]

This perception that the *tentara pelajar* had of the other *laskar* groups is notable, as it not only followed on from the stance of the TNI which wanted to more effectively control the *laskar* groups, but also that of the KNIL/KL. As Scagliola writes in her article discussing mythmaking and atrocities during the war, several Dutch accounts of the war praise the TNI officers as Dutch-educated freedom fighters who were considered to be "equals" to the officers of the Dutch army. Such recognition contrasts with a Dutch veteran's account of Darul Islam, a *laskar* group that later sought to secede from the Republic to form an Indonesian Islamic state. The veteran described the DI as made up of "robbers" and "bandits," the very words used by Sosrosuwarno to describe Mardjoeki's BPRI, distinguishing them from the "educated" TNI.[117] This similarity in outlook is indicative of the colonial and upper-class roots of the *tentara pelajar* and their continued need to distinguish themselves from other *pemuda.* The legacies of this recognition as equal combatants are also evident in the mutually respectful post-war reunions some *tentara pelajar* veterans had with former Dutch soldiers.[118] The sense of superiority the *tentara pelajar* and the TNI had in forwarding their struggle against colonialism ultimately revealed their own colonially forged biases.

This is not to say that neither the TNI nor the *tentara pelajar* were above committing acts of violence and "banditry" themselves. As Scagliola points out, Nasution admitted that committing so-called "low-level" atrocities in Dutch-controlled areas was instrumental in shaping a populace that was supportive of the TNI's guerrilla campaign.[119] In some cases, such acts of violence exceeded Nasution's vague parameters, as in the case of a massacre of Chinese Indonesians in Kediri that was

[116] Team Penyusun Sejarah Perjuangan Pasukan Pelajar I.M.A.M., *Ringkasan Sejarah Perjuangan Pasukan Pelajar I.M.A.M. Purwokerto*, 3.
[117] Scagliola, "The Silences and Myths of a 'Dirty War,'" 241.
[118] See an account of this in Ant P. de Graaff, *Napak Tilas Tentara Belanda Dan TNI: Ant. P. de Graaff*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997).
[119] Scagliola, "The Silences and Myths of a 'Dirty War,'" 246; Abdul Haris Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, Facsimile edition ; with an introduction by Otto Heilbrunn (New York: Praeger, 1965), 188–89.

apparently orchestrated by the TNI officers.[120] Similarly, while their participation in violence against civilians is naturally omitted from most accounts of *tentara pelajar* histories, it is noteworthy that the TRIP commander, Isman, admitted that his men did not come out of the war without blame. One of his men, future human rights activist and Catholic priest Y.B. Mangunwijaya, wrote that when he and his TRIP colleagues returned to Malang in 1949 to a hero's reception from the local populace, Isman responded by shunning away praise, instead claiming that he and his men "…are not heroes. We have burned, killed, and destroyed. Our hands are covered in blood."[121]

There are different ways to interpret this. One is that he is referring to how the young men of the TRIP were thrust into fighting a war that they were not necessarily ready nor wanted to take part in, killing Dutch soldiers and destroying infrastructure that might have supported them and the *rakyat* for whom they fought. The other is that he is alluding to TRIP participation in acts of violence against civilians. Though it is unclear which of these possible meanings Isman intended, the remainder of his address is another great depiction of how much the identity of the *tentara pelajar* was anchored in perceptions of the student role in national development, as he emphasised the potential for his young soldiers to be "useful in the future" and called on the people to "care for [them]."[122] Thus, despite an admission of their scarring by the violence of war, Isman maintained the discourse of *tentara pelajar* identity. He referred back to the discourse of the student role in national development as one of the key reasons for the *rakyat* to support the readjustment of TRIP students to post-war society.

Returning to the case of Mardjoeki and *tentara pelajar* perceptions of the *laskar* groups, the capture and execution of the BPRI leader led to an increase in the stature of the Central Javanese TP within the eyes of the TNI and government. Achmadi and his men were honoured by Sukarno through his promotion as the City Military Commander

[120] Ravando and Harsono, "Chinese Mass Graves as Key Sources to Examine Chinese Massacres during the Indonesian Revolutionary Period (1945-1949)."
[121] Moh. Habib Asyhad, "Romo Mangun: Kami Bukan Pahlawan! - Intisari," Intisari, accessed October 27, 2021, https://intisari.grid.id/read/0333737/romo-mangun-kami-bukan-pahlawan.
[122] Moh. Habib Asyhad; Maria Carolina Ramopolii, *Pemerdekaan: Pendidikan dan Teologi Y.B. Mangunwijaya Menghadapi Revolusi Industri 4.0* (PT Kanisius, n.d.), 23–24.; Y. B. Mangunwijaya, *Saya Ingin Membayar Utang kepada Rakyat*, Cet. 1. (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 1999), 35.

of Surakarta, placing him in command of the Surakarta garrison.[123] While to some extent this was a formality, as he was still outranked by divisional commanders who had more resources at their disposal, it showed an unprecedented level of trust in the *tentara pelajar* by the government. Indeed, Kahin writes of their involvement in the Mardjoeki affair that the *tentara pelajar* were "one of the most effective of the army's units, and could always be relied upon to back the government in times of crisis."[124]

Figure 5 A relief depicting Achmadi's promotion to City Military Commander by Sukarno, part of the Major Achmadi Monument in Surakarta. Image taken by the author, 18 December 2019

The TNI's trust in the *tentara pelajar* was ultimately manifested in July, when the units previously organised under the MPP were officially integrated into the TNI. As a part of the *rera* process, the TNI organised new formations that existed outside of the divisions, which were themselves heavily depleted due to the demobilisation. These new units, known as the Kesatuan Reserve Umum (General Reserve Unit, KRU), were largely comprised of those units that had completed *hijrah*.[125] Now without a designated area to defend, the reorganisation of these units into the KRU allowed them to function

[123] Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," 13.
[124] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 265.
[125] Himawan Soetanto, *Long March Siliwangi*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Kata Hasta Pustaka, 2007), 71.

as mobile reserve units, ready to support frontline units that found themselves outmatched by enemy forces. The Siliwangi division made up the bulk of the KRU X formation, while the *tentara pelajar* were organised into a separate formation, the KRU W.[126] In practical organisational terms, amalgamation into the KRU changed very little for the *tentara pelajar.* Sub-formations of KRU W were still divided along the same lines they had been during the MPP phase, with the Central Javanese TP, TRIP, and TGP being the dominant formations. There were very few shake-ups in command, with figures like Isman and Achmadi still overseeing their respective units.[127] Despite this, as was the case for many of the organisational structures of armed Republican units, the KRU would last for less than a year, ultimately being dissolved in December 1948 as the Dutch launched their second major offensive.[128] Notably, the unification of *tentara pelajar* units into the KRU and, subsequently, into a new brigade dubbed the 17th Brigade (not to be confused with the aforementioned *laskar*-dominated brigade), was handled directly by Nasution himself, indicative of the high regard the *tentara pelajar* were held in as well as their formal integration into the TNI's structure.[129]

Conclusion

The formal subsuming of the *tentara pelajar* units into the ranks of the TNI marks the culmination of their journey into becoming what they had consistently expressed within the pages of their publications since 1946. As discussed in Chapter II, a core part of the *tentara pelajar* identity involved defining the characteristics of *pelajar* and accentuating certain parts of their identity as students. This process ultimately involved the invocation of non-student youth as the "other" compared to the educated students who formed the core of *tentara pelajar* units. This included not only the *pemuda* of the lower classes and rural villages but also extended to the *laskar,* which many *tentara pelajar* units viewed to be both unprofessional and too politicised to serve the cause of independence.

[126] Ratmanto, *Pasukan Siliwangi*, 93; Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 61–62.
[127] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 104.
[128] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 61–62.
[129] Abdul Haris Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Cet. 1, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1983), 17.

Invoking again the notional "apoliticism" that grounded their identity, the *tentara pelajar* regarded groups like the socialist Pesindo and the Islamist Laskar Hizbullah as being too deeply committed to their political ideologies to be an effective fighting force. Similarly, exposure to the "criminal" acts of *laskar* groups like the BPRI, many of which maintained operational independence from the TNI despite being formally part of the regular army, further cemented a sense of difference between the *tentara pelajar* and other *laskar* groups.

Tentara pelajar perceptions of the TNI had remained consistently positive from the start of the war. As seen in the case of the TRIP and the IMAM of Purwokerto, many *tentara pelajar* units sought recognition from the regular army to add to their legitimacy within the struggle for independence. Added to this was the apparent contrast between the ill-trained *laskar* and the educated, professional officer corps of the TNI. The notion of an "apolitical" TNI is undeniably mistaken, especially considering the objection of many officers to the *rera* and, as will be discussed in Chapter IV, their actions in establishing a military government in 1949. Despite this, the TNI's professional command structure and perceived loyalty to the Republican government was enough to earn the respect of the *tentara pelajar*. The TNI too held the *tentara pelajar* in high regard due to their performance in battles of Operation Product.

These sentiments had been brewing within the *tentara pelajar* for some time, as seen in Chapter II. However, the events set in motion by the First Dutch Military Aggression and *rera* exacerbated tensions between the TNI and government on the one side and several influential *laskar* groups on the other. The acts of "banditry" committed by *laskar* groups like Mardjoeki's BPRI in Surakarta spurred the government into acting against them. Into the fray stepped units of the *tentara pelajar*. Armed with TNI support and a sense of superiority over the unprofessional and ill-disciplined *laskar*, the young student-soldiers opposed some of these groups and ended their "criminal" acts, bringing a semblance of peace and stability to the *rakyat* while consolidating the respect of the TNI and the government in the process.

These actions marked the manifestation of *tentara pelajar* rhetoric about their own perceived discipline and professionalism over the *laskar* and other *pemuda*, and was an extension of notions of *pelajar* exceptionalism that had existed since the

formation of the *tentara pelajar*. Through these acts, the *tentara pelajar* were no longer *laskar* in the traditional sense, and instead brought themselves closer to the TNI. Indeed, the promotion of Achmadi to the position of Surakarta Military Commander, and the acquiescence of the local TNI commanders to that decision, revealed the high regard in which the TNI held the *tentara pelajar*. The TNI embodied the *tentara pelajar* values of professionalism and apoliticism. It is through this lens that the subsequent actions of *tentara pelajar* following their amalgamation into the TNI, arguably their most important throughout the entire war, ought to be viewed. Indeed, these actions would help further solidify the *tentara pelajar* as a key part of the TNI, setting the stage for their involvement in the post-war Indonesian landscape

Chapter IV

Suppressing divisions: The *tentara pelajar* and the end of the independence war (1948-1949)

The processes of *rera* instigated by the Renville Agreement discussed Chapter III, while falling short of completely demobilising the *tentara pelajar*, still affected them immensely. Though their relatively smaller size and more "professional" nature meant that they were spared excessive rationalisation, they were reorganised into an official TNI formation and took part in efforts to disarm *laskar* units who resisted *rera*. Not only did this, as discussed in the previous chapter, symbolise the *tentara pelajar*'s process of fully distinguishing themselves as superior from the other *pemuda* in the *laskar*, it also cemented the status of the *tentara pelajar* units as respected formations within the TNI, on which both the Republican government and TNI high command could rely.

However, though the suppression of the resisting BPRI units by the Central Javanese TP proved the mettle and loyalty of the *tentara pelajar*, subsequent events would further test the *tentara pelajar in* this regard. *Rera* continued to cause emotions to flare even after the BPRI incident, with tensions in Surakarta rising further following the arrival of the West Javanese Siliwangi division in the city. Their rivalry with the homegrown and anti-*rera* Panembahan Senopati division would evolve into a full-on conflict which would once again force the hand of the TP to be involved in the political squabbles of the ostensibly apolitical TNI.

This chapter argues that the political and military developments of late 1948 and 1949, which heralded the end of the war and eventual Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence, further served to establish the *tentara pelajar'*s reputation as an elite fighting unit, thus strengthening their status as one of the more dominant subgroups of the *pemuda* of 1945. They key roles played by the TP and TRIP in power struggles in Surakarta, the Madiun Affair and the death of Tan Malaka, in which they largely intervened on the side of the TNI and the Republican government against dissident *laskar* and TNI units, further extracted them away from their previous *laskar* status and

entrenched their position in the regular army. Dissident voices within *tentara pelajar* units who sought to strengthen ties with and even defect to government opposition groups were silenced, either by force or persuasion, effectively ensuring that the *tentara pelajar* would retain and strengthen their reputation for loyalty to the government and TNI. This reputation then became further enhanced through their service in the military government, where they proved to be capable enough administrators for the military, as well as their performance in the final battles of the war of independence.

This chapter contends that these developments all served to strengthen the militaristic tendencies of the *tentara pelajar*, effectively rendering them into the military's ideal *pemuda.* While this would later become useful for the TNI as it sought to influence Indonesian youth, for the *tentara pelajar* it gave them a willing patron whilst also influencing their future trajectories. Their exposure to government work in the military administration provided them for an opportunity to establish closer relations with the Indonesian people and opened their eyes to the possibility of a military-dominated government that was free from politics. This view of the military government, while overly idealised, would go on to influence the *tentara pelajar* in the post-war era as many advocated for the military's greater role within the civilian government in post-war Indonesia.

Fighting in Surakarta and the consolidation of the Central Javanese TP

The tensions brought to the fore by *rera* took on both a military and political dimension. Militarily, opposing opinions on *rera* were mostly delineated by whether one was formerly of KNIL or PETA stock, as well as whether one was a member of the *laskar* militia or the regular army. As discussed in Chapter III, The KNIL-PETA rivalry has its roots in the formation of the TNI in 1945. Sudirman, the Commanding General of the TNI who also received his military training under the Japanese, was mostly sympathetic to the *laskar* and their fighting spirit, and actively opposed the *rera* process.[1] In contrast, the belief of most ex-KNIL officers in the value of a smaller but better-trained army made the centralisation of power within the army under a central command,

[1] Agoeng Wijaya, ed., *Soedirman: Seorang Panglima, Seorang Martir*, Cet. 1, Seri Buku Tempo (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2012), 105.

alongside its reduction to a slightly more manageable size, one of their long-term ambitions, and they had drafted plans to rationalise the army long before the Renville Agreement.[2] One ex-KNIL officer who was previously commander of the Siliwangi Division, A. H. Nasution, was promoted to the position of Deputy TNI Commander under the Hatta government.[3] It was a move that showcased the trust Hatta placed in him, especially in implementing the *rera* program.

Opposition to *rera* was rife among the *laskar* units, who would be the first to be cut from the TNI's rolls, with rumours having spread that the only officers that would be retained post-rationalisation were those who had received at least middle-school education, leaving the less educated *laskar* militiamen at a clear disadvantage.[4] This assumption was not entirely unfounded, with commanding general Sudirman, who had not completed formal education in the colonial schooling system but instead studied in an Islamic boarding school, demoted to the rank of Lieutenant General as part of *rera.* In contrast, his Chief of Staff, ex-KNIL officer Urip Sumoharjo, was promoted to Lieutenant General from Major General.[5]

The most vocal among these anti-*rera* units were those who fought with the Panembahan Senopati division, based in and around the city of Surakarta. While this division was nominally composed of regular army members, many of its brigades were amalgamations of strongly independent *laskar* units such as the Pesindo and BPRI. The Pesindo, as discussed in previous chapters, were socialist in bent, and while not officially affiliated with Amir Syarifuddin's Socialist Party, were seen as closely linked. The BPRI, while less inclined to swing left or right politically, were largely led by less educated officers such as the aforementioned Mardjoeki, and had a strong reputation for independence of action as seen in their role in the Battle of Surabaya in 1945.[6] Additionally, Senopati officers were mostly ex-PETA men, and with their past experience of removing their ex-KNIL commanding officer, had much to lose to *rera.*[7]

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[2] Abdul Haris Nasution, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, vol. 2 (Djakarta: Seluring Masa, 1968), 129.
[3] Harsya W. Bachtiar, Siapa Dia? Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD) (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1988), 220.
[4] Wijaya, *Soedirman*, 21–22.
[5] Wijaya, 23.
[6] Matanasi, "Ahmad Jadau." reveals that Mardjoeki was illiterate.
[7] Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," 3–8.

The position of Senopati troops in Surakarta was also a cause for concern among those keen on implementing *rera*. The city was known as a power centre for *laskar* and other opposition groups who were not always in line with government policy, such as Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan (PP).[8] Units from the division had, alongside other factions within the city, also played a key role in essentially removing the local Surakartan royal family from power against the wishes of the Republican government. The localised *coup d'état* occurred in 1946 as a part of a wave of progressive and pro-*pemuda* sentiment that emerged after the formation and disbandment of the PP.[9] While this did little to endear these units to the government, it cemented the Senopati division as a powerbroker in Surakarta that was not always willing to accede to government demands.[10] The Senopati opposed openly *rera*: one military parade that was originally intended to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of Budi Utomo and descended into an anti-rationalisation protest, instigated primarily by the Senopati's Pesindo units and sympathetic soldiers from the Indonesian Marines.[11]

While the decision to pursue *rera* was motivated by the precarious economic situation that the Republic found itself in, a political imperative was also present. Both Hatta and Nasution saw rationalisation as a way of reducing the influence of Syarifuddin and leftist elements in the armed forces, many of whom were concentrated in Surakarta and the *Senopati* division.[12] A smaller, more professional army, hopefully devoid of excessive political interest, would be easier for Nasution to command and be more willing to accede to the Hatta government's diplomatic efforts of promoting compromise with the Netherlands and international sympathy for the Indonesian cause.

The arrest and execution by Central Javanese TP troops of anti-*rera* officer Mardjoeki, a leader of the BPRI *laskar* in Surakarta, signalled the beginning of a challenge to the dominance of the Panembahan Senopati division. As discussed in Chapter III, the *tentara pelajar* units who executed Mardjoeki were now fully integrated into the TNI. Additionally, as part of the new KRU formations, they were not

[8] Anderson, 5–6; Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 356–57.
[9] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 357–66. See Chapter II of this thesis for a closer discussion of the *Persatuan Perjuangan*
[10] Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," 8.
[11] Wijaya, *Soedirman*, 21.
[12] Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," 6–7.

subordinate to the *Senopati* division. The TP, for example, were closely linked to the Hatta government, and, while they were comprised of a core of Surakartan students, did not necessarily take direct orders from Senopati.[13] Indeed, the order to arrest Mardjoeki came directly from Sukarno himself, bypassing divisional commanders in the Surakarta area.[14] The promotion of Commander of the Central Javanese TP, Achmadi, to the position of City Military Commander of Surakarta, created an alternative power base to the Senopati division which was far more friendly to the government.[15] Lastly, in Mardjoeki's arrest, the TP was supported not by Senopati units, but instead by soldiers of the West Javanese *Siliwangi* division that were also part of the KRU.

As part of the provisions of the Renville Agreement, Siliwangi troops had to withdraw from their pockets in West Java. They retreated across the Van Mook line in a process known as the *hijrah*, reminiscent of the Prophet Muhammad's own regrouping at Medina when his position in Mecca grew increasingly untenable.[16] Following their withdrawal, Siliwangi units were mostly stationed in and around Surakarta.

Their support of the TP is notable because of their own closeness with the government. Senopati units generally disliked the Siliwangi presence in Surakarta. The *hijrah*, depicted heroically among Siliwangi soldiers, was viewed by officers in the Senopati division as a failure and a result of their inability to hold onto West Java. Their closeness to the government also led to their being known as "Hatta's troops" or "Hatta's hitmen," while the predominance of ex-KNIL officers in the division led to it being given the unflattering nickname of *Stoot Legere Wilhelmina* (Wilhelmina's Shock Troops) after the Dutch monarch, a creative play on the division's SLW initials.[17] Additionally, the relatively cosmopolitan makeup of the Siliwangi's officer corps, which included people from different ethnic groups, stood in contrast with the predominantly Javanese Senopati officers and soldiers.[18]

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[13] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 165.
[14] Julius Pour, Ignatius Slamet Rijadi: Dari Mengusir Kempeitai sampai Menumpas RMS (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2008), 63.
[15] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 100.
[16] Soetanto, *Long March Siliwangi*, 274–75.
[17] Soetanto, 282.
[18] Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," 12.

While military tensions in Surakarta were symbolised by the conflict between the Siliwangi and Senopati divisions, political tensions were heightened by the divide between the pro-*rera* Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat (People's Revolutionary Movement, GRR) and the anti-*rera* Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR, People's Democratic Front). The FDR was an alliance of opposition political parties comprised of the PKI, a faction of the Socialist Party loyal to Amir Syarifuddin and other, smaller groups who were previously grouped in the *Sayap Kiri* coalition in the KNIP.[19] The Pesindo *laskar* was also a prominent member of the FDR and one of its main sources of influence within the army. Opposing it in the GRR was a motley assortment of nationalist political organisations. Notable among these was Muwardi and his nationalist BB *laskar* group, closely linked to Sukarno and one of the strongest *laskar* groups in Surakarta.[20] As mentioned earlier, *rera* significantly weakened the influence of Syarifuddin on the TNI. One of the greatest blows struck against him was the planned disbandment of the TNI Masyarakat, whose leadership was populated by his supporters.[21]

One of the major FDR actions aimed at rallying opposition to *rera* and the Renville Agreement were the Delanggu strikes. Delanggu was a plantation town located to the west of Surakarta. Cotton was the primary crop, and most cotton workers at the government-operated plantations there were members of the Serikat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia (Plantation Workers Union of the Republic of Indonesia, Sarbupri) plantation workers union. The Sarbupri in turn was part of the larger Serikat Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesian Federation of Workers' Organisations, SOBSI) trade union federation. Both organisations were controlled by leading members of the Communist Party.[22] Initially, the strikes came about due to dissatisfaction with the national textile manufacturer, with strikers demanding better conditions for workers as a whole and equal treatment for contract workers.[23] However, as the strikes grew in

[19] The other socialists instead followed the lead of Sutan Syahrir, also a leading member of the Socialist Party. See Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 158, 259–61.
[20] Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," 4; Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 262.
[21] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 263–64.
[22] Ann Swift, *The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948*, Monograph Series / Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, no. 69 (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1989), 41.
[23] Commandant Pulisi Militer Corps. I Bat, 23, "Surat Kepada Presiden Tentang Djawaban BTN Terhadap SARBOEPRI," May 19, 1948, Inventaris Arsip Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia,

June, they also became increasingly political. The SOBSI began taking a bigger role in the strikes, going so far as to force workers who had wanted to keep working into striking on June 27th, bringing in FDR military units to back them up.[24] Illustrative of the divisions that *rera* exposed, the SOBSI leadership proclaimed that the strikes were part of an "anti-colonial" struggle, essentially echoing the FDR line that the Hatta government was an American puppet that was not truly pursuing national interests or seeking Indonesian independence. For its part, members of the Masyumi, then part of the Hatta government, pointed at the strikes as merely being an FDR tool to destabilise the government and disrupt its ability to conduct the diplomatic negotiations necessary to achieve full independence.[25] The Central Javanese TP, alongside units of the Siliwangi, were sent to Delanggu to support and protect scabbing workers who were members of Masyumi's trade union. These workers broke through Sarbupri-organised picket lines at the behest of the Minister of Prosperity, who was also from Masyumi.[26] This act indicated even further the closeness between the *tentara pelajar* and the Republican government, as well as where the *tentara pelajar* would take sides in the upcoming power struggle that followed. Though the strikes eventually ended with the arrival of Hatta, who was able to negotiate a settlement with the strikers, it was indicative of the level of support the FDR could mobilise to disrupt the government.[27]

The FDR found further impetus in the arrival of Musso in August. Musso was a well-known communist, who, like Tan Malaka, had lived in exile and on the run since the failed PKI uprising of November 1926. In his travels he had become a Comintern agent, before hitching a ride back to Indonesia from Prague with a Republican diplomatic mission.[28] In addition to him being a leading communist figure, Musso also brought back with him Soviet recognition of Indonesia, as well as the "two-camps

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no. 1787, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia; "Laporan Tentang Comite van Actie Dari SARBUPRI Tjabang Surakarta," May 19, 1948, Inventaris Arsip Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, no. 1787, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.

[24] Pers Buro Berita Delanggoe, "Berita Dlanggoe," July 1, 1948, Inventaris Arsip Kepolisian Negara, no. 1215, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.

[25] Swift, The Road to Madiun, 41–42.

[26] Anthony Reid, "Marxist Attitudes to Social Revolution, 1946-1948," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 8, no. 1 (1974): 52.

[27] Reid, 52.

[28] Wahyu Dhyatmika and Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, eds., *Musso: Si Merah Di Simpang Republik*, Cet. 1, Seri Buku Tempo (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia bekerja sama dengan Majalah Tempo, 2011), 28–30, 37–38.

doctrine" formulated by the leading Soviet government official Andrei Zhdanov. The Zhdanov doctrine sharpened divisions between the "democratic" Soviet Union and its socialist allies, and the "imperialistic" United States and Western powers.[29] This manifested in several of Musso's actions after his arrival, such as his address in a meeting of the PKI politburo in Yogyakarta in August 1948, where he called for the formation of a PKI-led national front to replace the current "bourgeois" government.[30] While not all of the parties dissatisfied with *rera* were as ardent communists as Musso, his message largely gelled with their own sentiments. His arrival provided an additional figure for dissidents to rally around, and his portrayal as having the support of a great power in the form of the Soviet Union added to his appeal.

The trigger for open conflict in Surakarta came in July 1948. The commander of the Senopati division, ex-PETA officer Colonel Soetarto, was shot dead outside of his home.[31] A Siliwangi beret was allegedly found next to his body.[32] While Achmadi, investigating the murder in his capacity as City Military Commander, felt that the evidence was planted at the scene of the crime, it did not stop FDR and Senopati allegations that Soetarto was killed at the behest of the Hatta government for his anti-rationalisation stance.[33] An assortment of TP and Senopati units attempted an attack on a Siliwangi brigade headquarters on 23 August, an incident in which seven TP students died.[34]

The slow build-up of tensions between the Siliwangi and GRR on one side and the Senopati and FDR on the other culminated in a series of events that began after the first National Sports Games was held in Surakarta on 9-12 September.[35] On the 13th, Muwardi was kidnapped by an unknown group of soldiers, never to be seen again. Muwardi's kidnapping came after the disappearances of several Senopati officers in the

[29] Swift, The Road to Madiun, 54–56.
[30] Dhyatmika and Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, *Musso*, 42.
[31] Pour, Ignatius Slamet Rijadi, 75–76.
[32] Harry A. Poeze, *Madiun, 1948: PKI Bergerak*, Ed. 1 (Jakarta: KITLV-Jakarta : Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2011), 192.
[33] Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," 12–13; Poeze, *Madiun, 1948*, 102–3.
[34] Abdul Haris Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, vol. 8 (Bandung: DISJARAH-AD, 1977), 220.
[35] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Koesalah Soebagyo Toer, and Ediati Kamil, eds., *Kronik Revolusi Indonesia*, Cet. 1, vol. 4, 5 vols. (Jakarta: KPG, 1999).

days prior.[36] Leading Senopati officers attributed the kidnapping to the Siliwangi division, charges which the local Siliwangi commander, Brigadier General Sadikin, vehemently denied.[37] Full-scale fighting thus commenced between the two divisions.

It is interesting to examine the role of the TP in this situation. Achmadi's men were predominantly Central Javanese, while he himself was Surakarta-based. The unit he initially commanded before being elevated to overall TP commander was the Laskar Kere, a Surakarta student militia that later became a part of the Central Javanese TP.[38] As described in the previous chapters, the TP and other *tentara pelajar* units had sought to distance themselves from irregular *laskar* formations since their inception, as almost all student fighting units sought to directly link with the TNI. As their affiliation with the TNI became more and more formalised, so did their pro-government reputation. Their pivotal role in the arrest of Mardjoeki in March and the role they played in breaking the picket lines at Delanggu were the clearest indicators of this pro-government tendency. However, their actions during the period of heightened *rera*-related tensions in Surakarta add some nuance to this perception. While never formally taking sides, Achmadi and the TP hesitated to some degree when it came to an intra-TNI clash, choosing not to take decisive action despite his position as City Military Commander.

Though the TP would likely have had some sympathy for the Siliwangi soldiers who supported them during the March operations against the BPRI and had demonstrated a willingness to enforce the *rera* reforms, they would also have had sympathies for the Senopati soldiers who at one point were nominally their colleagues and superiors. Indeed, the TP had participated in the attack on the Siliwangi brigade headquarters.[39] Elements of the TP, including Achmadi himself, had also fought side-by-side with Senopati units, first in the Battle of Ambarawa in 1945 and then during the Dutch attacks of Operation Product in 1947.

The most potent symbol of this relationship was the bond between Achmadi and Slamet Riyadi, a brigade commander in the Senopati division. Both went to the same

[36] Toer, Toer, and Kamil, 4:480.
[37] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 8:224.
[38] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 87.
[39] Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," 13.

high school during the Japanese occupation, where Achmadi was Riyadi's junior.[40] This age difference led to their slightly different paths as the war broke out, seeing that while Achmadi helped form the Laskar Kere after the proclamation of independence in 1945, Riyadi enlisted immediately into the regular army.[41] Their friendship continued as the war progressed, as shown in both their roles in the arrest of Mardjoeki. After Achmadi arrested Mardjoeki, Riyadi ordered Mardjoeki's execution as the ranking officer, to which Achmadi complied.[42] Both came to face Hatta in Yogyakarta afterwards. Hatta had wanted to prevent such drastic action against a man who, despite his crimes, was still an officer, and wanted to court martial Riyadi for insubordination. This provoked a strong response from Achmadi, who said, "If Pak Met (a nickname for Riyadi) is guilty, then we are all guilty." Sukarno, who ordered Mardjoeki's arrest, intervened and exonerated Riyadi for the execution order.[43]

Ultimately Achmadi and the TP were able to use their position in-between the two divisions of Senopati and Siliwangi as a means for reconciliation. By the end of the day on the 13th, after much fighting, Sudirman ordered a ceasefire in the city. To back this up, the following morning Achmadi personally visited Riyadi to ask him to formally sign a ceasefire with a Siliwangi representative at his headquarters. Achmadi also attempted to court other factions, such as Ahmad Jadau and his marines, though this seems to have been less successful. Despite this, and smaller clashes involving *laskar* units such as the now leaderless BB and the *Pesindo*, relative calm was restored to Surakarta within a few days, with most of the city now solidly in the pro-government camp.[44]

The Madiun Affair and cleavages within the TRIP

As calm settled in Surakarta, more unrest emerged to the city's east in the town of Madiun. In some respects, Madiun was politically similar to Surakarta. It was not the

[40] Pour, Ignatius Slamet Rijadi, 193.
[41] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 87; Pour, Ignatius Slamet Rijadi, 33.
[42] Pour, Ignatius Slamet Rijadi, 64.
[43] Pour, 64–65.
[44] Poeze, *Madiun, 1948*, 136–37.

stronghold of a particular armed group, but instead it served as a base for an array of *laskar* and political parties.[45] The most significant military formation there was the 29th Brigade, a pro-FDR unit that was largely comprised of former Pesindo *laskar* militiamen.[46]

Not long after the fighting between the Senopati and Siliwangi divisions in Surakarta, Colonel Sumarsono, an officer in the Pesindo *laskar*, proclaimed the formation of an Indonesian Soviet Republic in Madiun on the 18th.[47] His men, alongside others in the 29th Brigade, moved to disarm Military Police units who sided with the Hatta government. As events progressed, it was clear that the insurrection in Madiun was FDR-backed, with Syarifuddin and Musso among its leading figures. Their aim was to consolidate Musso's planned PKI-led national front, before toppling the Hatta government.[48]

While the relative success of the FDR in Madiun aimed to provide a template for further insurrections in other major cities, there was significant resistance against the so-called Soviet Republic from within Madiun. Though the Military Police was successfully disarmed by pro-FDR units, the sheer numbers and variety of *laskar* units present within the city posed a challenge to FDR forces. Madiun's status as the third largest city still in the Republic's hands made it a hub for schooling, which meant there were also furloughed student-soldiers present there who were receiving their education at local temporary high schools. Indeed, a significant detachment of the TRIP was based in the city.[49]

Initially, the pro-FDR units chose not to disarm the TRIP students, believing that they would be sympathetic to their cause.[50] They had already managed to persuade two TRIP students, Alex Legowo and Soeryono, to help bring local TRIP units to their

[45] Swift, The Road to Madiun, 15–16.
[46] Himawan Soetanto, Madiun dari Republik ke Republik: Aspek Militer Pemberontakan PKI di Madiun 1948 (Jakarta: Kata Hasta Pustaka, 2006), 123–24.
[47] Toer, Toer, and Kamil, *Kronik Revolusi Indonesia*, 1999, 4:610–17.
[48] Poeze, *Madiun, 1948*, 143–50.
[49] Poeze, 215; Swift, The Road to Madiun, 15; Moehkardi, Pelajar Pejuang Tentara Genie Pelajar, 1945-1950, 127–59.
[50] Soetanto, Madiun Dari Republik Ke Republik, 136.

side.[51] This would prove to be the first of many miscalculations on their part, as the TRIP became a thorn in the side of the FDR, maintaining loyalty to the Hatta government while refusing to be disarmed. Indeed, the actions of the TRIP perhaps best showcase the desperate precarity of the so-called Soviet government's hold on Madiun. In his memoirs, TRIP officer Sukamto Sayidiman who was stationed in Madiun as the rebellion took place, recounted how he and the leaders of several other student groups, including a women's student group, were able to "mobilise the potential of students and successfully prevent the occupation of Madiun by Musso's troops."[52] While this might be slightly exaggerated, as Sayidiman wrote his memoirs well into the rule of the anti-communist New Order regime, TRIP students did provide a meaningful source of resistance for the FDR.

The refusal of TRIP students to disarm led to the storming of a student dormitory by FDR troops on 22 September. While the FDR were beaten back, one student by the name of Mulyadi was killed.[53] This sparked a wave of anger not only among the TRIP but also the student population at large. Thousands reportedly came out for Mulyadi's funeral, which was carried out under the close watch of Pesindo soldiers.[54] However, the armed guard failed to stop Mulyadi's death from becoming a rallying point for pro-government forces in the city. Students even took to forming an ad-hoc organisation called the Patriot Anti-Musso, whose members' common denominator was their opposition to the insurrection. Attempts by Moentalip, the newly appointed pro-FDR Resident of Madiun to address the students failed. His speech in front of seven thousand angry students was initially received with derision, as students responded to his speech by imitating the sounds of a steam engine.[55] Things only got worse, however, as he and other speakers were ultimately drowned out by cries of "Mulyadi needs avenging!"[56] Anti-insurrection protests within the city continued to be

[51] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, Perjuangan Pelajar Bersenjata TRIP Jawa Timur, 158.
[52] Sajidiman, *The Tender Power*, 40–41.
[53] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 273.
[54] Soetanto, Madiun Dari Republik Ke Republik, 137.
[55] Moehkardi, Pelajar Pejuang Tentara Genie Pelajar, 1945-1950, 159.
[56] Moehkardi, 159; Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, 1977, 8:329.

organised within the city, leading to the capture and execution of several TRIP students.[57]

Figure 6 The monument to Mulyadi in Madiun, erected by *tentara pelajar* veterans in 1985. Image taken by the author, 31 March 2022.

Militarily, the FDR was also severely outclassed. Sumarsono argued that the FDR leadership understood this fact and started the insurrection as a way of countering their repression by the Hatta government.[58] The FDR line, subsequently echoed by a leading PKI figure defending their actions in 1955, was that the kidnappings of pro-FDR officers and fighting in Surakarta were "provocations" by the Hatta government, who sought to eliminate the FDR to boost their anti-communist credentials and secure US support against the Netherlands.[59] Despite their attempts to forward this line, most TNI units outside of Madiun were loyal to the government while the small number of pro-FDR units had largely been pacified by loyalist troops. Sungkono's East Javanese

[57] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 274–75.
[58] Soemarsono, *Revolusi Agustus: Kesaksian seorang Pelaku Sejarah* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 2008), 144–47.
[59] D. N. Aidit, "Aidit: Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun (1955)," accessed March 2, 2021, https://www.marxists.org/indonesia/indones/1955-AiditMenggugatPeristiwaMadiun.htm.

Narotama division, which was expected to side with the FDR, ultimately complied with orders from Sudirman to participate in the "pacification" of Madiun and began moving towards the city on 20 September. A supporting operation by the Siliwangi division from the west began on the 25th, effectively sealing the fate of the rebellion.[60] Pro-FDR forces would offer scattered resistance as they melted into the countryside, but the death of Musso at the hands of pro-government soldiers on 31 October signalled the effective end of the Madiun Affair.[61]

The reckoning against pro-FDR figures and military units was swift. Even as the insurrection was taking place, steps were being taken outside of Madiun to ensure that the envisioned Java-wide pro-FDR uprising would never come to fruition. Pro-FDR brigades were disarmed and mustered out of formation in major cities like Yogyakarta and Kediri.[62] Several *tentara pelajar* units also took part in these anti-communist "cleansing" campaigns. Some students of the Ronggolawe Reserve Regiment helped arrest FDR leaders in Pati on the northern coast of Java, while a company of students from the KRU W disarmed one unit of pro-FDR soldiers in Yogyakarta.[63]

However, while *tentara pelajar* units were largely unwilling to stray away from their pro-government loyalties, there were individual students who decided to chart their own path amidst the political quagmire wrought by *rera* and the Madiun Affair. While these seem to be relatively rare cases, at least two TRIP students, the aforementioned Alex Legowo and Soeryono, sided with the FDR during the Madiun Affair despite the storming of the TRIP dormitory and the killing of Mulyadi.[64] Their motives behind joining the rebellion are unknown. In the most vivid account of their arrest and subsequent execution, TRIP veteran Abdul Radjab argues that they were, like other youths, buoyed by the "romanticism of their individual struggles." "Youths," he said, "are free to choose their path, but they will follow this to their deaths."[65] This might be an overly romantic description, and it is just as likely that Legowo and Soeryono

[60] Suratmin, *Kronik Peristiwa Madiun PKI 1948* (Yogyakarta : Jagakarsa, Jakarta: Mata Padi Pressindo ; Didistribusikan oleh Suka Buku, 2012), 108–9., 108-109.
[61] Suratmin, Kronik Peristiwa Madiun PKI 1948.
[62] Suratmin., 106-107.
[63] Himpunan Pas T Ronggolawe, Pasukan T Ronggolawe, 168–74; Paguyuban Tiga Tujuh Belas, Tentara Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan dan Pembangunan, 61–63.
[64] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 276.
[65] Radjab, 277.

sympathised with the cause of the FDR, which portrayed the Renville Agreement and rationalisation as an unacceptable weakening of the Republic. Both students were arrested by Military Police as the insurrection fell apart and were brought to the TRIP where they were executed by firing squad.[66]

The case of Alex Legowo and Soeryono is indicative of the complexity of the *tentara pelajar* identity as it began to complete its transition into "professionalism" through rationalisation. While their status as students pushed them further towards the disciplined nature that was required for absorption into the TNI entailed, there were still individual students who cast doubt on the dominant culture within the *tentara pelajar* that privileged professionalism, notional apoliticism, and loyalty to the Republican government. This occurred despite efforts from amongst the leadership of the *tentara pelajar* to "distance students" from "ideological conflicts."[67] *Tentara pelajar* rhetoric had always viewed nationalism and independence as causes that were above politics and had largely associated these values with government efforts. As discussed in Chapter II, their responses to the diplomatic compromises of the previous Syahrir government were largely that of measured acceptance with the understanding that, despite the short-term setbacks that such compromises entailed, the struggle for independence persisted. This stood in stark contrast with many *laskar* units that openly opposed these compromises. The drive of *tentara pelajar* units to "professionalise" was, in part, to disassociate themselves from the politics of the *laskar* with the misplaced assumption of discipline and apoliticism in the TNI. The Madiun Affair solidified the notion, at least in the TRIP, that the political adventurism associated with the *laskar* would only undermine the struggle for independence, and as shown in the execution of their two comrades, cause a kind of disunity that required some form of sacrifice to repair.

Anti-leftist repression occurred on an even greater level outside the TRIP. While pro-FDR officers and units were disarmed, repression continued against suspected pro-FDR civilian and political leaders in so-called "cleansing" operations. Syarifuddin was captured and subsequently executed in a village in Surakarta's east, along with several

[66] Radjab, 277.
[67] Radjab, 277.

other leading FDR members.[68] The government propaganda campaign heavily emphasised atrocities committed against Muslim clerics, civil servants and other groups by the FDR during the insurrection to mobilise popular anger against the FDR and the PKI.[69] Show trials often preceded mass public executions of suspected communists, while even further executions of suspected FDR-PKI sympathisers took place after the second Dutch offensive began in mid-December, perhaps due to fears that Dutch forces would free them.[70] PKI leader D. N. Aidit claimed in 1955 that up to ten thousand peasants and workers died in the post-Madiun purges.[71] While this dealt massive blow to the PKI and leftism in Indonesia in general, the goodwill held by many rural communities for the party meant that government propaganda was not entirely successful in completely eliminating support for the PKI in some areas.[72]

Despite the execution of the two pro-FDR TRIP students, the Madiun Affair became a stepping-stone for an even greater enhancement of TRIP's reputation in the government's eyes. While the two students were perceived as traitors to their unit and country, many "hundreds" of *tentara pelajar* had perished in the affair, according to army histories.[73] Prior to Madiun, it seems that the Central Javanese TP's exploits received the most government recognition. While the TRIP was recognised as a reliable enough fighting force, its most recent experience in battle was its failed defence of Malang, widely depicted as courageous but ultimately still a defeat that cost the lives of more than thirty student-soldiers.[74] Additionally, their close affiliation with Sungkono's Narotama division might have raised further questions about their loyalty. While Sungkono ultimately sided with the government, it was well-known that he and his *laskar*-dominated division were dissatisfied with the *rera* plans.[75] The actions taken by the TRIP in Madiun, however, would serve to distance them from this perception. The

[68] Dhyatmika and Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, *Musso*, 106–7.
[69] Poeze, Madiun, 1948, 284; Suratmin, Kronik Peristiwa Madiun PKI 1948, 88–90.
[70] Poeze, *Madiun, 1948*, 283, 302.
[71] Dhyatmika and Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, *Musso*, 107.
[72] Poeze, *Madiun, 1948*, 290.
[73] Sedjarah Militer Kodam VII/Diponegoro, *Sedjarah TNI-AD Kodam VII/Diponegoro: Sirnaning jakso katon gapuraning ratu* (Semarang: Jajasan Penerbit Diponegoro, 1968), 148–49.
[74] See for example several accounts of the TRIP's role in the defence of Malang in Radjab, *TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan*, 248–66; H. Boges Sudjadi GR, *Am-Track dan Gugurnya 35 Anggota TRIP Jawa Timur*; Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, 1977, 5:258–59.
[75] Poeze, *Madiun, 1948*, 178–79.

death of Mulyadi and the subsequent mobilisation of students against the FDR seemingly outweighed the actions of Alex Legowo and Soeryono. Their role as internal opposition to the FDR was so important that three TRIP students were acknowledged in military dispatches from Madiun, thus establishing the TRIP as another loyal, competent *tentara pelajar* unit.[76]

The re-emergence of Tan Malaka and the consolidation of the TRIP

The complexities of the political allegiances of individual *tentara pelajar* became even more apparent in the series of events following the release of Tan Malaka from prison. As discussed in Chapter II, he was imprisoned due to his role in the attempted coup of July 1946, which involved officers who were supportive of his Persatuan Perjuangan coalition. His imprisonment marked the effective end of the PP, which was shortly disbanded.

The political tensions that accompanied the formation of the PP were a point where *tentara pelajar* units could articulate their apparent "apolitical" tendencies and the need to, as Radjab wrote, "distance themselves from ideological conflicts."[77] As discussed in Chapter II, the rhetoric expressed by *tentara pelajar* publications surrounding the internal political tensions of the Republic was one of disdain. The politics of students, several student-authored articles argued, was the politics of independence. Questions of social revolutions or economic policies were, in their view, less important than that of independence and as such, the latter should be prioritised. The nuances of the Republic's often-charged ideological debates were at best a distraction and at worst a threat to unity for the *tentara pelajar*. Despite this, there were at least some in the *tentara pelajar* that sympathised with the ideals espoused by the PP. "100% independence" was a simple, catchy phrase that was easy to understand, and to some extent aligned with *tentara pelajar* views, though Tan Malaka's open criticism of the government might not have gelled in the same way.

[76] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 8:280.
[77] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 277.

Despite his imprisonment, Tan Malaka still retained a relatively healthy amount of support. It was largely due to pressure from these supportive groups and individuals that he was released in September 1948, just before the Madiun Affair went into full swing.[78] Upon his release, he established a new political party, the Partai Murba (Workers' Party), and sought to gain support for his ideas on how the war should progress. Despite his imprisonment, Tan Malaka remained committed to the ideas he espoused as the 'promoter' of the PP.[79] Namely, he continued to voice the need for commitment to 100% independence and his criticism of the Hatta government took on this mantle.

The Linggadjati Agreement of 1946 which initiated the first ceasefire with the Netherlands was seen by some, including Tan Malaka, as an admission of defeat, as it failed to secure independence and only recognised Republican sovereignty over parts of Java and Sumatra.[80] Additionally, it failed as a ceasefire as neither the Dutch nor Republicans were completely satisfied with its terms, thus causing fighting to resume in early 1947. The Renville Agreement, which shrunk Republican territory even further with seemingly no compromise given by the Netherlands, was no better in the eyes of Malaka. Despite his longstanding disagreement with the government's foreign policy efforts, Malaka opposed the machinations of the Madiun Affair. He believed that the Affair was a failure because it was by nature not a "mass action" and was wrong in "its preparation, location and timing."[81] Political differences with Musso might have spurred this line of thinking: while previously a member of the Comintern during his exile, Tan Malaka had been labelled a Trotskyist by Musso and criticised for straying from the Moscow line.[82]

Though his opposition to the Hatta government was clear, many officers and soldiers in the TNI remained sympathetic to Malaka. With the effective neutering of the

[78] Zulkifli et al., Tan Malaka: Bapak Republik yang Terlupakan.
[79] Tan Malaka, *From Jail to Jail*, trans. Helen Jarvis, vol. 3 (Athens, OH, UNITED STATES: Ohio University Press, 1991), 6, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unimelb/detail.action?docID=5109048.
[80] Poeze, Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri, dan Revolusi Indonesia, 2008.
[81] Poeze, 4:22.
[82] Poeze, *Madiun, 1948*, 41; This was likely a false accusation along Stalinist lines, as unlike Musso, Tan Malaka held no love for Stalin's Soviet Union and criticised the Comintern's endorsement of the failed 1926 PKI uprising. See Helen Jarvis, "Tan Malaka: Revolutionary or Renegade?," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 19, no. 1 (March 1987): 48–49, https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1987.10409868.

Panembahan Senopati division by *rera* and the Madiun Affair, and the Siliwangi division being notoriously pro-Hatta, the last major vestiges of support for him came from Sungkono's Narotama division. There he fell into the brigade of Major Sabarudin, who had offered him protection. Sabarudin was infamous for committing acts that were tantamount to war crimes against Allied POWs and internees, including keeping a "harem" of previously interned Dutch women, though it seems that he was loved as much as he was feared by the soldiers under his command. While Sabarudin had a core group of soldiers that served under him, he had the habit of absorbing troops stationed near him into his brigade. Some of these included TRIP students who, despite serving him loyally, said that he was "cruel, wild and a psychopath."[83]

As Tan Malaka began to consolidate his support base in East Java, the uneasy peace brought about by the Renville Agreement came to an end. Citing the failures of the Hatta government to control the *laskar* and sensing internal weakness among the Republicans following the Madiun Affair, the KNIL/KL launched a surprise offensive across. the whole of the Van Mook line. Dubbed Operation Crow (*Kraai*), known in Indonesian historiography as the Second Dutch Military Aggression, the offensive was launched on 19 December 1948 with the main objective of taking Yogyakarta and destroying the TNI, effectively destroying both the Republic and its armed forces.[84] Chastened by their experience of Operation Product, however, the TNI refused to engage the KNIL/KL in pitched battles, abandoning their previous strategy of linear defensive lines and adopting more fluid formations. Sudirman's orders in the wake of the attack, Tactical Order no. 1, showcased this strategic shift perfectly. Sudirman called on the TNI to abandon linear defences and avoid open conflict with the KNIL/KL, instead adopting guerrilla tactics and so-called "wingate" movements, forming pockets of resistance behind enemy lines.[85]

[83] Poeze, Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri, dan Revolusi Indonesia, 2008, 4:106.
[84] Toer, Toer, and Kamil, *Kronik Revolusi Indonesia*, 1999, 4:701.
[85] Nugroho Notosusanto, *Markas Besar Komando Djawa* (Djakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, 1973), 13. The phrase "wingate" describes the act of penetrating deep into enemy lines and avoiding major engagements to take up strategic positions against less defended points in the enemy's rear. The phrase was taken from the name of British commander Orde Wingate, who carried out similar operations against Japanese forces in Burma during the Second World War.

Thus, despite some TNI resistance in several areas, including by some units of the *tentara pelajar*, the KNIL/KL were largely able to take the areas they sought to occupy. Yogyakarta fell quickly to a combined arms Dutch attack, with paratroopers storming the Republican air base at Maguwo in the city's east. TNI resistance in the city was minimal, as they sought mainly to retreat and regroup. Both Sukarno and Hatta refused to join the army despite encouragement from Sudirman that they take part in the guerrilla resistance. Instead, to Sudirman and the TNI's disdain, they opted to remain in the city to be taken as prisoners, hoping that it would invoke international outrage. They got their wish and were captured alongside members of the Republican cabinet and sent to exile on the island of Bangka, off the eastern coast of Sumatra.[86] Sudirman, weak from tuberculosis, opted to continue a guerrilla struggle and was carried across parts of central and eastern Java on a stretcher by a cadre of bodyguards, jumping from village to village and aided by locals in avoiding detection by the KNIL/KL.[87]

As the TNI regrouped across Java, Malaka and his supporters in Sabarudin's brigade formed a loose coalition of disparate military formations known as the Gerilya Pembela Proklamasi (Guerrilla Defenders of the Proclamation, GPP), also known as the Kawi Pact after the mountain which served as their main area of operations.[88] Among these were remnants of the pro-FDR forces that took part in the Madiun Affair, along with a unit of TRIP soldiers, men from the Laskar Hizbullah and even a brigade of Siliwangi troops.[89] While initially the GPP was formed as a way of coordinating guerrilla operations in East Java among its participating units, its affiliation to Tan Malaka and his Partai Murba ultimately brought it into the mire of Republican politics. The defeat of the TNI in the early phases of the second major Dutch offensive gave Tan Malaka enough fuel to criticise not only the Hatta government but also members of the TNI's officer corps through numerous speeches and pamphlets. Peculiarly, this also included Sungkono, who via Sabarudin was technically his patron.[90]

[86] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 338.
[87] McGregor, *History in Uniform*, 129–30.
[88] Abdul Haris Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, vol. 10 (Bandung: DISJARAH-AD, 1977), 577.
[89] Poeze, Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri, dan Revolusi Indonesia, 2008, 4:110.
[90] Poeze, 4:171–73, 179–81.

The response to these criticisms outside of the GPP was mixed. A more positive reception was largely limited to units stationed within the sphere of influence of Sabarudin's brigade. This, however, shows the diversity of opinion that existed not only within the TNI in general, but also within individual units. One TRIP unit stationed close to Sabarudin, for example, was sympathetic to Tan Malaka's cause. However, this did not extend to the entirety of the TRIP, largely because of the relative isolation of this particular TRIP unit and the infamous reputation held by Sabarudin. TRIP leadership were reluctant to endorse these pronouncements and eventually went to lengths to discipline TRIP units that they viewed as being too supportive of the GPP. One pro-Tan Malaka TRIP officer, Widarbo, even received a delegation from TRIP headquarters chiding him for his support of the GPP, before requesting his company's return to headquarters to aid in a TRIP conflict with another Republican unit.[91]

Even more indicative of the official TRIP stance to the Kawi Pact and how strongly they sought to distance themselves from the Pact was the decision to send a senior member of TRIP leadership, Sukamto Sayidiman, from East Java to Yogyakarta. The objective of Sayidiman's mission to Yogyakarta was first and foremost to reassure Nasution and TNI leadership that the TRIP had no business with the Kawi Pact, and that any news to the contrary was a lie.[92] Sayidiman recollects in his memoirs that he initially had no interest in travelling to Yogyakarta, saying that he was not a diplomat or politician, but a soldier.[93] However, after having the importance of the mission impressed upon him by TRIP commander Isman, Sayidiman relented and left for Yogyakarta.[94] This was a profoundly difficult mission, as Dutch control of major cities and roads meant that Sayidiman had to trek through the wilderness to reach Yogyakarta, which was then still occupied by Dutch forces.[95]

Among the top brass of the Narotama division, Tan Malaka's statements provoked disappointment and outright anger. Unsurprisingly, Sungkono did not take too kindly to the denigrating statements regarding him and his officer corps. By early

[91] Poeze, 4:189.
[92] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, *Perjuangan Pelajar Bersenjata TRIP Jawa Timur*, 216–17.
[93] Sajidiman, *The Tender Power*, 27.
[94] Sajidiman, 27.
[95] Sajidiman, 27–29.

February 1949, a brigade commander under Sungkono, Surachmad, issued a "secret order," designating Tan Malaka and his movement as "endangering the national struggle of the Republic of Indonesia both militarily and politically…" and ordering several of his subordinates to "arrest and disarm" the movement's leaders. Sungkono approved these orders and subsequently reissued them to the entire division.[96] By mid-February, Sabarudin was dishonourably discharged from the TNI, leaving him and Tan Malaka on the run from the TNI. TNI troops finally caught up with him in the village of Blimbing on the slopes of Mount Kawi on February 21st, and he was subsequently executed.[97]

Though the resurgence of Tan Malaka was brief, it and the Madiun Affair showcased how the TRIP and other units in the armed forces experienced divisions that occurred in the TNI in different ways. For *tentara pelajar* units like the TRIP, efforts to formally become a part of the TNI, rather counterintuitively, instead caused them to be drawn into the political and ideological affairs that they had sought to avoid by shedding their attachment to the irregular *laskar.* The case of Tan Malaka's short second stint as a revolutionary leader showcases how these changes created rifts in the TRIP similar to those that appeared during the Madiun Affair: while leadership was seemingly single-minded, individual soldiers and officers possessed their own independence in carrying out actions, perhaps symptomatic of the still democratic nature of *tentara pelajar* units and their rather informal hierarchy. However, it is important to note that while this shows how far the *tentara pelajar* were from having a monolithic identity, such divisions that were seen as intolerable to the *tentara pelajar* values of discipline and loyalty to the government were ultimately snuffed out, by hook or by crook. In the case of the Madiun Affair, force was used to ensure internal discipline, while TRIP men who were sympathetic to Tan Malaka were reprimanded for their mistake.

Student-soldiers and the military government

While these events show the divisions which, however minor, still existed amongst the *tentara pelajar*, their conclusion in favour of the government and pro-government

[96] Poeze, Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri, dan Revolusi Indonesia, 2008, 4:201–4.
[97] Poeze, 4:219–20.

forces in the TNI consolidated the *tentara pelajar* behind the pro-government stance espoused by their leadership during the period prior to rationalisation. This unity of purpose would serve them well as the war began to enter its concluding stages.

The international community was largely united in protest of the second Dutch offensive, despite the efforts of the Netherlands to portray it as another "police action" in the same vein of the first military aggression of 1947.[98] The capture of Sukarno and Hatta did little to improve Dutch standing as well, with major powers considering the capture and imprisonment of the Republic's two major leaders distasteful. Meanwhile, though the Dutch offensive had allowed for the occupation of the Republican capital of Yogyakarta, the TNI still had significant strength and influence in the countryside. Even in their retreat, the TNI was still able to conduct scorched earth operations in several cities to ensure that not all urban infrastructure could be used by the KNIL/KL. Just as they did in Malang in 1947, the TGP student engineers assisted in carrying out scorched earth and sabotage operations in Yogyakarta and Surakarta in December 1948.[99]

Apart from that, from their "wingate" pockets in the countryside behind Dutch lines, now dotted across the whole of Java, the TNI carried out numerous harassment and sabotage operations against the Dutch. Different *tentara pelajar* units took part in attacks on Dutch supply depots and patrols, becoming a thorn in the side of Dutch forces.[100] Some *tentara pelajar* units coordinated and directly took part in "urban guerrilla operations" against the KNIL/KL in occupied cities like Surakarta and Yogyakarta, as well as smaller towns like Klaten.[101] These operations were commanded by student-officers, often stationed in the countryside, and used a combination of student-soldiers who had remained in the cities or had infiltrated them from rural areas and urban students who were sympathetic to the nationalist cause.

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[98] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 339–43.
[99] Moehkardi, Pelajar Pejuang Tentara Genie Pelajar, 1945-1950, 220–21.
[100] See for example actions depicted in Soedarwo et al., *Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Kompi IV, Detasemen II, Brigade XVII, Wilayah Jawa Tengah*, 134–35; Soedirdjo et al., *Sejarah perjuangan TRIP Bojonegoro*, 87–99; Yayasan Pelajar Pejoang Klaten, ed., *Dibawah Sang Merah Putih, Tentara Pelajar Klaten Mengabdi*, Cet. 1 (Klaten: Yayasan Pelajar Pejoang Klaten, 1993), 35–36.
[101] Soedirdjo et al., Sejarah perjuangan TRIP Bojonegoro, 143–45; Yayasan Pelajar Pejoang Klaten, Dibawah Sang Merah Putih, Tentara Pelajar Klaten Mengabdi, 29.

The refocus to guerrilla operations also allowed the *tentara pelajar* to rekindle their relationship with the *rakyat*, which first took centre-stage during the TRIP's retreat from Surabaya into the countryside in December 1945.[102] Though it never necessarily diminished in importance, the events of Surakarta and Madiun and the divisions it exposed amongst Republicans largely overshadowed other aspects of *tentara pelajar* life. Retreating to the countryside in isolated pockets, largely self-sufficient and independent of fixed supply lines, the TNI, including the *tentara pelajar*, grew increasingly reliant on support from rural Indonesians.

While the role of the *rakyat* as a force for progress within Indonesian history is one that was already in common use by this time, as it still is today, it was also quickly integrated into TNI doctrine as a crucial component of military success. Sudirman had always believed in the notion of a "people's army." as shown in his support of Tan Malaka's PP that specifically articulated the need for an army that was "of the people and their interests."[103] Despite his KNIL background, Nasution, by now among the chief strategists of the TNI, echoed Sudirman's sentiments. He would argue in his post-war treatise on guerrilla warfare about the importance of maintaining close cooperative ties with the people for a guerrilla army. The people served an integral role in his idea of "total people's war/resistance."[104] A guerrilla war, he argued, was "rooted in the people," and victory in such a war is contingent on the total support of the people.[105]

This sentiment bleeds into *tentara pelajar* accounts of the period immediately after the second Dutch offensive. Even prior to that, different *tentara pelajar* units had fully bought into the notion of a "total people's defence," and had taken the initiative to provide rudimentary military training to rural villagers as early as 1946.[106] However, as mentioned earlier, student support of the *rakyat* in their capacity as enlightened intellectuals was complimented by *rakyat* support of the students, with the latter often coming in more practical forms. Accounts of popular support for *tentara pelajar* units depict the different facets of *rakyat* assistance, with common features being the

[102] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 192–94.
[103] See Chapter II
[104] Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, 11.
[105] Nasution, 26.
[106] H. Boges Sudjadi GR, Sejarah Singkat Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar Jawa Timur (TRIP-JATIM), 20–21.

provision of food and clothing and the treatment of wounds.[107] Some accounts point to the "love" that *tentara pelajar* units experienced when they entered villages during their deep penetration guerrilla actions, with one describing an incident where TRIP soldiers entering a town in East Java were on the receiving end of hugs and handshakes from the local populace.[108] Discipline among *tentara pelajar* ranks however remained strong, perhaps due to their now official TNI status, as well as their staunch belief that whilst being part of the *rakyat*, they were also their enlightened guides.

In part due to their rapport with the rural populace, as well as the reputation that they had cemented over the events of the Surakarta clashes and the Madiun Affair, student-soldiers were relied upon more than ever by senior officers during this time. With the capture of Sukarno, Hatta and many government ministers, the civilian Republican government was effectively out of the picture in Java. Though Sukarno had ordered one government minister based in Sumatra, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, to establish an emergency government and maintain continuity of leadership, limitations in communications between the two islands meant that the emergency government had little control over governance in Java.[109] The TNI thus sought to fill the void left by the government, establishing its own military and territorial administration in Java. Prior to the Dutch offensive, as a part of the *rera* process Nasution had formed the Markas Besar Komando Djawa (Java Command General Headquarters, MBKD), a centralised military command that also doubled as a military government of Java.[110] The MBKD ran in tandem with civilian government structures, whilst also integrating civilian officials into subordinate roles as part of a local military staff section.[111] Following the Dutch offensive, the governing role of the MBKD became more pronounced, especially in the so-called *wehrkreise* (military district) pockets formed following the army's wingate movements.

Staffing the MBKD hierarchy proved to be a logistical nightmare for Nasution, as the distinct lack of experienced officers remained an issue well into the Dutch

[107] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, 192–94.
[108] Soedirdjo et al., Sejarah perjuangan TRIP Bojonegoro, 113–14.
[109] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 392–93.
[110] Notosusanto, Markas Besar Komando Djawa; Said, Genesis of Power, 101–4.
[111] Notosusanto, Markas Besar Komando Djawa, 22–23.

offensive. To compensate for this, the MBKD leadership decided to enrol students into many positions that were lower down the pecking order, largely as commanders or staff officers of the Komando Onder Distrik Militer (Subdistrict Military Command, KODM) or as village officers. Many of these students were members of existing *tentara pelajar* units, such as the TGP. Higher ranking officers in the KODM or even KDM were often taken from the Corps Mahasiswa (University Student Corps, CM) a non-combat unit that was previously assigned propaganda tasks.[112] Even these already serving students, however, were insufficient in number to staff the growing military bureaucracy. This eventually led to the so-called Mobilisasi Peladjar (Student Mobilisation, MOBPEL) in a military decree issued on February 1st, 1949. This entailed the mobilisation of students who would then be drafted into the MOBPEL command which would allocate them to work in positions in the military government as the TNI saw fit.[113] The sheer reliance on students as a stand-in for trained officers is apparent in the numerous orders issued by Nasution delineating how best this new pool of skilled labour could be used. Sophomore students could be used as "health cadres". Senior students could act as "military *lurah*" (village heads) in combat zones where the civilian *lurah* was either unavailable or unable to exercise their duties.[114] While this seems to be a very rudimentary way of allocating tasks to these students, an acceptable act considering the difficult circumstances the MBKD were operating in, their effects on the students involved cannot be overstated.

Many of the officers who were instructed to govern at the village and subdistrict level, essentially taking a dual civilian and military role, were members of the *tentara pelajar*, some from established units while others were brought in by the MOBPEL.[115] A former student-soldier of the Ronggolawe Student Reserve Regiment, Slamet Danusudirdjo, claimed that many student-soldiers were brought in to fill these positions

[112] See for example Abdul Krim Kusumoputro, *Corps Mahasiswa: Turut Membela dan Mengisi Kemerdekaan* (S.l.: s.n., 1995), 83,167-168, 171.
[113] Nugroho Notosusanto, *Some Effects of the Guerilla on Armed Forces and Society in Indonesia 1948-1949* (Jakarta: Department of Defence and Security, Centre for Armed Forces History, 1974), 16–17.
[114] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 10:391.
[115] Notosusanto, Markas Besar Komando Djawa, 34.

largely because it was difficult to find regular army officers who were willing to do so as it was seen as largely "unheroic" work.[116]

Issues also emerged between the young, mostly urban-based students in their interactions with rural villagers, painting a more complex image of relations with the *rakyat* than *tentara pelajar* accounts. Sunarto, a student-soldier assigned to work with a local village head, often butt heads with the latter, who even mentioned to others in the village that "the commander is too young, the only thing he knows is how to shoot."[117] This was far from being an isolated case, as Nasution himself mentions that a "young and energetic officer" would often clash with an older, more careful village head, while at other times an officer in command of a military subdistrict, many of whom were student-soldiers, might think himself a "little dictator" and act as he wanted.[118]

The decision to allocate student-soldiers and other students to seemingly mundane positions within the military government should not, however, be considered a slight on their abilities. Rather, as the most well-educated personnel in the army, the administrative work that was part-and-parcel of governance would have best suited the *tentara pelajar* when compared to other officers, many of whom were only recently recruited or, at best, received rudimentary PETA training during the Japanese occupation. Thus, one could argue instead that the *tentara pelajar*'s administrative dominance was a sign of the high trust and respect held by Nasution and other ranking TNI officers for them.

Additionally, *tentara pelajar* were entrusted to hold positions beyond the administrative realm, partly in recognition of their combat prowess. Notably, Nasution used students to staff urban pockets, which were some of the most dangerous positions in the guerrilla war. Nasution remarked that manning such pockets required a "high degree of initiative and individuality," concluding that students met these requirements.[119] In all, the key roles the *tentara pelajar* played in the military government and the guerrilla war further enhanced their reputation within the military.

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[116] Said, *Genesis of Power*, 104–5.
[117] Said, 106.
[118] Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, 258–59; Moehkardi, Pelajar Pejuang Tentara Genie Pelajar, 1945-1950, 248–49.
[119] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 10:349.

It can also be argued that the *tentara pelajar*'s experiences of the military government furthered their admiration for the military and the potential guiding hand the military could play in civilian government. As highlighted later in Chapters V and VI, the military's experience of government during the war became the basis of the ideology of *dwifungsi* (dual function), which argued that the TNI had a socio-political role to play in addition to its role as defender of the nation. The *tentara pelajar* would later be key proponents of *dwifungsi*.

Leaving a mark: *Tentara pelajar* in the final offensives

Though students were entrusted with key positions within the military government, the high esteem in which they were held by the government and TNI high command meant that they would ultimately serve in frontline duties as well. Indeed, while the TNI had limited itself to guerrilla warfare, it planned to carry out several 'general offensives' in 1949 to improve the Republic's position at the negotiating table. The most well-known of these are the 1 March General Offensive in Yogyakarta and the Surakarta General Offensive, also known as the Four-Day Battle, in August 1949.

The lineage of the 1 March General Offensive is a contested one, mostly because it was mythologised in subsequent years as being led by Suharto, then a Colonel in the Diponegoro division, but who would become president of Indonesia in 1967. Thus, claims are often made to both the importance of his role in the offensive and the significance of the attack itself. While many sources from the Suharto era proclaim that he was the conceiver and planner of the offensive, accounts that have appeared mostly after his fall from power in 1998 have posited that the Sultan of Yogyakarta,

Hamengkubuwono IX played a much greater role than Suharto.[120] Other accounts claimed that Suharto did little during the attack itself.[121]

Ultimately, while the legacy of the offensive is contested, several units of the Central Javanese TP played significant supporting roles in the offensive. The commander of the 17th Brigade, Colonel Soedarto, was situated in Yogyakarta and its environs at the time the KNIL/KL had attacked.[122] While he had only a relatively small headquarters unit with him, alongside a few other companies of *tentara pelajar* and TGP units, these would take part in some of the attacks prior to and during 1 March.[123] However, the dominance of regular army units in the area and the privileging of Suharto's role in much of the scholarship on the offensive, has meant that their role was minor compared to *tentara pelajar* units that took part in other offensives.[124]

A larger role was played by Central Javanese TP units in the later Surakarta General Offensive due to the position held by their commander Achmadi as City Military Commander of Surakarta. In the months following the 1st March General Offensive, with the support of the United States and other UN nations who were horrified at the renewal of fighting with Operation Crow, the Indonesian delegation to the UN made several breakthroughs in talks with their Dutch counterparts. This culminated in the Roem-van Roijen agreement of May 1949, in which the Republic agreed to cease guerrilla activities in exchange for the handover of Yogyakarta, with this agreement to continue in force until a future Round Table Conference to be held in August.[125] Sukarno and Hatta duly returned to Yogyakarta from Bangka in July 1949, entering the city alongside the TNI units that had fought in the offensive. By the time

[120] For works that provide a pro-Suharto account, see Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, *Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949 di Yogyakarta: Latar Belakang dan Pengaruhnya*, Cet. 2. (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1990); Amrin Imran, *Selamat Pagi, Yogyakarta (Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949)* (Jakarta: Mutiara Sumber Widya, 1985); An example of a more critical post-reformasi account can be seen in Lembaga Analisis Informasi (Yogyakarta, Indonesia), ed., *Kontroversi Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949* (Yogyakarta: Media Pressindo, 2000).
[121] "Kol. A. Latief tentang Peranan Soeharto dalam Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949, dan Gerakan 1 Oktober 1965," accessed February 1, 2023, https://news.hastamitra.org/p/laporan-tentang-dewan-jenderal-kepada.html.
[122] Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, *Serangan umum 1 Maret 1949 di Yogyakarta*, 186–87.
[123] Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, 150–51, 186–87.
[124] For example, in Imran, *Selamat Pagi, Yogyakarta (Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949)*, 80, the only mention of the *tentara pelajar* highlights how they met with Suharto, with little else discussing their actions.
[125] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 423–24.

the Round Table Conference began in August, a ceasefire was agreed upon between both sides, to be enforced by 11 August for Java and 15 August for Sumatra. Hearing this news, Achmadi summoned his commanders for a strategy meeting.[126] The aim was to plan an offensive on Surakarta, still in Dutch hands, in the week prior to 11 August, securing the city for the Republic prior to the ceasefire coming into force and thus strengthening the Republic's hand in subsequent negotiations.

The attack commenced on 7 August and continued for four days until the 10th. During those four days, Dutch forces were harassed and attacked almost continuously across the city as TP and other units launched attacks from bases within and outside of Surakarta. As was in the case of 1 March Offensive, reinforcements were called in by the KNIL/KL units in the city. However, such was the dominance over the field exerted by the Central Javanese TP in Surakarta that they were able to contain Dutch reinforcements more intensively than their counterparts in Yogyakarta.[127] The movements of the Dutch garrison in the city were also severely restricted, to the extent that they could only offer token resistance throughout the four days.[128] The retreat of the TP to the city's outskirts on the August 10th was largely motivated by orders coming from army and government leadership, who feared that an attempt to occupy the city would jeopardise discussions at the upcoming Round Table Conference. Indeed, Achmadi had apparently felt that the city was theirs for the taking before being chided and forced into accepting the decision of his ranking superior Slamet Riyadi.[129]

[126] Pertempuran Empat Hari Di Solo Dan Sekitarnya: Bunga Rampai Cuplikan-Cuplikan Sejarah, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Kerukunan Anggota Datasemen II BE 17, 1993), 20–21.
[127] Pour, Ignatius Slamet Rijadi, 177.
[128] Pour, 177–78.
[129] Pour, 192–93.

Figure 7 The Major Achmadi Monument in Surakarta, erected in 2010 by the Surakarta government to commemorate his role in the Surakarta General Offensive. Image taken by the author, 18 December 2019.

While other *tentara pelajar* units took part in several other attacks, most notably the series of harassment attacks made on the town of Blitar in East Java by the TRIP in the period between March and late 1949, these were relatively smaller in scale to the general offensives that occurred in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. However, they all showcased the active role played by the *tentara pelajar* towards the end of the war, and the leading role they often played in instigating such attacks. Even in the harassment attacks on Blitar, the TRIP played a key role due to their possession of one of the few pieces of field artillery in TNI hands, the anti-aircraft cannon that they dubbed the *Banteng Blorok* (Spotted Water Buffalo).[130] The saga of the *Banteng Blorok* took pride of place in TRIP mythology during this period of the war, as its movements in support of various TRIP operations became symbolic of student self-sacrifice, devotion to the *rakyat*, and tactical acumen, culminating in a film based on its exploits as well as a

[130] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, *Perjuangan Pelajar Bersenjata TRIP Jawa Timur*, 204; Ex Anggota Be-17 TRIP Jawa Timur and Jarahdam VIII Brawijaya, *Peranan Meriam Gempur "Banteng Blorok" dalam Perang Kemerdekaan R.I.* (Surabaya: self-published, 1995), 28–31.

history book dedicated to the *Banteng Blorok*.[131] Ultimately, though nominally less important than the roles played by other *tentara pelajar* in larger battles, the *Banteng Blorok*'s part in harassing the KNIL/KL in East Java and the struggle endured by the TRIP in ensuring its safekeeping, was appreciated enough by the TNI top brass to award a commendation to the *tentara pelajar* unit.[132]

Conclusion

Taken as a whole, these offensives and operations marked the end of the Indonesian war of independence. Though the TNI failed to reoccupy the cities in which it launched offensives, the damage to Dutch credibility was done. The failure of Operation Crow to effectively destroy the Republic, alongside the capture and imprisonment of the Republican leadership, soured the Netherlands' position on the international stage. At the end of the Round Table Conference in November 1949, the Netherlands agreed to formally recognise the sovereignty of the Republic. Though initially recognised as only being one constituent part of a federal United States of Indonesia, the Republic would grow to absorb other parts of the federal state and, by August 1950, proclaim a unitary and centralised Republic of Indonesia.

The role that the *tentara pelajar* played in the independence war was cemented by their consistent participation in the armed struggle and solidified by the pivotal part they played in the final stages of the war. This achievement becomes all the more impressive when considering the circumstances *tentara pelajar* units found themselves in. In the internal army conflict that occurred in Surakarta in late 1948, the subsequent Madiun Affair, and Tan Malaka's short-lived Kawi Pact, the *tentara pelajar* were faced with events that challenged the student-soldier identity that they had formed in the earlier stages of the war. While in Surakarta they were nearly torn between their allegiances to the Siliwangi and Senopati divisions, in Madiun and when dealing with Tan Malaka, they were faced with internal challenges to *tentara pelajar* values. In all

[131] Ex Anggota Be-17 TRIP Jawa Timur and Jarahdam VIII Brawijaya, *Peranan Meriam Gempur "Banteng Blorok" dalam Perang Kemerdekaan R.I.*; The film, directed by a TRIP veteran and released in 1964, can be seen on YouTube here: *Penjeberangan (Gatut Kusumo, 1963) Versi Berwarna*, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eCd_-YVbMwI.
[132] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, Perjuangan Pelajar Bersenjata TRIP Jawa Timur, 213.

these events, the notions of loyalty to the Republican government and "apoliticism" won out, in some cases by force.

This galvanised the *tentara pelajar* in the sense that it rooted out any internal dissent and placed them well during the Second Dutch Military Aggression, where their skills and their identity as one of the most elite, educated units of the army, in line with their "student" identity, was put to best use. Despite some instances of arrogance on the part of student officials of the military government, the *tentara pelajar* once again impressed their TNI commanders in their conduct. Not only did the *tentara pelajar* prove themselves as capable administrators in the army's military government, but they also re-established their reputation as fierce fighters in major battles against the KNIL/KL. In Surakarta, Yogyakarta, and East Java, the *tentara pelajar* acquitted themselves well and ensured that Indonesian independence was won. It marked the culmination of the *tentara pelajar'*s process of formalising their position within the TNI, achieving ultimate victory in the war through their complete integration into the regular army. They became, effectively, the TNI's *pemuda*, combat-effective yet still disciplined in following the orders of their superiors. Thus, the war concluded with the *tentara pelajar* both finding unity in purpose and a near-undamaged reputation as heroes of the independence war and shining examples of the *pemuda* of 1945, ready to imprint themselves upon post-war Indonesia.

Chapter V

Demobilisation and embracing politics: The *tentara pelajar* enter civilian life (1950-1975)

In 1950, following Dutch recognition of Indonesian sovereignty and the conclusion of the war of independence, Major Isman led the student-soldiers of the first detachment of the East Javanese TRIP into the city of Malang. It was the first time they had returned to the city in force since their defeat there in 1947, where they lost almost thirty men to a Dutch attack. The student-soldiers of the TRIP were greeted by the populace with open arms, lauded as heroes as they marched down its main street. When given the chance to speak, Isman chose not to glorify the achievements of his men, but instead emphasise the uncertainty that they faced with the end of the war. As Y.B. Mangunwijaya recounted in an interview long after the war, Isman said:

> Do not praise us. We are not the so-called pure *pemuda*, we are not flowers of the nation. We have killed, burned houses, our hands are covered in blood, and we have done cruel things We ask that you help make us normal again. This is what you can do for us, victims of the revolution forced to take up arms to defend the nation.[1]

Isman's statement, while made in specific reference to the soldiers of the TRIP, can be seen as summing up the circumstances of the *tentara pelajar* as a whole in the immediate aftermath of the war of independence. The students who formed the core of the *tentara pelajar* took part in fighting almost continuously from 1945 to 1949 against both foreign aggressors and internal enemies. While acknowledging the role of the *rakyat* in the struggle for independence, Isman emphasised the challenges faced by the demobilising *tentara pelajar*. For many of these students, their formative adolescent years were coloured by these violent experiences, the purity of the students ended not by politics but by war. The end of the war brought with it its own challenges, as the

[1] Mangunwijaya, Saya Ingin Membayar Utang kepada Rakyat, 59.

Indonesian government now sought to reduce the size of its peacetime army and demobilise many of its military formations, the *tentara pelajar* being one of them.

This chapter will argue that despite these challenges, the *tentara pelajar* would emerge from the early post-war period as an important political pressure group within Indonesia, cementing their status as part of a politically influential *angkatan 1945* (generation of 1945). It charts the evolution of the *tentara pelajar* from the heroic youth of the war's end into an influential and aggressive group of veterans, before eventually becoming an important cog in the complex political landscape of the Liberal (1950-1959) and Guided Democracy (1959-1965) eras. The chapter will demonstrate, via analysis of the various controversies that the rank-and-file *tentara pelajar* took part in and tracing the trajectories of key student-veteran figures, that it was precisely through their combination of unity of action and military discipline that student-veterans were able to garner valuable political capital and grew to be seen by influential political actors, ranging from the TNI to President Sukarno himself, as a useful group to have on side.

Despite this unabashed entry into Indonesian politics, this chapter argues that the student-veterans were still able to negotiate participation in "politics" with their notional apoliticism. With the independence war over, a shift away from the notional apoliticism that grounded their wartime identity was more palatable. Additionally, student-veterans were selective in their political participation, often opting against overt affiliation with political parties. Instead, they did so through the formation of veteran organisations and cooperatives, positioning themselves as an alternative to traditional parties in the Indonesian political landscape. However, rather than simply becoming tools to advance the political interests of Sukarno or the TNI, student-veterans acted independently, seeking first and foremost to ensure that their interests, namely "national development" as they interpreted, were forwarded. When student-veterans opted to support government policies or individuals, they did so first and foremost when such policies aligned with their aims, and in contrast actively opposing actions that jeopardised their goals. Though this effort led to varying outcomes for individual student-veterans, they all acted to protect the interests of *tentara pelajar* veterans, as well as themselves.

Rationalisation and demobilisation: The rocky transition into post-war life

The main issue faced by *tentara pelajar* units in the immediate aftermath of the end of the war of independence was demobilisation. The post-war demobilisation process was in many ways a continuation of the *rera* policy that cause so much turmoil throughout 1948 and 1949. The prime motive for both was the same: downsizing the army to alleviate the pressure its upkeep had on the national economy. Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence removed the Republic's greatest external threat in its short history. Though the government would continue to face numerous threats to its power, which in the short run took the form of internal rebellions and separatist movements, the need to maintain a standing army of the size that it had been during the war of independence appeared to have passed.

The demobilisation of the KNIL also influenced the demobilisation of the TNI. One of the clauses of the Round Table Agreement which formed the basis of Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence was that KNIL soldiers of Indonesian descent would be given the option to join the TNI.[2] Many in the TNI's leadership were quite happy to take them in. The TNI's leading lights in the immediate post-war period, in particular A.H. Nasution and T.B. Simatupang, were former KNIL servicemen, characterised by Crouch as "military technocrats."[3] Their position was further strengthened following the death of Sudirman in January 1950, just one month after Dutch recognition of Indonesian sovereignty. As discussed in Chapter II, Sudirman was a former officer in the Japanese-trained PETA militia, and his popularity amongst soldiers and other ex-PETA men largely contained the influence of the ex-KNIL officers.[4] While no single officer could hope to fill the gap left by Sudirman's death, Nasution and Simatupang rose to the influential positions of Army Chief of Staff and Armed Forces of Chief of Staff respectively soon after. Both men were key supporters of *rera*, and held the view that a smaller, professional military would be more useful than a larger, conscript force.[5]

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[2] Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 436.
[3] Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 28.
[4] Said, *Genesis of Power*, 30–33.
[5] Saleh A. Djamhari, "Politik Militer pasca Perang Kemerdekaan 1950-1952" (Konferensi Nasional Sejarah VIII, Hotel Millenium, Jakarta, 2006), 2.

The demobilisation process, like the wartime *rera,* was messy and disorganised. Opposition to it within the military again materialised along former PETA and KNIL lines. Many former PETA officers maintained their wartime distrust of the leading former KNIL men and viewed the "professionalisation" of the army as an excuse to further reduce their influence, already on the wane after Sudirman's death.[6] Their suspicion was further fuelled by the emergence of internal rebellions largely instigated by former KNIL officers dissatisfied with the results of the Round Table Agreement, such as the 1950 Andi Azis rebellion in Makassar and the formation of the separatist Republic of the South Moluccas, based in Ambon, in the same year.[7]

Tentara pelajar units, however, were mostly given a choice in the demobilisation question. Due to their perceived loyalty to the government throughout the war, their status as young students, and their exceptional service in numerous battles, *tentara pelajar* veterans were given three options as demobilisation rolled on. The first was to continue serving in TNI, which was contingent on student-soldiers completing additional training. The second option was to continue their education with the support of a government scholarship, undoubtedly an attractive proposition to *tentara pelajar* who had left their studies during the war. The last option was for *tentara pelajar* to simply re-enter civilian life without much in terms of direct government support.[8]

It was indicative of the special status of the *tentara pelajar* that other formations, especially the *laskar* integrated into the TNI, were not afforded the luxury of a choice. In Nasution's quest for a professional TNI, he eschewed "political" officers and units, a byword used to describe formations and individuals deemed either too left- or right-leaning. Demobilisation was a way in which such officers, along with the formations they commanded, could be purged, or at least broken up.[9] Nasution too highlighted that he agreed with the "modernisation" of the army's structure and the enrolment of *tentara pelajar* veterans into officer training schools to supplement the

[6] See Chapter III for a more detailed discussion of the PETA-KNIL rivalry.
[7] Djamhari, "Politik Militer pasca Perang Kemerdekaan 1950-1952," 6–7.
[8] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan., 274.
[9] Djamhari, "Politik Militer pasca Perang Kemerdekaan 1950-1952," 4.

lack of skilled officers, showcasing his continued preference for student-soldiers over other units.[10]

While the *tentara pelajar* were clearly favoured compared to other demobilised army units, many student-veterans were still dissatisfied and anxious for their future. In the speech that he gave as his soldiers entered Malang, Isman expounded on the close relationship the *tentara pelajar* had with the *rakyat* while emphasising the difficult wartime experiences of *tentara pelajar* soldiers. Whilst Isman espoused hope that the young, educated *tentara pelajar* veterans would be "useful" for the nation, in line with the perceived special role in national development held by many student-soldiers, their future was very much in doubt.

Anxieties over these uncertain times were apparent within the actions of student-soldiers and their commanders in the immediate aftermath of the Dutch recognition of Indonesian sovereignty. In early 1950, outside of the town of Blitar in East Java, TRIP students who had staffed the local military government fought a minor skirmish with other TNI units partly for control over plantations in the area. The conflict was largely spurred by financial anxieties, as student-soldiers, despite eventually becoming formally part of the TNI, were treated as volunteers and received compensation only when their units came across money.[11] In a situation of financial insecurity, where the prospect of government support appeared to be unlikely, Isman sought to secure support for the TRIP via control over the economically lucrative plantations, placing them at odds with other TNI units who had similar ideas.[12]

By late 1949, the government had acknowledged that student demobilisation, and its attendant problems, was a national priority. This acknowledgement is best seen in *Peraturan Pemerintah* (Government Regulation) no. 32 (1949) on students who have served, which outlined the duty of care that the government had for student volunteers and draftees.[13] This included the provision of a stipend, and assurances that student-

[10] Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, 1983, 2:256.
[11] Aditya, Peristiwa Blitar 1950, 98–101; Asmadi, Pelajar Pejuang, 240.
[12] Aditya, Peristiwa Blitar 1950, 104–7.
[13] "Peraturan Pemerintah no. 32 tahun 1949 tentang Penghargaan Pemerintah terhadap Pelajar yang telah Berbakti" (1949), https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/64233/pp-no-32-tahun-1949. See appendices.

veterans would receive government support in applying for work or education should they decide to leave the armed forces.[14]

The formation of the Office for the Affairs of Demobilised Students (Kantor Urusan Demobilisan Pelajar, KUDP), designed to implement these provisions, came shortly after the passage of the regulation. Its main mandate was to ensure that all students who had served be provided with adequate education and welfare as they completed the demobilisation process.[15] Even then, the sheer size of the student-soldier force, scattered across numerous military formations spread across the newly formed republic, meant that the KUDP could only really formulate a coordinated plan of action by mid-1950.[16] Despite the belated formulation of official policy, informally there were scattered instances of support for student-veterans, often coming from local governments and communities or from among students themselves. Efforts to aid demobilised students included setting up temporary lodging and boarding houses, conducting fundraisers and donation drives, and even setting up some form of schooling for them. This demonstration of a persisting *esprit de corps*, even after the end of large-scale conflict, would characterise the actions of *tentara pelajar* veterans well into Indonesian independence.

[14] Peraturan Pemerintah no. 32 tahun 1949 tentang Penghargaan Pemerintah terhadap Pelajar yang telah Berbakti.
[15] Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, *Republik Indonesia - Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta* (Kementerian Penerangan, 1953), 604.
[16] Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 603–4; Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 274.



Figure 8 An advertisement in the Jakarta-based Java Bode newspaper for a historical play starring former student-soldiers dated 18 August 1950. The proceeds of the play would be donated to student-veterans. Image sourced from: https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010865401:mpeg21:p004

This is not to say, however, that the KUDP was an entirely government-run endeavour, without any representation from amongst student-veterans: Isman of the TRIP and Achmadi of the Central Javanese TP served as advisers to KUDP leadership. Regionally too the KUDP relied on *tentara pelajar* officers to assess the situation on the ground and implement policy. For example, the Yogyakarta KUDP was staffed by representatives of all the major student formations operating in the area, including those comprised of Sumatran students.[17]

The main duty of the KUDP was to house and care for demobilised student-veterans, providing them with some basic vocational training before transitioning them into civilian society either directly or via placements in formal educational institutions.[18] The KUDP was also a key part of the government's national post-war reconstruction programme, as it also answered to the National Reconstruction Bureau (Badan Rekonstruksi Nasional, BRN).[19] The bureau was responsible for coordinating the new program of national development, setting up state-owned firms and enterprises in various fields, and allocating workers (mostly veterans) to staff these firms. These

[17] Sekitar Perdjuangan Peladjar dan Penjelesaiannja di K.U.D.P. Rayon III, Jogjakarta. (Jogjakarta: KUDP Rayon III Yogyakarta, 1952), 59.
[18] Sekitar Perdjuangan Peladjar dan Penjelesaiannja di K.U.D.P. Rayon III, Jogjakarta., 37.
[19] Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, *Republik Indonesia - Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta*, 614–15.

were varied companies, covering industries from agave and kapok plantations in Madura to rubber plantations in West Java.[20]

In this respect, the KUDP's links to the BRN echoes Isman's sentiment on the "usefulness" of student-veterans. While the BRN was tasked with finding roles in the reconstruction programme for non-student-veterans as well, the setting up of a specific office for student-veterans and the efforts made to provide vocational education and jobs for students showed the important role students were perceived to play in national development. As discussed in Chapter II, development was a key facet of *tentara pelajar* ideology even as they took part in the independence war, as they sought to rationalise their roles as budding members of a small national intelligentsia alongside their soldierly duty. Though many *tentara pelajar* groups agreed that fighting against the KNIL/KL (*perjuangan*) would have to be temporarily prioritised over their role in national development (*pembangunan*) there was a sense that both were closely linked and that ultimately by the end of the war, development would have to be a priority for student-soldiers.

Student-veterans who decided to continue their military careers were not placed under the KUDP's charge, instead undergoing additional training to allow them to transition into formal officer roles. Most student-veterans who chose this path were enrolled in the Reserve Officer School of the Pusat Pendidikan Perwira Angkatan Darat (Army Officer Training Centre, P3AD).[21] A select few went on to train at the under the auspices of the KL at the Royal Military Academy in Breda, part of a provision in the Round Table Agreement.[22]

Those who sought to continue within the TNI, however, were a minority. In an interview with Semarang newspaper *De Locomotief*, Achmadi said that fewer than ten percent of student-veterans wanted to reenlist in the army, with most wanting to resume

[20] "Berkas mengenai Perusahaan-perusahaan yang Diselenggarakan untuk Mepekerjakan Bekas Tentara dan Pejuang," September 24, 1951, Arsip Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959 II, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[21] Moehkardi, Pendidikan Pembentukan Perwira TNI-AD, 1950-1956, 59.
[22] Moehkardi, 211; Nugroho Notosusanto was given the opportunity to attend the Breda academy but was forced to turn it down by his father, significantly changing his future career trajectory. See McGregor, *History in Uniform*.

their studies.[23] This amounted to more than 30,000 of the recorded 40,000 students under arms by the end of the war, making the KUDP's work harder. In Yogyakarta alone, the regional KUDP recorded that it had nearly 4,000 students of various educational backgrounds on its books, ranging from primary school all the way up to vocational and tertiary education.[24]

In some respects, the KUDP was successful in these endeavours. It worked closely with the Education Ministry in efforts to revitalise the school system, which had suffered from major disruption and damage during the war. In Malang, the local KUDP took charge of funding the creation of three new *peralihan* (transitionary) schools dedicated solely to student-veterans, while in Yogyakarta they were able to facilitate the enrolment of students in various educational institutions, including various middle and high schools, vocational schools, and even local and overseas universities.[25] Several groups of student-veterans went on to study in California and Japan on KUDP-sponsored programmes, with KUDP leaders hoping that the "mental switch" of studying abroad would improve the wellbeing of student-veterans.[26]

This did not, however, necessarily translate to the complete resolution of issues surrounding the demobilisation of former student-soldiers. The difficulty of reintegration is best illustrated by the case of a school whose principal demanded that student-veterans not bring any of their firearms to class with them. In response, a student-veteran confidently stated that his weapons were "a part of his clothing," before then "wriggling" into his seat with an assortment of rifles and hand grenades.[27]

While the provision of a stipend for student-veterans was officially guaranteed, what veterans actually received was far below a living wage.[28] The Republican state, fresh from the economic stresses of fighting a war that devastated its productive

[23] "Majoor Achmadi: Van de Tentara Peladjar wenst 90 procent weer te studeren," *De Locomotief*, April 21, 1950.
[24] Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, *Republik Indonesia - Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta*., 611.
[25] "De SMA-Peralihan te Malang," *Nieuwe Courant*, October 6, 1950; Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, *Republik Indonesia - Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta*.
[26] "AURI-kadetten terug," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad de Preangerbode*, November 24, 1951; "Gedemobiliseerden naar Japan," *Indische courant voor Nederland*, January 17, 1953; Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, 287.
[27] "'Studentenleger' wordt onbonden," *Trouw*, August 22, 1950.
[28] "Voor gedemobiliseerde scholieren wordt een internaat ingericht," *De Locomotief*, September 18, 1950.

capacity, simply did not have enough funding to allocate to the programme. The Yogyakarta KUDP, for example, was asked by the central KUDP to set strict criteria for stipend provision, implying that there was not enough money from the central government to allocate for all students.[29] Lack of resources was a common theme echoed by those involved in demobilisation. Writing to the Prime Minister's office in October 1950, the Attorney General passed on the concerns of local police in Kediri, East Java, who reported that demobilised youths were committing crimes such as illegally harvesting sugar cane and stealing bicycles. He emphasised that local veterans' shelters were overwhelmed and asked for support from the Defence Minister. Similarly, the head of the central KUDP Sri Budojo, himself a student-veteran, urged the government to provide more support for demobilised *tentara pelajar* in November 1950.[30]

Such developments would doubtless have exacerbated anxieties among *tentara pelajar* members, to the extent that the Home Affairs Minister saw fit to inform the Education Minister on the "restlessness" among former TP members caused by rumours that Governmental Regulation no. 32 would be repealed.[31] Though the Home Affairs minister acknowledged that such rumours were baseless, he noted that because of the "…psychology of these youths who are quick to believe in developments that worsen their standing," their anxieties had to be taken seriously. While this level of attention from ministers is an indication of the importance the *tentara pelajar* veterans held in the eyes of the government, it is also indicative of the fearsome reputation they had built in post-war Indonesia that the minister mentioned their tendency to "worsen their standing."

Some newspaper articles from the time also report tensions between student-veterans and students who chose not to enlist during the war in a reproduction of the wartime tensions of *berjuang atau belajar* (to struggle or to study). While those who

[29] Sekitar Perdjuangan Peladjar dan Penjelesaiannja di K.U.D.P. Rayon III, Jogjakarta., 48.
[30] "Surat-surat mengenai Demobilisasi Anggota Tentara Pelajar dan TNI," June 16, 1950, Arsip Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959 II, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[31] Menteri Pendidikan Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan, "Surat dari Menteri Pendidikan Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan kepada Perdana Menteri mengenai Kegelisahan dalam Kalangan ex Tentara Pelajar (T.P) karena adanya Desas-desus Pencabutan PP No. 32.," n.d., Arsip Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959 II, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.

continued studying throughout the war looked down on the less-than-intellectual exploits of their *tentara pelajar* peers, some student-veterans saw their counterparts as being coddled by their parents while they themselves served the nation through participating in the independence struggle. This led to some instances of fighting between the two groups, much to the chagrin of those involved in the demobilisation process.[32] It is thus unsurprising that many student-veterans often failed to progress very far. Twenty-nine students under the care of the Yogyakarta KUDP failed to pass their final high school exams in 1951, while in the same year fifty-four students failed to pass their final middle school exams.[33] Similarly, only a handful of *tentara pelajar* officers ever managed to pass the P3AD and graduate into becoming regular officers.[34]

Student-veterans as a power base: The destruction of the parties and the emergence of functional groups

This combination of anxieties surrounding their economic circumstances and futures led to several instances of student-veterans committing theft, often accompanied with violence. While some of these were clearly purely economic in nature, such as the case of a bank robbery in Semarang, others were displays of the continued *esprit de corps* maintained by student-veterans and their nationalist leanings.[35] For example, also in Semarang, student-soldiers reportedly stole a jeep belonging to the Dutch War Graves Service, still present in Indonesia to take care of their war dead. When two student-veterans accused of the theft were taken into custody by the military police, two truckloads of their fellow student-soldiers came to their support, outnumbering the Dutch military policemen and freeing their two comrades.[36]

However, these actions also showcased the resilience of the identity-forming processes of the student-veterans, who remained relatively united despite the formal

[32] "De SMA-Peralihan te Malang"; "Scholier mishandeld," *De Locomotief*, June 7, 1950.
[33] Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, *Republik Indonesia - Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta*, 612.
[34] Though some sources attribute this to the "feelings of rivalry" held by the Dutch instructors of the programme to the student-veterans. See Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, *Perjuangan Pelajar Bersenjata TRIP Jawa Timur*, 231.
[35] "Geld van Javasche Bank terecht gevonden in een benzinedrum," *Nieuwe Courant*, January 20, 1951.
[36] "Wild West in Hartje van Semarang: Viftig Man Overbluften de Politie Met Twee Pistolen," *De Volkskrant*, May 19, 1951.

disbandment of their units. This was supported by as much a physical unity as it was spiritual, as student-veterans often studied in the same schools, separate from their non-veteran counterparts, and stayed in KUDP-designated boarding houses.[37] Supporting one's comrades in tight situations, just as they did in the case of the freeing of student-veterans implicated in the jeep theft, became a trademark of various student-veterans' groups, and would be repeated in other instances.

The most notable of these involved moments where student-veterans attacked newspapers and publications that carried articles depicting them in a negative light. Even notionally pro-nationalist news outlets were not exempt from these attacks. For example, when the Indonesian state news agency *Antara* reported in 1952 that some student-veterans had stolen bicycles because "they could not live on their measly government allowance," their Semarang office was attacked by a group of student-veterans from the Central Javanese TP.[38] Another more notorious example is the attack on the *de Vrije Pers* newspaper in Surabaya. The newspaper initially reported on an incident that had occurred in the city's Simpang Hotel on 13 January 1954, where the Indonesian Minister for Economic Affairs was denied a room by the Dutch-run hotel management. While the hotel had stated that there were no rooms available and that proper protocol had not been followed in reserving a room, the Surabaya governor who had been charged with arranging the minister's stay there claimed that the hotel was acting in bad faith and practising racial discrimination.[39] The hotel was then subjected to court proceedings to remove its operating license. *De Vrije Pers* reported the hotel's version of events, which then led to a group of *pemuda*, led by and comprised mostly of TRIP veterans, attacking the paper and forcing its Dutch editor, Evanhuis, into protective custody.[40] Evanhuis was subsequently told that the government could not guarantee his safety in the wake of this expression of student-veteran anger, effectively ensuring his deportation to the Netherlands.

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[37] "Voor gedemobiliseerde scholieren wordt een internaat ingericht."
[38] "EX-T.P.'ers bestormden Antara-Semarang," *De Vrije Pers*, February 28, 1952.
[39] "Evenhuis: 'Incident in Simpang-Hotel geen rassendiscriminatie,'" *De Tijd*, February 22, 1954; Gubernur Kepala Daerah Propinsi Djawa Timur, "Surat-surat mengenai Peristiwa Hotel Simpang Jawa-Timur," February 22, 1954, Arsip Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959 II, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[40] "Actie-Comitie Simpang-Hotel in Surabaja opgericht," *Indische courant voor Nederland*, February 3, 1954.

Though these attacks on newspapers and Dutch soldiers show the penchant of student-veterans towards hotheadedness feared by the Minister of Home Affairs, it also impressed upon key political actors their potential as a useful political tool. The *de Vrije Pers* incident in particular demonstrated that student-veterans were able and willing to mobilise for concerns that went beyond their own well-being and reputation. It showed that they still deeply held the nationalist feeling that they carried throughout the war and were willing to act against perceived enemies of the Indonesian state. It also demonstrated the level of organisation present among student-veterans even after demobilisation, indicative of their continued elite status within Indonesian society as well as the military. Additionally, the press coverage of the Simpang Hotel incident took on national significance due to its demonstration of the state's response to what many Indonesians perceived to be neo-colonial practices. This further enhanced the reputation of *tentara pelajar* veterans nationwide.[41] Recognising the influence of student-veterans, Sukarno himself saw it fit to maintain cordial relations with student-veterans' groups, speaking at many of their meetings and conferences.[42] In most addresses, the president was largely supportive of the veterans and their effort, though he asked that they express their political opinions in a manner that was more "controlled" in some instances.[43]

It is also clear that, despite the relatively few student-veterans who continued in the armed forces, *tentara pelajar* veterans' groups maintained close relations with the military, in particular with supportive high-ranking officers of the army. The most important of these was Nasution himself, long an admirer of the *tentara pelajar*'s discipline and effectiveness during the war.[44] The alignment of their interests was displayed during the 17 October Affair of 1952. The affair was a culmination of growing tensions between the military and the political elite, stemming from the continuation of *rera*. This itself occurred within the larger background of the military's

[41] Gubernur Kepala Daerah Propinsi Djawa Timur, "Surat-surat mengenai Peristiwa Hotel Simpang Jawa-Timur."
[42] "President Soekarno onthult 'Tugu Muda' te Semarang," *Indische courant voor Nederland,* May 30, 1953; "President bezoekt Solo en Tjirebon," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad de Preangerbode*, March 20, 1956.
[43] "Invasie van Ruwe Student-Soldaten in Djakarta," *De Volkskrant,* July 2, 1952.
[44] See Chapter IV

own political ambitions, rooted in the establishment of the military government during the war.

As mentioned previously, within the TNI rationalisation was mostly supported by influential ex-KNIL officers such as Nasution and Simatupang, while being opposed by a collective of mostly Japanese-trained former PETA officers. Sundhaussen argues that the ex-PETA faction, more closely linked with Sukarno and the political parties due to their more overt nationalism, sought to depose Nasution and Simatupang and reverse the process of *rera*.[45] Seeking to counter these efforts, Nasution mobilised both civilian demonstrators and soldiers of his former Siliwangi division to surround the presidential palace in Jakarta, demanding that Sukarno dissolve parliament and return to the provisional constitution of 1945.[46] This demand meant a strengthening of presidential powers, which had been reduced following the end of the war, and gambled that Sukarno's own refusal to take a public stance on the *rera* controversy prior to the 17 October Affair meant that he would be amenable to such a change. Sukarno, however, decided not to commit, instead ending the affair peacefully by calling on soldiers and demonstrators to go home and stating his refusal to give in to their demands. Nasution was suspended in favour of appointing an ex-PETA officer to his position, and Simatupang only narrowly avoided a suspension.[47]

For student-veterans, the 17 October Affair was an early chance to showcase their political influence. Various groups were mobilised by the TNI and political parties to support and oppose the affair, student-veterans among them. In Semarang, student-veterans participated in "anti-parliament" demonstrations, calling for a more "representative" parliament and closing with a statement that parliament needed to be "cleansed."[48]

Their opposition to parliament also showcased the political allegiances of student-veterans. On the one hand, it indicated a support of Sukarno that dated back to the war. The president was not directly opposed in these demonstrations, and Sukarno himself was, as will be shown later in the chapter, not a keen supporter of parliament.

[45] Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, 66–67, 72–79.
[46] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 281–82.
[47] Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, 75–76.
[48] "Rond de 'anti-parlement' demonstratie," *De Locomotief*, October 21, 1952.

On the other, it also showed their closeness to Nasution and the established officer corps at large. This too was symptomatic of wartime experiences. As demonstrated in previous chapters, almost all *tentara pelajar* units sought to seek recognition from regular army officers during the war.[49] Additionally, Nasution clearly favoured the *tentara pelajar* during the war. His multi-volume account of the war praises the discipline of student-soldiers, while his decision to mobilise secondary and university students to support the Java military government showed his trust that even only partially educated students would be better suited to man administrative positions than the uneducated rank-and-file.[50] Similarly, Simatupang also praised the student armies, noting that their officers were regarded with "pride" in the regions in which they operated, and that they had played a "highly important part" in the independence war.[51]

The decision of these student-veterans' groups to ally with Nasution proved to be wise despite his and Simatupang's resignation. Nasution's replacement, a moderate ex-PETA officer, failed to satisfy both the radical elements of the ex-PETA officer group and politicians still eager to reform the military. Nasution reassumed his position as Army Chief of Staff in 1956, largely because he was still seen in a favourable light by Sukarno.[52]

The political power of student-veterans would be further enhanced by the end of the period of Liberal Democracy. The 17 October Affair was indicative of the instability of the Indonesia during the time, which was marked by a "high and rising level of political unrest" and a "lack of commitment" from leading politicians to democracy itself.[53] While the elections of 1955 were widely hailed as democratic, it did little to stop the many impasses that occurred in parliament, nor the numerous cabinet reshuffles and changes.[54] Sukarno too felt increasingly restricted by the legislature as well as the now-ceremonial role of president, and despite his unwillingness to dissolve parliament during the 17 October Affair, began to take steps in that direction.

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[49] See Chapter III
[50] Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 1977, 10:391–92.
[51] T. B Simatupang, *Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People's War*, trans. Benedict R. O'G Anderson (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2010), 74, 85.
[52] Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, 92–94.
[53] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox Pub., 2007), 603–4.
[54] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 286–87.

On 30 October 1956, Sukarno gave a speech to delegates of youth organisations calling for political parties to be "buried."[55] This was the clearest indication of Sukarno's shift away from liberal democracy and his subsequent adoption of so-called "guided democracy" in 1959. The shift to guided democracy, while in the making since the Dutch recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in 1949, must also be seen in the global context of the ensuing Cold War. By 1959, Indonesia had experienced a series of internal separatist movements, fuelled by dissatisfied army officers who had the backing of the United States. These rebellions, namely the 1957 Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta (Universal People's Struggle) in parts of eastern Indonesia and the 1958 Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) in Sumatra, compounded a sense of political uncertainty that had never truly dissipated since 1949. Though both rebellions were clandestinely supported by the US, which now viewed Indonesia as leaning increasingly to towards the Eastern Bloc, they were founded on real grievances amongst Indonesians outside of Java that they had been ignored and increasingly subject to Javanese dominance. The instability wrought by the rebellions subsequently added support and sympathy to Sukarno's position.[56] In his disdain for political parties, Sukarno found an unlikely ally in Nasution. Long sceptical of political parties despite forming his own in 1953, Nasution ensured that Sukarno had a solid base of support in the military to limit the power of the parties and successfully suggested the president to declare martial law in 1957.[57]

Far from being altruistic in his support for Sukarno against the parties, Nasution instead believed that the military had the ability and right to play a greater socio-political role in Indonesia. In 1959, these ideas were publicly expressed by Nasution as the "middle way" in a speech to graduating army cadets. It would eventually be known as *dwifungsi* (dual-function), the core tenet of which argued that the military had both a national defence function and a socio-political function, entitling it to hold government positions.[58] This argument had longstanding roots: as seen in Chapter IV, during the

[55] Sukarno, "Let Us Bury the Parties (1956)," in *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965*, ed. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (Jakarta: Equinox Pub., 2007), 81–83.
[56] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 291.
[57] Ricklefs, 292.
[58] David Jenkins, "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of 'Dwifungsi'," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 11, no. 2 (1983): 20.

later stages of the independence war the army formed a military government extending down to the village level, exerting control on various aspects of daily life.

Collectively, the events that marked the end of liberal democracy in Indonesia provided further opportunities for student-veterans to organise. In Sukarno and Nasution, they had two willing benefactors, and having participated in the wartime military government, they would have doubtlessly sympathised with Nasution's idea of a middle way. The political instability of liberal democracy would also have fed into the existing distrust student-veterans had for political parties, a continuation of a key element in their wartime identity. Isman and many others attributed many of the key issues of economic inequality and corruption as a result of ceaseless politicking on the side of the parties.[59] Sukarno's 1956 Youth Pledge speech served to galvanise student-veterans' groups into taking action, though this was not without some subtle prodding from parts of the military.

Against this backdrop, it is important to again emphasise the persistent importance of youth within Indonesian political discourse. While this was incredibly prominent during the war, where many armed *laskar* groups embraced the label of *pemuda*, it was maintained well into the 1950s and beyond. Sukarno's decision to deliver his 1956 speech on dismantling the party system on the anniversary of the 1928 Youth Pledge to representatives of Indonesian youth was symbolically important. The pledge had long been seen as a display of the unity of Indonesian youth in the face of colonialism, and Sukarno made sure that his speech called specifically upon youth. Sukarno urged young Indonesians to unite as "one people undivided" and overcome the "disease of parties," before then urging for the "rationalisation" of the party system.[60] He then called on youth who "want[ed] a nation that is not split by parties…" to "exercise the sovereignty of youth" and "don't just parrot the parties."[61]

Again, as during the war and prior, youth were perceived to be a source of dynamism and revolutionary fervour, perfect for Sukarno who believed that reforming

[59] Mas Isman, The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces in Nurturing Democratic Life and Their Relations with the Party-System in Indonesia, 5th ed (S.l.: S.n., 1969), 24; Padmodiwiryo, Memoar Hario Kecik, 578–81; Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 89–90.
[60] Sukarno, "Let Us Bury the Parties (1956)," 81–83.
[61] Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 517.

the political system was part of the ongoing Indonesian revolution. It is thus unsurprising that student-veterans, claimants to the *pemuda* identity and now influential members of the so-called generation of 1945, quickly answered the president's call to arms. Both Isman and Achmadi were, according to Feith, part of a group of *pemuda* that Sukarno grew to rely upon to affect political change.[62] Thus the *pemuda*, and in particular student-veterans, were of keen importance to the president's political agenda.

Delegations of student-veterans' groups from West, Central and East Java met in Jakarta on 14 February 1957 specifically to discuss how to formally respond to the evolving situation. Notably, the meeting was also attended by an officer from Army headquarters, Major Pamurahardjo, a subordinate of Nasution who had served in the Siliwangi division during the war.[63] The presence of a serving army officer from Nasution's base of operations showed the close cooperation between both student-veterans and the military, as well as between veterans and Nasution himself. This initial meeting was followed up by a larger one involving the youth wings of political parties such as Masyumi and the PKI.[64]

By the time of the second meeting, Sukarno had already made clear his "conception" where he argued that previous attempts at forming cabinets based on party coalitions had showcased the instability of "Western-style democracy." Instead, he believed that the nation should be governed on the basis of mutual cooperation (*gotong royong*) with the aid of a national council involving all of the "functional groups," sections of society whose work contributed to the Indonesian revolutionary struggle.[65] Among these functional groups were the armed forces and youth.

The second meeting of youth organisations declared their support for the presidential conception and, with the facilitation of Pamurahardjo, formalised their relationship with the armed forces. The organisation born from this affiliation became known as the Youth-Military Cooperation Agency (Badan Kerjasama Pemuda-Militer,

[62] Feith, 516.
[63] Imam Pratignyo, Ungkapan Sejarah Lahirnya Golongan Karya: Perjoangan Menegakkan Kembali Negara Proklamasi 17-8-1945 (Jakarta: Yayasan Bhakti T.P. Kedu Jakarta, 1983), 33; Turner, A. H. Nasution and Indonesia's Elites, 96.
[64] Pratignyo, Ungkapan Sejarah Lahirnya Golongan Karya, 35–36.
[65] Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 542.

BKS-PM), involving multiple youth organisations from across the political spectrum, united in their support for the presidential conception and willingness to take part in acts that forwarded it.[66] In Feith's words, it was used by the military to "supervise" and thus control youth organisations.[67]

While the BKS-PM became an organisation that included various youth groups in its ranks, the core of its leadership was comprised of members of the student-veterans organisations that had taken part in the 14 February meeting. The TNI's decision to approach student-veterans first and then effectively promoting them above other youth organisations showed how much the military trusted the *tentara pelajar* and the continued survival of the *tentara pelajar*'s wartime reputation for loyalty to the TNI. Even in post-war Indonesia, student-veterans' groups remained notionally "apolitical" as they had strived to be during the war of independence: not in the sense that they had no political interest, but because they eschewed affiliation with any political party whilst supposedly putting the national good above political squabbling.[68] This made them a key power base and ally in the eyes of both the military and Sukarno himself.

In tandem with the strengthening of the military's power came efforts to nationalise foreign-owned industries, particularly those owned by the Netherlands. While these were nominally protected under the terms of the round-table agreement, the shift to guided democracy also called for a transition to a "guided economy," essentially one controlled by the state and reliant on the nationalisation of foreign assets.[69] Deadlock over the fate of West Irian (now West Papua) on the international stage also helped fuel anti-Dutch sentiment within Indonesia. In late 1957, as Dutch-Indonesian relations soured, workers of the Dutch-owned KPM shipping company forcibly took over their workplace, ousting the Dutch board of directors. Workers in several Dutch-owned banks followed suit shortly after.[70] It was at this moment that the military stepped in and decided to take control of these companies, ostensibly to prevent them

[66] Pratignyo, Ungkapan Sejarah Lahirnya Golongan Karya, 36.
[67] Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 589.
[68] See Chapter II
[69] Jan Luiten van Zanden and Daan Marks, *An Economic History of Indonesia 1800-2010* (London: Routledge, 2014), 220.
[70] Bondan Kanimoyoso, Nasionalisasi Perusahaan Belanda Indonesia: Menguatnya Peran Ekonomi Negara (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2001), 62–64.

from falling under the control of the communist-dominated trade unions.[71] This was a culmination of the military's growing interest in business, initially strengthened by the implementation of martial law.[72]

The armed forces in turn relied largely on its new civilian arm, the BKS, to aid in its takeover of these companies. The military formed multiple BKS organisations in addition to the BKS-PM to influence more functional groups. This included a BKS for cooperation with workers and one for peasants. Ultimately, all BKS' played significant roles in the nationalisation process, including the BKS-PM.[73] Specifically, the BKS-PM mobilised support for nationalisation via demonstrations and provided some limited expertise to run the nationalised companies.[74]

As armed confrontation against the Netherlands over the issue of West Irian grew increasingly likely, the BKS were reorganised to form the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat, FNPIB). The FNPIB was a coalition of different functional groups whose main purpose was to mobilise support for the effort to "liberate" West Irian. This demonstrated a slight enhancement in the BKS' stature but not necessarily a change in aims, as the BKS-PM had already committed itself to the cause of the integration of West Irian in its founding charter. The evolution of the FNPIB into the Front Nasional (FN) in 1959, which aimed to galvanise Indonesian society by bringing political parties and functional groups under a single banner, spurred the student-veterans of the BKS-PM to better organise functional groups to contend with the political parties.[75]

Subsequently, in October 1964 student-veterans of the BKS-PM spearheaded the formation of the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, commonly known as the Functional Groups (Golongan Karya, Golkar). Golkar was, on paper, an umbrella for

[71] Bambang Purwanto, "Economic Decolonization and the Rise of Indonesian Military Business," in *Indonesian Economic Decolonization in Regional and International Perspective*, ed. J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Post (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 51–52, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004253780.
[72] Purwanto, 49.
[73] Pratignyo, Ungkapan Sejarah Lahirnya Golongan Karya, 40–41; Pham Van Thuy, Beyond Political Skin: Colonial to National Economies in Indonesia and Vietnam (1910s-1960s) (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2019), 162–63, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-13-3711-6.
[74] For example, Sajidiman, then a TNI officer and a part of the BKS-PM was assigned to be the head of a national paper company. See Sajidiman, *The Tender Power*, 44–45.
[75] Pratignyo, Ungkapan Sejarah Lahirnya Golongan Karya, 71–74.

non-party functional groups that were part of the FN. Effectively, however, it was a military-backed grouping within the FN that acted as a counterweight to both the political parties and left-leaning unions and organisations.[76] Indeed, the purpose of Golkar was, according to Reeve, to divorce mass organisations from political parties to support Sukarno's "grand vision."[77] The first Secretary General of Golkar, Sokowati, was a serving military officer, whose appointment there was approved by Nasution.[78]

Student-veterans played vital roles in the organisation of Golkar. Though officially founded by the various unaffiliated functional groups, the key figures who spurred the creation of Golkar and organised the functional groups were student-veterans who had been previously active in the BKS-PM. For example, Imam Pratignyo, who was a Vice Secretary General of the FN and had met with numerous other functional group representatives in the lead-up to the formation of Golkar, was also formerly a soldier in the Central Javanese TP, while prominent student-veterans like Achmadi and Isman were relied on by Sukarno in the construction of Golkar.[79] Ultimately, it is again an indicator of the level of trust the military had in former student-soldiers and the belief that they were a reliable conduit of the military's values in civilian spaces. Student-veterans, in the words of Reeve, symbolised both revolutionary values and professional skills, just as they had viewed themselves during the war.[80] Through their roles in Golkar, student-veterans had carved for themselves a place within the Indonesian political landscape that proved resilient even as further instability was to come.

Changing fortunes: Different *tentara pelajar* trajectories post-1965

While Guided Democracy saw the growing establishment of student-veterans as a significant force in Indonesian society and politics, the events of 1965 proved pivotal in reshaping the role that student-veterans played. On the night of September 30 and the early hours of 1 October 1965, several army officers, many of whom were members of

[76] Leo Suryadinata, *Golkar dan Militer: Studi tentang Budaya Politik*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992), 14–15.
[77] David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Singapore ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 119.
[78] Pratignyo, Ungkapan Sejarah Lahirnya Golongan Karya, 76.
[79] Pratignyo, backcover; Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia*, 169.
[80] Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, 169.

the general staff, were kidnapped and murdered by soldiers of the presidential guard. Other military units linked to the action then occupied several key positions in the capital city of Jakarta. The action, dubbed the 30 September Movement by its perpetrators, was quickly suppressed by army units under the leadership of Major General Suharto, Commander of the elite Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve, KOSTRAD). As he observed the disinterment of the remains of the dead officers for reburial with military honours, Suharto placed the blame for the movement squarely at the feet of the PKI and its allies in the military.[81]

What followed over the next three years was a period of immense political destabilisation in Indonesia, where existing political divisions that were sharpened during the late Guided Democracy period reached their boiling point as the country fractured along supposedly pro- and anti-communist lines. Under the direction and with the active participation of the military, various elements of Indonesian civil society were mobilised against suspected communists, sympathisers and members of groups supposedly linked to the PKI in a campaign of mass killing that some scholars have called a genocide.[82] Among these were a faction of the IPI, now branded as the Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Students and Youth, IPPI) to denote its greater and more varied membership. Now without any formal links to the *tentara pelajar*, large sections of the IPPI became more closely affiliated with the PKI throughout the 1960s, resulting in its destruction and the systematic arrest, torture, and execution of many of its members after 30 September.[83] Conservative estimates place

[81] Numerous accounts, analyses, and theories of the coup d'etat and its supposed 'mastermind' exist, though this summarised version of events seen above is one that is commonly acknowledged across most scholarly works. For examples of work written on the 30 September movement, see A. C. A. Dake, *The Sukarno File, 1965-1967: Chronology of a Defeat*, Social Sciences in Asia, v. 9 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2006); Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Ruth T. McVey, and Frederick P. Bunnell, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*, Interim Reports Series (Ithaca, N.Y: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971); Victor M. Fic, *Kudeta 1 Oktober 1965: sebuah studi tentang konspirasi* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005); John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement And Suharto's Coup d'état in Indonesia*, New Perspectives in Southeast Asian Studies (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

[82] Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder*, Rethinking Southeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 2018).

[83] Soebagijo I. N, Perjuangan Pelajar IPI-IPPI, 150–203; HD Haryo Sasongko, Catatan Harian Anak Bangsa Terpidana: Kisah Sepenggal Sejarah dari Tragedi Nasional yang Berlumuran Darah, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Utan Kayu, 2003).

the death toll at 500,000, though according to some sources up to one million people were killed in the process, with many more imprisoned.[84]

The military was also subjected to the anti-communist purge. The leader of the presidential guard, Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri, was executed after a speedy show trial. A purge of the presidential guard and the rest of the army followed. In Central Java, officers who were sympathetic to 30 September Movement were arrested and executed by soldiers of the Army Para-Commando Regiment, a special forces formation that was loyal to Suharto.[85] By 1967, widespread purges had occurred in the Diponegoro and Brawijaya divisions of Central and East Java respectively, targeting not just alleged communists but also Sukarnoists.[86] The two provinces were notably the old stomping grounds of the *tentara pelajar* during the war.

With the military subjected to an anti-communist purge, student-veterans too, especially those who still served in the armed forces, experienced these divisions. To examine this, it is useful to again analyse the trajectories of the two main leaders of the *tentara pelajar* and, by extension, the student-veteran community: Achmadi of the Central Javanese TP and Isman of the TRIP. Both were considered key figures of the *pemuda* community by Sukarno and Nasution, an extension of the trust and respect they and the student-soldiers they commanded held during the war. In some respects, their pathways were similar, influenced by the prestige they managed to attain. Both advised KUDP leadership on the best way to help demobilised students, before then moving on to either further study or relatively senior positions within the armed forces and government. Achmadi, for example, went on to study in the Netherlands.[87] Unlike Isman, Achmadi resigned from the armed forces.[88] He subsequently played an active role in instigating campaigns against perceived corruption in the public and private

[84] R. B. Cribb, ed., *The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali*, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 21 (Clayton, Vic: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990).
[85] Douglas Kammen and David Jenkins, "The Army Para-Commando Regiment and the Reign of Terror in Central Java and Bali," in *The Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia, 1965-68*, ed. Douglas Kammen and Katharine E. McGregor, Southeast Asia Publications Series (Asian Studies Association of Australia) (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), 83–88.
[86] Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 232–34.
[87] "Achmad en Achmadi," *De Nieuwsgier*, February 26, 1954.
[88] While he still held the rank of Major General in 1966, several sources refer to this as a ceremonial *'tituler'* appointment, reserved only for persons not serving in the military. See Koesalah Soebagyo Toer, *Kronik Abad Demokrasi Terpimpin: Dari Manifes Politik sampai Naiknya Suharto, (5 Juli 1959-11 Maret 1967)*, 2019.

sector, which earned him further recognition from Sukarno.[89] Isman, on the other hand, continued his service in the military whilst also advancing himself in the civilian government. He graduated from the Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat (Army Staff and Command College, SESKOAD) in 1958, and then worked for the Office of the Prime Minister.[90] He also received several diplomatic placements, becoming part of the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations, and then ambassador to Myanmar, Thailand and Egypt, and was abroad when the 30 September Movement took place.[91] While this points to relative inactivity in internal Indonesian politics, Isman maintained a presence via the formation of the Koperasi Gotong Royong (Mutual Support Cooperative, Kosgoro).

Cooperatives had long been seen by Indonesian nationalists as an ideal way of conducting business, in-line with the values of social justice and equality espoused by the Indonesian revolution.[92] By the 1950s, when the implementation of the "Benteng" policy privileged native Indonesian traders over their Chinese rivals in key industries, the formation of cooperatives were encouraged to aid in rural economic development.[93] Formed in 1957, Kosgoro was a part of this trend. Initially, Kosgoro was founded as a mutual support cooperative exclusively for TRIP veterans and was clearly meant as some kind of political vehicle for student-veterans who remained committed to the *tentara pelajar* disdain for parties.[94] Over time, it widened its scope, focusing on development in rural areas, particularly those where the TRIP was active during the independence war.[95] Kosgoro was among the many other functional groups that joined to form Golkar in 1964.

While both Isman and Achmadi were trusted by Sukarno, Achmadi's path brought him closer to the president, indicating an enhanced level of trust. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter IV, Achmadi was promoted to the position of City Military Commander of Surakarta by Sukarno himself, a feat that Isman never quite matched.

[89] Padmodiwiryo, *Memoar Hario Kecik*, 578–81.
[90] Ramadhan K. H and Sugiarta Sriwibawa, *Peran Historis Kosgoro* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000), 17–20.
[91] Bachtiar, *Siapa Dia?*, 146.
[92] Zanden and Marks, An Economic History of Indonesia 1800-2010, 159–60.
[93] Zanden and Marks, 154, 159–60.
[94] Mas Isman, *Pedoman Perdjoangan*, 2nd ed. (Lembaga Penerbitan dan Pers Kosgoro, 1969), 2.
[95] "Kosgoro - Koperasi 'Gotong-Rojong'" (Tjibogo: Kosgoro, April 30, 1965), 5, 9–10.

The positions that he held from the late 1950s onwards tells a similar story. Achmadi was part of the leadership of the FNPIB, before then becoming a minister in several of Sukarno's cabinets, rising to the prestigious appointment of Minister of Information.[96]

The politics of both Isman and Achmadi are difficult to ascertain. Both were clearly trusted by Sukarno, which was perhaps an indication of how "apolitical" they were, in the sense that they shared his disdain for the political parties. However, how much this trust translated to loyalty to Sukarno's ideals is up for debate. This comes into further question as the alliance between Sukarno and the military became increasingly fraught. While Sukarno and Nasution were both disillusioned by the political parties, Sukarno's insistence to include the PKI in subsequent Guided Democracy cabinets was opposed by the armed forces hierarchy.[97] The heightened influence of the PKI in the government, best illustrated by their call to form a "Fifth Force" of armed workers and peasants to fight in the *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia, further increased the suspicion held by the TNI for the PKI.[98] It is at this point that splits among student-veterans can be seen as well.

Achmadi, for his part, was a strong Sukarno loyalist. He was appointed by Sukarno to the leadership of the Komando Operasional Tertinggi (Supreme Operations Command, KOTI) to liberate West Irian in 1963.[99] Additionally, he often repeated Sukarno's rhetoric in his speeches.[100] His loyalty is best demonstrated by the fact that in 1966, when Sukarno, cornered by the political manoeuvring of the military and university students along with his stubborn allegiance to the PKI, ordered Achmadi specifically to form a pro-Sukarno front.[101] Neither was Achmadi alone in his support for Sukarno among student-veterans. Brigadier General Hario Kecik, Commander of the East Kalimantan Military District and formerly of the Corps Mahasiswa unit of the *tentara pelajar*, was also considered a Sukarno loyalist, and took part in the same anti-

[96] Padmodiwiryo, *Memoar Hario Kecik*, 589; Susan Finch and Daniel S. Lev, *Republic of Indonesia Cabinets, 1945-1965*, Cornell University. Modern Indonesia Project. Interim Reports Series iii, 66 p. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1965), //catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001149274.
[97] Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, 145.
[98] Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 87.
[99] Crouch, 55.
[100] Toer, Kronik Abad Demokrasi Terpimpin, 435–36.
[101] Toer, 436.

corruption movement that Achmadi did.[102] So too was Maulwi Saelan, a former soldier of the *tentara pelajar* who then became a Colonel in the Presidential Guard. Sri Muljono Herlambang, a former soldier of the Central Javanese TP's SA/CSA unit, was appointed to the KOTI leadership alongside Achmadi, was eventually promoted to the position of Air Force Chief of Staff in 1966 with his loyalties ultimately lying with Sukarno.[103] All would be imprisoned for varying lengths of time by the New Order regime.

However, though all the aforementioned *tentara pelajar* veterans were Sukarnoists, their communist inclinations are unclear. Sometime after his imprisonment by the New Order regime in 1966, Achmadi's younger brother stated that he was "not a communist," and after he was released in the 1970s, there appears to have been a degree of rehabilitation and reconciliation between himself and Isman, with both playing roles in Golkar.[104] Saelan too claimed that he was imprisoned not because he was a communist, but because he refused to provide evidence incriminating Sukarno in the 30 September Movement.[105] That all of the aforementioned names, including Herlambang, were released sometime during the New Order regime and were more or less allowed to hold stable work and even establish reputable businesses, unlike many former political prisoners, can be seen as indicative of their relatively vague "communist" status.

On the other side are student-veterans who were not necessarily anti-Sukarno or even anti-communist but instead were more sympathetic to seeing the strengthening of the army's political position. In her research, McGregor found that it was difficult to say whether Nugroho Notosusanto, a student-veteran of the Central Javanese TP who later became head of the Army History Centre as well as Minister of Education, had long-held anti-communist views.[106] However, his affiliation with the SESKOAD and role in writing an army anti-communist counter history showed that he at least participated in

[102] Padmodiwiryo, *Memoar Hario Kecik*, 578–81.
[103] Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 55, 161.
[104] "SEBUAH KISAH: Meninggal Dunia (Mayjen Achmadi)," *SEBUAH KISAH* (blog), accessed March 21, 2022, http://s-kisah.blogspot.com/2012/04/meninggal-dunia-mayjen-achmadi.html; Yayasan Pelajar Pejoang Klaten, *Dibawah Sang Merah Putih, Tentara Pelajar Klaten Mengabdi*, 72.
[105] M.F. Mukhti, "Maulwi Saelan: Sukarno tak Terlibat G30S," Historia - Majalah Sejarah Populer Pertama di Indonesia, October 1, 2014, https://historia.id/politik/articles/maulwi-saelan-sukarno-tak-terlibat-g30s-vVoWP.
[106] McGregor, History in Uniform, 56.

such projects prior to 1965.[107] Isman's political leanings prior to 1965 are similarly difficult to ascertain, as discussed earlier. Isman, with Kosgoro and the rest of Golkar, sided with Suharto against Sukarno, purging themselves of suspected communist elements and calling for Sukarno's resignation.[108] However, at a meeting of the Kosgoro in April 1965, Isman reiterated the organisation's commitment to Sukarno's politics, though this might have been more lip service than anything else.[109] Additionally, Kosgoro had received Sukarno's personal backing prior to the 30 September Movement.[110] These kinds of splits, however, were not unique to student-veterans and occurred along the length and breadth of the country.

Ultimately, the aftermath of the 30 September Movement for student-veterans was the continued political survival of those who had sufficiently demonstrated anti-leftist and, to some extent, anti-Sukarnoist credentials. Achmadi and many other student-veterans suspected of leftist leanings were imprisoned or even executed in the wave of anti-communist and anti-Sukarnoist repression that followed the failure of the movement.[111] Others, however, were far more fortunate, as would become evidently clear during the rise of Suharto and the establishment of the New Order.

The rise of Golkar and a place for the *tentara pelajar* in the New Order

The elimination of the PKI as a viable political force made Sukarno's presidency increasingly untenable. University students, with the blessing of the army, began mobilising against Sukarno in early 1966 and conducted massive protests calling for his resignation outside of the presidential palace. His weakened position allowed Suharto to pressure Sukarno into giving emergency powers via the controversial Order of 11th March.[112] Suharto banned the PKI and its affiliated organisations immediately after. In

[107] McGregor, 58–59.
[108] Pratignyo, Ungkapan Sejarah Lahirnya Golongan Karya, 86–87; Ramadhan K. H and Sriwibawa, Peran Historis Kosgoro, 38–39.
[109] "Kosgoro - Koperasi 'Gotong-Rojong,'" 7–8.
[110] Ramadhan K. H and Sriwibawa, *Peran Historis Kosgoro*, 36–37.
[111] Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 195; Suhario Padmodiwiryo, *Memoar Hario Kecik II* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2001), 107–22.
[112] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 326.

March 1967 he assumed the position of Acting President and was officially inaugurated as President in 1968.

A key role in Suharto's rise would be played by Kosgoro, the *tentara pelajar* mutual assistance cooperative formed in 1957 that by now had become an important suborganisation of Golkar. As part of its role as a functional group, Kosgoro had widened its membership beyond student-veterans not long after its formation. Initially only comprised of 33 founding members, the second meeting of the Kosgoro membership in 1959 opted to widen its membership pool and create a committee to provide food and economic aid to the *rakyat*.[113] In 1962, Isman ordered TRIP veterans of the Kosgoro to "melt into the people" and "return to the villages" in an effort to encourage the growth of Kosgoro's membership and, to some extent, dilute the strength of the PKI in rural areas.[114]

Kosgoro's importance to the formation of the New Order lies in its position within Golkar. While he already held the presidency, Suharto wanted to legitimise his position by winning the upcoming 1971 general elections. Without a political party at his disposal, Suharto began making plain his intention of using the relatively unknown Golkar as his "political vehicle," in the sense that it was largely a vessel to channel votes and mobilise the functional groups that were part of its membership rather than expressing any proscribed political ideology.[115] By 1966 the army had reasserted its status as a functional group via the *Tri Ubaya Cakti* doctrine and openly supported Golkar's effort to strengthen and consolidate, which the organisation used to handily increase the number of organisations under its wing.[116] That Golkar was comprised largely by serving or retired army officers, as outlined earlier, who also heavily backed the army's claim to a greater stake in political life, made the decision to back it easier.[117] In 1969 Golkar rationalised its member organisations into more manageable groupings, known as *Kesatuan Induk Organisasi* (Basic Organisation Units, KINO). The KINO

[113] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, Perjuangan Pelajar Bersenjata TRIP Jawa Timur, 227.
[114] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, 237; Ramadhan K. H and Sriwibawa, *Peran Historis Kosgoro*, 29.
[115] Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia, 180–81.
[116] Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia*, 292–93; Seminar AD Ke-II tanggal 25 s/d 31 Agustus 1966, *Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI-AD "Tri Ubaya Cakti,"* 2nd ed. (Bandung: Pertjetakan Negara R.I., 1966).
[117] Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, 272.

were the core organisations of Golkar, with power concentrated into three main groupings: the SOKSI, the MKGR and Kosgoro.[118]

By this time, as leader of Kosgoro and now a leading figure in Golkar, Isman had cemented his position in the New Order's hierarchy. In 1967 he was appointed as an adviser to Suharto, and in 1968 rose to an assistant position on the Army General Staff.[119] To say, however, that Isman and the Kosgoro student-veterans were Suharto loyalists is an oversimplification. Isman, as mentioned earlier, was widely regarded as close to Sukarno, though perhaps not as much as Achmadi. However, Isman was clearly sympathetic to the idea of *dwifungsi* and, independent of Suharto, believed that the armed forces could serve as a stabiliser and balance to the power and influence of the political parties.[120]

As part of the strengthening of Golkar, Kosgoro further expanded its organisational structures as early as 1965, creating sub-groups known as *gerakan* (movements) and *lembaga* (foundations) that aimed to organise different functional groups in Indonesian society.[121] This move strengthened Kosgoro nationally, but had the dual effect of further diluting *tentara pelajar* influence within the cooperative. This, however, did not appear to be a major issue for student-veterans, who saw Kosgoro's expansion as a necessary effort in furthering the cause of national development, which in turn was among the founding principles of the cooperative.[122] The national nature of Kosgoro as well as the consolidation of the other KINOs were important factors in Golkar's overwhelming victory in the 1971 elections and the resulting centralisation of political power under Suharto. This victory, however, came at the expense of the power of Kosgoro and the other KINOs, who now found themselves increasingly under Suharto's control.

Control came through the insertion of a close confidant of Suharto, Brigadier General Ali Murtopo, into Golkar. Murtopo was previously a subordinate of Suharto in

[118] Suryadinata, *Golkar dan Militer*, 31–32.
[119] Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, 271.
[120] He wrote a treatise to this effect. See Isman, The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces in Nurturing Democratic Life and Their Relations with the Party-System in Indonesia.
[121] Ramadhan K. H and Sriwibawa, *Peran Historis Kosgoro*, 39.
[122] Ramadhan K. H and Sriwibawa, 20–29.

KOSTRAD and grew in influence under the New Order as part of the new president's team of *aspri* (personal assistants).[123] Murtopo implanted himself in Golkar alongside a group of civilian intellectuals, which included many student leaders that had gained prominence in the student protests that helped depose Sukarno, as well as his OPSUS (Special Operations) team from KOSTRAD.[124] OPSUS played a key role in ensuring Golkar's victory in the 1971 elections by weakening its rivals via political manipulation, while simultaneously presenting Golkar as the party of "development and modernisation," distancing themselves from the perceived economic stagnation and political turmoil of Guided Democracy.[125] Despite his role in the electoral win, Murtopo's insertion into Golkar was considered by many of the older heads of the KINOs, including Isman, as Suharto's personal intervention into Golkar and a threat to their power.[126] Despite Kosgoro's notionally apolitical roots, the rise of Golkar meant that it ultimately became a political vehicle for student-veteran interests and, in particular, Isman's interests as well.[127] By the late 1970s, Isman became one of the more influential KINO leaders and was a leading alternative candidate for the position of Chairman in Golkar's 1978 congress.[128] This bid, however, failed, and the chair was retained by a Suharto loyalist.

Despite this failed leadership challenge, Kosgoro remained Isman's organisation, with him retaining near-complete control over it. While he continued dominating Kosgoro, his former role as TRIP commander ensured that it, and in turn Golkar, retained some *tentara pelajar* influence throughout the New Order. Isman remained the chair of Kosgoro and an influential member of Golkar until the end of his life, after which he was replaced by Hayono Isman, his son as well as an influential member of the "Second Generation" of TRIP veteran.[129] Additionally, Isman's

[123] Tim Majalah Historia, ed., *Ali Moertopo: Lakon Sang Jenderal Orde Baru*, Cetakan pertama, Seri Historia (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2019), 18–20, 62.
[124] Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, 298.
[125] Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 245–72; Suryadinata, Golkar dan Militer, 44.
[126] Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia*, 294–301.
[127] Alysson A Oakley, "Anatomy of Authority: Informal Political Networks and the Mobilization of Indonesia's Elite" (PhD dissertation, Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins University, 2018), 344–45, http://jhir.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/61127.
[128] Suryadinata, *Golkar dan Militer*, 94–98.
[129] It should be noted that the independence of the *tentara pelajar* element within Kosgoro grew even more apparent after the fall of the New Order and the evolution of Golkar into an official political party rather than a political vehicle. *Tentara pelajar* elements within Kosgoro led by Hayono Isman, unwilling

leadership challenge was also supported by *tentara pelajar* veterans, such as the once-disgraced Achmadi as well as Solichin G.P., a former commander in the Siliwangi *tentara pelajar* and then-Governor of West Java.[130] This was indicative not only of the continued influence that the student-veterans held in the TRIP, but also of their continued political relevance and independence. Student-veterans, despite their allegiance to the New Order, still pursued their own interests independently from Suharto. While this included more practical power-seeking ambitions as seen in Isman's own attempts to shore up his position within Golkar and the regime, it also included, as shown in the next chapter, a want to ensure the continued survival of the *tentara pelajar* legacy in Indonesian youth.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that, above all, the strength and resilience of the *tentara pelajar* identity among both non-officers as well as the officers of the *tentara pelajar* even as they faced the demobilisation and dissolution of armed student formations as active units of the TNI. This resilience was subsequently displayed in the role played by student-veterans in Indonesian post-war politics. Rank-and-file student-vetwerans were able to maintain a strong *esprit de corps* despite their verying post-war pathways. This manifested itself in many ways. Student-veterans would come to the defence of their fellow former student-soldiers in various times of difficulty, be that in schoolyard brawls against students who chose not to enlist during the war, or against those whom they believed slandered their name in the newspapers. Most importantly, this *esprit de corps* transcended mere solidarity among fellow student-veterans and extended into their continued commitment to nationalism and loyalty to Sukarno and the Indonesian government. This gave them value in the eyes of the government and the military as an

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to commit to a formally political Golkar, opted to split from the party in 2001. Details of this dispute can be read in Akbar Tanjung, *The Golkar Way: Survival Partai Golkar Di Tengah Turbulensi Politik Era Transisi* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007).

[130] Suryadinata, *Golkar dan Militer*, 93. Solihin was a commander in the Corps Pelajar Siliwangi, the West Javanese component of the *tentara pelajar*. To read more about him, see Forum Diskusi Wartawan Bandung and Dewan Pemerhati Kehutanan dan Lingkungan Tatar Sunda, eds., *The Trouble Shooter: Cendramata 80 Tahun Solihin G.P*, Cet. 1 (Bandung: FDWB & DPKLTS, 2006).

important political pressure group, both willing to mobilise and having a degree of political legitimacy as part of the *pemuda* of 1945, which fought for independence.

Throughout the periods of Liberal and Guided Democracy, student-veteran leaders and organisations played a part in the Indonesian political landscape, aiding both Sukarno and the armed forces in forwarding their political goals. Their participation in this dangerous game of political brinkmanship came to a head in 1965, which concluded in the loss of political legitimacy of Sukarno and those student-veterans who had thrown their lot in with him. However, for student-veterans who had managed to distance themselves from Sukarno and the PKI, the rise of the TNI as the dominant political power through Suharto and the New Order regime provided them with opportunities to establish themselves within the new government. Leading student-veterans, especially those from the TRIP, were able to do this via affiliation to the Kosgoro cooperative and, by proxy, Golkar.

However, despite their occupation of important positions within the New Order regime and their status as some of its important co-founders, the *tentara pelajar* were far from willing puppets of Suharto. Instead, while maintaining sympathy and support for the *dwifungsi* ideals that formed the basis of the New Order's rule, leading *tentara pelajar* veterans did not shy away from criticising Golkar and the regime when they thought it was necessary. Notably, they did not oppose the regime's strident anti-communism, militarism, nor its weakening of political parties, as these were all strong features of the *tentara pelajar* identity that emerged from the war. Instead, criticism was framed in a way that called out Golkar's apparent lack of cultivation of relations with the *rakyat*, effectively opposing Suharto's moves to turn Golkar into a personal political vehicle at the expense of the KINOs. It was a display of agency and independence on the part of the *tentara pelajar* veterans who sought to preserve their own interests in the wake of the increasing dominance of Suharto in the organisation. While their efforts to do so failed, *tentara pelajar* veterans would continue to find ways in which to play an active role in New Order society, as will be discussed in Chapter VI.

Chapter VI

Passing on the *Perjuangan* Spirit: The *tentara pelajar* and their post-war legacy (1975-1985)

In 1977, on behalf of their former commander Mas Isman, the student-veterans of the East Java TRIP presented their battle standard to the Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45 (National Council of the Generation of 1945, DHN). It was to be displayed at the DHN's museum, the Museum Joang 45, in the heart of Jakarta, where it would be accessible to the general public. Reading from a speech prepared by Isman himself, one of his former subordinates read:

> What we want is for youth to appreciate the historical reality where… students in particular play an important role in determining our national history. It is not expected for students in this age of development to play the same roles [as students in the past]. What needs to be appreciated is the spirit in facing the challenges of the time [...] the spirit of 1945.[1]

Figure 9 The battle standard of the TRIP, still present in the DHN's Museum Juang 45. Image taken by the author, 10 January 2023.

[1] "Laporan Khusus: Penyerahan Duaja TRIP kepada DHN Angkatan 45," *Gema Angkatan 45*, January 1977.

As outlined in Chapter V, student-veterans were able to emerge from the war with their reputation intact and, despite the messy process of demobilisation, had become an established part of Indonesian politics by the fall of Sukarno in the mid-1960s. However, as shown by the failed leadership challenge made by Isman and other student-veteran leaders within Golkar, their influence within political life was limited by the paramount position of Suharto within the New Order. As such, if student-veterans sought to maintain or expand their influence in Indonesian society, open opposition to Suharto was off limits. In turn, alternative means of maintaining student-veteran interests as well as ensuring that they could fulfill their stated goals of taking part in national development had to be found.

This chapter argues that *tentara pelajar* veterans found that alternative means through taking an active role in the New Order's project of constructing an idealised version of *pemuda* that would serve the interests of the regime and address the increasing generational dissonance between the regime and youth. As shown above, they provided state-run museums with relics from their past battles to support efforts to inculcate young people with the spirit of the struggle for independence. They went beyond this, however, and contributed in various different ways. While, as illustrated in Chapter V, there were points in which the *tentara pelajar* butted heads with Suharto or, more precisely, those who acted in his stead, they ultimately bought into the developmentalist project of the New Order and stood to benefit from its success.

As part of its attempts to co-opt youth into its project of economic development, the New Order regime tried to inculcate militarised values of service and discipline, based on the Indonesian military's experience of the independence war, into the hearts and minds of young Indonesians. The militarisation of Indonesian history was a key part of this project, with scholars and academics serving as key contributors to the process of writing the army into Indonesian history through the construction of museums and history books that forwarded this narrative.[2] Adding to this body of knowledge, I argue that student-veterans are a relatively ignored yet still important part of this project,

[2] See McGregor, History in Uniform; Curaming, Power and Knowledge in Southeast Asia, 99–124; Michael Wood, Official History in Modern Indonesia: New Order Perceptions and Counterviews, electronic resource, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle Eastand Asia, v. 99 (Boston: Brill, 2005), 83–149, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unimelb/detail.action?docID=280696.

largely because the unique position they held during the war as both students and soldiers. They played a key role in rearticulating and reinterpreting the ideas contained in the so-called "values of 1945," in particular those of *perjuangan* (struggle), away from its original military-specific connotations into a struggle for development, one that Indonesian youth could readily participate in. With many no longer actively serving in the armed forces, they also became a key support base for Suharto within Indonesia's growing middle class, reproducing the regime's values of order and discipline within civilian life.

Student-veterans attempted to transfer the values of 1945 to younger Indonesians through the construction of *lieux de mémoire* that forwarded the *tentara pelajar* identity developed during the war, thus preserving the collective, cultural memory of the *tentara pelajar.* These sites of memory took various shapes, including short stories, essays, museum exhibits, and novels, but all were united in the messages they sought to convey. The messages forwarded in these sites of memory effectively transposed the values of the historic *tentara pelajar* onto the Indonesian youth of the New Order, calling for the *tentara pelajar*'s armed struggle for independence to be converted into a struggle for development by the next generation of youth.

However, while student-veterans sought to cement and maintain the relevance of their legacy by participating in the militarisation of Indonesian history, their legacy was also the subject of contestation. This chapter will also discuss how the *tentara pelajar* legacy figured into an alternative image of Indonesian youth, one promoted largely by Indonesian student activists who opposed the restrictions on civil rights imposed upon them by the New Order regime.[3] By examining the contrasting claims to the legacy of the *tentara pelajar* and the historical role of Indonesian youth as a whole, this chapter hopes to contribute to a more complex understanding of historical ideas of youth in both New Order and contemporary Indonesia.

[3] Heri Akhmadi, Breaking the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People: Defense Statement at His Trial on Charges of Insulting the Head of State, Bandung, June 7, 8, 9, 10, 1979, Translation Series / Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1981), 160–61.

The values of 1945 and the militarisation of Indonesian history

In addition to direct political influence in the New Order government via Kosgoro and Golkar, student-veterans were also able to participate in the regime through other organisations. The most notable of these was the DHN. Formed in 1954, the DHN was an organisation comprised of the "Generation of 1945," a combination of veterans and leading political figures who had taken part in the war of independence. Its mixed membership at its conception is noteworthy, with figures such as the founder of the leftist Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women's Movement, Gerwani), Umi Sardjono, also holding membership in the DHN.[4] In her research, McGregor argued that the purpose of the DHN was to preserve the "spirit and values of 1945" for current and future generations.[5]

Like many other organisations that were incorporated into Sukarno's functional group system, the DHN was incredibly politicised. The values of 1945 were as malleable as they were vague, and they were fashioned to support Sukarno and his policies. The DHN, through its annual national conference, the *Musyawarah Besar Angkatan '45*, endorsed policies like the nationalisation of Dutch companies and the liberation of West Irian in the 1960s.[6] Its first chair, Chairul Saleh, was a well-known *pemuda* figure. He and others were among the group of youth who kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta following news of Japanese surrender to force a quick declaration of independence. During the war, he built a reputation as a follower of Tan Malaka and became a confrontational leader of several *laskar* groups. After a brief stint in prison following involvement with a rebellious *laskar* militia, Saleh went to study in West Germany in 1955 on a government scholarship. Upon his return, he helped found the Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia (Veterans' Legion of the Republic of Indonesia, LVRI) and became Minister for Veterans' Affairs.[7]

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[4] PBFN Soetarto, "Catatan tentang Daftar Nama-nama Anggota Pengurus Besar Front Nasional" (December 31, 1961), Inventaris Arsip Front Nasional, no. 264, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[5] McGregor, *History in Uniform*, 123–26.
[6] Badan Musyawarah Nasional Angkatan 45, "Arsip tentang Badan Musyawarah Nasional 45" (n.d.), Inventaris Arsip KOTI, no.193, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[7] Irna Hanny Nastoeti Hadi Soewito, *Chairul Saleh,Tokoh Kontroversial* (Jakarta: PT. Mutiara Rachmat, 1993), 95–105.

In many ways, Saleh was in the mould of Isman and Achmadi. He was only slightly older than them and a clear stalwart of the Generation of 1945. His *laskar* militia was also never entirely subsumed into the army during the war, and during the period of demobilisation he joined forces with Achmadi in demanding better treatment for irregular veterans.[8] More importantly, despite his wartime dalliance with Tan Malaka and his Murba Party, Saleh did not join a political party following his return from Germany. Instead, he shared Sukarno's view of the inadequacies of the Indonesian liberal democratic system and was disillusioned with party politics. Feith rightly puts Saleh alongside Isman and Achmadi as part of the non-affiliated *pemuda* who Sukarno increasingly relied on as his patience for party politics waned. The DHN, in its initial form, reflected this trend.[9]

Developments in the DHN post-1965 mirror that of the rest of Golkar. Its Sukarnoist and leftist membership was purged. Umi Sardjono was imprisoned due to her position in Gerwani, which was accused in anti-communist propaganda as having played an important role in the torture of the kidnapped officers.[10] Saleh too was imprisoned, though on charges of corruption.[11] He died in prison in 1967.

While the new style DHN maintained its mixed military and non-military membership, the presence of military men in its leadership became increasingly pronounced. After undergoing several leadership changes, the chairmanship of the DHN eventually settled on army General Surono Reksodimedjo, a veteran of the independence war. It is clear that Surono was favoured by Suharto. Both were Javanese men who eventually became commanders of the Diponegoro Military District in Central Java. Under Suharto's leadership, Surono would rise to become Army Chief of Staff in 1973 and Coordinating Minister for Politics, Justice and Security in 1983.[12] The government also invested heavily in the DHN, providing it with a premises in Central Jakarta in August 1974 from which it maintained its offices and a museum. The symbolism of the building was palpable. During the Japanese occupation it served as a

[8] Soewito, 90–92.
[9] Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 516.
[10] McGregor, *History in Uniform*, 78–79.
[11] Soewito, Chairul Saleh,Tokoh Kontroversial, 127–28.
[12] Bachtiar, *Siapa Dia?*, 401–2.

dormitory and political training centre for prominent *pemuda* who would play key roles in the independence war, including those who had abducted Sukarno and Hatta in the prelude to the proclamation of independence.[13] Giving it to the DHN was effectively an acknowledgment of the importance of the values of 1945, and the role that the DHN would play in inculcating it to a new generation of *pemuda.*

Though the DHN's professed mission had not changed, the discourse surrounding the values of 1945 had shifted with the rise of the New Order, and with it, the Indonesian military to positions of power. While Sukarno relied on the army as a power base, especially in his initial quest to do away with political parties, he dampened its influence by playing the military against other factions, most notably the PKI.[14] The effective destruction of the PKI in the wake of the anti-communist violence of 1965 to 1967 left the military without any major rivals to power. Coupled with the purge of leftist and Sukarnoist officers, the military under Suharto's leadership became by far the most dominant power in the country.

The ideology of *dwifungsi* was formally adopted by the New Order, as it legitimised the military's involvement in the socio-political affairs of the nation. The New Order built upon this, strengthening the TNI's political presence by awarding it a full 100 seats in parliament.[15] Suharto himself remained a serving army general well into his presidency, only resigning from active military service once he reached the official retirement age of 55.

The now preeminent position held by the military in the Indonesian society government paved the way for the militarisation of Indonesian society. The values of 1945 were also subjected to this process. While the military presence in the DHN was strengthened, the armed forces took other steps to imprint their image more strongly on the values of 1945. This came most apparently in the Third Army Seminar, held in 1972. The seminar was held because of the increasing number of young officers who had not fought in the independence war, and thus was themed "Values and Transferring

[13] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 118.
[14] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 300.
[15] Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia, 166.

Values," focusing on how best the officers of the 1945 generation could "transfer" the values of 1945 to the "younger generation" of armed forces personnel.[16]

Through the seminar, the army sought to formalise its approach to the values of 1945. They did so by shaping a definition of said values that privileged the army's role in the independence struggle. Essentially, it set up a clean slate upon which a reinterpretation of the values of 1945 could be made. Events such as the alleged chaos of the Guided Democracy era and the 30 September Movement were considered "deviations" from the values of 1945, which meant that said values needed "purifying" by the army.[17] In his introduction to the *Dharma Pusaka 45,* the booklet that served as the official proceedings of the seminar, Army Vice Chief-of-Staff Maraden Panggabean noted that the purpose of the seminar was not to "change the foundation of Indonesian society," but instead to ensure "the continuity of the goals set by the Proclamation of Independence," juxtaposing the seminar as complimenting a seminal moment in Indonesian history.[18] The goals of the proclamation, as interpreted by Panggabean, was the *raison d'etre* of the New Order, "development of the nation and the state."[19]

By 1972, Indonesia was midway through its first *Repelita* (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun,* Five Year Development Plan), a flagship programme of the New Order. The Guided Democracy regime, with its economic mismanagement and aggressive foreign policy, left the Indonesian economy reeling from the effects of high levels of unemployment and inflation.[20] One of the first priorities of the New Order was to stabilise the economy and create circumstances from which a coordinated plan of national development could be carried out. While to some extent development programmes like the *Repelita* had been implemented during Sukarno's rule, their implementation was stifled by a combination of a lack of expertise as well as government suspicion of many of the American-trained economists and managers that

[16] Markas Besar Tentara Nasional - Sekolah Staf dan Komando Indonesia Angkatan Darat, *Karya Juang Seskoad 1951 - 1989* (PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), 99.
[17] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, *Dharma Pusaka 45*, 17–19.
[18] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, xi.
[19] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, ix. The choice of *Dharma Pusaka 45* as the title was also symbolic. *Dharma* refers to the concept of duty, while *Pusaka* means a venerated item that is often passed on to future generations. Thus, *Dharma Pusaka 45* means that the values of 1945 constituted a noble duty, to be passed on to future generations by the armed forces. See Markas Besar Tentara Nasional - Sekolah Staf dan Komando Indonesia Angkatan Darat, *Karya juang Seskoad 1951 – 1989*, 99.
[20] Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia, 158.

advocated for it.[21] The New Order, in contrast, embraced American-style developmentalism and relied on a group of American-trained economists known as the Berkeley Mafia to liberalise the Indonesian economy and jump start growth.[22] Notably, among these groups of economists were at least two student-veterans.[23] This showcases both the varied trajectories of former *tentara pelajar*, as well as the continued influence they had within government, even in civilian life, in no small part due to the levels of education they received.

As a result, development featured strongly in the army's reinterpreted values of 1945. Among the "principles born of the struggle to achieve, defend, and fulfil independence," a component of the reinterpreted values was "orientation towards future development."[24] Indeed, one of the set goals of instilling the values of 1945 in society at large was "the strengthening of political, socio-cultural, military/defence and security, and religious stabilisation to ensure the success of national development."[25] The developmentalist rhetoric is palpable, albeit with some caveats. Though the seminar found that development and modernisation were important national goals, it emphasised that they should not be achieved with the loss of the "national family," a reference to the organicist thinking of the New Order.[26] Panggabean himself concluded his introduction to *Dharma Pusaka 45* by saying that one of the overarching goals of "purifying" the values of 1945 was to ensure that the Indonesian people had "spiritual unity" and thus a "common understanding of the principles… of national development."[27]

Additionally, the army also effectively militarised the values of 1945, placing itself as its gatekeepers. In a section entitled "The values of 1945 of the TNI," it is stated that the TNI's devotion to the *Sapta Marga* and the soldier's oath, alongside its

[21] Farabi Fakih, Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia's Early Independence Period : The Foundation of the New Order State (1950-1965) (Brill, 2020), 125–30, https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/35960.
[22] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 329.
[23] Emil Salim was a member of the Laskar IPI in Bogor, while Widjojo Nitisastro was a member of the TRIP.
[24] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, *Dharma Pusaka 45*, 9.
[25] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, 43.
[26] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, 21–24; David Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unimelb/detail.action?docID=1899808.
[27] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, *Dharma Pusaka 45*, xi.

status as a defender of the *Pancasila* and the Constitution of 1945, were important components of the values of 1945 It also listed various aspects of the military's "leadership values" as part of the values of 1945.[28]

While the seminar was initially focused on the transferring of the values of 1945 specifically to the younger generation of the armed forces, it also intended to emphasise the importance of transferring the values of 1945 to younger generations outside of the military. This was demonstrated by the army's commitment to invite civilian speakers to take part in the seminar.[29] In the *Dharma Pusaka 45* this is emphasised even further, as it suggests that non-army youth lacked the necessary support structures to understand the "true" values of 1945 and were more easily exposed to "deviations" from the "true" values.[30]

Student-veterans as part of the *pemuda* of 1945 and conduits of the values of 1945

The immediate circumstances surrounding the army seminar and the short story competition was one of youth rebellion and dissension within Indonesia. The New Order rode to power on a wave of anti-Sukarno student protests in 1966, supported in turn by the TNI. Organised under the banner of the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Students' United Action, KAMI), university students successfully disrupted the government in Jakarta, harassing corrupt ministers and forcing Sukarno to retreat to the relative safety of Bogor.[31] Following the rise of Suharto, several leading student activists were given prominent positions in the New Order government, much to the chagrin of idealistic student activists such as the famous Soe Hok Gie.[32] Their role in the rise of the New Order gave the student activists "*angkatan*" status and mythologised them alongside the previous *angkatan* of 1928 and 1945, as the *Angkatan 1966*. By the

[28] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, 13. The *Sapta Marga* refers to the "Sevenfold Way" of the Indonesian military, which are seven principles that make up the armed forces pledge.
[29] Markas Besar Tentara Nasional - Sekolah Staf dan Komando Indonesia Angkatan Darat, *Karya Juang Seskoad 1951 - 1989*, 99, 102.
[30] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, *Dharma Pusaka 45*, 31.
[31] Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C.1200, 326.
[32] Sastramidjaja, "Playing Politics: Power, Memory, and Agency in the Making of the Indonesian Student Movement," 134–35.

1970s, however, dissent began to emerge among students dissatisfied with Suharto's authoritarian turn. In particular, student dissent grew as a result of corruption, increasing economic inequality and the heavy-handed nature of foreign investment, culminating in the large-scale demonstrations and subsequent riots of 15 January 1974, commonly known as the *Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari* (Catastrophe of January 15th, *Malari*).[33]

Additionally, there was also a growing perception within the military and parts of government that Indonesian youth were increasingly Westernised. The fall of the Sukarno regime and its anti-Western cultural policies saw the re-emergence of Western film and popular culture within Indonesia.[34] The growth of Western pop culture, particularly amongst urban youth, alongside their alleged widespread use of narcotics, led to tighter government restrictions on young people. Of particular note was the attempt to outright ban young men from having long hair, which was deemed distinctly Western and "un-Indonesian."[35] This came in the form of multiple, raids and checkpoints implemented by army and police units across the country, where young men caught sporting "Beatles-style" hair and flared jeans were taken into temporary custody and had their heads shaved.[36] This was just one example of the generational dissonance that existed between the New Order regime and Indonesian youth, as well as how the former sought to implement its nationalist ideals upon the latter[37].

Several strategies were proposed to transfer the values of 1945 to non-military youth, and many of these have been subject to thorough research. The armed forces' effort to militarise Indonesian history for their own ends is well-documented. McGregor highlights the various forms in which this occurred, be that through the military's pride

[33] See Widiarsi Agustina and Arif Zulkifli, *Massa Misterius Malari: Rusuh Politik Pertama dalam Sejarah Orde Baru*, Cetakan 1 (Jakarta: Tempo Publishing, 2014). for an explanation of events of the day and the involvement of the military elite in orchestrating the rioting.
[34] Aria Wiratma Yudhistira, Dilarang Gondrong! Praktik Kekuasaan Orde Baru terhadap Anak Muda Awal 1970-an, Cet. 1 (Tangerang: Marjin Kiri, 2010), 50–51.
[35] Yudhistira, 115.
[36] Yudhistira, 114–15.
[37] Another interesting example of youth militarisation under the New Order came in the form of the University Student Regiment (MENWA). The MENWA were initially established under the Sukarno regime as a means of mobilising university students in support of the army against local rebellions. Under the New Order, its purview changed and it became a means of monitoring student activities. While it is tempting to draw a direct link between the MENWA and the *tentara pelajar*, no *tentara pelajar* were directly involved with the creation of the MENWA, and none of the *tentara pelajar* works cited in this thesis refer to the MENWA as a continuation of the *tentara pelajar* legacy.

of place in the independence war depicted in various school history textbooks, or through military museums such as the Museum of Communist Betrayal near Jakarta, which forwarded the New Order's strident anti-communist version of Indonesian history.[38] Additionally, Curaming explores the relations between individual scholars and the state in the writing of the New Order's SNI book series, and how the dominant figure of historian Nugroho Notosusanto and his military credentials shaped a writing of history that privileged the armed forces' viewpoint.[39]

In addition to the preservation of historical materials and museums, other notable strategies outlined in the *Dharma Pusaka 45* to capture younger generations included the publication of more books about the independence war and holding short story and essay writing competitions themed around the "struggle of 1945," opening up pathways for non-military personnel to participate within the process of transferring values.[40] While transferring values within the army very much placed the onus on the "1945 Generation of the Armed Forces" as instigators, externally *the Dharma Pusaka 45* shows that there was room for flexibility in strategy.[41]

It is here that student-veterans came into play. Student-veterans were an ideal conduit for the values of 1945 to the public. They were still relatively organised, with initiatives like Kosgoro ensuring that they maintained close ties with one another. Their mostly civilian status can also be seen as a plus, as it minimised the onus on the army to transfer values, instead allowing the values to spread almost organically within civil society. While there were some efforts on the part of student-veterans to document their wartime experiences prior to the rise of the New Order, these were few and relatively scattered.[42]

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[38] McGregor, *History in Uniform*, 68–96.
[39] Curaming, Power and Knowledge in Southeast Asia, 140–64.
[40] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, *Dharma Pusaka 45*, 81.
[41] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, 81–86.
[42] See for example Slamet Saubary, *Keluar-Masuk Perdjuangan* (Djakarta: Kompas, 1951). One of the few student-veteran works to be published during the Sukarno era, it touched more on the immediate post-war struggles of *tentara pelajar* rather than anything that should be passed down, perhaps owing to Saubary's young age when he wrote this memoir. Additionally, a major *tentara pelajar* monument was also constructed in the 1950s in Malang for the purposes of memorialising TRIP losses there, but this was an exception to the norm, with almost no other *tentara pelajar*-specific monuments constructed during the Sukarno era.

They also had a vested interest in the success of the New Order. Owing partly to the support they received after the end of the war, many student-veterans were able to complete secondary or even tertiary education, solidifying their position as part of Indonesia's elite. By the 1970s, many were working in government-owned enterprises like state plantations, or in the private sector. While their positions varied, ranging from rank-and-file employees to members of a board of directors, all would have benefitted from the economic growth and stability that the New Order provided and would need little encouragement to frame their experiences in a manner that supported the regime.[43]

The values of 1945 that were to be transferred to Indonesian youth of the day also resonated with the values so closely held by student-soldiers during the war. As discussed in Chapters II and III, the *tentara pelajar* identity developed during the independence war was based on their perceptions of their role as intellectuals, and how this meant that they had a role separate from other fighting youth in the quest of post-war national development. This, coupled with the closeness that the *tentara pelajar* had with the TNI discussed in Chapter IV, further enhanced the status of student-veterans as leading purveyors of the values of 1945 in the eyes of the New Order and armed forces. The brand of apoliticism that formed such a core part of the *tentara pelajar* identity throughout and, as shown in Chapter V, after the war, was also very similar to the policy of depoliticisation instigated by the New Order, designed to stabilise the regime's political control. Both the student-veterans and the New Order viewed politics as a destabilising force, a hurdle along the path to a national goal, be that independence in 1945, or national development in the 1970s. Thus, in the New Order, many student-veterans found a regime that, in many ways, was their ideological match, and was easy to mobilise support for.

This is not to say that student-veterans were completely united in their support for the New Order. As was the case with the student-soldiers who sided with the insurrectionist soldiers during the Madiun Affair of 1948, dissenting voices did exist among student-veterans. The most noteworthy of these was the aforementioned former Corps Mahasiswa officer Hario Kecik. A loyal Sukarnoist, Hario was on an official

[43] See examples in Sekretariat Alumni SPMA-Peralihan Malang, *Almanak Alumni Reuni SPMA-Peralihan Malang 51-53* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Alumni SPMA-Peralihan Malang, 1982).

posting in the Soviet Union when the 30 September Movement occurred. He returned to Indonesia in 1977 and was put into military prison upon his arrival, due to his perceived leftist tendencies.[44] Released four years later, Hario was a critic of Suharto and the New Order as well as a productive writer but was forced into silence as a condition of his release. It was only during the period of *keterbukaan* (openness) in the early 1990s, shortly before the fall of the regime, that he was able to publish the first volume of his memoirs.[45] However, while he presented an alternative view to Sukarno and the Guided Democracy in this book, presenting Sukarno as the figure that encouraged him and other student-veterans in pursuing an anti-corruption initiative, his retelling of his wartime experiences were fairly similar in character to many of the works written by more pro-New Order student-veterans. Hario retold his experiences as a soldier in a manner that, while perhaps more inclusive of the regular *rakyat*, privileged his role and those of other soldiers in the war.[46]

A similar account is also presented by Abdul Syukur, a veteran of the TGP. Abdul played an important role in the first mass meeting of youth and students in Surabaya in late 1945, which helped motivate students in the city to form the TRIP. Though he mentioned Sukarno's fall only briefly, he does so regretfully, saying that his removal from power was "illogical."[47] He then recounted that the news of Sukarno's death and the circumstances surrounding it so saddened him that he felt compelled to resign from his position in the Ministry of Industry.[48]

Syukur also maintained close ties with HD Haryo Sasongko, a former student leader in the IPPI, the successor to the IPI group which had helped form the first armed student units of the independence war. IPPI was deemed a PKI affiliate in the aftermath of the 30 September Movement, with many of its leaders, including Sasongko,

[44] Padmodiwiryo, *Memoar Hario Kecik II*, 107–14. Padmodiwiryo denies this allegation in his memoirs, alleging that it was his disputes with the oil company Royal Dutch Shell during his tenure in command of the East Kalimantan military district that led to this perception.
[45] See the previously cited Padmodiwiryo, *Memoar Hario Kecik*.
[46] See, for example, his recollections in Suhario Padmodiwiryo, *Dokter Gerilya* (Yogyakarta: Abhiseka Dipantara, 2015). It is in many ways more complex than New Order-sanctioned accounts, discussing topics considered taboo like economic inequality, but remains a story of heroic soldierly exploits.
[47] Sjoekoer, 80 tahun Abdoel Sjoekoer, 109.
[48] Sjoekoer, 109.

imprisoned and tortured.[49] Sasongko helped edit Syukur's memoirs, while Syukur wrote the preface to a history book written by Sasongko. In his book, Sasongko too criticised Suharto's treatment of Sukarno, while underlining that the New Order regime was built on the foundations of state repression and institutional corruption.[50] Syukur's preface was a gently phrased criticism of Suharto, imploring readers who assumed that the transition between Sukarno and Suharto was a "smooth handing over of the baton" should check their assumptions.[51]

Syukur was clearly far from being a cheerleader of the New Order, despite his relatively smooth transition between the two regimes. However, his memoirs, like Kecik's, echo New Order-sponsored accounts of the war, at points exalting the actions taken by the military during the war as necessary when the civilian government was effectively "paralysed."[52] This shows that, despite some splits between pro- and anti-New Order student-veterans, the values they held remained consistent.[53]

Student-veterans also occupied key positions in several veterans' organisations, such as the Veterans' Legion and the DHN, placing them strategically when it came to spreading values of 1945 to younger generations. In some cases, they played active roles in making the transfer of the values of 1945 a priority of these organisations. Major General Sukamto Sayidiman, a former TRIP officer, was active in both organisations and wrote a four-part column in the DHN's official magazine, *Gema Angkatan 45* (Echo of the Generation of 1945), where he argued that veterans played a key role in instilling the values of 1945 in the younger generations. Echoing the language of *Dharma Pusaka 45*, Sayidiman wrote that the "selfless" generation of 1945

[49] Sasongko, Catatan Harian Anak Bangsa Terpidana, 167–83.
[50] HD Haryo Sasongko, *Bung Karno dan Pak Harto: Dari Revolusi ke Korupsi*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafiksi, 2006), 51–68.
[51] Abdoel Sjoekoer, "Preface," in *Bung Karno dan Pak Harto: Dari Revolusi ke Korupsi*, by Hd Haryo Sasongko, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafiksi, 2006), x.
[52] Sjoekoer, 80 tahun Abdoel Sjoekoer, 85.
[53] One possible exception here is the aforementioned Y.B. Mangunwijaya. A *tentara pelajar* veteran, Mangunwijaya sincerely felt that student-soldiers owed their lives to the efforts of the *rakyat*. He later became a Catholic priest to dedicate his life to serving the *rakyat*. He is absent from in-depth discussion here mainly because his works were mostly non-autobiographical and do not include much of his *tentara pelajar* experiences.

had to ensure that younger generations fully understood the essence of the values of 1945 and that their duty was to build the nation in the current peaceful times.[54]

The first case of transferring values: Thirty Years of Independence and the short story competition

The first opportunity for the recommendations of the *Dharma Pusaka 45* to be put into practice came in 1975. It was an important year in the celebration of key dates of the independence war, namely the thirtieth anniversary of both the Proclamation of Independence and the Battle of Surabaya, or Heroes Day. As part of celebrations, the DHN announced that it was holding a nationwide short story/essay writing competition with the theme "The Struggle of 1945 for National Development." The competition attracted significant interest, with its multiple winning submissions published in a series of seven edited books over 1976. The winners were invited to an awarding ceremony at the Presidential Palace, organised by the DHN. The prizes, a mix of trophies and certificates, were awarded by a host of different government officials, including several ministers. The grand prize was awarded by Suharto himself.[55]

The seven books were divided into two series, based on their authors. The competition was likely divided along these lines as well. Four books were released under the label "A series of experiences and views on the struggle of 1945." The works contained here were submitted to the competition by members of the public, and attracted entries from academics, university students, and even veterans themselves.[56] The remaining three books were part of the series "A collection of students' thoughts on 'The Struggle of 1945 for National Development.'" Works in this series were written

[54] Soekamto Sajidiman, "Veteran RI dan Fungsi Pewarisannya," *Gema Angkatan 45*, July 1977.
[55] Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, ed., Sarimu Kupetik Kini: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30., Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976).
[56] Public entries were compiled in Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, ed., *Aku akan Teruskan: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R. I. yang Ke 30*, 45 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976); Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, *Cahaya dari Medan Laga: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.* (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976); Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, ed., *Letusan di Balik Buku: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.* (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976); Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, ed., *Terbukalah Jalanku: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.* (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976).

exclusively by school students, with each book containing the best entries of the primary, middle, and high school brackets respectively.[57] All the books explicitly targeted a youthful readership. The editorial board that prepared the submissions for publication was formed at the behest of the Ministry of Education, and in his foreword, the chief editor stated that the editing process prioritised readability by students from the perspective of "language, historical knowledge, and ideological development."[58]

The winners of the public bracket were mostly academics, many of whom had longstanding connections to the army. The grand prize-winning entry was an essay on the Battle of Semarang written by Moehkardi, a history lecturer at the army academy in Magelang.[59] Second prize went to Christianto Wibisono, a journalist who was formerly a student activist of the *Angkatan 66.*[60] Third prize was awarded to Garnadi Prawirosudirdjo, rector of the Bandung Institute of Education and a speaker at the Third Army Seminar, who wrote about his experiences during the independence war.[61] This spread of winners showcased the priority of the seminar in garnering a wide array of experiences into the transferring values project, ranging from military historians to academics and youth representatives. Notably, among the other submitting authors were two student-veterans.

The bulk of the content of submissions was based on instances of wartime heroism. Veterans, for example, contributed their own experiences of combat and the

[57] These were compiled in Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, ed., *Bingkisan Mutiara 45: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R. I. yang Ke 30* (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976); Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, ed., *Sarimu Kupetik Kini: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976); Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, ed., *Jejakmu Langkahku: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976).

[58] Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, *Sarimu Kupetik Kini*, 7.

[59] Moehkardi, "Pertempuran Lima Hari di Semarang," in *Terbukalah Jalanku: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.*, ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 19–52.

[60] Christianto Wibisono, "Perang Kemerdekaan sebagai Inspirasi bagi Generasi Pembangunan Indonesia," in *Aku akan Teruskan: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R. I. yang Ke 30*, ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 19–42.

[61] Garnadi Prawirosudirdjo, "Kisah Perjuangan Kemerdekaan di Perioda 1945-1950 Sebagai yang Kami Alami," in *Letusan di Balik Buku: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.*, ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 32–42; Markas Besar Tentara Nasional - Sekolah Staf dan Komando Indonesia Angkatan Darat, *Karya Juang Seskoad 1951 - 1989*, 102.

war, including events like the disarming of Japanese soldiers, the loss of comrades in battle, and the experience of guerrilla warfare. Students often drew on what they learned in history books or the experiences of parents and grandparents who lived through the war, using these stories as a basis for reflecting on their own lives. To some extent, the submissions from veterans were less explicit in their appeal to youth, perhaps expecting its young readers to draw their own conclusions. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the two student-veterans whose submissions were included in the books made it a point to address their readers explicitly upon concluding their respective chapters. Sumarsono Mestoko, a Central Javanese TP veteran and lecturer at the Bandung Institute of Education, wrote that his readers needed to "take the essence of [his] story… and decide for [themselves] which is good, and which is bad."[62]

In his chapter, Soemarsono discussed his encounter with Sudirman, commanding general of the armed forces, and cited his bravery under fire and nobility as admirable traits, in line with the military's portrayal of him as a legendary figure. While he admitted that throughout the war there were many instances of "opportunism," he insisted that students like himself and his comrades in the TP took part in the independence struggle "purely, pure white, selflessly."[63] As discussed in depth in Chapter II, notional apoliticism was a closely held value of the *tentara pelajar* at their inception and, as seen earlier in this chapter, persisted throughout their existence. He argued that these traditions must be maintained, for "that is why [young people today] have become the next generation."[64] He concluded by urging his young readers on, calling on them to "defend and fulfill" as well as "develop, grow, and maintain" independence, as "the future of Indonesia will be in your hands, as the next generation."[65]

Soedarsono Pr., a TRIP veteran, echoed these sentiments. In his chapter, he retells the TRIP's involvement in the Battle of Surabaya, including shootouts with

[62] Sumarsono Mestoko, "Sebuah Bingkisan bagi Remaja Pelajar Generasi Penerus (Secercah Kisah Peninggalan Tentara Pelajar Angkatan 45)," in *Aku akan Teruskan: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R. I. yang Ke 30*, ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 190.
[63] Sumarsono Mestoko, 190.
[64] Sumarsono Mestoko, 188.
[65] Sumarsono Mestoko, 183–84.

British forces and the death of one of his juniors in the fighting. The essay is ended with a lengthy, bullet-pointed conclusion. In one point, he uses language similar to the *Dharma Pusaka 45*, saying that he hoped that the essay would help prevent "deviations" from the "original" goals of the independence struggle.[66] Additionally, he also stated that the values of 1945 were a continuation of the values of 1928, harkening to the long legacy of Indonesian youth. He called on the youth of 1975 to "realise their obligation to maintain these values."[67]

In student submissions, the use of student-soldiers and even youths who were not involved in combat roles during the war as examples becomes even more apparent, perhaps due to the comparative ease of identifying with fellow students. This is most saliently felt in the winning submission for the high school bracket, written by Lea Yuni Atmani Mestoko. Lea, the daughter of Soemarsono Mestoko, recounted her father's exploits as a student-soldier in her submission, while also reflecting on how difficult it is for her to imagine that middle school students could take part in armed combat. She observed that while her father's generation were "student-soldiers who fought for Indonesian independence," the students of her generation had to become "student-defenders of Indonesian independence," protecting the gains made by previous generations.[68]

Her concluding paragraph served as a call to arms for Indonesian students, once again using the student-soldiers as an example:

> The *tentara pelajar* did not expect anything in return. They were not tossed around by the waves of political dissension. What they wanted was Indonesian independence based on the Pancasila, no more and no less.[69]

Like her father and the other authors, Lea cited the "purity" of the *tentara pelajar* and their aversion to "political dissension" as being key features for modern students to

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[66] Soedarsono Pr., "Anak-anak TRIP Terobos Pertahanan Tentara Sekutu di Surabaya," in *Terbukalah Jalanku: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.*, ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 96.
[67] Soedarsono Pr., 121.
[68] Lea Yuni Atmani Mestoko, "Pelajar Pembela Kemerdekaan Indonesia," in *Sarimu Kupetik Kini: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.*, ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 29.
[69] Lea Yuni Atmani Mestoko, 29.

emulate. She argued that students today had to "learn from the lessons" of the students of 1945, by taking part in national development through "studying hard."[70]

It is notable that the winning entry for the high school student bracket was written by a girl rather than a boy, considering the masculine connotations attached to the *pemuda.* While it is easy to conclude that she was chosen due to her status as a daughter of a former *tentara pelajar*, there is a degree of symbolism in Lea's writing. In her essay, she transitions seamlessly between the struggle of 1945 and the struggle for development, just as the New Order would have liked to perceive the values of 1945. However, by urging all students to participate in development through the accessible way of studying, Lea calls for a national development in which students can participate in the same space regardless of gender. In her analysis of youth and children under the New Order, Saya Shiraishi posited that that youth could not be "tamed," and that Indonesian youth remained rebellious despite the constraints imposed upon them by the regime.[71] While it is possible that Lea imagined girls like her to contribute in a different way than boys, it is demonstrative of the different ways the development-laden values of 1945 could be interpreted. Similarly, it is also indicative of how, despite the delineated gender roles promoted by the New Order, there was space within their definition of the ideal *pemuda* for young people to ascertain and negotiate their role in national development.

Many of the other student submissions, despite not explicitly mentioning the *tentara pelajar*, echo the sentiments of Lea and the notion of students being engines of development. Other submissions also showcase contemporary concerns around the habits of modern youth. After discussing the historical provenance behind a *tentara pelajar* monument in Central Java, seventeen year-old Legawa wrote that the demands of development mean that "it is not time to have fun, especially to the extent of poisoning the nation with negative things like marijuana and drugs."[72] Many students

[70] Lea Yuni Atmani Mestoko, 30.
[71] Saya S. Shiraishi, *Young Heroes* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1997), 158, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvb6v6gr.
[72] Legawa, "Apa yang saya Ketahui tentang Perjoangan 45," in *Sarimu Kupetik Kini: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.*, ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 46–48.

characterised themselves as "inheritors of the values of 1945" carrying the torch from the previous generation to lead the nation into a period of national development.[73]

Ultimately, the short story competition of 1975 showcased, to some extent, the role that student-veterans could and to some extent already played in the process of transferring the values of 1945 to younger generations. The short stories served as one of the first coordinated efforts from them to construct their own sites of memory for the purposes of transferring the values of 1945. Through these essays and short stories, they clearly not only sought to preserve their collective, *tentara pelajar* identity for themselves, instead doing so by taking active steps to ensure the adoption of facets of their identity among Indonesian youth. Student-veterans called on Indonesian youth to fulfill independence by remaining politically "pure" and contributing to the project of national development, effectively encouraging them to become the New Order's ideal *pemuda*. Indeed, by taking such an active role in transferring the values of 1945, the sites of memory constructed by student-veterans ensured that the *tentara pelajar* identity took pride of place within *pemuda* discourse, ultimately becoming blueprints for the New Order's ideal *pemuda*.

Their participation in the short story competition showed how student-veterans were ideal candidates for transferring values: their previous experiences as students made them more easily identified with the students of 1975, the main target of organisations like the DHN, while their loyalty to the Republican government, spirit of self-sacrifice and notional apoliticism were traits valued by the military and the New Order's version of the values of 1945. Student-veterans who participated in the competition leveraged on their experiences as teaching tools for the next generation, while young students who participated, inculcated with the notion of being "heroes of development," found ready-made role-models in the stories of the *tentara pelajar*.[74]

[73] Tjioe Swan Tjin (Tetty Susanty), "Aku sebagai Pewaris Angkatan 45," in *Sarimu Kupetik Kini: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.*, ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 50–59.
[74] Machrup Elrick, "Ambarawa Persada dalam Ingatanku," in *Sarimu Kupetik Kini: Hasil Sayembara Mengarang dalam Rangka Peringatan Hari Ulang Tahun Kemerdekaan R.I. yang ke 30.*, ed. Dewan Harian Nasional Angkatan 45, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1976), 40.

Passing on the values of 1945 through memoirs and museums

Though it fell short from being a formal launch of a coordinated student-veteran effort to transfer values, the short-story/essay competition heralded a wave of student-veteran contributions to the construction of sites of memory in a variety of ways beyond the short-story/essay format. Former student-soldiers also sought to preserve historical artifacts related to their experiences in collaboration with organisations like the DHN, such as the aforementioned battle standards and the arms they used or faced during the war. These were sizeable commitments in terms of time and effort, as much of the heavier equipment were missing or in a state of disrepair and required searching and maintenance before they were presented to museums and similar organisations.

For example, the *Banteng Blorok* artillery piece used by the TRIP heavily during the later stages of the war was sought after by TRIP veterans to donate to the DHN's museum in Jakarta. The cannon, which had been seconded to a TNI divisional artillery unit in East Java at the end of the war, was traced to the headquarters of an artillery battalion of the Siliwangi division.[75] The piece was then restored and transferred to the DHN in 1975, where TRIP veterans hoped that the sight of the historic weapon would encourage students to "obtain a love of the motherland and independence, noting that the student-soldiers of the war of independence were of a similar age to them."[76] In 1978, on the occasion of Heroes Day (10 November), the wartime journey of the *Banteng Blorok* was re-enacted in an event co-organised by the DHN and TRIP veterans. Organisers invited university students from a Jakarta hiking group to take part in a trek that took place across several villages in East Java.[77] The aim of the trek, apart from commemorating Heroes Day, was the promotion of the values of 1945, and in particular the importance of national development, to the youths taking part.[78]. In a

[75] Ex Anggota Be-17 TRIP Jawa Timur and Jarahdam VIII Brawijaya, *Peranan Meriam Gempur "Banteng Blorok" dalam Perang Kemerdekaan R.I.*, 81–82.
[76] Ex Anggota Be-17 TRIP Jawa Timur and Jarahdam VIII Brawijaya, 82.
[77] Eddie R. Sharief, "Melacak Route Gerillya 'BANTENG BLOROK' Mulai Desa Panjer Hingga Gabru," *Gema Angkatan 45*, November 1978.
[78] "Pengabdian 'BANTENG BLOROK' dalam Perang Kemerdekaan," *Gema Angkatan 45*, October 1978, 37–38.

speech delivered during the event, a veteran said "We are old. [The youth] must continue the struggle to develop our motherland."[79]

Similarly, in Malang, where the TRIP was involved in the town's doomed defence during the First Dutch Military aggression (see Chapter III), they presided over the donation of Amphibious Landing Craft used by the attacking Dutch soldiers to the Brawijaya Museum, run by the East Java military district command. The "Am-Track" was tracked down by TRIP veterans to be in the possession of the Indonesian Navy, who had been given it by the KNIL/KL as part of the arms transfer stipulated by the Round Table Agreement. Following restoration, the vehicle was donated to the museum in a ceremony involving TRIP veterans in 1988.[80] Other items donated to the Brawijaya museum include battle standards and several commemorative souvenirs, such as TRIP-themed statuettes and newspaper clippings discussing TRIP exploits.

Figure 10. The amphibious landing craft on display outside of Brawijaya Museum, Malang. Image taken by the author, 4 April 2022.

[79] Sharief, "Melacak Route Gerillya 'BANTENG BLOROK' Mulai Desa Panjer Hingga Gabru," 39.
[80] H. Boges Sudjadi GR, Am-Track dan Gugurnya 35 Anggota TRIP Jawa Timur, iv.

Figure 11 A plaque signifying the purpose of the display to remember the "heroic traits and attitudes" of the soldiers of the TRIP. Image taken by the author, 4 April 2022.

In addition to preserving historical objects, on an individual level many student-veterans heeded the call to author memoirs and publish their own histories of both their experiences and their units. Sukamto Sayidiman took the initiative in this regard, writing a memoir titled *The Tender Power* in 1977.[81] What follows is largely a narrative of service to the state and of respect for elders, highlighting his obedience to orders from ranking officers and his parents. Though he acknowledged that he sometimes disagreed with such orders, they ultimately result in a good outcome. Additionally, the people who gave those orders would end up rising to even more prominent positions where they would showcase their virtues.[82] This naturally includes Isman, his former commander in the TRIP, but also other New Order figures, such as Nasution and Suharto, indicating an endorsement of the regime. His prominent inclusion of the *Sapta Marga* in the book also showcases the values upon which Indonesian youth could model

[81] Sajidiman, The Tender Power.
[82] See for example the case mentioned in Chapter IV where he took orders from Isman, or another where, during his time in the Military Law Academy in the 1950s, he was ordered to manage the takeover of a Dutch paper company. See Sajidiman, 44–45.

themselves, before concluding with an encouragement for Indonesian youth to pursue their education with an eye to national development.[83]

The Tender Power was not an exception to the norm, and many similar works followed from student-veterans. The 1980s and 1990s saw a wave of student-veterans publishing different types of works outlining their wartime experiences, many of whom were not serving military men of the likes of Sayidiman and Isman. These can mostly be divided into two types of works. The first were clear-cut novels, mostly written by student-veterans with a keen interest in literature and the arts. While to some extent their works would rely on their experiences as student-soldiers, they were first and foremost novels, with plotlines involving multiple characters. A common denominator of these novels was their humanistic portrayals of their characters, each experiencing the war in different ways.

The earliest works of this kind were written by arguably the most influential student-veteran of all, Nugroho Notosusanto. Nugroho served in the Central Javanese TP, likely in its Yogyakarta detachment. While offered the opportunity available to many student-veterans to enrol in the Dutch Royal Military Academy in Breda, he was forbidden from taking it up by his father.[84] Nugroho instead enrolled in the Faculty of Letters at the University of Indonesia, where he eventually became a lecturer. Nugroho's dalliance with the military did not end, however, as he also took up a lecturer position at SESKOAD.[85] In the aftermath of the 30 September Movement, Nugroho wrote the army's version of the events, placing the blame squarely in the hands of the communists.[86] Nugroho would then rise to become the Head of the Pusat Sejarah Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces History Centre, Pusjarah ABRI) and Minister of Education, where he would continue to author works that forwarded the New Order's militaristic version of Indonesian history.[87] The Pusjarah played an important role in the project of transferring the values of 1945, leading the

[83] Sajidiman, 76, 79.
[84] Katharine E. McGregor, "Nugroho Notosusanto: The Legacy of a Historian in the Service of an Authoritarian Regime," in *Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present*, ed. Mary Sabina Zurbuchen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 209.
[85] McGregor, *History in Uniform*, 55–56.
[86] McGregor, "Nugroho Notosusanto: The Legacy of a Historian in the Service of an Authoritarian Regime," 215–24.
[87] McGregor, *History in Uniform*, 26–34.

process of writing patriotic military histories aimed at both soldiers and civilians.[88] Nugroho himself presented a paper on the transfer of values at a conference in Yogyakarta in 1974, essentially echoing the sentiments of the *Dharma Pusaka 45*.[89]

While his period in charge of the Pusjarah saw a focus on official histories, in his youth Nugroho wrote several works of fiction based on his time as a student-soldier. A standout example is his 1961 work *Hijau Tanahku, Hijau Bajuku* (Green is my Land, Green is my Uniform), where the narrator reminisces on his combat experiences at the grave of a comrade-in-arms who died in battle.[90] Other authors of this bent include Slamet Danusudirdjo, a former member of the student reserve regiment in the Ronggolawe division, and Gatut Kusumohadi, a former battalion commander in the TRIP. Both rose to positions of relative significance in the New Order, in no small part due to their artistic tendencies. Danusudirdjo continued to serve in the army after the war, lecturing at the SESKOAD. Following the rise of the New Order, he served in various ministries, achieving a degree of notoriety as head of an anti-corruption task force based in Jakarta's Tanjung Priok port before eventually becoming the rector of the influential Jakarta Institute of Culture.[91] Under his penname of Pandir Kelana, Danusudirdjo published several interconnected novels about the war throughout the 1980s and 90s, with masculine soldiers often (but not always) as main protagonists.[92]

Kusumohadi had a far more chequered post-war career. He continued serving in the army after the war but resigned his commission after four years.[93] Afterwards, he became a scriptwriter and film director, directing at least two films depicting the

[88] Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, *Sepuluh Tahun Pusat Sejarah ABRI* (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, 1974), 7–9.
[89] Nugroho Notosusanto, *The Transfer of Values in the Indonesian Armed Forces* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Department of Defence and Security, Centre for Armed Forces History, 1974).
[90] Nugroho Notosusanto, *Hijau Tanahku Hijau Bajuku*, Cet. 4, BP, no. 2180 (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1993).
[91] Dwi Arjanto and Rini P.W.I., "Wawancara Slamet 'Pandir Kelana' Danusudirdjo: 'Mereka Tahu Saya Tak Bisa Dibeli'," *Tempo*, April 17, 2000.
[92] See for example Pandir Kelana, *Bara Bola Api* (Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1992), where one of the protagonists is a sex worker who gathers intelligence from the Japanese soldiers who patronise her brothel. It is notable that Pandir chose not to address the issue of the so-called 'comfort women' who were forced into sex work by the Japanese military, though the character calls herself 'unclean' when embraced by a revolutionary youth (see page 72).
[93] Randy Wirayudha, "Pemuda Sosialis di Balik Film Legendaris," Historia - Majalah Sejarah Populer Pertama di Indonesia, November 18, 2018, https://historia.id/kultur/articles/pemuda-sosialis-di-balik-film-legendaris-Dnw30.

independence war. The first, *Penjebrangan* (Crossing), depicted the crossing of the Brantas River in East Java by the TRIP.[94] His second, arguably most well-known film, *Merdeka atau Mati: Surabaya 1945* (Freedom or Death: Surabaya 1945) was a retelling of the Battle of Surabaya, where the TRIP first experienced combat.[95] Kusumohadi was a known supporter of the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party, PSI), which fell out of favour during the Guided Democracy period. While initially supportive of the New Order, the PSI grew critical of corruption within the government which to the imprisonment of several leading members, including Kusumohadi. He was freed partly due to the intervention of Bu Dar Mortir, a relative of his who distinguished herself while serving in the army and the TRIP during the independence war.[96] His career trajectory did not seem to be too adversely affected by his stint in prison, as he became head of the Surabaya Cultural Council between 1979 to 1983. In 1981, he authored a novel, *Pita Merah di Lengan Kiri* (Red Ribbon on the Left Arm), which followed a group of TRIP soldiers and their experiences during late 1945 and early-to-mid 1946.[97]

Similar to Nugroho, both Pandir Kelana and Kusumohadi's depictions of their characters emphasised their human traits, rather than for them being mere vessels for propagandistic values. All depicted the independence struggle holistically, with many supporting characters from among the Indonesian populace who had differing experiences of the revolution. In *Pita Merah,* for example, Kusumohadi writes of the tensions between a nationalistic TRIP student and his father, who is far more sceptical of the revolutionary cause.[98] Even Pandir Kelana's works, which focused more on the heroic actions of its soldier-protagonists, had a cast of characters from all walks of society, contributing to the war in different ways.[99]

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[94] A colourised version of the film can be viewed at *Penjeberangan (Gatut Kusumo, 1963) Versi Berwarna*.
[95] Randy Wirayudha, "Pemuda Sosialis di Balik Film Legendaris."
[96] Randy Wirayudha.
[97] Kusumo, Pita Merah di Lengan Kiri.
[98] Kusumo, 63–68.
[99] For example, Pandir Kelana, *Rintihan Burung Kedasih: Sebuah Roman Revolusi '45, 1948/49* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1992). contained a cast of revolutionary characters which, in addition to the youthful protagonist, included sex workers sympathetic to the cause of independence.

The other type of written works produced by student-veterans during this time were more factual in nature. While the three previously mentioned authors wrote many works that touched on the student-soldier experience in some respects, most student-veteran works written during the 1980s and 90s took the form of regimental histories and factual retellings of the battles fought by the *tentara pelajar*. While many of these works were supported or sponsored in some way or form by the government and armed forces, their authors were often neither military officers or government employees.

The most notable was Asmadi, known by his *nom de guerre* of "Kucing" (Cat).[100] Asmadi was a seventeen-year-old student in Probolinggo, a town to the southeast of Surabaya, when independence was proclaimed.[101] He travelled to Surabaya not long after and enrolled in the TRIP, taking part in the Battle of Surabaya.[102] After the war, he chose not to continue in the army, instead graduating from Universitas Indonesia with a degree in economics in 1951. He went on to work for a major Indonesian car manufacturer for the rest of his life. In the 1980s, Asmadi wrote two works of note. One, *Pelajar Pejuang* (Student Warriors), was a more traditional regimental history of the TRIP, spanning from its formation in Surabaya in 1945 to its move to Blitar in response to the first Dutch military aggression in 1947.[103] His other, and perhaps most popular work, was *Sangkur dan Pena* (Bayonet and Pen), an allusion to the *tentara pelajar*'s dual responsibility of studying and taking part in the armed struggle.

Unlike *Pelajar Pejuang*, *Sangkur dan Pena* was partly written in the style of a historical novel, largely retelling Asmadi's experiences as a student-soldier in all but name. However, the novel style was not maintained throughout the work, and half of the book is written in the factual manner expected of regimental histories. Both books were circulated to various school libraries across the country at the behest of the Ministry of Education and Culture, to some success. Such was the ministry's demand for *Sangkur*

[100] Gatari Asriwulan, "Asmadi Wiryomiharjo (Kucing)," mastrip.org, December 1, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20201201015144/http://mastrip.org/in-memoriam/asmadi-wiryomiharjo-kucing.html.
[101] Gatari Asriwulan.
[102] Gatari Asriwulan.
[103] Asmadi, Pelajar Pejuang.

dan Pena that it received three print runs after its first publication in 1982.[104] *Sangkur dan Pena* serves almost as a sequel to *Pelajar Pejuang*, roughly covering the period between the first Dutch military aggression (Operation Product) in 1947 and the Madiun Affair in 1949. Its fictional elements allowed *Sangkur dan Pena* to explore some of the emotional themes highlighted in *Pita Merah*, such as the generational dissonance between TRIP soldiers and their parents.[105]

Abdul Radjab, another former TRIP soldier, published a regimental history entitled *Pelajar dan Perang Kemerdekaan* (Students and the War of Independence) in 1977.[106] Like Asmadi, Radjab chose not to continue in the army at the end of the war. Following demobilisation, he enrolled in an English language teaching course in a Malang college, though he subsequently became a member of several Kosgoro delegations to diplomatic missions and conferences abroad.[107] The book covers the formation of the TRIP in Surabaya in 1945 and its role in the battle of Surabaya, its retreat to rural villages and their consolidation there, while briefly touching on its role during the two Dutch military aggressions. *Pelajar dan Perang Kemerdekaan* has much of its focus on the individual sacrifices of TRIP students, highlighting their removal from their privileged households to train as soldiers in the rural outskirts of Surabaya as part of their process of achieving maturity.[108]

More importantly for their value as vessels to transfer the values of 1945, both Radjab and Asmadi extoll the apparent closeness between the *tentara pelajar* and the Indonesian people. By proxy, this extended to claims of the close ties between the Indonesian people and the military. Closely tied to the doctrine of *dwifungsi* was the notion that the military was "a child of the people" and thus could claim a say in national governance.[109] There is some truth in this: as discussed in Chapter II, the Indonesian military emerged mostly independent of civilian influence with its leading officers electing its first commanding general. This feeling was further strengthened

[104] Asmadi, Sangkur dan Pena.
[105] Asmadi, 24–31.
[106] Radjab, TRIP dan Perang Kemerdekaan, backcover.
[107] Radjab, backcover.
[108] Radjab, 66–73, 192–212.
[109] Jun Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), 29, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unimelb/detail.action?docID=1111572.

when the military established its own parallel to the civilian government in Java after Sukarno and Hatta were taken prisoner by the Netherlands in 1948 which, as discussed in Chapter IV, was largely staffed by student-soldiers. This time is often romanticised in military accounts as a period of close military-*rakyat* cooperation and can be seen as the basis of the concept of *kemanunggalan TNI-rakyat* (unity of the TNI and the people). As *dwifungsi* became formalised, this concept became further enshrined in army doctrine and became seen as part of the military's claim to a socio-political role.

This view of the military has been criticised by some scholars. Coen Husain Pontoh rightly notes that the Indonesian military was initially commanded by a combination of PETA and KNIL officers, both of which came from distinctly unpopular and oppressive regimes.[110] Indeed, considering the military's involvement in implementing the oppressive policies of the New Order and the benefits that many of its top brass experienced from the regime's endemic corruption, this claim fails to stand under further scrutiny.

Writing a role for *tentara pelajar* veterans in the New Order: Transitioning from *perjuangan* to *pembangunan*

In addition to these individual works, several *tentara pelajar* history-writing projects were initiated by institutional actors. Many of these came from student-veterans' groups, who had become more organised and well-funded in the economic boom of the New Order years. Of these, the most organised was the East Javanese TRIP. Kosgoro's evolution into an organisation with wider appeal saw TRIP veterans form their own exclusive community outside of Kosgoro. One of the ways they organised this was through the publication of a monthly magazine, the *Buletin MAS TRIP*, which was available only to TRIP veterans, and the Paguyuban MASTRIP/Sekretariat Darmo 49, an organisation that would function exclusively as a veterans' group in the 1970s.[111]

In contrast to the TRIP, the Central Javanese TP were somewhat less organised, and did not maintain significant regular internal publications like their East Javanese

[110] See Coen Husain Pontoh, *Menentang Mitos Tentara Rakyat* (Yogyakarta: Resist Book, 2005).
[111] Sagimun M. D., *Mas TRIP*, 337.

counterparts. As a result, there are comparatively fewer regimental histories of the TP as there are the TRIP.[112] The likely reasoning behind this is a combination of post-1965 political realities and the decentralised nature of the Central Javanese TP itself. The imprisonment of TP commander Achmadi by the New Order would have somewhat damaged the networking capabilities of TP veterans, but his subsequent release and rehabilitation and, as mentioned in Chapter V, involvement in New Order politics, means that this not tell the full story. Additionally, many other leading New Order figures, such as Nugroho Notosusanto and Golkar co-founder Imam Pratignyo, were also Central Javanese TP veterans.

Another contributing factor is the relatively decentralised nature of the TP. As discussed in Chapter II, the TRIP served as the focal point for many armed student units in East Java in the early stages of the war and, at the Malang IPI Congress, became the unit into which many of the other East Javanese armed students were subsumed. The TP, by contrast, had no such focal point. While the Surakarta TP, headed by Achmadi, was the most influential, other subunits of the Central Javanese TP operated with relative independence.[113] This can be seen in the production of some regimental histories of regional TP detachments, rather than that of the TP as a whole across the New Order period. This, however, did not mean that the TP did not take part in transferring values.[114]

One of the first coordinated projects to author a common history of the *tentara pelajar* came from the Pusjarah in the form of the book *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan* (The Role of Students in the Independence War).[115] Published in 1985, it compiled the histories of various student units that took part in the war, ranging from the formations that became part of the 17th Brigade such as the TP and TRIP, as well as smaller independent formations like the IMAM. Though each chapter is dedicated to discussing a different unit, the opening chapter of the book firmly situates the *tentara*

[112] There are fewer noteworthy regimental histories of the TP, the most prominent of these being Keluarga Ex Anggota Be XVII Tentara Pelajar Cie Purwokerto, *Sejarah Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar Purwokerto* and; Sewan Susanto, *Perjuangan Tentara Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985).
[113] Such as the Purwokerto unit which wrote the regimental history above.
[114] The fact that Nugroho was a Central Javanese TP veteran too makes the complete exclusion of them unlikely.
[115] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.

pelajar within the tradition of Indonesian *pemuda* and the notion of generations of Indonesian youth.[116]

It was a project that had the blessing of many higher-ups within the TNI and the *Angkatan 45*, with prefaces coming from Surono, chair of the DHN, as well as Benny Moerdani, the influential Commander of the Armed Forces who himself a *tentara pelajar* veteran.[117] Surono, who was by 1985 also Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, emphasised the book's importance as "a medium to preserve… the values of 1945, not just to the youth of today, but for future generations of the Indonesian nation."[118] He also spoke about the "cultural-educative" and "communicative" functions of the book, as it can "inspire the spirit of the nation's young generation to struggle to develop the nation."[119]

Moerdani too echoed these sentiments, expressing hope that the book would "encourage students of any generation to have the same patriotism [of the *tentara pelajar*]."[120] Moerdani, however, makes the distinction that was made by many of the submissions to the 1975 essay competition regarding the new role played by students. He stressed that the end of the independence war necessitated a different type of contribution from students to the nation, that of national development.[121] However, while he outlined that "real contributions of students today do not have to come through force of arms," Moerdani stressed that ultimately it was part of the same lineage of the struggle of independence, and that the values of 1945 "should be transferred to and continued by the next generation of students" to the struggle for development.[122]

Such ideas were echoed in other history-writing projects of the *tentara pelajar*. The organisational strength of TRIP veterans would play a large part in their ability to regularly produce several written pieces on their wartime experiences. Many of these publications were limited in circulation and took the form of fairly small pamphlet-sized

[116] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 1.
[117] Moerdani was a member of the SA/CSA armed student formation, closely affiliated with Achmadi's Surakarta TP, at the young age of 13. See Julius Pour and Tim Scott, *Benny Moerdani, Profile of a Soldier Statesman*, 1st ed (Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993).
[118] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, *Peranan Pelajar dalam Perang Kemerdekaan.*, VI–XII.
[119] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, VIII.
[120] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, XI.
[121] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, XII.
[122] Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, XII.

books most often published during the semi-regular reunions of TRIP veterans. These publications can mostly be categorised into three kinds, according to their content: general histories of the TRIP, the history of TRIP activities in a particular area/subunit, and histories of particular pieces of weapons/machinery. State and military support for these publications was evident; one of them, which focused on the search for their prized artillery piece, the *Banteng Blorok*, was authored in conjunction with the history bureau of the Brawijaya Military District of East Java.[123]

Despite the relative independence exhibited by many student-veterans in writing their memoirs and regimental histories, they leveraged upon their existing connections with the military whenever they could. In addition to figures like Isman and Sukamto Sayidiman, who continued to serve in the military while holding state positions, TRIP veterans could also count on Colonel Boges Sudjadi. Born in Nganjuk, East Java in 1930, Soedjadi joined the TRIP aged fifteen. After the war, he continued to serve in the army, rising to the rank of Colonel.[124] Importantly, he became a leading historian within the TNI, serving as Head of Military History of KOSTRAD for sixteen years before then becoming Head of the Army History Service in 1984 prior to his retirement.[125] This trajectory would likely have put him in contact with Nugroho Notosusanto, a key proponent of transferring values. As such, it can be inferred that there was a degree of coordination within TRIP history-writing to ensure that a transfer of the values of 1945 occurred.

Within the Paguyuban MASTRIP, Boges served as one of the main instigators of the TRIP's history-writing project. His mark is felt on several pages of the *Buletin MASTRIP*, in particular on the incomplete project of a MASTRIP film. This film would supposedly have retold the full experience of TRIP veterans, from the Japanese occupation to demobilisation, on the silver screen.[126] While this grand project was never completed, Boges was active in various other efforts to write histories of the TRIP. He

[123] Ex Anggota Be-17 TRIP Jawa Timur and Jarahdam VIII Brawijaya, Peranan Meriam Gempur "Banteng Blorok" dalam Perang Kemerdekaan R.I.
[124] H. Boges Sudjadi GR, Am-Track dan Gugurnya 35 Anggota TRIP Jawa Timur, 64.
[125] H. Boges Sudjadi GR, 65.
[126] H. Boges Sudjadi GR, "Bagaimana Pembuatan Film MAS TRIP Jatim?," *Buletin MAS TRIP*, August 1995; Soedarno Siswohadimartono, "Tanggapan atas Terbentuknya Team Kerja Penulisan Sejarah dan Pembuatan Film Perjuangan Brigade XVII Detasemen I TRIP Jawa Timur," *Buletin MAS TRIP*, August 1995.

was among the key contributors and instigators of the TRIP's series of pamphlet histories, and he was the lead author of at least two of these works.

More importantly, he served as one of the liaisons connecting the TRIP with the army's military history resources, and he used this to great effect in the writing of the first major wide-ranging history of the TRIP. *Perjuangan Pelajar Bersenjata TRIP Jawa Timur* (The Struggle of the Armed Students of the East Java TRIP) was published by the Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat (Army History Service, Disjarahad), which Sudjadi led, in 1986.[127] Compared to the individual attempts of Asmadi and Radjab, it is a far more extensive history built on research that involved interviewing many surviving TRIP veterans. As a result, it is written in a much more traditional military history fashion, mostly free from embellishments and largely containing factual accounts of battles and skirmishes in which the TRIP was involved, as well as the TRIP's organisational development and restructuring throughout the war. Despite this focus on a more historical retelling of events, there are notable parts of the book where there is a clear emphasis on heroism and other militaristic values associated with the values of 1945.[128]

It was also as much a TRIP endeavour as it was an army one, as it goes well beyond the TRIP's wartime experiences into the post-war era, focussing specifically on the TRIP's "contribution to the people" and its role in national development.[129] The purpose of the work was clear in the prefaces to the book, written by Sudjadi, as well as the Army Chief of Staff General Rudini. Both Sudjadi and Rudini emphasised the importance of the book to the transferring values process. Rudini made this connection particularly explicit, saying that the book was "part of the larger work of transferring and preserving the values of 1945" and urged that it be disseminated to the "next generation of the nation."[130]

[127] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, Perjuangan Pelajar Bersenjata TRIP Jawa Timur.
[128] Examples include the depiction of the Battle of Surabaya, which makes reference to the "strong *esprit de corps*" of the young TRIP who made their "unit their home". See Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, 87–92.
[129] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, 234–61.
[130] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, xv.

In his preface, Sudjadi narrowed the book's intended audience even further, identifying school- and university-aged students as its target and hoping that they could "absorb the positives from these stories of the struggle of the East Javanese TRIP, to be used in the development of the Indonesian nation as a whole."[131]

Though these excerpts are taken from examples of particularly state- and military-directed projects of *tentara pelajar* history-writing, their overall message was carried in practically all of the history works written by *tentara pelajar* veterans. In the TRIP's largest self-sponsored history-writing project, the overarching narrative was formed around the unit's evolution from "a fighting brigade to a development brigade," emphasising the continuing post-war role TRIP veterans played in the struggle for development.[132] TGP veterans too used similar labels, promoting their post-war role in one of their regimental histories, going so far as to subtitling it "the development revolution," explicitly situating themselves as participating in a continuation of the independence war.[133] Even within these projects sponsored by the Pusjarah and the army, *tentara pelajar* voices made themselves heard, be that through interviews or, in the case of Boges Sudjadi, their leading roles in the projects.

Importantly, these efforts further showed the level of engagement student-veterans had with the act of transferring the values of 1945. While previous studies of the militarisation of Indonesian history have focused on the key roles played by serving members of the TNI and scholars in writing and integrating the militarised values of 1945 into the national historiography, this chapter has so far shown the parts played by student-veterans who, in exercising their agency, sought to actively take part in transferring the values of 1945 ensure the survival of their own values and identity by inculcating them into Indonesian youth.[134]

[131] Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, ix.
[132] Sagimun M. D., *Mas TRIP*.
[133] Sapranggoro et al., TGP. Masa2 Revolusi Pembangunan: Buku Kenang2an Tentara Genie Peladjar TGP. Kompi III Fabricage A Brig. 17 (Jakarta: self-published, 1991).
[134] McGregor, History in Uniform; Curaming, Power and Knowledge in Southeast Asia.

Awakening students: The *tentara pelajar* legacy in action

As discussed in detail above, the extent to which *tentara pelajar* veterans took an active role in the process of transferring the values of 1945 was, though somewhat ill-coordinated, incredibly extensive. If anything, the rather haphazard nature of *tentara pelajar* history and memoir writing showcased the organic nature of the process. As a result of these efforts, by the late New Order period of the mid-to-late 1990s, there existed a relatively established collection of *tentara pelajar*-related historical works, in addition to the various other means through which *tentara pelajar* veterans sought to transfer their values.

To some extent, the transferring values initiative was successful in inculcating the glorification of, if not the military, the *pemuda* of 1945 within Indonesian youth. The variety of student entries in the 1975 essay competition showed that, at least in the early stages of the transferring values project, there existed a working knowledge of the values of 1945 amenable to the DHN among young people. The DHN maintained its engagement with youth via its various museums as well as seminars on the values of 1945 that specifically targeted secondary and university students.[135] Militarised histories replete with references to the independence war were extensively produced even outside of the *tentara pelajar* sphere, with official histories such as the six volume SNI finding use in university and secondary school classrooms.[136] However, despite the ubiquity of the New Order's version of historical events, it did not take long for counter-narratives to appear, and for some of these counter-narratives to utilise a reinterpretation of the *tentara pelajar*'s legacy. It was also unsurprising that the first opposition movements to utilise this reinterpretation against the New Order were students.

As was discussed earlier in the chapter, student activism slowly evolved from being one of the regime's key supporters to one of its major opposition groups as it grew increasingly less likely that Suharto would cede power. After the *Malari* of 1974, controls over students were further extended in the late 1970s, when students across Indonesia voiced their opposition to Suharto's re-election as president in the 1977

[135] See for example Nas Sebayang, "Suatu Kritik dan Evaluasi KEGIATAN DHD-45 SUMATERA UTARA 1978," *Gema Angkatan 45*, December 1978.
[136] Wood, Official History in Modern Indonesia, 30.

general election.[137] As was in the case of the *Malari*, the armed forces were sent in to break up the protesters. Following these protests, the Ministry of Education implemented the Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan (Normalisation of Campus Life/Student Coordination Bureau, NKK/BKK), a policy that effectively killed the vibrant on-campus political scene and relegated previously large-scale student activism to small, relatively informal "study groups" off campus.[138] Then-education minister Daoed Joesoef urged students to "fill [their time] with reading, writing, conducting research; don't waste it in the streets."[139]

The political restrictions placed on students were part of the New Order's longstanding policy of depoliticisation. It was one of the New Order's first priorities when it was established, as it argued that Guided Democracy was marred by "conflicts," a by-product of the politicisation of society.[140] Golkar was technically not a political party despite participating in general elections as Suharto's political vehicle of choice and remained theoretically as it had been when it was first formed: an organisation that represented the functional groups of Indonesian society.[141] Civil servants, who were compelled to vote for Golkar, were "depoliticised" in the early stages of the New Order and banned from joining political parties.[142] The "floating masses" policy, designed by Ali Murtopo, barred political parties from operating outside of regional centres in an effort to maintain national stability.[143]

While the 1978 protests achieved little in terms of concessions from the New Order regime, it is pertinent to examine how they were framed by some of the students who took part in them. The most noteworthy of these protests occurred at the prestigious Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology, ITB). The military response was swift, as across Indonesia and at ITB, soldiers and police

[137] For an account of student demands, see Institut Teknologi Bandung and Dewan Mahasiswa, *Buku Putih Perjuangan Mahasiswa 1978* (Bandung: Keluarga Mahasiswa Institut Teknologi Bandung, Dewan Mahasiswa, 1978).
[138] Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto*, 120–22.
[139] Aspinall, 120.
[140] Ali Murtopo as cited in David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz, eds., *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2013), 48.
[141] Suryadinata, *Golkar dan Militer*, 8.
[142] Suryadinata, 47.
[143] Murtopo as cited in Bourchier and Hadiz, *Indonesian Politics and Society*, 48.

descended upon campuses and arrested the leaders of the protests, after which they were put on trial for disrespecting the head of state.[144]

Though ultimately designed to legitimise the imprisonment of student activists, the trials became an opportunity for student leaders to present their ideas to a wider audience, considering the national audience that the trials captured. Figures such as Indro Tjahyono, a member of the ITB student council, used his defence speech to historicise the struggle of the ITB activists, arguing that the repressive policies of the New Order were in many ways similar to those of Dutch colonialism, effectively reclaiming the pro-independence values of 1945 away from the military-dominated regime.[145]

In a similar vein, Heri Akhmadi, the chair of the ITB Student Congress, was put on trial in July 1979, where he presented his defence speech. Titled "Breaking the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People," in it he highlights the progressive role students and youth have played in Indonesian history. In many ways, his account is a rehash of the nationalist historiography championed by the New Order which cited various youth groups as the movers and shakers of Indonesian history. Importantly, Akhmadi also acknowledged the *tentara pelajar* as part of the legacy from which the students of ITB drew legitimacy from, saying that the "*Tentara Pelajar*, *Brigade Pelajar*, TRIP, and so forth…" had "formed the backbone" of the independence struggle, thus showing that "the *pemuda* have… never been absent during major events in [Indonesia's] state life."[146] He subsequently reinforces the point of the role of the *pemuda,* and students in particular, in Indonesian history, by saying that "it was the historical facts of student involvement in various significant and decisive events in Indonesian national life which propelled our awareness and awakened us!"[147]

He also emphasises that student politics were exceptional in that they did "not cloak ambitions for power. Rather, they are spurred by a desire to create a government

[144] Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto*, 118–20; Sastramidjaja, "Playing Politics: Power, Memory, and Agency in the Making of the Indonesian Student Movement," 162–63.
[145] Sukmadji Indro Tjahjono, *Indonesia di bawah Sepatu Lars: Pembelaan di muka Pengadilan Mahasiswa Bandung* (Bandung, Indonesia: Diperbanyak oleh Komite Pembelaan Mahasiswa, Dewan Mahasiswa, Institut Teknologi Bandung, 1979).
[146] Akhmadi, Breaking the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People, 161.
[147] Akhmadi, 161.

which is democratic, honest, and clean. For that reason, student politics are oriented toward change which will improve our lives and political system."[148]

Akhmadi's statement showed that the nationalist historiography of the New Order had succeeded in becoming the dominant narrative as it related to the *pemuda* role in Indonesian history, with him dutifully reciting the list of youth organisations as well as military units that fought in the war as part of this role. Akhmadi also, perhaps unknowingly, claims many of the key tenants of *tentara pelajar* identity for the contemporary student movement in addition to citing them as an inspiration. By the time of the 1978 protests, university students had adopted the position of being a "moral force" in the sense that they served as a kind of national conscience.[149] With this role, they eschewed involvement in the "dirtiness" of so-called practical politics, distancing themselves from political parties and government while simultaneously serving as their critical check.[150] Arief Budiman, a student activist of the *Angkatan 66* and younger brother of Gie, likened students to *resi*, ascetic sages who leave their life of meditation (universities/schools) from time to time to correct societal injustices only to return back to meditation, or cowboys of Western films who, after ensuring that a villain receives justice, leave the town they saved.[151] Writing in hindsight, a former chair of the Bandung-based Pajajaran University Student Congress in the 1970s argued that students of the time were more "intellectual" and "internally reflective," effectively apolitical until confronted with the dictatorial reality of the New Order.[152]

The moral force role was in many ways faithful to many instances of past Indonesian student activism and, in particular, to the student-soldier identity developed and adopted by the *tentara pelajar*.[153] As discussed in Chapter II, the *tentara pelajar* too despised the dirtiness of politics, expressing a dislike for political parties and seeing

[148] Akhmadi, 161.
[149] Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 118; Hatta Albanik, "Gerakan Mahasiswa = Gerakan Hati Nurani Bangsa," in Menyilang Jalan Kekuasaan Militer Otoriter: Gerakan Kritis Mahasiswa Bandung di Panggung Politik Indonesia 1970-1974, by Rum Aly (Jakarta: Kompas, 2004), 3–24.
[150] Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto*, 118.
[151] Arief Budiman, "The Student Movement in Indonesia: A Study of the Relationship between Culture and Structure," *Asian Survey* 18, no. 6 (1978): 616–17, https://doi.org/10.2307/2643229; Sastramidjaja, "Playing Politics: Power, Memory, and Agency in the Making of the Indonesian Student Movement," 136–37.
[152] Albanik, "Gerakan Mahasiswa = Gerakan Hati Nurani Bangsa," 12–14.
[153] Budiman, "The Student Movement in Indonesia," 618.

their machinations as a distraction from the goal of achieving independence. Akhmadi claimed this mantle for the students of 1978, positioning the "awakening" of students as being an impetus to shape positive change in a political system deemed corrupt.

It is difficult to ascertain just how leading *tentara pelajar* veterans reacted to this use of their legacy, as they did not respond overtly to Akhmadi's defence speech. However, while there is no sign of their opposition to Akhmadi's sentiment, it is unlikely that they would have supported his statements. Many established student-veterans as well as their descendants remained strong supporters of the New Order and continued to hold key positions in the regime. Of particular note is the absence of any leading *tentara pelajar* figures from the 1980 Petition of Fifty, a petition signed by leading figures in Indonesian politics criticising the New Order regime's increasing encroachment into other political parties and non-governmental organisations.[154] One of the signatories of the Petition was Nasution, once a patron of the *tentara pelajar* who by the 1970s had fallen out of favour with Suharto. The Petition was one of the major displays of elite dissatisfaction with the New Order, and thus the lack of support it received from the student-veteran elite is indicative of their stance. While, as mentioned in Chapter V, some student-veterans opposed Suharto's steps to consolidate control over Golkar, they remained supportive of the New Order's values in principle and eschewed positioning themselves alongside more radical opposition.

Thus, while showcasing his immersion in the New Order's historiography militarised and heroic narrative of the *pemuda*, in the same breath Akhmadi turns the New Order's narrative on its head, using this much vaunted history as grounds for activism against the very regime that sought to foster students as a tool in supporting its developmentalist agenda. Though the trials ended with the imprisonment of Akhmadi and other student leaders as well as the implementation of the NKK/BKK policies, their defence speeches showcased how students were able to instrumentalise the New Order's, and to an extent the *tentara pelajar*'s, attempts to mould Indonesian youth into their version of the ideal pemuda. More importantly, this adoption of the pemuda narrative to oppose rather than support the regime was a flash in the pan. As discussed in detail by Lee, the legacy of the *pemuda* went on to influence student activists in the

[154] Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto*, 61–66.

lead up to and during the fall of Suharto in 1998, where they were a major political force. Student activists adopted "pemuda styles" and rhetoric, harkening back to the historical role of the *pemuda* in their contemporary activism.[155] These actions by student activists in both the 1970s and 1990s showcases the malleability of the *tentara pelajar* and *pemuda* legacy, as well as the ability of student activists to take advantage of this malleability in their own efforts.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that student-veterans played in shaping and maintaining their legacy via transferring the values of 1945, a process instigated by the TNI and the New Order regime. While these processes were formalised through the hierarchical structures of the TNI and given legitimacy by the academics and scholars who took part in the process, most notably through the Third Army Seminar in 1972 and the writing of the SNI, *tentara pelajar* veterans did not need orders to begin thinking about the ways in which they could cement their legacy for the next generation of Indonesian youth. While they had already began creating sites of memory and processes of memorialisation in the immediate post-war space, the Army Seminar and the crystallisation of the values of 1945 as well as the importance placed on transferring these values to Indonesian youth by the New Order regime gave *tentara pelajar* veterans opportunity and encouragement to widen and intensify these pre-existing processes. They embraced the policy, constructing their own sites of memory in various forms to transfer the values of 1945 to Indonesian youth. Through this they were willing participants in the state-sanctioned project, doing so because they viewed the New Order's values as being line with their own. The ideals of developmentalism and the key role of youth in achieving national development that were so championed by the New Order were also key values of the *tentara pelajar*. These values, first emerging as a part of *tentara pelajar* identity during the independence war, grew in relevance in the post-war period as *tentara pelajar* veterans sought to establish themselves in an independent

[155] Lee, Activist Archives, 86–87.

Indonesia. Transferring the values of 1945 was thus a key opportunity for veterans to stake this claim, transferring their own values onto Indonesian youth.

Through the short story/essay writing competition held to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of Indonesian independence, student-veterans took part in one of the first formal instances of transferring values by writing accounts of their exploits in the independence war in a manner that was specifically geared to address younger generations. Following the competition, *tentara pelajar* memoirs and histories began to proliferate, with many being written by a combination of individual veterans as well as *tentara pelajar* veteran's organisations, all of which sought to impress upon younger generations the nature of the independence struggle as well as their work in continuing the struggle of the *tentara pelajar* in "fulfilling" independence through participating in national development.

These efforts were not instigated or directed by the New Order regime. Rather, student-veterans took the initiative to create their *lieux de mémoire*, seeing within the transferring values project an opportunity to advance their own interests. These were, namely, both the security of their status within the New Order as well as the equipping of younger Indonesians with the values of the *tentara pelajar*, which they believed to be suited to Indonesian youth of all generations. The organic nature in which *tentara pelajar* veterans took part in transferring values is a perfect illustration of this, with works of varying nature written by different authors, united solely by the common aim of instilling the values of 1945 in Indonesian youth.

The effectiveness of transferring values, however, was mixed. Though the student entries in the 1975 short story competition are indicative that the values of 1945 as prescribed by the New Order were, to some extent, ingrained within parts of Indonesian youth, the student protests that marked the late 1970s showcased how, despite the dominance of the New Order's narrative, young people still retained agency in interpreting what the values of 1945 meant to them, just as *tentara pelajar* veterans retained their agency in utilising transferring values to forward their own aims. Using the language of the values of 1945 and drawing upon the historical legacy of the *pemuda* and the *tentara pelajar*, student activists in ITB and other university campuses across Indonesia opposed and criticised the New Order in major student protests. By

using the legacy of the *tentara pelajar*, student activists translated the values of 1945 not into a struggle for national development, as intended by the New Order regime, but instead into a struggle against political repression.

Conclusion

In early 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, via the invitation of Surabaya-based historian Rifkhi Sulaksmono, I had the privilege of attending a reunion event for members of the TGP veteran's association via Zoom. It brought together mostly members of the "Second Generation" of the association, the children of those who served in the TGP. The reunion began with the singing of *Indonesia Raya*, followed by the *Mars TGP* (TGP March) and a brief reading of the history of the unit.

Figure 12 The promotional poster of the TGP reunion. Supplied by Rifkhi Sulaksmono.

This was followed by a discussion facilitated by a member of the Second Generation who was also a child psychologist, themed "The Importance of Familial Motivation in Ensuring the Survival of the Spirit of the Struggle." It discussed the different ways in which the values of the TGP could be passed on to members of Third and Fourth Generations. While some solutions were posited, the difficulties behind the process took centre stage in the forum as participants discussed the changing circumstances experienced by their children and grandchildren which has led to some feeling that the

values of the TGP, and by extension the values of 1945, might be less relevant to younger generations today.

I picked up on similar fears during a 2022 fieldwork visit to Jombang, East Java, once a stronghold of the TRIP. There I met with members of the local branch of the TRIP veteran's association and spoke with them briefly about the ways in which the organisation continues to contribute to local life today. Following the conversation, the head of the branch, Pak Harmono, very kindly offered to put me in touch with surviving TRIP veterans for my research. However, he also mentioned that there were very few such veterans left, and that the memories of many surviving veterans are beginning to fail them. Thus, both the TRIP and the TGP, as well as I would argue many other *tentara pelajar* veterans' groups, face the same question: with the decline of the "First Generation," have values and memories been effectively transferred to subsequent generations, and are said values still relevant for the youth of today?

This thesis has expanded existing knowledge on Indonesian youth and through a critical examination of its varied origins has also contributed to global understandings of youth. Chapter I examined the interaction of Indonesian youth with the practices of the global scouting movement and how its marrying with a changing sense of citizenship propelled young Indonesians towards nationalism and militarism. Interacting with the activities of the global scouting movement through the framework of a "transnational youth culture," Indonesian youth experienced the militarised practices of scouting, such as drill and survival skills, alongside young people from other countries who also took part in scouting.[1] While Indonesian students were a part of this global trend, it was the unique circumstances of Japanese occupation and the subsequent Indonesian independence war that make the experiences of the *tentara pelajar* particularly significant. Departing from previous studies that presented the Japanese occupation as a period of immense change for Indonesian nationalism, I argued that the occupation engaged with these pre-war trends in scouting by allowing them to evolve into preparation and recruitment grounds for initially paramilitary and subsequently fully-fledged military forces. The lack of professional soldiers for the Indonesian republic as the British landed in Jakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya in late 1945 pushed

[1] Jobs and Pomfret, "The Transnationality of Youth."

students into action and, armed with their scouting and paramilitary training, the *tentara pelajar* became an integral component of Indonesian resistance against the Netherlands.

The elevated role of the *tentara pelajar* gave them legitimacy as part of the *pemuda* of the independence war, which provides an added layer of importance to examining the identity and values of student-soldiers. The analysis of the *tentara pelajar* identity made in this thesis thus expands upon existing work written on Indonesian youth and youth more broadly. Most analyses of the *pemuda* of 1945 have largely focused on the *pemuda* of the various *laskar* groups, such as Pesindo, the BPRI, or the LRJR, excluding those youth who served in the TNI.[2] This understanding of the *pemuda* has been echoed in several subsequent studies of Indonesian youth. For example, Sastramidjaja describes the increased prominence of the TNI in the latter stages of the war as causing the partial "death" of the *pemuda*.[3] Lee, in her analysis of Indonesian student activism, argued that the New Order had co-opted the imagery of Indonesian youth to forward its own militarised image of ideal youth.[4]

While there is a degree of truth to this notion of the co-opting of youth by the Suharto regime, this thesis has also shown that such an understanding of the *pemuda* oversimplifies its varied origins and complex evolution vis-à-vis the Indonesian state and, more importantly, the *pemuda* themselves. Chapter II showcased that, far from being the rebellious and independent *pemuda* as often represented in these studies, the *tentara pelajar*, through a process of collective identity formation, embodied a more disciplined and obedient form of youth. While as revolutionary as their peers in terms of their desire for independence, they largely stayed out of partisan politics out of fear that it would damage the "purity" of students. They also envisaged a role beyond the revolutionary here-and-now of the independence war, arguing that as students they had a duty to use their intellectual prowess to aid in the inevitable task of national development that would come after the war.

[2] Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution; Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries; Frederick, Visions and Heat.
[3] Sastramidjaja, "Playing Politics: Power, Memory, and Agency in the Making of the Indonesian Student Movement," 86–87.
[4] Lee, Activist Archives, 7.

In these two features of the *tentara pelajar* identity, apoliticism and developmentalism, student-soldiers viewed themselves as superior to the lesser educated *pemuda* of other *laskar* groups. Chapter III showed how this trend continued with another defining feature of *tentara pelajar* units: their strong emphasis on military discipline, which brought them into closer alignment with the TNI, culminating in the end of their irregular *laskar* status and their official integration into the hierarchy of the regular army. This process would place them at odds with other *laskar* groups who they perceived to be overly political in learning or lacking in professionalism. In some cases, these suspicions culminated in instances of armed conflict between the *tentara pelajar* and *laskar* like the BPRI, KRIS, and Pesindo. It was the *tentara pelajar*'s loyalty to the government and the military in these intra-*laskar* conflicts that solidified their good reputation within the regular armed forces and the Republican government.

This analysis shows that, rather than the notion of a militarised, disciplined *pemuda* being one almost created by the New Order and a perversion of the ideal revolutionary *pemuda* of 1945, instead the *pemuda* were far more varied. This thesis has successfully presented the *tentara pelajar* as a significant influence on the *pemuda* and, more importantly, one that did not fit the mould of revolutionary and difficult-to-manage youth. The *tentara pelajar* as a part of the *pemuda* predate the New Order and yet embodied the values of apolitical and development-oriented youth that the New Order wanted to forward. Though the *tentara pelajar* were far from the perfect scions of discipline, militarised youth, as shown in several instances throughout the war and after, what mattered was how the *tentara pelajar* sought to represent themselves rather than how they conducted themselves in practice. In rhetorical terms, the *tentara pelajar* were, effectively the military's *pemuda*, intelligent, young, and dynamic but still adherent to hierarchy and discipline. Chapter IV showed how these constituent elements of the *tentara pelajar* made them ideal to staff the late-war military government and the reliable, elite foot soldiers for the final offensives of the war.

These factors and characteristics are also what made the *tentara pelajar* so attractive to the powers at be even in the post-war era. As shown in Chapter V, student-veterans were able to navigate the instability of post-war Indonesia. Though there were various situations where *tentara pelajar* veterans were arguably ill-disciplined, such as during the Simpang Hotel incident and numerous other occurrences where student-

veterans committed acts of violence, these were understood by the government and other political actors as being the patriotic outbursts of nationalistic youths who sought to defend both their individual and collective honour as well as that of their government. Unsurprisingly, the *tentara pelajar* continued their ownership of the *pemuda* mantle that they had claimed during the war, to some extent strengthening their control over it as they rose to influential positions within Indonesian socio-political life. The profound disruption brought about by the destruction of the Indonesian left and anti-communist genocide of 1965, while affecting individual *tentara pelajar* veterans differently, allowed for several prominent student-veterans to consolidate their positions within the newly formed New Order regime through political organisations that they had established, namely the Kosgoro cooperative and Golkar. Importantly, despite becoming influential parts of the New Order regime, student-veterans still fought for their own interests, even in cases where that might conflict with those of the New Order and its president, Suharto.

It was fortunate for student-veterans that such conflicts were uncommon, and under the New Order that the collective identity of the *tentara pelajar* would flourish, as the regime sought to transfer its version of the values of 1945 that prioritised discipline and development to Indonesian youth. Crucially, these state-sponsored values were in line with those of the *tentara pelajar*. Continuing their tendency towards independence and agency, rather than simply being parrots and mouthpieces of the New Order's vision of ideal *pemuda*, the *tentara pelajar* used their position to shore up their own values among Indonesian youth. While existing studies of history-writing during the New Order have focused on the role of the military and of government-aligned intellectuals in state-sponsored projects, this thesis has analysed the role of arguably less powerful and influential actors, that of veterans, in shaping and writing their own histories and through that influencing remembrance on a national scale.[5] Contributing to these studies, Chapter VI showed how, rather than awaiting the machinations of the military and scholarly historians, *tentara pelajar* veterans took their legacy into their own hands in a remarkable demonstration of veteran agency, through projects of history-writing, ranging from writing memoirs, short stories, and regimental histories.

[5] See McGregor, History in Uniform; Curaming, Power and Knowledge in Southeast Asia.

Through the construction of these sites of memory that specifically targeted Indonesian youth, student-veterans took part in the act of transferring the values of 1945. In these works, they grounded their heroic wartime actions in the values of 1945, urging students to apply the spirit and values of the wartime struggle to the modern day through taking an active part in national development. While the struggle of 1945 was a physical struggle against colonialism, *tentara pelajar* veterans emphasised that in an independent Indonesia the struggle persisted not against a foreign enemy, but against national backwardness. In this, not only did they frame a history of youth that largely echoed the narrative that the New Order wanted to forward, but they also used the act of transferring values as a platform through which the core values of the *tentara pelajar*, discipline, apoliticism and militarism, could be disseminated to younger Indonesians, reshaping the cultural memory of Indonesian youth into one that was dominated by their conception of the ideal *pemuda*.

While they did so with tacit support from the TNI as well as, to some degree, scholars, it is important to recognise the agency of the *tentara pelajar* veterans. The TNI-instigated project of transferring the values of 1945 to Indonesian youth did encourage Indonesian veterans to retell stories of their wartime experiences to young Indonesians, but this served as less than a push for student-veterans rather than a window of opportunity. It was, as this chapter argued, the *tentara pelajar'*s organised and enthusiastic response to the call that provided the project with impetus. Thus, while the scholars of the New Order provided the framework for writing a new, militarised national history, it was *tentara pelajar* veterans who filled the gaps with their historical experiences, forwarding their own agenda of remembrance in the process.

The time when the construction of these sites of memory was at its height, however, has passed. The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 heralded with it a waning in the influence of student-veterans, who by this time were also mostly of advanced age. In many ways, the anxieties expressed by the "Second Generation" of *tentara pelajar* are based on these trends that could potentially cause the cultural memory of the *tentara pelajar* to fade. Such anxieties are in turn a reflection of the persistent demands placed on the future of Indonesian youth and of youth in general by individuals as well as governments. As reflected in earlier chapters, the *tentara pelajar* were in many ways shaped by these anxieties, first in their roots in late-colonial

scouting movements designed to combat the perceived demoralisation of youth, then too in debates regarding the best place for students in the independence war and of the perceived hedonism of youth in the 1970s.

On the surface at least, these concerns can be alleviated. The *tentara pelajar* remain potent symbols of banal nationalism in Indonesia, often utilised in simplistic ways to harken back to the legacy of youth within Indonesian nationalist historiography. For example, to commemorate the 1 March General Offensive in 2023, the Faculty of Humanities at Yogyakarta's prestigious Universitas Gadjah Mada asked its students to wear their high school uniforms to "celebrate the role of the *tentara pelajar*" in the battle, while *tentara pelajar* merchandise is available to purchase at the 10 November Museum in Surabaya.[6]

Figure 13 A poster from UGM's Faculty of Humanities calling on students to wear their high school uniforms in celebration of the role played by student-soldiers in the 1 March General Offensive. Supplied by Ravando

[6] The author is a proud owner of a *tentara pelajar* t-shirt purchased from said museum.

Even beyond the practices of banal nationalism, the *pemuda*, and by proxy the *tentara pelajar* remain an ideological tool used by successive Indonesian governments within the post-New Order space to influence youth. While the 2009 Law on Youth discussed in the introduction is one example, more recently the current Joko "Jokowi" Widodo administration, first elected in 2014, has also tried to utilise youth to forward its own agenda of economic growth and encouragement of foreign investment. Notably, following his re-election in 2019, Jokowi appointed an expert staff comprised of "millennials," now a byword in Indonesia for young people. The so-called millennials on the expert staff were mostly young entrepreneurs and businesspeople from various industries, ranging from education to fintech.[7] While the Jokowi administration's focus on tech-savviness and business-mindedness is a departure from the militarised and disciplined ideal youth of the New Order, both regimes share the want to define a type of ideal youth for young people to emulate, thus supporting their respective agendas.[8]

While the New Order and the Jokowi administration both possess a vested interest in the creation of this image of ideal youth, the realities faced by many youths on the ground in both cases were vastly different from the ideal. In both cases, rather than obediently embracing state-sponsored values of ideal youth, young people, many of whom experienced the brunt of economic and social crises brought about by government mismanagement, mobilised to oppose both regimes. While, as discussed in Chapter VI, student activists protested the New Order's corruption and nepotism, university and high school students have demonstrated against various attempts by the Jokowi administration to curtail their freedom of expression and reverse progressive policies. Most notably, in 2019 students moved against the passage of a law that would have weakened the popular Corruption Eradication Commission.[9] In 2020, they once again mobilised, now against the Omnibus Law on Job Creation that instigated wide-ranging reforms aimed at encouraging foreign investment which included loosening

[7] Marchio Irfan Gorbiano, "Jokowi Picks Young People to Presidential Expert Staff for Their 'Fresh, Innovative Ideas'," News, The Jakarta Post, November 21, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/11/21/jokowi-picks-young-people-to-presidential-expert-staff-for-their-fresh-innovative-ideas.html.
[8] Annisa R. Beta, "Politics of Youth Survival in Times of Crisis," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 21, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 485, https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2020.1832297.
[9] Kharishar Kahfi et al., "Students Lead the Way, Again," News, The Jakarta Post, September 25, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/25/students-lead-way-again.html.

protections for workers and reducing regulations aimed at protecting the environment. Just as the New Order had done, the Jokowi administration too called on students to return to classrooms, restricting student dissent to "correct forums," meaning those that the "adults [were] comfortable with."[10]

Though the students of the 1970s often drew upon the New Order's image of ideal *pemuda* as a means of legitimising their political participation, Indonesian youth in 2019 and 2020 relied on different repertoires of contention. Perhaps due to the lessened importance and popularity of the *pemuda* moniker as forwarded by Farid, recent student protests have mostly chosen not to utilise it in their rhetoric.[11] Instead, student protesters have used humour and memes, as well as common networks like K-Pop fandoms to make their ideas and opinions more accessible to other youths who choose not to take part in physical demonstrations, expanding their repertoires of contention into online spaces.[12]

It is, however, important to recognise the increased variety of students taking part in recent protests. Though the protests of the 1970s and 1998 that eventually brought down the New Order were largely instigated by university students, the protests of 2019 and 2020 had a distinctly large body of high school student protesters. It was students from Indonesia's vocational and academic high schools, mostly the same age level as the *tentara pelajar* when they fought in the independence war, who often bore the brunt of police violence, shielding their more senior university peers.[13] In Jakarta, some confrontations between students and the police occurred, ironically, on a major road named after the *tentara pelajar* located near the city centre.[14] They too were criticised most heavily by the government and the security apparatus rather in comparison to university students, with police saying that students "did not understand"

[10] Beta, "Politics of Youth Survival in Times of Crisis," 488.
[11] Farid, "Meronta Dan Berontak: Pemuda Dalam Sastra Indonesia."
[12] Y. Sastramidjaja and P. P. Rasidi, "The Hashtag Battle over Indonesia's Omnibus Law: From Digital Resistance to Cyber-Control," *ISEAS Perspective* 2021 (July 21, 2021), https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=23b97426-4013-4907-885d-2e67e78226cd.
[13] News Desk (the Jakarta Post), "Poster Boy of Student Protests Found Guilty but Walks Free from Prison - City - The Jakarta Post," News, The Jakarta Post, accessed January 3, 2023, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/01/30/poster-boy-of-student-protests-found-guilty-but-walks-free-from-prison.html.
[14] Sausan Atika, "Chaos Erupts as High School Students Hit the Streets," The Jakarta Post, September 25, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/25/chaos-erupts-as-high-school-students-hit-the-streets.html.

what they were protesting about and were motivated by provocateurs.[15] In response to rhetoric from politicians who called on students to stay in school as well as active attempts by police to prevent students from attending protests, students took to social media to coordinate means of avoiding police checkpoints. It was here that a rediscovery of the historic *pemuda* was made, with some social media accounts citing examples of young national heroes, such as the communist and labour activist Semaun who organised a major strike at the young age of sixteen.[16]

Figure 14 An Instagram post uploaded during the 2019 #reformasidikorupsi protests calling for students to be taken seriously as demonstrators, citing the historical figure of Semaun. The text in the image reads: *Semaun was 14 when he entered a pergerakan organisation, and 16 when he led a major strike... and you doubt the capacity of the high school students who are on the streets?* Sourced from https://www.instagram.com/p/B239DMSHTkO/

Importantly, while university student protesters could use the work of student activists in 1998 as a means of situating themselves within the legacy of politically active Indonesian youth, high school students who had yet to receive tertiary education would

[15] Wahyu Adityo Prodjo, "Polisi: Pelajar Yang Demo Tak Paham UU Cipta Kerja, Hanya Ikut Ajakan Di Medsos," KOMPAS.com, October 16, 2020, https://pemilu.kompas.com/read/2020/10/16/14214171/polisi-pelajar-yang-demo-tak-paham-uu-cipta-kerja-hanya-ikut-ajakan-di.

[16] "BERDIKARI BOOK on Instagram: 'Jadi gini.. #BerdikariBook #KatalogBerdikariBook #BacaBuku #MembacaAdalahMelawan #AlternativeOnlineBookstore,'" Instagram, September 26, 2019, https://www.instagram.com/p/B239DMSHTkO/.

have found it far more difficult to make that claim. It was thus, in these circumstances, that high school students rediscovered the *tentara pelajar* legacy.

In a social media post on Instagram which circulated around the time of the 2020 protests against the Omnibus Law, the Indonesian Student Alliance activist group revived the *tentara pelajar* image by using them as an example of why students should be taken seriously as a political force. The post, entitled "Don't Silence Students," showcased images of TRIP soldiers and extolled the "bravery and patriotic souls" of the teenage soldiers of the TRIP, and concluded on the final slide with an image of student protesters and a call to arms:

Figure 15. An Instagram post of the Aliansi Pelajar Indonesia (Indonesian Student Alliance) uploaded during the 2020 anti-Omnibus Law Protests using the *tentara pelajar* as an example for students to emulate. Sourced from: https://www.instagram.com/p/CGe-NMYg4gC/

> We [students] are a part of independence! The government should not silence us! We are a great power. We once fought to preserve our independence. And now we must return with a greater spirit and strength to fight against injustice! Long live students!![17]

[17] "ALIANSI PELAJAR INDONESIA on Instagram: 'Melarang Pelajar Untuk Turun Kejalan Ikut Serta Dalam Aksi Massa Memperjuangkan Hak-Hak Rakyat Merupakan Sebuah Pembungkaman Demokrasi…'."

More importantly, the high school students who authored this post argued that their distinction from university students was their strength, asking, despite not being as smart as university students, what will be our lot in the future if we do not change it now"?[18]

This use of the *tentara pelajar* as a means of mobilising students today is notable for various reasons. It harkens back to a period where students, now seen in official discourse as being unable to comprehend complex political issues, had a stronger voice within national affairs and were united to achieve a common goal. Even outside of dissident youth circles, such a notion is incredibly attractive. In her study of historical reenactments of the 1 March General Offensive, Zurné found that individual reenactors, some as young as sixteen, saw roleplaying as the *tentara pelajar* attractive precisely because of their perceived unity of purpose. The status of *tentara pelajar* as students rather than high-ranking officers and their comparatively loose hierarchy also enhanced their appeal as an "everyman" for young students, allowing them to reenact the independence war and be "heroes" as well.[19]

Additionally, the call for fellow students to "fulfill independence" openly utilises the language that the state uses to describe youth. However, while the New Order and the current Jokowi administration urge students to fulfill independence through means that are contribute to their versions of national development, the Indonesian Student Alliance, as did Heri Akhmadi and the ITB students that preceded them, have called on students to reimagine what the act of fulfilling independence can be in contemporary Indonesia. By saying that students have a stake in the act of fulfilling independence, this statement effectively counters claims from the Indonesian government that students did not know what they were fighting for and argued that they had a role beyond the "correct forums" of expression the state had restricted them to. Student activism against state oppression is thus made to fit nationalist historiography, an heir to student participation in the armed struggle against colonialism. This leads on

[18] "ALIANSI PELAJAR INDONESIA on Instagram: 'Melarang Pelajar Untuk Turun Kejalan Ikut Serta Dalam Aksi Massa Memperjuangkan Hak-Hak Rakyat Merupakan Sebuah Pembungkaman Demokrasi…'."
[19] Lise Zurné, "'Are We Heroes Too?': Reenacting the 1949 Offensive against the Dutch Occupation in Yogyakarta, Indonesia," in *Reenactment Case Studies*, ed. Vanessa Agnew, Juliane Tomann, and Sabine Stach (Routledge, 2022), 188–89.

to the crux of the Instagram post, which is that "prohibiting students from… taking part in mass action is a way of silencing democracy."

Though this means of fulfilling independence might not have gelled well with what the *tentara pelajar* veterans imagined when they sought to transfer the values of 1945 to young Indonesians, the students who took part in these demonstrations were effectively taking part in the same processes of identity formation that *tentara pelajar* students did during the war. As discussed in Chapter II, in the early phases of the independence war *tentara pelajar* members faced questions internally and from government officials over whether arming students was a good idea. Officials from the Education Ministry argued that students were too "valuable" to be placed in frontline combat positions, and that they would better serve the cause of independence by studying and preparing to take part in national development. This suggestion was opposed by many *tentara pelajar*, who felt that it would be a disservice to their comrades-in-arms who had already lost their lives. Additionally, many argued that, with war in full swing, studying had far less importance to the physical struggle of ensuring Indonesian independence. This debate came to a head in the 1946 student congress in Malang, where students ultimately decided that the physical struggle took precedent over the need for students to study. This strengthened the *tentara pelajar*'s claim to legitimacy.

It would not be a stretch to compare the call of the students protesting the Omnibus Law to "take part in mass action" with the plight of the *tentara pelajar*. In both cases, students struggled to be taken seriously by governing powers and strove to be included in events that would define the future of the nation. That student protesters openly alluded to the *tentara pelajar* role in the independence war only serves to strengthen their claim as they situate themselves within the same tradition of their student-soldier predecessors.

This, of course, is unlikely to be the manner in which the *tentara pelajar* veterans of the New Order would have imagined as the outcome of transferring values, nor would it be the way in which the Second Generation of the TGP, many of whom were born under the New Order regime, would have liked their descendants to continue the legacy of their First Generation predecessors. However, just as student-veterans

demonstrated their agency in utilising the transferring values project to retell their stories, so too have students, both in the 1970s and more recently, demonstrated their agency by using the *tentara pelajar* legacy to justify their actions. If the students of 1945 refused to be subservient to an oppressive colonial power, the students of 2020 refused to be subservient to a government that sought to deprive them of some of their basic rights. In many ways, it is precisely the malleability of the *tentara pelajar* identity that serves as its strength, as shown in its ability to survive, in various incarnations, from the independence war to contemporary Indonesia today. As Mannheim argued, generations are constantly in a process of "interreaction," whereby younger and older generations struggle over the meaningfulness of each other's "drama."[20] And yet, while "the teacher educate[s] his pupil […] the pupil educates his teacher too."[21] Whereas the intended legacy of the *tentara pelajar* might what is currently most remembered by young student-activists, it is through the selective processes of "actualising" that legacy that students have resituated themselves as successors of the *tentara pelajar*, ensuring the perpetuation of the cultural memory of student-soldiers.[22] In their interreaction with the cultural memory of the *tentara pelajar*, Indonesian youth have "taught" the First and Second Generations how said memory has evolved beyond their control, into hands of the current generation.

Youth have, in Indonesia and across the world, often been subjected to expectations from their elders over what they should amount to be, invariably described as "the future" or "the hope of the nation," or the world. How youth aspire to fulfil these expectations, despite the agenda set by their elders, is worth examining on its own considering the agency held by youth. In more recent times, globally youth have played key roles in protest movements against hot-button issues ranging from climate change to economic inequality. Students and youth operating within this space have drawn on the legacy of past youth activism as a means to justify and expand upon their actions.[23]

[20] Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (London: Routledge, 2013), 301, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315005058.
[21] Mannheim, 301.
[22] Erll, "Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction," 5–6.
[23] See for example Björn Lundberg and David Larsson Heidenblad, "Greta Thunberg Emerged from Five Decades of Environmental Youth Activism in Sweden," The Conversation, November 4, 2021, http://theconversation.com/greta-thunberg-emerged-from-five-decades-of-environmental-youth-activism-in-sweden-171043.

This thesis argues that Indonesian youth mobilise, at least partly, by drawing on the historical legacy of the *pemuda* within which, as this thesis has demonstrated, the *tentara pelajar* was and still is an important and influential part. By closely examining the fine line between revolutionary elan and militarism, and the latent influence the latter can have on young people, this thesis has provided an important close and more critical examination of the sources of youth identity and activism. It has also demonstrated the critical importance of investigating how certain groups, like veterans, through history-making efforts, contributed to discourses and practices of postcolonial nation-building in ways that often aligned with state projects and values but were not dictated by them. Importantly, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of youth and encourages a greater appreciation of the capabilities of young people in taking part in critical discourses of important issues around them, be that a struggle for national independence, or opposition to a repressive government.

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Appendix 1 – Government Regulation no. 32 (1949) on government awards for students who have served.

GOVERNMENT REGULATION NUMBER 32 OF 1949

ON

GOVERNMENT AWARDS FOR STUDENTS WHO HAVE SERVED.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,

Considering : that it is necessary to enact a Regulation concerning the Government's appreciation of students, for having fulfilled their duty of service during the national revolution in order to uphold the State;

In view of : Government Regulation Number 9 of 1949.

Has decided to establish regulations as follows:

"REGULATION ON GOVERNMENT AWARDS FOR

STUDENTS WHO HAVE SERVED THE NATION"

Article 1

1. The government will provide awards to students of the struggle, who have fulfilled their duty of service to uphold the State since August 17, 1945.

2. The Minister of Defence will determine who has fulfilled this obligation and also determine the start and end of the service period for each student concerned.

Article 2

Awards are divided into:

1. The general award;

2. The special award;

3. The extraordinary award.

Article 3

General awards take the form of:

1. a letter of service;

2. the provision that the time spent in service will be considered as time at work, which will be considered in determining salary, rank, and pension.

Article 4

Special awards take the form of:

1. transitional classes;

2. separate examination times;

3. exemption from school and equipment fees;

4. a stipend;

5. free treatment for those suffering from physical and spiritual ailments because of the struggle.

Article 5

Extraordinary awards take the form of:

A letter of extraordinary service accompanied by a scholarship and/or other benefits.

Article 6

1. General awards are given to every student who has carried out their duty of service.

2. Special awards can be given in addition to general awards.

3. The special awards referred to in Article 4 No. 1, 2, 3 or No. 4, are given only if and for as long as it is considered necessary for the student concerned in accordance with the opinion of the Minister of Education, Teaching and Culture, or the official appointed by them.

4. Bearing in mind the provisions in clause no. 2, the special awards referred to in Article 4 No. 3 or/and No. 4, can be given for as long as the student concerned is enrolled in school.

5. The awards referred to in Article 4 No. 5 are given until those concerned no longer need it, in accordance with the opinion of the Minister of Health or the official appointed by them.

6. Without prejudice to the provisions in clauses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, extraordinary awards are given to students who in their service have shown:

a. courage;

b. honesty;

c. sincerity;

d. loyalty and;

e. wisdom.

7. The Minister of Education, Teaching and Culture together with the Minister of Defence determines who can be given scholarships, the amount of said scholarships, as well as for what discipline and for how long.

Article 7

The President of the Republic of Indonesia will determine who meets the requirements to receive extraordinary awards after considering the opinion of the Minister of Defence.

Article 8

The Minister of Defence is entitled to issue letters of service. The President of Indonesia is entitled to issue letters of extraordinary service.

Article 9

The President of the Republic of Indonesia/Minister of Defence may hand over their right to issue letters of extraordinary service/letters of service to the official appointed by them.

Article 10

All costs for the implementation of this Regulation are borne by the budget of the Ministry of Defence, except for costs related to teaching which are borne by the budget of the Ministry of Education, Teaching and Culture.

Article 11

1. The awards referred to in Article 2, except for recognition of time at work, can be revoked in part or in whole for those who, because of a crime, are sentenced to prison for at least one year by a judge’s irreversible decision.

2. If there is a valid reason, then the special award referred to in Article 4 Nos. 1, 2, and 3 can be terminated by the Minister of Education, Teaching and Culture, the special award referred to in Article 4 No. 4 can be terminated by the Minister of Defence, and the special award referred to in Article 4 No. 5 can be terminated by the Minister of Health.

Article 12

1. In order to implement this Regulation, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Education, Teaching and Culture will be assisted by a Committee whose members are appointed and dismissed by the aforementioned Ministers.

2. The Committee has the right to submit proposals, opinions, etc. to the ministries named in clause no. 1 and may also be entrusted with planning Regulations and carrying out works for their implementation. This regulation is according to the instructions of the Ministers referred to above.

Article 13

This regulation will be known as the "Regulation on Awards for students who have served".

Article 14

After the United States of Indonesia is established, the rights and obligations contained in this Regulation that were given to the Minister and Ministry of Defence will be shifted to an agency to be appointed by the President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Appendix 2 – Explanation of Republic of Indonesia Law no. 40 (2009) on youth

EXPLANATION

OF

LAW OF THE REPUBLIC INDONESIA

NUMBER 40 OF 2009

CONCERNING

YOUTH

I. GENERAL

The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia mandated the protection of all the people of Indonesia and all the independence and the land that has been struggled for, the improvement of public welfare, the education the life of the nation and participation in the establishment of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace, and social justice. In realising this national goal, youth have an important role as one of the pivotal subjects in the achievement of national goals.

The history of the Indonesian national struggle has recorded an important role for youth, which began from the Budi Utomo movement of 1908, the Youth Pledge (*Sumpah Pemuda*) of 1928, the Proclamation of Independence of 1945, the movement of youth, secondary students, and university students in 1966, up to the university student movement of 1998 which has brought the Indonesian nation into the *reformasi* period. This proves that youth is capable of playing an active role as the vanguard of the process of national struggle, renewal, and development.

In the process of national development, youth serve as a moral force, a social control, and an agent of change in their embodiment of their strategic functions, roles, characteristics and positions in nation-building. For this, the responsibility and strategic role youth in all dimensions of development must be enhanced within the national legal framework in accordance with the values contained within the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, based on the principles of Belief in the One

and Only God, humanity, nationalism, diversity, democracy, justice, participation, togetherness, equality, and self-dependence.

To meet these expectations, it is necessary to provide a framework and structure for youth-oriented national development which is directed towards youth services that can realise an Indonesian youth who believe and fear Almighty God and possess noble morals, good health, intelligence, creativity, a spirit of innovation, self-dependence, democratic values, responsibility, and competitiveness. In practice, youth services function to awaken, empower, and develop the potential of youth in the fields of leadership, entrepreneurship, and initiative.

Youth services are developed in accordance with the characteristics of young people, who possess a fighting spirit, are critical, idealistic, innovative, progressive, dynamic, reform-oriented, and futuristic without leaving their roots in Indonesian national culture which is reflected in unity in diversity. Therefore, the process of youth services must be prepared integrally and comprehensively by first formulating and determining (i) a youth services strategy; (ii) the duties, functions, authorities and responsibilities of the national government and regional governments; and (iii) the roles, responsibilities, and rights of youth.

Youth services policies aim to increase the participation and active role of youth in developing themselves, society, the nation, and the state. In addition, youth services policies also aim to foster patriotism, dynamism, a culture of achievement, and a spirit of professionalism resulting in high-achieving youth, namely youth of character who are capable and competitive.

This law is intended to strengthen the position and provide opportunities for every citizen aged sixteen to thirty years old to develop their potential, capacity, self-actualisation and aspirations. Furthermore, this law provides guarantees of protection and legal certainty for the existence of youth and youth activities. This law also provides legal certainty for the national government and local governments to integrate youth services programmes.

This law contains arrangements regarding all aspects of youth services related to coordination and partnership, infrastructure and facilities, and youth organisations. It

also contains arrangements regarding community participation in youth services, the provision of awards, funding, and access to capital for planned youth entrepreneurial activities in an integrated, deliberate, and sustainable way.